Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Weston

Date & Time: Oct 26, 2015 at 1233 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N55GK
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jacksonville – Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
31-7852013
YOM:
1978
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11000
Captain / Total hours on type:
105.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6003
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot of the multiengine airplane had fueled the main (inboard) fuel tanks to capacity before the cross-county flight. As the flight approached the destination airport, an air traffic controller instructed the pilot to turn right for a visual approach, and the pilot acknowledged. Subsequently, the pilot reported that he might have to land on a highway. The airplane impacted a marsh area about 15 miles from the destination airport. Review of data downloaded from an onboard engine monitor revealed that the right engine momentarily lost and regained power before experiencing a total loss of power. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the left propeller was feathered and that the right propeller was in the normal operating range. Sufficient fuel to complete the flight was drained from the left wing fuel tanks. Although the right wing fuel tanks were compromised during the impact, sufficient fuel was likely present in the right main fuel tanks to complete the flight before impact because both the left and right main fuel tanks were fueled to capacity concurrently before the flight, but it likely was in a low fuel state due to fuel used during the flight. The right wing main fuel tank was not equipped with a flapper valve, which should have been located on the baffle nearest the wing root where the fuel pickup was located. The flapper valve is used to trap fuel near the fuel pickup and prevent it from flowing outboard away from the pickup. The maintenance records did not indicate that the right main fuel tank bladder had been replaced; however, the manufacture year printed on the bladder was about 20 years before the accident and 16 years after the manufacture of the airplane, indicating that the bladder had been replaced at some point. When the right main fuel tank bladder was replaced, the flapper valve would have been removed. Based on the evidence, it is likely that maintenance personnel failed to reinstall the flapper valve after installing the new fuel bladder. This missing valve would not affect operation of the fuel system unless the right main fuel tank was in a low fuel state, when fuel could flow outboard away from the fuel pickup (such as in a right turn, which the pilot was making when the engine lost power), and result in fuel starvation to the engine.Toxicology testing of the pilot revealed that his blood alcohol level during the flight was likely between 0.077 gm/dl and 0.177 gm/dl, which is above the level generally considered impairing. Therefore, it is likely that, during the right turn, the fuel in the right main fuel tank moved outboard, which resulted in fuel starvation to the right engine. When the right engine lost power, the pilot should have secured the right engine by feathering the propeller to reduce drag and increase single-engine performance; however, given the position of the propellers at the accident site, the pilot likely incorrectly feathered the operating (left) engine, which rendered the airplane incapable of maintaining altitude. It is very likely that the pilot's impairment due to his ingestion of alcohol led to his errors and contributed to the accident.
Probable cause:
The pilot's feathering of the incorrect propeller following a total loss of right engine power due to fuel starvation, which resulted from maintenance personnel's failure to reinstall the flapper valve in the right main fuel tank. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment due to alcohol consumption.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 31A in Apaseo el Alto: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 22, 2015 at 1528 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XB-GYB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Toluca - Zacatecas
MSN:
31-166
YOM:
1998
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2693
Aircraft flight hours:
3237
Aircraft flight cycles:
2368
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Toluca Airport at 1528LT on an executive flight to Zacatecas, carrying two passengers and two pilots. Four minutes later, the crew was cleared to climb to FL380 and later reported moderate but continue turbulences. Then the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and disintegrated in the air before crashing near Apaseo el Alto. Debris were found on a large area and all four occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Due to lack of evidences, the exact cause of the loss of control could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 207 Skywagon in Taylor: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 16, 2015 at 1515 LT
Registration:
C-GNVZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Taylor – Vernon
MSN:
207-0317
YOM:
1976
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from a grassy airstrip located just outside from the town of Taylor, some 15 km southeast of Fort St John, the single engine aircraft crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and both occupants, a father and his son, were killed.

Crash of an Airbus A300B4-203F in Afgooye

Date & Time: Oct 12, 2015 at 1930 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SU-BMZ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oostend – Cairo – Mogadishu
MSN:
129
YOM:
1980
Flight number:
TSY810
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was performing a cargo flight from Ostend to Mogadishu with an intermediate stop in Cairo with perishable goods on board on behalf of the AMISOM, the African Mission in Somalia. The final approach to Mogadishu-Aden Abdulle International Airport was performed by night. As the crew was unable to localize the runway, he abandoned the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. A second attempt was also interrupted and the crew initiated a new go-around then continued towards the north of the capital city. Eventually, the captain decided to attempt an emergency belly landing near Afgooye, about 25 km northwest of Mogadishu. Upon landing, the aircraft lost its both engines and came to rest in the bush. Two crew members were taken to hospital while four others were uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. According to Somalian Authorities, the International Airport of Mogadishu is open to traffic from 0600LT till 1800LT. For undetermined reason, the crew started the descent while the airport was already closed to all traffic (sunset at 1747LT). Also, an emergency landing was unavoidable, probably due to a fuel exhaustion. It is unknown why the crew did not divert to the alternate airport.
Probable cause:
When the controller received the estimated time of arrival for TSY810 from the Flight Information Center (FIC) Nairobi he advised FIC Nairobi (Kenya) that Mogadishu Airport was closed at the estimated time of arrival and advised the crew should divert to their alternate aerodrome but received no feedback. At 14:45Z the tower received first communication from the crew advising they would be overhead the aerodrome at 15:02Z, the controller advised again that the aerodrome would already be closed by then, the crew insisted however that they would land. Tower provided the necessary landing information like weather and active runway. At 15:02Z there was no sight of the aircraft, tower queried with the crew who reported still being 54nm out and revised their estimated time of arrival. At 15:27Z the aircraft turned final for runway 05, tower advised the crew to land at own discretion as tower's "instructions were only advisory and not clearance". The controller added that the approach was aborted and all subsequent approaches were unsuccessful too. "At one point the pilot mistook street parallel to the runway lighted by flood lights with intention of landing but was alerted the runway was on his right and the approach was discontinued. The crew has been warned numerous times that Mogadishu Airport closed at 1800LT (1500Z) and there is no adequate runway lights as the airport is not prepared to receive flights during night time hours. Thus, the pilot has intentionally tried to land at the airport while the visibility was limited to few metres due to darkness.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-310 Navajo in Los Camastros: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 2, 2015 at 1203 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GCMD
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
31-7912101
YOM:
1979
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, departed Managua-Augusto C. Sandino Airport at 0934LT on a flight for the Australian Company CSA Global, taking part to a geological mission dedicated to the construction of a canal. In unknown circumstances, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in a field located in Los Camastros, about one km north of Veracruz. The pilot was killed and maybe tried to use a parachute before the crash as one was found in the wreckage.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R near Bratsk

Date & Time: Sep 16, 2015 at 1115 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
RA-35141
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Zhelenogorsk-Ilimsky – Taseyovo – Achinsk
MSN:
1G112-23
YOM:
1969
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5116
Captain / Total hours on type:
4683.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1283
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1283
Aircraft flight hours:
14512
Aircraft flight cycles:
19970
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Zhelenogorsk-Ilimsky Airport on a flight to Achinsk with an intermediate stop in Taseyovo, carrying one passenger and two pilots. After 43 minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of about 1,200 metres, the engine lost power and the oil temperature increased from 70° to 150° C. The aircraft lost height, forcing the crew to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft hit tree tops and eventually crash landed in a wooded area located 60 km northeast of Bratsk. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and all three occupants escaped unarmed.
Probable cause:
The crash of An-2 RA-35141 aircraft occurred during the emergency landing on a forest firebreak. The landing was urged due to in-flight engine power loss as a result of the destruction of the 62.06.02 bronze hub pouring of the master rod big end of the crank mechanism. Most probably the destruction of the bronze hub pouring was caused by a manufacturing flaw consisting in a lack of bronze friction with the steel base on a part of its surface.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-3T Turbo Otter in Iliamna: 3 killed

Date & Time: Sep 15, 2015 at 0606 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N928RK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iliamna - Swishak River
MSN:
61
YOM:
1954
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
11300
Captain / Total hours on type:
450.00
Aircraft flight hours:
15436
Circumstances:
On September 15, 2015, about 0606 Alaska daylight time, a single-engine, turbine-powered, float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3T (Otter) airplane, N928RK, impacted tundra-covered terrain just after takeoff from East Wind Lake, about 1 mile east of the Iliamna Airport, Iliamna, Alaska. Of the 10 people on board, three passengers died at the scene, the airline transport pilot and four passengers sustained serious injuries, and two passengers sustained minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was registered to and operated by Rainbow King Lodge, Inc., Lemoore, California, as a visual flight rules other work use flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Dark night, visual meteorological conditions existed at the departure point at the time of the accident, and no flight plan was filed for the flight. At the time of the accident, the airplane was en route to a remote fishing site on the Swishak River, about 75 miles northwest of Kodiak, Alaska.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to depart in dark night, visual meteorological conditions over water, which resulted in his subsequent spatial disorientation and loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to determine the airplane's actual preflight weight and balance and center of gravity (CG), which led to the airplane being loaded and operated outside of the weight and CG limits and to a subsequent aerodynamic stall.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Les Bergeronnes: 6 killed

Date & Time: Aug 23, 2015 at 1127 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FKRJ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Lac Long - Lac Long
MSN:
1210
YOM:
1958
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
5989
Captain / Total hours on type:
4230.00
Aircraft flight hours:
25223
Circumstances:
The float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 Mk. 1 Beaver (registration C-FKRJ, serial number 1210), operated by Air Saguenay (1980) inc., was on a visual flight rules sightseeing flight in the region of Tadoussac, Quebec. At 1104 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft took off from its base on Lac Long, Quebec, for a 20-minute flight, with 1 pilot and 5 passengers on board. At 1127, on the return trip, approximately 2.5 nautical miles north-northwest of its destination (7 nautical miles north of Tadoussac), the aircraft stalled in a steep turn. The aircraft descended vertically and struck a rocky outcrop. The aircraft was substantially damaged in the collision with the terrain and was destroyed by the post-impact fire. The 6 occupants received fatal injuries. No emergency locator transmitter signal was captured.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot performed manoeuvres with a reduced safety margin at low altitudes. As a result, these flights involved a level of risk that was unnecessary to attain the objectives of sightseeing flights.
2. With no restrictions on manoeuvres and no minimum altitude prescribed by the company prior to flight, the pilot flew according to his own limits and made a steep turn at approximately 110 feet above ground level.
3. When the pilot made a steep left turn, aerodynamic stalling ensued, causing an incipient spin at an altitude insufficient to allow control of the aircraft to be regained prior to vertical collision with the terrain.
4. The absence of an angle-of-attack indicator system and an impending stall warning device deprived the pilot of the last line of defence against loss of control of the aircraft.

Findings as to risk:
1. If lightweight flight data recording systems are not used to closely monitor flight operations, there is a risk that pilots will deviate from established procedures and limits, thereby reducing safety margins.
2. If Transport Canada does not take concrete measures to facilitate the use of lightweight flight data recording systems and flight data monitoring, operators may not be able to proactively identify safety deficiencies before they cause an accident.
3. If pilots do not obtain at least the regulatory rest periods, there is a risk that flights will be conducted when pilots are fatigued.
4. Unless all flights made are recorded in the pilot’s logbook and monitored by the company, it is possible that the pilot will not receive the required rest periods, which increases the risk of flights being conducted when the pilot is fatigued.
5. If flights made are not recorded in the aircraft’s journey logbook, it is possible that inspection and maintenance schedules and component lifetimes will be exceeded, increasing the risk of failure.
6. Unless safety management systems are required, assessed, and monitored by Transport Canada in order to ensure continual improvement, there is an increased risk that companies will not be able to identify and effectively mitigate the hazards involved in their operations.
7. If pilots do not receive stall training that demonstrates the aircraft’s actual behaviour in a steep turn under power, there is a high risk of loss of control.

Other findings:
1. The replacement of the ventral fin with Seafins on C-FKRJ was in compliance with the requirements of Kenmore Air Harbor Inc.’s supplemental type certificate.
2. The control wheel was in the left-hand position (pilot side) at the moment of impact.
3. Angle-of-attack indicator systems have been recognized as contributing to flight safety by improving pilot awareness of the stall margin at all times, thereby allowing pilots to react in order to prevent loss of control of the aircraft.
4. Stall warning systems have been recognized as a means of improving flight safety by providing a clear, unambiguous warning of an impending stall.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410UVP in Červený Kameň: 4 killed

Date & Time: Aug 20, 2015 at 0921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OM-ODQ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dubnica - Dubnica
MSN:
84 13 20
YOM:
1984
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
17
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
10625
Aircraft flight hours:
8021
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was carrying 17 skydivers and two pilots and was performing a skydiving mission with another Let L-410 owned by the same operator. Registered OM-SAB, the second aircraft was carrying 17 skydivers and 2 pilots as well. Both crew were preparing a program for an airshow scheduled next Sunday August 23. While climbing to an altitude of about 1,400 - 1,500 metres, the pilot of OM-ODQ was trying to get closer to OM-SAB when both aircraft collided. All but three skydivers were able to bail out prior both aircraft crashed in a wooded area located north of the airfield. All four crew members were killed and three skydivers as well, one in OM-SAB and two in OM-ODQ.
Probable cause:
The main cause of the in-flight collision was a poor flight management on part of the OM-ODQ captain.
Contributing factors:
- The captain of OM-ODQ was using a mobile phone at the time of the collision,
- The total weight of OM-ODQ at the time of the accident was above MTOW.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410MA in Červený Kameň: 3 killed

Date & Time: Aug 20, 2015 at 0921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
OM-SAB
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dubnica - Dubnica
MSN:
75 04 05
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
17
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
8404
Copilot / Total flying hours:
235
Aircraft flight hours:
5618
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft was carrying 17 skydivers and two pilots and was performing a skydiving mission with another Let L-410 owned by the same operator. Registered OM-ODQ, the second aircraft was carrying 17 skydivers and 2 pilots as well. Both crew were preparing a program for an airshow scheduled next Sunday August 23. While climbing to an altitude of about 1,400 - 1,500 metres, the pilot of OM-ODQ was trying to get closer to OM-SAB when both aircraft collided. All but three skydivers were able to bail out prior both aircraft crashed in a wooded area located north of the airfield. All four crew members were killed and three skydivers as well, one in OM-SAB and two in OM-ODQ.
Probable cause:
The main cause of the in-flight collision was a poor flight management on part of the OM-ODQ captain.
Contributing factors:
- The captain of OM-ODQ was using a mobile phone at the time of the collision,
- The total weight of OM-ODQ at the time of the accident was above MTOW.
Final Report: