Crash of a BAc 111-520FN in São Paulo

Date & Time: Feb 2, 1974
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PP-SDQ
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
228
YOM:
1970
Country:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
82
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The landing at São Paulo-Congonhas Airport was completed in heavy rain falls. After touchdown on a contaminated runway, the airplane encountered difficulties to decelerate properly and as the end of the runway was imminent, the captain decided to veer off runway to the left. While contacting a waterlogged ground, the undercarriage were torn off and the airplane came to rest. All 88 occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The airplane suffered hydroplaning after landing on a wet runway. The braking coefficient was poor as there was an excessive accumulation of water on the runway surface.

Crash of a BAc 111-521FH in Bahía Blanca

Date & Time: Dec 4, 1973 at 1540 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LV-JNR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Buenos Aires – Bahía Blanca – Trelew
MSN:
192
YOM:
1969
Country:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
68
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Just after liftoff, while in initial climb, the crew noticed a loss of power on the left engine. The captain decided to land back but the remaining distance was 950 meters only. Unable to stop in time, the airplane struck arresting cables installed for the Douglas A4Q Skyhawk of the Argentinian Navy. Impact caused severe damages to both wings and the airplane came to rest in flames as the fuel tanks were punctured. All 74 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Aborted take-off due to apparent loss of power. This was caused by the aircraft having touched down on the runway again, after initial lift-off, whilst the crew were distracted by a bird of considerable size which was flying past the left hand windscreen. Wrong decision on part of the crew as the takeoff procedure was already completed.

Crash of a BAc 111-515FB in Hamburg: 22 killed

Date & Time: Sep 6, 1971 at 1821 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-ALAR
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hanover – Hamburg – Málaga
MSN:
207
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
DR112
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
115
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
22
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from runway 34 at Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel Airport, while climbing to an altitude of 1,000 feet, both engine stopped almost simultaneously (the right engine failed immediately after the left engine). The crew declared an emergency and the captain decided to attempt an emergency landing on the Hamburg - Kiel Highway. On touchdown, the airplane slid for several yards, struck a concrete bridge, lost its wings and tail. It veered to the left and came to rest in flames, broken in two after the cockpit separated. A crew member and 21 passengers were killed while all others occupants escaped, 45 of them were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the engine failure was the consequence of a problem that occurred on the cooling system. Investigations were able to determine that the tanks coupled to this cooling system should normally be filled with water. However, as a result of a handling error, these tanks were filled with Jet A1. As a result, the engines could not be cooled properly, overheated and failed during initial climb.

Crash of a BAc 111-424EU in Constanţa: 19 killed

Date & Time: Dec 7, 1970
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YR-BCA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tel Aviv – Bucharest
MSN:
130
YOM:
1968
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
20
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
19
Circumstances:
In flight from Tel Aviv to Bucharest, the crew was informed about bad weather at destination and was rerouted to Constanţa, about 200 km east of Bucharest. While approaching Constanţa-Mihail Kogălniceanu Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to fog. Descending too low, the airplane struck the ground and crashed in a field located about 5 km short of runway. Eight occupants were injured while 19 others were killed.
Probable cause:
The visibility was limited due to fog and the crew continued the approach below the minimum descent altitude (MDA), in violation of the published procedures.

Crash of a BAc 111-402AP in Manila: 45 killed

Date & Time: Sep 12, 1969
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PI-C1131
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cebu City - Manila
MSN:
92
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
PR158
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
42
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
45
Aircraft flight hours:
7208
Aircraft flight cycles:
6445
Circumstances:
On final approach to Manila Intl Airport, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck the ground and crashed in flames some 22 km from the runway 24 threshold. A crew member (steward) and a passenger were rescued while 45 other occupants were killed.

Crash of a BAc 111-201AC in Milan

Date & Time: Jan 14, 1969 at 2032 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ASJJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Milan - London
MSN:
14
YOM:
1965
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
26
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13360
Captain / Total hours on type:
2153.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10973
Copilot / Total hours on type:
497
Aircraft flight hours:
8310
Circumstances:
On 14 January 1969 the crew flew from Gatwick to Rotterdam and return, following which they departed on a scheduled international flight Gatwick-Genoa-Gatwick. For this flight Captain A occupied the left-hand seat as pilot-in-charge, Captain B the right hand seat as co-pilot and Captain C the centre supernumerary seat as pilot-in-command, ultimately responsible for the correct operation of the aircraft. Before leaving Gatwick Captain A briefed Captain B concerning the co-pilot duties assigned to him. Although Captain C, as pilot-in-command, did not himself formally brief Captains A and B there was no doubt that they were aware of their respective tasks. On the flight from Gatwick to Genoa the aircraft was forced, due to unfavourable weather conditions at Genoa, to divert to Milan-Linate Airport where it landed at 1430 hours. Before commencing the return flight to Gatwick the crew had to await the arrival of the passengers from Genoa. This took place at 1930 hours. During the five-hour waiting period on the ground, the aircraft APU was kept in operation to ensure cabin heating and air conditioning. While Captain C tried unsuccessfully to sleep in the aircraft, Captains A and B inspected the aircraft and found ice on the wings and tail unit. The aircraft was subsequently de-iced. Before boarding the aircraft, Captains A and B made another external inspection of the aircraft and established that there was no ice on any part of it. The result of this inspection was duly reported to Captain C. Captains A and B carried out the pre-flight checks in accordance with the company checklist and verified that the take-off weight and aircraft loading were within the permitted limits. The crew occupied the same positions as during the previous flight, Captain A being in the left-hand seat, Captain B in the right-hand seat and Captain C in the jump- seat. In view of the weather, temperature and runway conditions, the crew decided to use the 18O flap setting, Spey 2 thrust (full thrust), engine anti-icing and the APU for cabin air conditioning. V1 and Vr were established at 117 kt and V2 at 127 kt. At 2018 hours, after clearance from Linate ATC, the engines were started and engine anti-icing selected "ON". There was a considerable layer of snow along the sides of the taxiways and runway, but they themselves were clear and usable. In view of the isolated patches of slush or water on the runway, Captain A considered it essential for the engine igniter switches to be selected "ON" during the entire take-off. At 2028 hours the aircraft was cleared to enter runway 18 and, after receiving the latest information concerning visibility and wind, it was cleared for take-off at 2031 hours. Before the brakes were released, a check was made of engine P7 pressures and of the other engine instruments which were found to be normal. At about 80 kt Captain A took over the aircraft's control column. The airspeed indicators showed regular acceleration and Captain A stated that just before 100 kt the engine instruments were also registering normally. V1 and Vr were called and the aircraft was rotated into the initial climbing attitude; immediately after or during this manoeuvre, a dull noise was distinctly heard by all the crew members. This noise was variously described by them as: "not like a rifle shot, not like the slamming of a door or something falling in the aircraft but more like someone kicking the fuselage with very heavy boots, an expansive noise covering a very definite time span with a dull non-metallic thud". The bang was immediately associated by the crew with the engines. After looking at the TGT gauges, and observing that No. 1 engine was indicating a temperature 20°c higher than that of No. 2 engine, Captain C said: "I think it's number one" or wards to that effect, and after a brief pause "throttle it". On receipt of Captain C's comment Captain A closed the power level of No. 1 engine. During or just after the explosion, he had completed the rotation manoeuvre and the aircraft was climbing at 12O of pitch with reference to the flight director. As a precaution, after closing No. 1 power lever he reduced the angle of climb to 6O. At the same time the co-pilot (Captain B) who had reached for the check list and was looking for the page relating to an engine emergency, became aware of a sharp reduction in the aircraft's acceleration; he noticed that the undercarriage was still down and he retracted it immediately. According to the crew the aircraft reached a maximum height of 250 ft, after which a progressive loss of momentum became evident. A maximum speed of 1401145 kt was achieved immediately after rotation, but it fell to 127 kt after No. 1 engine had been throttled back, These figures were consistent with those subsequently derived from the flight recorder. The crew said that the stick-shaker operated three times between 125 and 115 kt. The co-pilot had a vague recollection that the stick-push and the warning klaxon operated during the critical phase before impact. The pilot-in-charge remembered vaguely that someone said "raise the flaps", but no crew member remembers doing so or making the re traction. On looking out of the aircraft the crew saw the ground and the obstructions close at hand and realized that contact of the aircraft with the ground was inevitable and imminent. Captain A controlled the aircraft extremely well during the touchdown; the aircraft slid along the snow-covered surface, passing over small obstructions, and came to a halt 470 m from the point of first contact with the ground (see Fig. 1-11. The co-pilot operated both engine fire-extinguishers and Captain C ordered the pilots to leave the aircraft immediately via the side windows. During the ground slide an orange glow was seen to light up the glass panels of the windows for a short time. There was no fire. After closing No. 1 power lever, Captain A remembered having ordered the shutdown drill for this engine but he could not say for certain whether this wae dme. It was established, however, that Captain B closed both the HP cocks at the first sensation of ground contact.
Probable cause:
The accident must be attributed to a combination of factors following a compressor bang/surge in No. 2 engine immediately after take-off and the aircraft crashed because the crew, after fully closing No. 1 throttle in error, failed to recognize their mistake and, in addition, were not aware that the thrust of No. 2 engine had also been partially reduced after an inadvertent displacement of the relevant throttle lever. The following findings were reported:
- A segment of the HP turbine seal of No. 2 engine caused a compressor bang/ surge which led the crew to think that there was a serious engine malfunction. The loss of thrust attributable to this defect was negligible,
- Tests have shown that there were no defects or failures of the engine fuel system or fuel controls which could be associated with the loss of thrust over and above that resulting from the deliberate throttling of No. 1 engine,
- N° 1 engine was throttled back after an erroneous order or piece of advice and its throttle lever was pulled rearwards rapidly,
- The major loss of thrust in No. 2 engine was probably due to the displacement of the throttle lever by a crew member and to the fact that its partially open position remained unnoticed during the period of confusion preceding the emergency landing,
- The incorrect diagnosis of a malfunction of No. 1 engine after the bangleurge can be attributed to the hasty intervention of the pilot-in-command and this could be attributed to fatigue, aggravated by the long duty period,
- In rapidly throttling back No. 1 engine, the pilot-in-charge promptly executed without question what he thought to be an order instead of waiting until a greater height was reached and then taking any appropriate action,
- The judgement and actions of the pilot-in-charge were influenced by the presence of an experienced pilot designated as pilot-in-command, although the latter's specific task was the supervision of the co-pilot,
- If the aircraft pilot-in-command had been seated at the controls, he might have acted correctly; similarly, if he had been responsible solely for the supervision of the co-pilot and had not been designated as pilot-in-command, the pilot-in-charge would have had a wider and more responsible field of action and would very probably have complied with the company's prescribed drills.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAc 111-204AF in Blossburg: 34 killed

Date & Time: Jun 23, 1967 at 1447 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1116J
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Elmira - Washington DC
MSN:
98
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
MO040
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
30
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
34
Captain / Total flying hours:
13875
Captain / Total hours on type:
603.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4814
Copilot / Total hours on type:
677
Aircraft flight hours:
2246
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Elmira-Corning Airport at 1439LT on a schedule flight to Washington-National Airport, carrying 30 passengers and a crew of four. After takeoff, the crew was cleared to climb to FL160 when the airplane went into a nose-down attitude, plunged into the earth and crashed in a huge explosion in a wooded area located one mile east of Blossburg, Pennsylvania. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and none of the 34 occupants survived the crash.
Probable cause:
The loss of integrity of empennage pitch control systems due to a destructive in-flight fire which originated in the airframe plenum chamber, fueled by hydraulic fluid, progressed up into the vertical tail fin. The fire resulted from engine bleed air flowing back through the malfunctioning non return valve and an open air delivery valve, through the auxiliary power unit in a reverse direction, and exiting into the plenum chamber at temperatures sufficiently high to cause the acoustics linings to ignite.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAc 111-203AE in Falls City: 42 killed

Date & Time: Aug 6, 1966 at 2312 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N1553
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
New Orleans – Shreveport – Fort Smith – Tulsa – Kansas City – Omaha – Minneapolis
MSN:
70
YOM:
1965
Flight number:
BN250
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
37
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
42
Captain / Total flying hours:
20767
Captain / Total hours on type:
549.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9296
Copilot / Total hours on type:
685
Aircraft flight hours:
2307
Aircraft flight cycles:
2922
Circumstances:
Flight 250 was a scheduled domestic passenger/cargo flight from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Minneapolis, Minnesota, with intermediate stops at Shreveport, Louisiana, Fort Smith, Arkansas, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Kansas City, Missouri, and Omaha, Nebraska. The flight departed from New Orleans at 1835 hours CST and arrived at Kansas City without reported incident. It departed from Kansas City at 2255 hours on an IFR clearance to Omaha via Jet Route 41 at FL 200. Just prior to take-off, the flight was restricted to 5 000 ft due to conflicting traffic. When the flight was about 12 miles north of Kansas City, control of the aircraft was transferred to the Kansas City Air Route Traffic Control Centre (ARTCC). Radar contact was confirmed and the flight was cleared to climb to and maintain FL 200. After some discussion with ARTCC about the weather the flight crew advised that they would like to maintain 5 000 ft to Omaha. They reported they were at 6 000 ft and ARTCC cleared the flight to maintain that altitude until 5 000 ft was available. At 2303 hours the Kansas City ARTCC initiated a transfer of control of the flight to the Chicago ARTCC but before the transfer could be accomplished the flight requested and received permission from the Kansas City controller to deviate to the left of course. At 2306 hours the Kansas City controller cleared the flight to descend to and maintain 5 000 ft and contact the Chicago ARTCC. After some discussion of the weather as it was displayed on the Chicago controller's radar, the flight was advised that another Braniff flight, Flight 255, was on the same frequency and was at 10 000 ft climbing to 17 000 ft after departing Omaha. The crews of the two aircraft exchanged weather information and the crew of Flight 255 advised that they had encountered light to moderate turbulence from about 15 miles southeast of the Omaha airport and that it appeared they would be out of it in another 10 miles based on their radar observations. Flight 250 terminated this conversation at approximately 2308:30 hours. This was the last transmission received from the flight. Ground witnesses stated that they observed the aircraft approach and either fly into or over a shelf of clouds preceding a line of thunderstorms that was approaching frbm the north and northwest, and that shortly thereafter they saw an explosion in the sky followed by a fireball falling out of the clouds. The aircraft crashed at approximately 2312 hours, 7.6 statute miles on a true bearing of 024.50 from Falls City, Nebraska, at an elevation of 1 078 ft AMSL. All 42 occupants have been killed.
Probable cause:
The Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was in-flight structural failure caused by extreme turbulence during operation of the aircraft in an area of avoidable hazardous weather. The following findings were reported:
The aircraft was confronted with a severe squall line which was oriented across its intended flight route. This system was adequately forecast and reported by the Weather Bureau; however, the company forecast was somewhat inaccurate with respect to the number and intensity of thunderstorms and the intensity of the associated turbulence in the system. The crew was aware of the forecast weather and was aware that the system could have been circumnavigated to the west. This was, in fact, suggested by the co-pilot.
Because the company forecast did not predict a solid line of thunderstorms, the company dispatcher did not take any action to delay or to reroute the flight. However, the dispatcher did not relay to the crew information which might have persuaded the pilot- in-command to avoid the storm system. In fact, when the dispatcher was informed of the efforts of other aircraft to avoid the squall line, he should have recommended avoidance action to Flight 250.
In spite of his apparent concern were the en-route weather and his knowledge that the squall line was quite solid, the pilot-in-command elected to penetrate the line using his airborne weather radar to select a "light" area.
Flight 250 never reached the main squall line. Instead, the aircraft broke up in a roll cloud approximately 5 miles from the nearest radar weather echo. At this ti= the aircraft was at the proper configuration and airspeed for flight in turbulence and the autopilot was engaged.
Flight 250 encountered extreme turbulence generated by the strong horizontal and vertical wind shears associated with the outflow of cold air from the approaching squall line. This turbulence probably caused a large angled gust of very short duration with components in the lateral, vertical, and longitudinal planes.
The forces and accelerations produced by this encounter caused the fin and right tailplane to reach their ultimate loads, with near-simultaneous failures resulting. The aircraft then pitched downward until the right wing reached its negative ultimate load. The loss of these components rendered the aircraft uncontrollable and shortly afterward it probably began a random tumbling motion which stabilized some time before impact into a flat-spinning attitude.
Final Report:

Crash of a BAc 111-201AC in Wisley

Date & Time: Mar 18, 1964
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ASJB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wisley - Wisley
MSN:
006
YOM:
1964
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
17
Aircraft flight cycles:
16
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a local test flight at Wisley Airport. After a 2,5 hours flight, the instructor gave his seat to the copilot to carry out 2 familiarisation circuits and landings. On final approach, the airplane was slightly below the glide and struck the ground in a slight nose-down attitude, bounced to a height of 20 feet then struck the runway surface a second time. It bounced to a height of 50 feet then the nose gear struck the ground first and collapsed. Out of control the airplane skidded on runway, lost its right main gear and came to rest. All five crew members were uninjured while the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a BAc 111-200AB in Chicklade: 7 killed

Date & Time: Oct 22, 1963 at 1040 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-ASHG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Wisley - Wisley
MSN:
001
YOM:
1963
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
5385
Captain / Total hours on type:
78.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9648
Aircraft flight hours:
81
Aircraft flight cycles:
52
Circumstances:
The aircraft took off at 1017 hours GMT from runway 10, at Wisley Aerodrome on its fifty third test flight. It was to carry out stalling tests in all configurations with the centre of gravity at 0.38 SMC (standard mean chord), the furthest aft limit for which the aircraft had then been cleared. Based on the radio-telephony conversations recorded in the Wisley Tower and the flight recorders carried aboard the aircraft, the flight was reconstructed. Following take-off the aircraft climbed in visual meteorological conditions on a westerly heading to 17 000 ft while monitored by Wisley radar. At 1026 the co-pilot reported that they were about to commence tests at flight level 170. By 1035, four stalls had been completed with the undercarriage and flaps up. The co-pilot acknowledged a fix from Wisley at 1036 hours and nothing further was heard from the aircraft. The flaps were then lowered to to investigate the stalling characteristics in this configuration. The stall was initiated about two minutes after the last contact, when the aircraft was between 15 000 and 16 000 ft. Approach to the stall appears to have been normal. When attempting recovery, the elevators responded initially to the control movement but subsequently floated to the fully up position in spite of a large push force on the control column. The aircraft then descended in a substantially horizontal fore and aft attitude at about 180 ft/sec (54 meters per sec). During the descent it banked twice to the right and once to the left and at one stage the engines were opened up to full power. This action resulted in a large nose-up pitch which was followed by a pitch down when power was taken off. The aircraft then assumed the substantially horizontal attitude in which it made impact with the ground. The final portion of the flight was observed by numerous eye witnesses who commented on the low level of engine noise and a sharp report from the aircraft which was heard while it was in the air. The aircraft had approached from the southwest, in a stable stalled condition, and crashed at about 1040 hours in a flat attitude. Following impact, the aircraft moved forward about 70 ft and some 15 ft to the right before coming to rest. It exploded and caught fire. All seven crew members, four engineers and three test pilots, were killed.
Probable cause:
The nose-down pitching moment (elevator neutral) just beyond the stall was insufficient to rotate the aeroplane at the rate required to counteract the increase of incidence due to the g-break. During the fifth stall the angle of incidence reached a value at which the elevator effectiveness was insufficient to effect recovery. During a stalling test the aircraft entered a stable stalled condition recovery from which was impossible.
Final Report: