Douglas DC-3

The accident aircraft, a Douglas DC-3C, C-GWUG, was owned and operated by Kelowna Flightcraft Air Charter Ltd. (Kelowna Flightcraft) and was under charter to Purolator Courier Ltd. (Purolator). Since April 1998, the aircraft had been dedicated to transporting cargo on a route between Vancouver and Nanaimo, British Columbia. On occasion, it was also used for flights to Victoria to meet Purolator=s scheduling or cargo-loading contingencies. On the day of the accident, the aircraft, operating as KFA300, was rerouted and tasked to fly from Vancouver to Victoria and then proceed to Nanaimo. This change was precipitated by the delayed arrival of Purolator=s Boeing 727 at Vancouver because of inclement weather in the Toronto/Hamilton, Ontario, area. Warning of this route change was passed to the crew members with their pre-flight planning package, which included filed instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plans for the Vancouver-to-Victoria and Victoria-to-Nanaimo legs of the trip. The captain of the occurrence flight cancelled his IFR flight plan and refiled visual flight rules (VFR) on first contact with air traffic control. Vancouver tower cleared KFA300 for take-off at 0622 Pacific standard time (PST) from runway 26L. After take-off, the aircraft turned left on a track toward Active Pass, as seen in Figure 1. During the departure climb, the captain requested an altitude of 1000 feet above sea level (asl); the tower controller approved this request. Recorded radar data indicate that the aircraft climbed to and levelled at 1000 feet asl and then accelerated to a steady en route ground speed of 130 knots. The aircraft left the Vancouver control zone at 0626 and entered Class E (controlled) airspace. There are no special requirements for VFR aircraft operating within this class of airspace, nor are any specific services required of the air traffic control system. As the aircraft approached the Gulf Islands, it descended slightly and remained level at 900 feet asl. It crossed about 0.25 nautical mile (nm) west of the Active Pass non-directional beacon (NDB) at 0632 while remaining steady at 130 knots (ground speed) and level at 900 feet asl. At 0633:04, the aircraft descended to 800 feet asl for about nine seconds. The last radar data show the aircraft at 900 feet asl and 130 knots. The last radar-depicted position of the aircraft is on a bearing of 189 degrees (true) and 21.8 nm from the Sea Island radar source, coincident with the crash location.

The aircraft was completing a charter flight over the Salto Angel falls east of the Mt Auyán-Tepui, in the Canaima National Park, carrying 22 tourists and a crew of three. On approach to Canaima Airport, at an altitude of 3,000 feet, the right engine lost power. The crew continued the approach when the left engine suffered a loss of power as well. The aircraft stalled and crashed in an open field located 1,600 metres short of runway. The copilot was killed and three other occupants were seriously injured.

Final power assurance checks were carried out on the aircraft’s engines on the morning of the accident. The AME (Aircraft Maintenance Engineer) trimmed the elevator-trim tab to the Full Nose UP position in order to reduce the stick forces required to hold the tail down during the engine power checks, but he did not set the elevator trim back to the neutral position on completion of the checks. The AME was requested by the pilot(s) to remove the aileron and elevator external gust locks and the landing gear down lock pins. He left the rudder lock in place, which was later removed by one of the pilots. The pilot(s) did not carry out a pre-flight inspection. At approximately 1646 on 24 August 1998 the DC3TP, registration number ZS-NKK, crashed during take-off from runway 11 at Wonderboom Airport. The PIC (Pilot-in-Command), who did not wear a shoulder harness, sustained fatal injuries and the co-pilot, who did wear a shoulder harness, serious injures. The accident occurred on the first flight after the aircraft had undergone a maintenance inspection, which included power assurance checks of the engines. The co-pilot sat in the left-hand seat and while he started the engines, the PIC attended to the cockpit checklist.

The PIC stated he was established on an instrument approach when the left engine fuel pressure dropped to zero and the engine quit. He moved the fuel selector to the right rear fuel tank and the engine started. He continued the approach for about 2 miles when the right engine quit followed by the left engine. He made a forced landing to a sandbar. Examination of the airplane revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and the fuel tanks were empty.

After takeoff from runway 09, a climbing left turn was made. At about 1,000 feet, the #2 (right) engine backfired, emitted flames, and lost power. The captain instructed the copilot to feather the #2 propeller, which the copilot initiated with the feathering button. When the captain requested gear and flap extension, the copilot released the feathering button which did not remain engaged, contrary to system design. The airplane had arrived on a left downwind abeam the landing area at 500 feet and 95 to 100 knots. The captain turned toward the runway, then he ordered the gear and flaps to be retracted and initiated a go-around by increasing the left throttle without increasing propeller speed. A right turn was then made, and the airplane eventually crashed about 3 miles from the runway. During a postaccident examination, the propellers were found unfeathered, and the right engine fuel selector was in the main tank position. The emergency procedure listed the best single engine speed as 85 knots. The procedure for engine fire/failure was to feather the propeller and to move the respective fuel selector to 'OFF.' Examination revealed the number 11 cylinder on the right engine was cracked. There was evidence of fire, adjacent to the cylinder on the cowling, which consisted of scorching, sooting, and a burned through area of the underside of the right engine cowling. The copilot indicated a previous problem with the feathering system, but maintenance records did not contain any previous discrepancies regarding this anomaly.

During initial takeoff climb the copilot who was manipulating the controls called for METO (maximum except takeoff) power. After the pilot-in-command set METO power, the left engine lost power. The PIC took the controls from the copilot and called for him to feather the left propeller. The copilot did not hear the call to feather the left propeller. Maintaining an indicated airspeed of 90 knots and wings level attitude, the airplane descended into trees and impacted a rural residential paved street. The cockpit area and main fuselage were consumed by a post crash fire. Examination of the throttle quadrant revealed the propeller control levers were forward, the mixture control levers were autorich, the throttle for the right engine was forward, and the throttle for the left engine was at idle. According to a FAA operations inspector maintaining 90 knots with the propeller not feathered would result in the aircraft descending. The pilot and copilot had not completed a proficiency check or flight check for the DC3 type aircraft within the previous 24 months. Examination of the left engine did not disclose any preexisting anomalies.

Upon landing on the icy Kenty Lake, the right ski struck a snowbank, causing the gear to collapse. All three occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Villavicencio, carrying livestock, nine passengers and four crew members. The approach to Miraflores Airport was completed in poor weather conditions. On short final, the left engine failed. The aircraft lost height, collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area. Three passengers and both pilots were killed while eight other occupants were injured.