Ohio

The pilot made routine radio communications in preparation for takeoff. The airplane departed from runway 25 in daylight instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with light snow and fog. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane's radar target disappeared from the controller's scope. The airplane crashed on wooded terrain about two miles south-southwest of the departure end of runway 25. Impact occurred in an steep, nose down, left wing low attitude. The airplane was destroyed by ground impact forces and a post-impact fire. No physical incapacitation of the pilot-in-command was determined. No contributory mechanical malfunctions of the airplane were discovered. All three occupants were killed.

Shortly after departure the airplane was seen climbing to an altitude of about 200 feet agl. Witnesses saw smoke coming from one of the engines and heard a 'popping noise.' The pilot executed a forced landing in a field. The airplane struck electrical wires and fence then burst into flames. The airplane had refueled just prior to take off, and the fuel receipt showed that 300 gallons of jet (A) fuel was put into the tanks. The normal fuel used in the airplane was 100LL.

On final approach the pilot reported an engine failure. He said he was putting the landing gear down. The airplane crashed 3 miles from the airport. Examination of the engines revealed no discrepancies. The pilot did not feather the propeller after the engine failure. He had no training in this airplane or any other multi-engine airplane in over 5 years. His last before was in a Cessna 172. It was reported that the pilot did not manage the airplane fuel system in the recommended manner. A witness said the pilot used fuel from the main tanks until they were nearly empty. He ignored forecasts of light icing conditions and during his flight he reported ice accumulation. All five occupants were killed.

After takeoff at 600 feet, the right engine quit. The pilot said, '[the] altitude dropped about 100 feet and airspeed at 120 knots. The right engine came back again . . . It ran for about 10 seconds. [I] adjusted power on left engine . . . Feathered right prop and tried to maintain altitude, but airspeed kept diminishing, so I had to descend to maintain airspeed.' The pilot put the landing gear down to absorb the shock of landing in a field. An examination revealed no malfunctions in the engine or carburetor. The airplane was within allowable gross weight and center of gravity limits. The weather was: ceiling 600 feet broken, 1,500 feet overcast, visibility 3 miles, light rain and fog. The pilot escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

N458J was landing during a rain shower. As the airplane started to flare for landing, the wind caused it to drift to the right. The pilot started to correct this drift, as the rain became heavier. During the touchdown, the pilot lost visual reference with the runway, yet he continued with the landing roll. The airplane drifted off the left side of the runway and ran into soft terrain. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The flight had flown through weather conducive to airframe ice about 40 minutes prior to the accident during descent into Cleveland. During the 35-minute turnaround at Cleveland the crew did not exit the airplane to conduct an exterior preflight inspection to verify that the wings were free of ice contamination. It was snowing while they were on the ground. The airplane stalled and rolled into the ground immediately after takeoff. There was no operator requirement for the preflight. The flight had not been given training regarding the effects of wing contamination on the airplane. The FAA and the manufacturer have been aware for several years of the propensity of the DC-9 series 10 to the loss of control caused by wing contamination, but neither of them took positive action to include related information in the approved airplane flight manual. Both pilots were killed.

At 0515 est, the flight was cleared for takeoff on a flight from Ypsilanti, MI to Louisville, KY. About 17 minutes later, the flight crew began to display indications of a deterioration of their ability to control the aircraft. At 1st, they deviated from instruments to hold west of the Findlay VOR at FL220. As the flight continued and was cleared to FL270, the crew displayed confusion about magnetic headings and basic instruments. At 1048 est, the aircraft deviated from the en route heading and the wrong heading was read back after a heading correction was given. Also, the aircraft continued climbing (to FL291), then radar and radio contact were lost at 0551 est. The controller noted the pilot's speech was slurred and some portions of the conversation were unintelligible. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed in a steep dive. No preimpact part failure was verified, though impact forces and post-crash fire resulted in extensive damage of the aircraft. The aircraft was equipped with oxygen and pressurization system. No audible warning was noted on ATC recordings to indicate the cabin altitude had exceeded 10,000 feet, though the aircraft was equipped with such a device. Both pilots were killed.

During night cargo operation, check captain (right seat) was evaluating the 1st officer (f/o, left seat) for possible upgrade to captain. Before departing, flight was cleared for right turn after takeoff to 020°. Takeoff began at 0441:11. Water/methanol injection was used (to 1st power reduction). At 0441:49, landing gear was retracted; 8 seconds later 1st power reduction was made, then a frequency change was approved. Captain noted they should climb to 1,500 feet msl (approximately 500 feet agl) before turning. At about 300 feet agl, aircraft entered overcast and began a steep right turn. CVR indicated captain was performing cockpit duties at this time and giving info to f/o about the departure. FDR showed aircraft reached max alt of 423 feet agl and began descending. At 0442:22, captain remarked to f/o, 'don't go down . . . Get up . . . Up up up . . . Up, oh!' At about that time, aircraft hit in an open field, but continued flying for approximately 3/4 mile. It then hit a tree and crashed in a wooded area. Investigation revealed that during several training flights and 2 check flights, the f/o demonstrated difficulty in performing instrument flight due to disorientation, narrow focus of attention, or lack of instrument scan (instrument fixation), especially during high task workload. Both pilots were killed.

The pilot was making a contract cargo flight under far 91 rules and had experienced icing enroute. When just past Dayton, he indicated that he 'had a little fuel problem' and needed to get into OSU without delays. A short time later he indicated that he needed to go to the nearest airport. He was vectored toward SGH for landing. He then indicated that he had lost an engine and a short time later indicated that he had lost the other engine. The aircraft crashed in a residential area. There was no fire and only residual fuel was found in the airplane. The company president indicated that he did not encourage his pilots to carry 'excess fuel'. It was reported that this pilot, along with others, had been 'chewed out' for carrying 'excess fuel'. The operation should have been conducted under far 135 rules since the company had retained operational control of the operation. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During arrival, the flight was vectored for an ILS runway 32 approach. As the arrival continued, the ATC controller provided the latest info on cloud tops and in-cloud icing. The pilot acknowledged, then inquired about the status of the 'locator.' The controller advised that all components of the ILS, including the outer marker locator, were monitoring normal. Four miles from the outer marker/faf, the pilot was given a final vector, was cleared for the approach and was cleared to circle and land on runway 23. He acknowledged, then radio and radar contact with the aircraft were lost. The aircraft crashed approximately 2 miles southeast of the faf, while in a steep descent on a heading of 140°. No preimpact part failure/malfunction of the aircraft was found, though it was extensively damaged. About three weeks after a boating accident on 7/2/88, the pilot was admitted to a hospital and treated for a stroke, but an autopsy and toxicological checks failed to reveal any condition which would have prevented the pilot from performing his duties. Ad 88-13-01, concerning aircraft equipped with m-4c/d autopilots, was not complied with. All four occupants were killed.