Cessna 500 Citation

While on a night approach to Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The captain reduced his altitude and attempted an emergency landing in an open field located few km from the airport. The aircraft belly landed in a snow covered field and came to rest, broken in two. All six occupants evacuated the cabin and took refuge in a nearby house before being rescued.

After takeoff from Skiathos Island Airport, while in initial climb, the aircraft lost height and crashed in the sea. All 10 occupants were rescued while the aircraft was destroyed.

The crew departed Toronto-Lester Bowles Pearson Airport at 1107LT on a training flight to Muskoka Airport. En route, while cruising at an altitude of 9,500 feet, the crew was cleared to make a low pass over Orillia Airport. Following a passage at an altitude of about 150-200 feet and a speed of 200 knots, the crew initiated a climb when, at an altitude of 1,000 feet, the aircraft banked right then got inverted and crashed in a near vertical attitude. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

The aircraft was engaged on a night freighter service from Cairns (CNS) to Brisbane (BNE) with intermediate stops at Townsville (TSV) and Proserpine (PPP). The flight departed Cairns at 18:47 hours. After arriving at Townsville the aircraft was refuelled and additional freight loaded before departing for Proserpine at 19:47 hours. The aircraft was cleared to track direct to Proserpine on climb to FL250. At 20:08 hours the pilot reported that the aircraft had left FL250 on descent into Proserpine and requested a clearance to track to intercept the 310 omni radial inbound for a DME Arrival. This request was approved and a short time later the aircraft reported established on the radial. At 20:16 hours, in answer to a question from Townsville Control, the aircraft reported at 2600 feet and was instructed to call Townsville Flight Service Unit. The aircraft complied with this instruction, and after the initial contact no further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The wreckage was located approximately 4 kilometres north-west of the threshold of runway 11 and in line with that runway. The aircraft had been destroyed by impact forces and the ensuing fire. A witness, who lived near the final approach path of the aircraft, reported that she observed the aircraft when it was on final approach. Analysis of her observations indicated that when she sighted the aircraft it was at a lower height than normal for the type of approach that the pilot reported would be flown. At the time of the sighting she did not notice anything unusual about the operation of the aircraft. Other persons at the Proserpine Aerodrome at the time of the accident reported rainstorms and strong winds in the vicinity.

On the day of the accident, the aircraft left Biggin Hill, U.K. on a private flight at 12:51 hrs with full fuel tanks to fly to Paris-Le Bourget, France, carrying a pilot, a pilot's assistant and two passengers. At Le Bourget, two more passengers embarked and the aircraft departed for Liverpool, without refuelling, at approximately 13:55 hrs. It landed at Liverpool at 15:25 hrs, where it was refuelled with 800 litres of turbine fuel, the pilot being seen to mix anti-icing additive to the fuel as it was dispensed. Two more adult passengers and two infants were embarked and the aircraft left Liverpool at 16:32 hrs en route to Stornoway, Outer Hebrides, Scotland. The pilot had submitted an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan to fly from Liverpool to Stornoway at Flight Level (FL) 310 via Dean Cross and Glasgow. At 16:53 hrs, when approximately over Dean Cross, he reported to the Scottish Air Traffic Control Centre (ScATCC) that he was at FL280 climbing to FL310. This radio call was heard by the pilot of another aircraft, registration N40GS. This aircraft was a Citation 11, which had been leased by the operating company of G-UESS and was carrying other members of the same private party to which the passengers in G-UESS belonged. N40GS had taken off from Biggin Hill and was also en-route to Stornoway via Dean Cross at FL350. When just north of Dean Cross, the pilot of N40GS saw G-UESS ahead of him and established radio contact with its pilot on the company discrete radio frequency. From that point on, the two aircraft remained in intermittent radio contact on this frequency. After passing Dean Cross, both aircraft were given clearance by ScATCC to route direct to Stornoway. At 17:00 hrs G-UESS was asked to climb to FL330 to avoid crossing traffic. At 17:18 hrs the pilot of N40GS reported that he still had G-UESS in sight and would be ready to descend in 3 minutes. At this time, his aircraft was slowly overtaking G-UESS. At 17:20 hrs ScATCC directed both aircraft to maintain a radar heading of 330° (M) so as to provide lateral separation during descent, and cleared N40GS to descend. Three minutes later, G-UESS was cleared to descend. During the descent, N40GS was cleared progressively to FL65 and G-UESS to FL85. At 17:29 hrs ScATCC released both aircraft from their radar headings, advising them that there was no other air traffic to affect them. ScATCC also advised N40GS that G-UESS was 5 miles to his right and slightly behind him. The pilot of G-UESS responded to this message by reporting that he had the other aircraft in sight. ScATCC then instructed both aircraft to establish radio contact with Stornoway. At 17:34 hrs Stornoway ATC passed details of the present Stornoway weather to both aircraft and asked them to report at 25 miles range from Stornoway. The weather as reported was fine with a light wind, good visibility and one eighth of low cloud. The pilot of G-UESS acknowledged the weather but did not repeat back the QNH. At this time, G-UESS was 49 miles from Stornoway descending through FL140. At 17:38 hrs N40GS reported at 25 miles range, and immediately afterwards G-UESS reported 30 miles from the airfield. N40GS was then cleared to 2,000 feet on the QNH of 1001. At 17:40 hrs the pilot of G-UESS reported that his range was 25 miles and that he had N40GS in sight. He asked for clearance to continue his descent and was cleared by the Stornoway controller to descend at his discretion with the aircraft ahead in sight. A moment later he was asked to report when he had the airfield in sight for a visual approach to runway 01. He acknowledged this message. No further communication was received from the aircraft and at 17:51 hrs, after failing to re-establish contact, the Stornoway controller reported to ScATCC that he had lost radio contact with G-UESS. The pilot of N40GS, who had meanwhile landed safely, stated afterwards that during the descent from FL350 they had passed through some layered stratus cloud and patches of altocumulus and cumulus cloud. The co-pilot in N40GS described a layer of lower cloud over the sea with tops between 3,000 and 4,000 feet, lying across the path of their descent into Stornoway. The pilot of N40GS was tracking directly to Stornoway airfield during the descent, using Omega/VLF area navigation equipment. At 17:45 hrs he reported to Stornoway ATC that he was just breaking cloud at 1,400 feet but stated later that he had cleared the base of the lowest cloud at between 1,100 and 1,000 feet, close to Stornoway. He also stated that the visibility below cloud was very good, even though the night was dark and he could not see the sea beneath him. N40GS experienced no icing and no significant turbulence during the descent. An intensive search was made for G-UESS that night, and two bodies were recovered one mile north-west of the last observed radar position. During the next 4 days, five more bodies and some small pieces of aircraft wreckage were found near the same position. The bodies of two more passengers were recovered from the sea bed on 28 February and 5 June 1984, and that of the pilot's assistant on 18 July 1984. Attempts to recover the main wreckage were not successful.

The aircraft collided with the ground during takeoff. The fuel tank in the right wing ruptured and the aircraft burned while sliding to a stop. The day before the accident the aircraft was washed and the thrust reverser doors were polished. After the service, the reverser doors circuit breakers which had been pulled were not reset. It was company policy to leave circuit breakers out that were pulled during servicing. Prior to flight, the aircraft was loaded and the engines started. The reversed unlock lights on both reverser annunciator panels illuminated. The pilot discussed the situation with the copilot and elected to go. He pushed the light assemblies which unlatched the light housing and put out the 'unlock' lights. After takeoff while the gear was retracting the aircraft yawed right and impacted the ground. All occupants evacuated and after the fire was put out a Cessna Aircraft investigator observed the two thrust reverser circuit breakers in the 'out', open position and partially covered by a flight chart. Both thrust reversers were deployed.

The aircraft was on a flight to a private ranch landing strip at night. The strip had an unlighted windsock at midfield and portable runway edge lights were in use. During arrival, the aircrew estimated the visibility was 3 to 4 miles and reported they would be able to land. Personnel at the ranch heard the aircraft fly over. One of them reported that earlier, the wind had been blowing hard and the air was full of dust, but at the time the aircraft arrived, dust had settled. A deputy sheriff noted that at times, the visibility was good, but at other times, it was poor. The aircraft owner, who was at the ranch, said he could see the aircraft lights at times (in the traffic pattern), but at times, he could not see them. After making two passes, the aircraft crashed in the area where it should have been on a base leg. An exam of the wreckage revealed it was in a left turn during impact. After initial impact, it bounced/slid 663 feet, then hit a tree covered canal levee and burned. No evidence of a preimpact/mechanical malfunction or failure was found. All four occupants were killed.

The airplane overran the end of runway 23, following an instrument landing system (ILS) approach, crashed, and burned at the Mercer County Airport, Bluefield, West Virginia. The aircraft touched down between 500 and 2,000 feet on the runway which was covered with wet snow, and it did not decelerate normally. About 1,200 feet from the departure end of the runway, the pilot added engine thrust and rotated the aircraft for liftoff; however, it did not get airborne because of insufficient flying speed. The aircraft overran the end of the runway and struck three localizer antennas and a 10-foot embankment before it plunged down a steep, densely wooded hillside. The five occupants were killed, and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire.

The pilot had completed three flights previous to the accident flight on the same day. He left Jersey at 0729 hrs to fly to Coventry via Cardiff for a day of business meetings in the Midlands and to return, again via Cardiff, to Jersey in the evening. Before leaving Coventry at 1729 hrs he had filed Air Traffic Control (ATC) Flight Plans for the sectors to Cardiff and to Jersey, he also checked the weather conditions at Jersey. The conditions shown in the forecast were of poor weather with low cloud and visibility intermittently falling to 400 metres in drizzle with 7 oktas of cloud below 100 feet. The 1650 hrs weather report for Jersey was noted on the top of his copy of the flight plan, this showed: surface wind 2900 at 11 knots, visibility 6000 metres, cloud 4 oktas at 100 feet, 7 oktas at 200 feet, intermittently becoming 3000 metres visibility in drizzle with 6 oktas cloud at 100 feet. Sufficient fuel for a return flight from Jersey was on-loaded at Cardiff, the pilot remarked, to the Customs Officer, that he might have to return because of the weather at Jersey. The aircraft departed Cardiff for Jersey at 1821 hrs. It could not be established whether the pilot obtained the latest weather reports for Jersey, issued at 1720 hrs and 1750 hrs whilst at Cardiff; or if he availed himself of the in-flight weather broadcast service by London Volmet South, which transmitted the 1820 hrs Jersey weather report whilst en route. Had he done so, he would have been aware of deteriorating landing conditions because the 1820 hrs report for Jersey showed: visibility 300 metres, runway visual range (RVR) 800 metres in drizzle and 8 oktas of cloud below 200 feet. By 1842 hrs the aircraft was descending towards Jersey. The pilot was in radio contact with 'Jersey Zone' ATC, he had received his inbound clearance and had been advised of the latest weather conditions at Jersey. Radar guidance was provided by Jersey Zone, then later, by Jersey Approach Control who also advised that the RVR had fallen to 850 metres and, later, to 650 metres. On receipt of this information the pilot asked for the Guernsey weather. He was informed that the weather at Guernsey had improved to 1800 metres visibility although the cloud base was still below 100 feet. At 1857 hrs, when at 7 miles on the approach to runway 27 at Jersey, the pilot reported that he was established on the Instrument Landing System (lLS). He then contacted Jersey Tower controller who cleared G-BPCP to land. During the final stages of the approach, about 45 seconds before the crash, the Tower controller advised that the RVR had improved to 850 metres. This message was not acknowledged. The approach controller continued to observe the progress of the aircraft towards the runway on his radar screen until it was about one mile from the threshold, at which point it appeared to be on the extended centre line of the runway. The approach controller then left the radar screen and went to the window to watch for the aircraft landing. When the aircraft was half a mile from the runway, it was observed by an eyewitness to be on a normal approach path for runway 27. It was lost to view as it passed behind an adjacent house and almost immediately afterwards there was an increase in engine power. This increase was also heard by a professional pilot who was on the aerodrome, about 500 metres from the end of the runway; he said that the "engines started to spool-up as for an overshoot" and shortly afterwards he saw a flash and heard an explosion. The aircraft struck the roof of a house situated 190 metres to the north of the runway threshold centre line. The house caught fire, the tail of the aircraft lodged in the blazing roof whilst the remaining structure fell into a courtyard where it was destroyed by fire. The four persons occupying the house at the time were able to escape with minor injuries although one, a young girl, was detained in hospital with serious bums. The pilot was killed.

The airplane departed La Carlota-General Francisco de Miranda earlier in the day on an inspection flight on behalf of the Venezuelan Ministry of Agriculture and Farming. While flying along the Colombia - Venezuela border, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and was forced to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft crashed in a mountainous area near Machiques and came to rest in flames. All three passengers, among them Minister Luciano Valero, escaped uninjured while both pilots were killed.