Plain, Valley

When the controller received the estimated time of arrival for TSY810 from the Flight Information Center (FIC) Nairobi he advised FIC Nairobi (Kenya) that Mogadishu Airport was closed at the estimated time of arrival and advised the crew should divert to their alternate aerodrome but received no feedback. At 14:45Z the tower received first communication from the crew advising they would be overhead the aerodrome at 15:02Z, the controller advised again that the aerodrome would already be closed by then, the crew insisted however that they would land. Tower provided the necessary landing information like weather and active runway. At 15:02Z there was no sight of the aircraft, tower queried with the crew who reported still being 54nm out and revised their estimated time of arrival. At 15:27Z the aircraft turned final for runway 05, tower advised the crew to land at own discretion as tower's "instructions were only advisory and not clearance". The controller added that the approach was aborted and all subsequent approaches were unsuccessful too. "At one point the pilot mistook street parallel to the runway lighted by flood lights with intention of landing but was alerted the runway was on his right and the approach was discontinued. The crew has been warned numerous times that Mogadishu Airport closed at 1800LT (1500Z) and there is no adequate runway lights as the airport is not prepared to receive flights during night time hours. Thus, the pilot has intentionally tried to land at the airport while the visibility was limited to few metres due to darkness.

The crash of An-2 RA-35141 aircraft occurred during the emergency landing on a forest firebreak. The landing was urged due to in-flight engine power loss as a result of the destruction of the 62.06.02 bronze hub pouring of the master rod big end of the crank mechanism. Most probably the destruction of the bronze hub pouring was caused by a manufacturing flaw consisting in a lack of bronze friction with the steel base on a part of its surface.

The pilot's decision to depart in dark night, visual meteorological conditions over water, which resulted in his subsequent spatial disorientation and loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to determine the airplane's actual preflight weight and balance and center of gravity (CG), which led to the airplane being loaded and operated outside of the weight and CG limits and to a subsequent aerodynamic stall.

Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot performed manoeuvres with a reduced safety margin at low altitudes. As a result, these flights involved a level of risk that was unnecessary to attain the objectives of sightseeing flights.
2. With no restrictions on manoeuvres and no minimum altitude prescribed by the company prior to flight, the pilot flew according to his own limits and made a steep turn at approximately 110 feet above ground level.
3. When the pilot made a steep left turn, aerodynamic stalling ensued, causing an incipient spin at an altitude insufficient to allow control of the aircraft to be regained prior to vertical collision with the terrain.
4. The absence of an angle-of-attack indicator system and an impending stall warning device deprived the pilot of the last line of defence against loss of control of the aircraft.

Findings as to risk:
1. If lightweight flight data recording systems are not used to closely monitor flight operations, there is a risk that pilots will deviate from established procedures and limits, thereby reducing safety margins.
2. If Transport Canada does not take concrete measures to facilitate the use of lightweight flight data recording systems and flight data monitoring, operators may not be able to proactively identify safety deficiencies before they cause an accident.
3. If pilots do not obtain at least the regulatory rest periods, there is a risk that flights will be conducted when pilots are fatigued.
4. Unless all flights made are recorded in the pilot’s logbook and monitored by the company, it is possible that the pilot will not receive the required rest periods, which increases the risk of flights being conducted when the pilot is fatigued.
5. If flights made are not recorded in the aircraft’s journey logbook, it is possible that inspection and maintenance schedules and component lifetimes will be exceeded, increasing the risk of failure.
6. Unless safety management systems are required, assessed, and monitored by Transport Canada in order to ensure continual improvement, there is an increased risk that companies will not be able to identify and effectively mitigate the hazards involved in their operations.
7. If pilots do not receive stall training that demonstrates the aircraft’s actual behaviour in a steep turn under power, there is a high risk of loss of control.

Other findings:
1. The replacement of the ventral fin with Seafins on C-FKRJ was in compliance with the requirements of Kenmore Air Harbor Inc.’s supplemental type certificate.
2. The control wheel was in the left-hand position (pilot side) at the moment of impact.
3. Angle-of-attack indicator systems have been recognized as contributing to flight safety by improving pilot awareness of the stall margin at all times, thereby allowing pilots to react in order to prevent loss of control of the aircraft.
4. Stall warning systems have been recognized as a means of improving flight safety by providing a clear, unambiguous warning of an impending stall.

The main cause of the in-flight collision was a poor flight management on part of the OM-ODQ captain.
Contributing factors:
- The captain of OM-ODQ was using a mobile phone at the time of the collision,
- The total weight of OM-ODQ at the time of the accident was above MTOW.

The main cause of the in-flight collision was a poor flight management on part of the OM-ODQ captain.
Contributing factors:
- The captain of OM-ODQ was using a mobile phone at the time of the collision,
- The total weight of OM-ODQ at the time of the accident was above MTOW.

Double engine failure on approach due to fuel exhaustion. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor Crew Resources Management in decision making, team work and communications in the cockpit,
- Low level of alert of the crew while completing a training mission,
- The crew failed to follow the emergency procedures,
- Limited experience of the instructor to proceed with an initial training,
- Poor flight planning.

The probable causes of this accident are the following:
- Temporary incapacitation of the pilot,
- Use of flaps upon take-off in the conditions of deterioration/modification of weather conditions during take-off (wind direction and speed),
- Aircraft operation with incomplete crew.