Douglas DC-3

Final power assurance checks were carried out on the aircraft’s engines on the morning of the accident. The AME (Aircraft Maintenance Engineer) trimmed the elevator-trim tab to the Full Nose UP position in order to reduce the stick forces required to hold the tail down during the engine power checks, but he did not set the elevator trim back to the neutral position on completion of the checks. The AME was requested by the pilot(s) to remove the aileron and elevator external gust locks and the landing gear down lock pins. He left the rudder lock in place, which was later removed by one of the pilots. The pilot(s) did not carry out a pre-flight inspection. At approximately 1646 on 24 August 1998 the DC3TP, registration number ZS-NKK, crashed during take-off from runway 11 at Wonderboom Airport. The PIC (Pilot-in-Command), who did not wear a shoulder harness, sustained fatal injuries and the co-pilot, who did wear a shoulder harness, serious injures. The accident occurred on the first flight after the aircraft had undergone a maintenance inspection, which included power assurance checks of the engines. The co-pilot sat in the left-hand seat and while he started the engines, the PIC attended to the cockpit checklist.

The PIC stated he was established on an instrument approach when the left engine fuel pressure dropped to zero and the engine quit. He moved the fuel selector to the right rear fuel tank and the engine started. He continued the approach for about 2 miles when the right engine quit followed by the left engine. He made a forced landing to a sandbar. Examination of the airplane revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and the fuel tanks were empty.

After takeoff from runway 09, a climbing left turn was made. At about 1,000 feet, the #2 (right) engine backfired, emitted flames, and lost power. The captain instructed the copilot to feather the #2 propeller, which the copilot initiated with the feathering button. When the captain requested gear and flap extension, the copilot released the feathering button which did not remain engaged, contrary to system design. The airplane had arrived on a left downwind abeam the landing area at 500 feet and 95 to 100 knots. The captain turned toward the runway, then he ordered the gear and flaps to be retracted and initiated a go-around by increasing the left throttle without increasing propeller speed. A right turn was then made, and the airplane eventually crashed about 3 miles from the runway. During a postaccident examination, the propellers were found unfeathered, and the right engine fuel selector was in the main tank position. The emergency procedure listed the best single engine speed as 85 knots. The procedure for engine fire/failure was to feather the propeller and to move the respective fuel selector to 'OFF.' Examination revealed the number 11 cylinder on the right engine was cracked. There was evidence of fire, adjacent to the cylinder on the cowling, which consisted of scorching, sooting, and a burned through area of the underside of the right engine cowling. The copilot indicated a previous problem with the feathering system, but maintenance records did not contain any previous discrepancies regarding this anomaly.

During initial takeoff climb the copilot who was manipulating the controls called for METO (maximum except takeoff) power. After the pilot-in-command set METO power, the left engine lost power. The PIC took the controls from the copilot and called for him to feather the left propeller. The copilot did not hear the call to feather the left propeller. Maintaining an indicated airspeed of 90 knots and wings level attitude, the airplane descended into trees and impacted a rural residential paved street. The cockpit area and main fuselage were consumed by a post crash fire. Examination of the throttle quadrant revealed the propeller control levers were forward, the mixture control levers were autorich, the throttle for the right engine was forward, and the throttle for the left engine was at idle. According to a FAA operations inspector maintaining 90 knots with the propeller not feathered would result in the aircraft descending. The pilot and copilot had not completed a proficiency check or flight check for the DC3 type aircraft within the previous 24 months. Examination of the left engine did not disclose any preexisting anomalies.

Upon landing on the icy Kenty Lake, the right ski struck a snowbank, causing the gear to collapse. All three occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Villavicencio, carrying livestock, nine passengers and four crew members. The approach to Miraflores Airport was completed in poor weather conditions. On short final, the left engine failed. The aircraft lost height, collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area. Three passengers and both pilots were killed while eight other occupants were injured.

The crew was engaged in an humanitarian flight on behalf of Unicef. On approach to an airstrip somewhere near Likwangbala, the aircraft collided with trees and crashed. Both pilots were killed.

While taking off from the icy Lake Bondésir, the left ski struck an ice ridge on the ground. The main gear/ski collapsed and the aircraft came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.