Connecticut

After making a localizer runway 08 approach, the pilot landed over halfway down the 4,422 feet wet runway. He then decided to abort the landing, added power, and when airborne, retracted the landing gear. He said he asked the right front seat (non-rated) passenger to reset the flaps (to 20°). The pilot saw trees ahead, and realized the airplane was not going to clear the obstacles, though full power was applied. Just before impact, he pulled back on the elevator control to soften the impact, rather than hitting the trees nose first. After the accident, the wing flaps were found in the retracted position. A passenger was killed and three other occupants were seriously injured.

The captain had ILS glideslope data available during the approach but did not fly the ILS glideslope. The partial obscuration of the airport environment, due to ground fog, contributed to the captain's failure to recognize that the airplane was high on both his approach and landing. The destruction of the airplane and the resulting occupant injuries were a direct result of the collision with the blast fence. FAA interaction and communication with local communities, although persistent, were unsuccessful in gaining support for runway safety area improvements and for the installation of approach lighting for runway 6. The passenger seats had been improperly assembled using unapproved parts, and seat belts had been installed incorrectly.

On an approach to land at the destination, the second-in-command (sic) was flying the airplane. The plane touched down with the landing gear retracted, and the propeller blades contacted the runway. The sic initiated a go-around (aborted landing). Witnesses saw the airplane in a steep left bank just before impact in a river next to the airport. Propeller strikes on the runway extended 380 feet, indicating a touchdown speed of 96 knots. The last propeller strikes on the right side indicated a speed of 86 knots. The last strikes on the left side indicated a slowing propeller. Published VMC for the airplane was 94 knots. The CVR tape revealed the crew completed a descent arrival check, performed an incomplete approach briefing, and did not perform a before landing check. The CVR revealed no sound of a gear warning horn. Company personnel stated that the circuit breaker for the warning horn had been found pulled at the completion of previous flights by other crew; this was to prevent a warning horn from sounding during a high rate of descent. Both pilots were killed.

N425EX was on the takeoff roll when the flightcrew experienced a 'thump' that resounded through the airplane. They also observed erratic engine indications from the n°3 engine. The captain aborted the takeoff and stopped the airplane on the runway. The fire warning system activated on the n°3 engine after the airplane came to rest. The crew attempted to extinguish the fire with the airplane's fire extinguishing system; however, they were unsuccessful. The post accident examination of the n°3 engine revealed the high pressure compressor disk had failed due to a fatigue crack that originated from a corrosion pit. The shrapnel from the disk penetrated the engine nacelle and severed the main fuel line for the engine. The fuel ignited and burned into the fuselage, igniting the 12,600 lbs of cargo (US Mail).

The aircraft completed an instrument approach and landed hard on the runway surface first with the left gear then the right gear. The tires burst and the lower fuselage came into contact with the runway surface. After the nose gear touched down, the right main landing gear collapsed and the pilot lost control of the aircraft. It veered to the left and departed the runway, coming to rest approximately 150 to 200 yards from the point of departure. Initial touch down occurred about 12 feet from the threshold, ten feet left of centerline.

According to witnesses, the weather was changing from minute to minute as the aircraft was arriving. Witnesses reported the wind was blowing from east to northeast at 10 to 15 knots, rain fall was varying from strong to periods of light rain, and the ceiling (cloud level) was variable. The pilot began an ILS runway 36 approach; however, before reaching the airport, the aircraft collided with trees and crashed about 2 miles short of the runway. The pilot was seriously injured and could not remember the accident, but did recalled receiving a wind shear alert. The pilot reported an intermittent problem with the autopilot heading mode; however, no other preimpact malfunction or failure of the acft was evident. All five occupants were injured, two seriously.

The aircraft descended into the water six and 1/2 miles southwest of Bridgeport, CT. The aircraft was on an ILS approach to runway 06. The aircraft was in communication with NY tracon arrival radar and on his initial call had indicated a desire for a clearance direct to Bridgeport. A brief radio exchange resulted in the desired clearance. There was no indication of any problems or low fuel state in the communication. Approximately 15 minutes after initial call, the controller was giving the final approach instructions to N100CT, after having used some turns and changes in airspeed to space the flight behind landing traffic, when radar and radio contact was lost. Post accident fuel calculations based on fuel aboard vs flight time en route and normal fuel consumption showed approximately 6 gallons of fuel remaining. The normal unusable fuel for this aircraft is 13 gallons which increases during maneuvering. Identifiable parts of the aircraft and some paper documents were recovered by the coast guard. The pilot's body was not recovered.

On June 4, 1984, an unmodified Gates Learjet 23A, N101PP, was being operated by Air Continental, Inc., Elyria, Ohio, on a regularly scheduled cargo flight transporting cancelled bank checks under 14 CFR 135. The flight departed Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport, Ohio, as Night Air 4 at 2200 eastern daylight time. After an uneventful flight, Night Air 4 arrived at Syracuse-Hancock International Airport, New York, at 2245. There was routine ground cargo handling at Syracuse; the airplane was not refueled. Night Air 4 departed Syracuse at 2311, was cleared to climb to 17,000 feet, and was handed off to Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center (Boston Center) at 2314. Boston Center cleared Night Air 4 to its requested altitude of FL290 and the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. At 2332, Night Air 4 was handed off at 16,000 feet during its descent to Bradley International Airport, Windsor Locks, Connecticut Approach Control. Approach control identified the airplane, cleared it for a visual approach to runway 33, and at 2336 gave Night Air 4 a turn to position the airplane on final approach at 10 miles from the airport. At 2338:22, Night Air 4 reported that the airplane was on final approach for runway 33, and at 2338:25 the air traffic control tower operator cleared the flight to land. At 2341:18, the control tower operator reported to approach control that there had been an accident at the airport. Fifteen witnesses, who either heard and/or saw the accident, were interviewed, and with the exception of a few minor points, all of the witnesses described basically the same accident sequence. The airplane was on a normal approach to runway 33 with no apparent abnormalities. When the airplane was about 200 feet over the approach lights, an increase in engine thrust was heard and the airplane halted its rate of descent in what two pilot witnesses thought was an apparent attempt to go-around. Immediately afterward, Night Air 4 began what appeared to be a level turn to the right. As the airplane went through about 90° of turn, the wings of the aircraft were nearly vertical to the ground. The airplane's nose dropped below the horizon and the airplane descended into the ground in a nose low attitude. The witnesses stated that they saw an explosion which was followed by intense ground fire. None of the witnesses reported any significant lateral or vertical changes while the aircraft was on short final or during the 90' right turn prior to its descent into the ground. Many witnesses stated that they saw some lights illuminated on the aircraft but none reported seeing the landing lights, located on the landing gear, or the landing gear in the extended position. Witnesses reported no inflight fire, smoke, or airframe separation before the crash. All three occupants were killed.
Crew:
Charles Huffman, pilot,
Ronald Dulay, copilot.
Passenger:
Eldridge Sheetz.

The aircraft was flown earlier in the day for a sales demonstration. On the return flight, when the landing gear were lowered, the pilot thought he heard a noise emitting from the gear, although cockpit indications were normal. The aircraft landed at Johnny Cake Airport and was refueled for a flight to Bradley Field where it is hangared. The pilot stated he intended to make the 22 miles flight with the gear down as a precaution. He also stated his intention to fly below the overcast because of delays of up to 45 minutes in obtaining IFR clearances. Moments after takeoff the aircraft collided with trees east of the airport. About one mile east of the airport is a north-south ridge. Another pilot, who departed 15-20 mins earlier, reported entering the overcast between 400 and 700 feet agl. Ground witnesses one mile southeast of the airport who heard the crash described the weather as heavy fog and mist. One witness estimated the ceiling as 100 feet agl. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

After crossing the mondi intersection inbound for an ILS runway 05 approach, the captain felt that a proper descent was not possible due to a strong tailwind and their present altitude. They turned and proceeded outbound to lose altitude. The crew then established themselves again on the inbound course at an airspeed of approximately 120 knots. The copilot reported that around 300 feet "the bottom dropped out." the aircraft crashed onto the surface of a frozen cove and slid onto marshy terrain and stopped about 500 feet short of the runway. An NTSB weather summary shows that the following wind regimes existed when the aircraft made its approach: 5,000 to 24,000 ft asl, wind 220/50; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, wind 180/30; 450 feet asl to surface, wind 100/5. Using the above wind regimes and assuming an approach airspeed of 123 knots, the following ground speeds were computed: 5,000 to 2,400 ft asl, 155 knots; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, 147 knots; 450 feet asl to surface, 118 knots.