Crash of a Quest Kodiak 100 off Georgetown: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 27, 2018 at 1925 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N969TB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Welaka - Welaka
MSN:
100-0173
YOM:
2016
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
3400
Aircraft flight hours:
68
Circumstances:
The private pilot and pilot-rated passenger were returning to the airport in night visual meteorological conditions with a cloud ceiling about 1,500 ft above ground level. Radar data indicated that the airplane overflew the airport and completed a 360° descending right turn and overflew the airport again before entering an approximate 180° left climbing turn toward and over an unlighted area within a denselywooded national forest. The airplane continued the left turn and entered a descent to impact in a river about 1 mile from the airport. All major components of the airplane were recovered from the river except the outboard section of the left wing and the left aileron. An examination of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Because each of the two pilots onboard would have been capable of safely landing the airplane, it is unlikely that an acute event from either occupant's heart disease contributed to the accident. The night conditions, which included overcast clouds that would have obscured the nearly full moon, and the pilots' maneuvering for landing over an area devoid of cultural lighting provided conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. It is likely that the pilots experienced a "black hole" illusion while maneuvering to align with the runway for landing, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and impact with water.
Probable cause:
The pilots' spatial disorientation while maneuvering for landing in night conditions over unlighted terrain, which resulted in an uncontrolled descent and impact with water.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver off Cottage Point: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 31, 2017 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
VH-NOO
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cottage Point - Sydney
MSN:
1535
YOM:
1963
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
10762
Aircraft flight hours:
21872
Circumstances:
On 31 December 2017, at about 1045 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, five passengers arrived via water-taxi at the Sydney Seaplanes terminal, Rose Bay, New South Wales (NSW) for a charter fly-and-dine experience to a restaurant at Cottage Point on the Hawkesbury River. Cottage Point is about 26 km north of Sydney Harbour in the Ku-ring-gai Chase National Park, a 20 minute floatplane flight from Rose Bay. At about 1130, prior to boarding the aircraft, the passengers received a pre-flight safety briefing. At about 1135, the pilot and five passengers departed the Rose Bay terminal for the flight to Cottage Point via the northern beaches coastal route, in a de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver floatplane, registered VH-NOO and operated by Sydney Seaplanes. The flight arrived at Cottage Point just before midday and the passengers disembarked. The pilot then conducted another four flights in VH-NOO between Cottage Point and Rose Bay. The pilot arrived at Cottage Point at about 1353. After securing the aircraft at the pontoon and disembarking passengers from that flight, the pilot walked to a kiosk at Cottage Point for a drink and food. At about 1415, the pilot received a phone call from the operator via the kiosk, asking the pilot to move the aircraft off the pontoon, which could only accommodate one aircraft at a time. This was to allow the pilot of the operator’s other DHC-2 aircraft (VH-AAM) to pick-up other restaurant passengers. The pilot of VH-NOO immediately returned to the aircraft and taxied away from the pontoon into Cowan Creek. The operator’s records indicated that VH-AAM arrived at the pontoon and shut down the engine at about 1419, and subsequently departed at about 1446. The pilot of VH-NOO returned to the pontoon after having taxied in Cowan Creek with the engine running for up to 27 minutes, while waiting for the other aircraft. During the taxi, closed-circuit television footage from a private residence at Cottage Point showed VH-NOO at 1444, with the pilot’s door ajar. After shutting down the aircraft, the pilot briefly went into the restaurant to see if the passengers were ready to leave, and then returned to the aircraft. The return flight to Rose Bay, scheduled to depart at 1500, provided sufficient time for the passengers to meet a previously booked water-taxi to transport them from Rose Bay to their hotel at 1545. At about 1457, the passengers commenced boarding the aircraft and at around 1504, the aircraft had commenced taxiing toward the designated take-off area in Cowan Creek. At about 1511, the aircraft took off towards the north-north-east in Cowan Creek, becoming airborne shortly before passing Cowan Point. The aircraft climbed straight ahead before commencing a right turn into Cowan Water. A witness, who was travelling east in a boat on the northern side of Cowan Water, photographed the aircraft passing over a location known as ‘Hole in the wall’. These photographs indicated that the aircraft was turning to the right with a bank angle of 15-20°. Witnesses observed the right turn continue above Little Shark Rock Point and Cowan Water. The last photograph taken by the passenger was when the aircraft was heading in a southerly direction towards Cowan Bay. At that time, the aircraft was estimated to be at an altitude of about 30 m (98 ft).Shortly after the turn in Cowan Water, several witnesses observed the aircraft heading directly towards and entering Jerusalem Bay flying level or slightly descending, below the height of the surrounding terrain. Witnesses also reported hearing the aircraft’s engine and stated that the sound was constant and appeared normal. About 1.1 km after entering Jerusalem Bay, near the entrance to Pinta Bay, multiple witnesses reported seeing the aircraft flying along the southern shoreline before it suddenly entered a steep right turn at low-level. Part-way through the turn, the aircraft’s nose suddenly dropped before the aircraft collided with the water, about 95 m from the northern shore and 1.2 km from the end of Jerusalem Bay. The aircraft came to rest inverted and with the cabin submerged. A number of people on watercraft who heard or observed the impact, responded to render assistance. Those people could not access the (underwater) aircraft cabin. The entire tail section and parts of both floats were initially above the waterline, but about 10 minutes later had completely submerged. The pilot and five passengers received fatal injuries.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors:
- The aircraft entered Jerusalem Bay, a known confined area, below terrain height with a level or slightly descending flight path. There was no known operational need for the aircraft to be
operating in the bay.
- While conducting a steep turn in Jerusalem Bay, it was likely that the aircraft aerodynamically stalled at an altitude too low to effect a recovery before colliding with the water.
- It was almost certain that there was elevated levels of carbon monoxide in the aircraft cabin, which resulted in the pilot and passengers having higher than normal levels of carboxyhaemoglobin in their blood.
- Several pre-existing cracks in the exhaust collector ring, very likely released exhaust gas into the engine/accessory bay, which then very likely entered the cabin through holes in the main
firewall where three bolts were missing.
- A 27 minute taxi before the passengers boarded, with the pilot’s door ajar likely exacerbated the pilot’s elevated carboxyhaemoglobin level.
- It was likely that the pilot's ability to safely operate the aircraft was significantly degraded by carbon monoxide exposure.
- Disposable chemical spot detectors, commonly used in general aviation, can be unreliable at detecting carbon monoxide in the aircraft cabin. Further, they do not draw a pilot's attention to a hazardous condition, instead they rely on the pilot noticing the changing colour of the sensor.
- There was no regulatory requirement from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for piston-engine aircraft to carry a carbon monoxide detector with an active warning to alert pilots to the presence of elevated levels of carbon monoxide in the cabin. (Safety issue)

Other factors that increased risk:
- It was likely that the effectiveness of the disposable carbon monoxide chemical spot detector fitted to the aircraft was reduced due to sun bleaching.
- Although detectors were not required to be fitted to their aircraft, Sydney Seaplanes had no mechanism for monitoring the serviceability of the carbon monoxide detectors. (Safety issue)
- The in situ bolts used by the maintenance organisation to secure the magneto access panels on the main firewall were worn, and were a combination of modified AN3-3A bolts and non-specific bolts. This increased the risk of the bolts either not tightening securely on installation and/or coming loose during operations.
- The operator relied on volunteered passenger weights without allowances for variability, rather than actual passenger weights obtained just prior to a flight. This increased the risk of underestimating passenger weights and potentially overloading an aircraft.
- The standard passenger weights specified in Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 235-1(1) Standard passenger and baggage weights did not accurately reflect the average weights of the current Australian population. Further, the CAAP did not provide guidance on the use of volunteered passenger weights as an alternative to weights derived just prior to a flight.
- Australian civil aviation regulations did not mandate the fitment of flight recorders for passenger-carrying aircraft under 5,700 kg. Consequently, the determination of factors that influenced this accident, and other accidents, have been hampered by a lack of recorded data pertaining to the flight. This has likely resulted in the non-identification of safety issues, which continue to present a hazard to current and future passengercarrying operations. (Safety issue)
- Annex 6 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation did not mandate the fitment of flight recorders for passenger-carrying aircraft under 5,700 kg. Consequently, the determination of factors that influenced this accident, and numerous other accidents have been hampered by a lack of recorded data pertaining to the flight. This has likely resulted in important safety issues not being identified, which may remain a hazard to current and future passenger carrying operations. (Safety issue)

Other findings:
- It was very likely that the middle row right passenger did not have his seatbelt fastened at the time of impact, however, the reason for this could not be determined.
- The accident was not survivable due to the combination of the impact forces and the submersion of the aircraft.
- The pilot had no known pre-existing medical conditions that could explain the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Lake Harney: 3 killed

Date & Time: Dec 8, 2017 at 1115 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N19LW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sanford - Sanford
MSN:
LJ-991
YOM:
1981
Flight number:
CONN900
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
243
Captain / Total hours on type:
0.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4800
Copilot / Total hours on type:
357
Aircraft flight hours:
10571
Circumstances:
The flight instructor, commercial pilot receiving instruction, and commercial pilot-rated passenger were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane during instrument meteorological conditions. After performing a practice instrument approach, the flight was cleared for a second approach; however, the landing runway changed, and the controller vectored the airplane for an approach to the new runway. The pilot was instructed to turn to a southwesterly heading and maintain 1,600 ft until established on the localizer. Radar information revealed that the airplane turned to a southwesterly heading on a course to intercept the localizer and remained at 1,600 ft for about 1 minute 39 seconds before beginning a descending right turn to 1,400 ft. The descent continued to 1,100 ft; at which time the air traffic control controller issued a low altitude alert. Over the following 10 seconds, the airplane continued to descend at a rate in excess of 4,800 ft per minute (fpm). The controller issued a second low altitude alert to the crew with instructions to climb to 1,600 ft immediately. The pilot responded about 5 seconds later, "yeah I am sir, I am, I am." The airplane then climbed 1,400 ft over 13 seconds, resulting in a climb rate in excess of 6,700 fpm, followed by a descent to 1,400 ft over 5 seconds, resulting in a 1,500-fpm descent before radar contact was lost in the vicinity of the accident site. Radar data following the initial instrument approach indicated that the airplane was flying a relatively smooth and consistent flightpath with altitude and heading changes that were indicative of autopilot use until the final turn to intercept the localizer course. Maneuvering the airplane in restricted visibility placed the pilot in conditions conducive to the development of spatial disorientation. The accident circumstances, including altitude and course deviations and the subsequent high-energy impact, are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Additionally, examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no evidence of any preexisting anomalies that would have precludednormal operation. Therefore, it is likely that the pilot receiving instruction was experiencing the effects of spatial disorientation when the accident occurred. Toxicology testing of the flight instructor identified significant amounts of oxycodone as well as its active metabolite, oxymorphone, in liver tissue; oxycodone was also found in muscle. Oxycodone is an opioid pain medication available by prescription that may impair mental and/or physical ability required for the performance of potentially hazardous tasks. The flight instructor's tissue levels of oxycodone suggest that his blood level at the time of the accident was high enough to have had psychoactive effects, and his failure to recognize and mitigate the pilot's spatial disorientation and impending loss of control further suggest that the flight instructor was impaired by the effects of oxycodone. Toxicology testing of all three pilots identified ethanol in body tissues; however, given the varying amounts and distribution, it is likely that the identified ethanol was from postmortem production rather than ingestion.
Probable cause:
The pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation during an instrument approach in instrument meteorological conditions, and the flight instructor's delayed remedial action. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor's impairment from the use of prescription pain medication.
Final Report:

Crash of a Grumman C-2A(R) Greyhound in the Philippines Sea: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 22, 2017 at 1445 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
162175
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iwakuni - USS Ronald Reagan
MSN:
55
Flight number:
Password 33
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The aircraft was on its way from Iwakuni Airbase to the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) cruising in the Philippines Sea on behalf of the 7th Fleet. It is believed that while approaching the supercarrier, the airplane stalled and crashed in the sea, apparently following an engine failure. Eight crew members were rescued while three were still missing two days after the accident. The wreckage was localized on 29 December 2017 at a depth of 5,640 meteres.
Those killed were:
Lt Steven Combs, Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Equipment),
Airman Matthew Chialastri,
Aviation Ordnance Airman Apprentice Bryan Grosso.

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan off Placencia

Date & Time: Nov 17, 2017 at 0846 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
V3-HGX
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Placencia – Punta Gorda
MSN:
208B-1162
YOM:
2005
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
19040
Captain / Total hours on type:
12092.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2106
Circumstances:
On 17 November, 2017, a Tropic Air Cessna 208B Grand Caravan with registration V3-HGX, departed from the Sir Barry Bowen Municipal Airport at approximately 7:15 a.m. local time with one aircraft captain, 11 passengers and 1 crew on board. The flight was a regular operated commercial passenger flight with scheduled stops in Dangriga, Placencia and with the final destination being Punta Gorda. The pilot reported that the portion of the flight from Belize City to Dangriga was uneventful and normal and so was the landing at Placencia. At approximately 8:40 a.m. local time the airplane taxied from the Tropic Air ramp and taxied towards the west on runway 25. The pilot did a turnaround using all the available runway at normal speed and started his takeoff run to the east on runway 07. The pilot proceeded down the runway in a normal takeoff roll with normal takeoff speed and prior to reaching the end of the runway, he rotated the aircraft and lifted the nose wheel to get airborne. At exactly 28 feet past the end of runway 07 and during the initial climb phase, a part of the aircraft landing gear made contact with the upper part of the front righthand passenger door frame of a vehicle that had breached the area in front of the runway which is normally protected by traffic barriers. The impact caused the aircraft to deviate from its initial climb profile, and the pilot reported that the engine was working for a couple seconds and it abruptly shut down shortly after. The pilot realized that he was unable to return to the airport. The pilot carried out emergency drills for engine loss after take-off over water and decided to ditch the aircraft in the sea, which was approximately 200-300 feet from the main shoreline in front of the Placencia airport. The flight crew and all passengers were safely evacuated from the fuselage with the assistance of witnesses and passing boats which provided an impromptu rescue for the passengers. All passengers received only minor injuries.
Probable cause:
The following are factors that are derived from the failures in the areas mentioned in section 3.00 (conclusions):
a. There is a lack of traffic surveillance to ensure that drivers comply with the warning signs of low flying aircraft and do not breach the barriers when they are down or inoperative. The left barrier at Placencia was reportedly inoperative and the right barrier was said to be working. As a result, this removed a significant level of protection for vehicles which operate on the portion of the road which intersects the departure path of aircraft. The purpose of the barriers is to protect vehicles from coming in close contact with low flying aircraft. The driver of the vehicle failed to adhere to traffic warning signs regarding low flying aircraft and drove his vehicle directly into the departure path of an aircraft (Probable cause).
b. ADAS data calculations showed that the pilot had a period of 13.33 seconds when he achieved take off performance, but he did not rotate the aircraft. Although the aircraft engine performance was normal, the actual take-off weight was within limits and the distance available to the pilot to abort the take-off was 872 feet; the pilot still flew the aircraft at a dangerously low altitude over the road and did not properly assess the risk at hand which was a vehicle advancing into the aircraft’s departure path which could cause a collision. (Probable cause).
c. The angle at which the aircraft made contact with the vehicle was not a direct head on angle, but the contact was made when the vehicle was off to the right-hand side of the extended centerline of runway 07. The aircraft did not follow the direct path of the extended center line of runway 07 prior to making contact, but instead it made a slight right turn shortly after the wheels left the ground. The pilot did not take collision avoidance (evasive) measures in a timely manner (probable cause).
d. The pilot did not demonstrate adequate knowledge of proper ditching procedures which led to an inadequate response to the emergency at hand. The operator did not provide the flight crew with the proper ditching training.

Probable causes:
1. The driver of the vehicle failed to adhere to traffic warning signs regarding low flying aircraft and drove his vehicle directly into the departure path of an aircraft.
2. The pilot flew the aircraft at a dangerously low altitude over the road and did not properly assess the risk at hand which was a vehicle advancing into the aircraft’s departure path which could cause a collision.
3. The pilot did not take collision avoidance (evasive) measures in a timely manner.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208A Caravan I in the Anavilhanas Archipelago: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 17, 2017 at 1240 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PR-MPE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Manaus - Anavilhanas Archipelago
MSN:
208A-0510
YOM:
2009
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
8535
Captain / Total hours on type:
660.00
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Manaus-Eduardo Gomes Airport at 1220LT on a flight to the Anavilhanas Archipelago, carrying cargo, four passengers and one pilot. Upon landing on the Rio Negro, the airplane struck the water surface and crashed upside down before coming to rest partially submerged. The pilot and three passengers were rescued while a fourth passenger was killed.
Probable cause:
The aircraft landed on the water with the landing gear in the down position.
Contributing factors:
- Attitude – a contributor
Failure to comply with the checklist during the pre-flight inspection and the flight itself favored the landing with inadequate configuration. This attitude may have been triggered by the pilot's confidence in his operational capability, because of his long experience in aviation.
- Flight indiscipline – a contributor
Failure to comply with the checklist indicated, in addition to the low level of situational awareness, a low level of concern for the safe conduction of the flight by failing to follow basic procedures set forth in the manufacturer's manuals and current regulations.
- Piloting judgement – a contributor
The pilot's choice not to use the checklist during the flight phases revealed an inadequate evaluation of parameters related to the operation of the aircraft. Improper compliance with the items in the Pre-Flight Inspection Sheet prevented the AMPHIB PUMP 1 and 2 circuit breakers from being rearmed.
- Aircraft maintenance – a contributor
After performing the test of landing gear extension and retraction by the emergency system, the AMPHIB PUMP 1 and 2 circuit breakers were not rearmed, being the aircraft delivered to fly in this condition. The setting recorded on the AIRSPEED switch of the landing gear position warning system computer demonstrated that the scheduled speed of 74kt was not in accordance with the recommended in the 9600-1A installation manual of Wipaire Inc. in its revision G.
- Memory – undetermined
The AMPHIB PUMP 1 and 2 circuit breakers were found disarmed after the occurrence, indicating that, after the completion of the maintenance service, the executor of the tasks probably forgot to comply with the procedures for reconfiguring the aircraft. In addition, it is possible that the pilot's automatism in relation to his way of carrying out the air operations, without the use of the checklist, has prevented the correct perception of the circuit breakers condition and the erroneous positioning of the landing gear.
- Perception – a contributor
The accomplishment of the landing on the water with the aircraft in inadequate configuration for the situation denotes a decrease in the level of situational awareness of the pilot, considering that the necessary factors and conditions for the safety of the operation were not observed.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26-100 off Abidjan: 4 killed

Date & Time: Oct 14, 2017 at 0823 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ER-AVB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Ouagadougou – Abidjan
MSN:
32 04
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
Kondor 26
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
23766
Captain / Total hours on type:
10133.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2250
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2080
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Ouagadougou on a flight to Abidjan, carrying seven passengers, three crew members and military equipment on behalf of the French Army (antiterrorist operation 'Barkhane'). On approach to Abidjan-Félix Houphouët-Boigny Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to heavy rain falls. On short final, the aircraft descended below MDA, impacted water and crashed in the sea few hundred metres short of runway 03. Six occupants were rescued while four others including all three crew members were killed. The aircraft was destroyed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were below minimums.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of this accident is the continuation of the approach below minimums without having established formal visual contact with runway references and without adequate monitoring of the aircraft's glide path. The rigorous application of the company SOPs should have necessarily led to a go-around.
The following factors contributed to the accident:
- Underestimation of adverse weather conditions below minimums;
- A lack of knowledge of the environment of Abidjan airport and insufficient awareness of the aircraft's vertical position;
- Inadequate monitoring of aircraft instruments and flight path (altitude and speed) in degraded weather conditions;
- A high workload due to continued final approach training and distraction from tasks not related to flight operations;
- Disabling EGPWS audible alerts due to unwanted alarms;
- Crew resource management (CRM) probably unbalanced by the authority of the PNF over the rest of the crew.
- Strict non-compliance with company SOPs.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 25D off Naiguatá: 5 killed

Date & Time: Aug 19, 2017 at 0016 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YV3191
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Maiquetía – Barcelona
MSN:
25-368
YOM:
1984
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Maiquetía-Símon Bolívar Airport at 0011LT for a 35 minutes flight to Barcelona. About five minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 23,000 feet, the aircraft went out of control and plunged into the sea few km off Naiguatá, State of Vargas. It appeared the aircraft disintegrated on impact and few debris were found the following morning floating on water. All five occupants were killed.

Crash of a Piper PA-46-350P Malibu Mirage off Mainau Island: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 8, 2017 at 1152 LT
Operator:
Registration:
HB-PPH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Zurich – Hamburg
MSN:
46-36045
YOM:
1996
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2236
Aircraft flight hours:
2408
Circumstances:
The single engine airplane departed Zurich Airport Runway 28 at 1134LT bound for Hamburg-Helmut Schmidt Airport, carrying one passenger and one pilot. After passing over the city of Konstanz at an altitude of 16,750 feet in IFR conditions, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and eventually crashed in the Konstanz Lake, about 200 metres off Mainau Island. The wreckage was found at a depth of 60 metres and both occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Loss of control while cruising in IMC conditions with strong atmospheric turbulences associated with icing conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Gulfstream GIII off Punta Arenas: 9 killed

Date & Time: Jul 4, 2017 at 1343 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
YV2896
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Maiquetía – Porlamar
MSN:
469
YOM:
1986
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
9
Circumstances:
While approaching the Island of Margarita, en route from Maiquetía-Simon Bolivar Airport to Porlamar, the crew encountered control difficulties and informed ATC about hydraulic problems. The crew initiated a rapid descent to 3,000 feet apparently to ditch the aircraft when it went out of control and crashed in the sea about 16 km west off Punta Arenas. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and only few debris were found floating on water. All nine occupants were killed, among them officers flying on behalf of the Vice-Presidency of the Venezuelan Government.