Crash of a Shaanxi Y-8F-200W into the Andaman Sea: 122 killed

Date & Time: Jun 7, 2017 at 1335 LT
Type of aircraft:
Shaanxi Y-8
Operator:
Registration:
5820
Flight Phase:
Flight
Flight Type:
Military
Survivors:
No
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Mergui – Yangon
YOM:
2016
Location:
Andaman Sea
All World
Country:
World
Region:
World
Crew on board:
14
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
108
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
122
Aircraft flight hours:
809
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Mergui (Myeik) Airport at 1306LT bound for Yangon, carrying soldiers and their family members. While cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet in good weather conditions, radar contact was lost with the airplane that crashed in unknown circumstances in the Andaman Sea at 1335LT. SAR operations were initiated and first debris were found at the end of the afternoon about 218 km off the city of Dawei, according of the Myanmar Army Chief of Staff. It is believed that none of the occupants survived the crash. Brand new, the aircraft has been delivered to the Myanmar Air Force in March 2016. The Shaanxi Y-8 is a Chinese version of the Antonov AN-12 built post 2010. The tail of the aircraft was found a week later and both CFR and DFDR were recovered and transmitted to the Army for further investigations.

Crash of a Mitsubishi MU-2B-40 Solitaire off Eleuthera Island: 4 killed

Date & Time: May 15, 2017 at 1329 LT
Type of aircraft:
Mitsubishi MU-2 Marquise
Operator:
Ithaca Consulting
Registration:
N220N
Flight Phase:
Flight
Flight Type:
Private
Survivors:
No
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Aguadilla – Space Coast
MSN:
450
YOM:
1981
Location:
Eleuthera Island
All Bahamas
Country:
Bahamas
Region:
Central America
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
1483
Captain / Total hours on type:
100.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4634
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot and three passengers were making a personal cross-country flight over ocean waters in the MU-2B airplane. During cruise flight at flight level (FL) 240, the airplane maintained the same relative heading, airspeed, and altitude for about 2.5 hours before radar contact was lost. While the airplane was in flight, a significant meteorological information notice was issued that warned of frequent thunderstorms with tops to FL440 in the accident area at the accident time. Satellite imagery showed cloud tops in the area were up to FL400. Moderate or greater icing conditions and super cooled large drops (SLD) were likely near or over the accident area at the accident time. Although the wreckage was not located for examination, the loss of the airplane's radar target followed by the identification of debris and a fuel sheen on the water below the last radar target location suggests that the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent after encountering adverse weather and impacted the water. Before beginning training in the airplane about 4 months before the accident, the pilot had 21 hours of multi engine experience accumulated during sporadic flights over 9 years. Per a special federal aviation regulation, a pilot must complete specific ground and flight training and log a minimum of 100 flight hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) in multi engine airplanes before acting as PIC of a MU-2B airplane. Once the pilot began training in the airplane, he appeared to attempt to reach the 100-hour threshold quickly, flying about 50 hours in 1 month. These 50 hours included about 40 hours of long, cross-country flights that the flight instructor who was flying with the pilot described as "familiarization flights" for the pilot and "demonstration flights" for the airplane's owner. The pilot successfully completed the training required for the MU-2B, and at the time of the accident, he had accumulated an estimated 120 hours of multi engine flight experience of which 100 hours were in the MU-2B. Although an MU-2B instructor described the pilot as a good, attentive student, it cannot be determined if his training was ingrained enough for him to effectively apply it in an operational environment without an instructor present. Although available evidence about the pilot's activities suggested he may not have obtained adequate restorative sleep during the night before the accident, there was insufficient evidence to determine the extent to which fatigue played a role in his decision making or the sequence of events.The pilot's last known weather briefing occurred about 8 hours before the airplane departed, and it is not known if the pilot obtained any updated weather information before or during the flight. Sufficient weather information (including a hazardous weather advisory provided by an air traffic control broadcast message about 25 minutes before the accident) was available for the pilot to expect convective activity and the potential for icing along the accident flight's route; however, there is no evidence from the airplane's radar track or the pilot's communications with air traffic controllers that he recognized or attempted to avoid the convective conditions or exit icing conditions.
Probable cause:
The pilot's intentional flight into an area of known icing and convective thunderstorm activity, which resulted in a loss of control of the airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft G18S off Metlakatla

Date & Time: Mar 3, 2017 at 0815 LT
Type of aircraft:
Beechcraft G18S
Operator:
Point to Point
Registration:
N103AF
Flight Phase:
Landing (descent or approach)
Flight Type:
Private
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Klawock – Ketchikan
MSN:
BA-526
YOM:
1960
Location:
Metlakatla
Alaska
Country:
United States of America
Region:
North America
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10308
Captain / Total hours on type:
330.00
Aircraft flight hours:
17646
Circumstances:
The pilot of the twin-engine airplane and the pilot-rated passenger reported that, during a missed approach in instrument meteorological conditions, at 2,000 ft mean sea level, the right engine seized. The pilot attempted to feather the right engine by pulling the propeller control to the feather position; however, the engine did not feather. The airplane would not maintain level flight, so the pilot navigated to a known airport, and the passenger made emergency communications with air traffic control. The pilot was unable to maintain visual reference with the ground until the airplane descended through about 100 to 200 ft and the visibility was 1 statute mile. The pilot stated that he was forced to ditch the airplane in the water about 5 miles short of the airport. The pilot and passenger egressed the airplane and swam ashore before it sank in about 89 ft of water. Both the pilot and passenger reported that there was postimpact fire on the surface of the water. The airplane was not recovered, which precluded a postaccident examination. Thus, the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.
Probable cause:
An engine power loss for reasons that could not be determined because the airplane was not recovered.
Final Report:

Crash of a Grumman G-73 Mallard in Perth: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 26, 2017 at 1708 LT
Type of aircraft:
Grumman G-73 Mallard
Operator:
Registration:
VH-CQA
Flight Phase:
Flight
Flight Type:
Demonstration
Survivors:
No
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Serpentine - Serpentine
MSN:
J-35
YOM:
1948
Location:
Perth
Western Australia
Country:
Australia
Region:
Oceania
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
625
Captain / Total hours on type:
180.00
Circumstances:
On 26 January 2017, the pilot of a Grumman American Aviation Corp G-73 amphibian aircraft, registered VH-CQA (CQA), was participating in an air display as part of the City of Perth Australia Day Skyworks event. On board were the pilot and a passenger. The pilot of CQA was flying ‘in company’ with a Cessna Caravan amphibian and was conducting operations over Perth Water on the Swan River, that included low-level passes of the Langley Park foreshore. After conducting two passes in company, both aircraft departed the display area. The pilot of CQA subsequently requested and received approval to conduct a third pass, and returned to the display area without the Cessna Caravan. During positioning for the third pass, the aircraft departed controlled flight and collided with the water. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
From the evidence available, the following findings are made regarding the loss of control and collision with water involving the G-73 Mallard aircraft, registered VH-CQA 10 km west-south-west of Perth Airport, Western Australia on 26 January 2017. These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Safety issues, or system problems, are highlighted in bold to emphasise their importance. A safety issue is an event or condition that increases safety risk and (a) can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and (b) is a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operating environment at a specific point in time.
Contributing factors:
- The pilot returned the aircraft to the display area for a third pass in a manner contrary to the approved inbound procedure and which required the use of increased manoeuvring within a confined area to establish the aircraft on the display path.
- During the final positioning turn for the third pass, the aircraft aerodynamically stalled at an unrecoverable height.
- The pilot's decision to carry a passenger on a flight during the air display was contrary to the Instrument of Approval issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for this air display and increased the severity of the accident consequence.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90GT King Air off Paraty: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jan 19, 2017 at 1244 LT
Type of aircraft:
Beechcraft 90 King Air
Operator:
Registration:
PR-SOM
Flight Phase:
Landing (descent or approach)
Flight Type:
Executive/Corporate/Business
Survivors:
No
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Campo de Marte - Paraty
MSN:
LJ-1809
YOM:
2007
Location:
Paraty
Rio de Janeiro
Country:
Brazil
Region:
South America
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
7464
Captain / Total hours on type:
2924.00
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Campo de Marte Airport at 1301LT bound for Paraty. With a distance of about 200 km, the flight should take half an hour. The approach to Paraty Airport was completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls reducing the visibility to 1,500 metres. While descending to Paraty, the pilot lost visual contact with the airport and initiated a go-around. Few minutes later, while completing a second approach, he lost visual references with the environement then lost control of the aircraft that crashed in the sea near the island of Rasa, about 4 km short of runway 28. Quickly on site, rescuers found a passenger alive but it was impossible to enter the cabin that was submerged. The aircraft quickly sank by a depth of few metres and all five occupants were killed, among them Carlos Alberto, founder of Hotel Emiliano and the Supreme Court Justice Teori Zavascki who had a central role overseeing a massive corruption investigation about the Brazilian oil Group Petrobras.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors:
- Adverse meteorological conditions - a contributor
At the moment of the impact of the aircraft, there was rain with rainfall potential of 25mm/h, covering the Paraty Bay region, and the horizontal visibility was 1,500m. Such horizontal visibility was below the minimum required for VFR landing and take-off operations. Since the SDTK aerodrome allowed only operations under VFR flight rules, the weather conditions proved to be impeding the operation within the required minimum safety limits.
- Decision-making process - a contributor
The weather conditions present in SDTK resulted in visibility restrictions that were impeding flight under VFR rules. In this context, the accomplishment of two attempts to approach and land procedures denoted an inadequate evaluation of the minimum conditions required for the operation at the Aerodrome.
- Disorientation - undetermined
The conditions of low visibility, of low height curve on the water, added to the pilot stress and also to the conditions of the wreckage, which did not show any fault that could have compromised the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft, indicate that the pilot most likely had a spatial disorientation that caused the loss of control of the aircraft.
- Emotional state - undetermined
Through the analysis of voice, speech and language parameters, variations in the emotional state of the pilot were identified that showed evidence of stress in the final moments of the flight. The pilot's high level of anxiety may have influenced his decision to make another attempt of landing even under adverse weather conditions and may have contributed to his disorientation.
- Tasks characteristics - undetermined
The operations in Paraty, RJ, demanded that pilots adapt to the routine of the operators, which was characteristic of the executive aviation. In addition, among operators, possibly because of the lack of minimum operational requirements in SDTK, the pilots who landed even in adverse weather conditions were recognized and valued by the others. Although there were no indications of external pressure on the part of the operator, these characteristics present in the operation in Paraty, RJ, may have favored the pilot's self-imposed pressure, leading him to operate with reduced safety margins.
- Visual illusions - undetermined
The flight conditions faced by the pilot favored the occurrence of the vestibular illusion due to the excess of "G" and the visual illusion of homogeneous terrain. Such illusions probably had, consequently, the pilot's sense that the bank angle was decreasing and that he was at a height above the real. These sensations may have led the pilot to erroneously correct the conditions he was experiencing. Thus, the great bank angle and the downward movement, observed at the moment of the impact of the aircraft, are probably a consequence of the phenomena of illusions.
- Work-group culture - a contributor
Among the members of the pilot group that performed routine flights to the region of Paraty, RJ, there was a culture of recognition and appreciation of those operating under adverse conditions, to the detriment of the requirements established for the VFR operation. These shared values promoted the adherence to informal practices and interfered in the perception and the adequate analysis of the risks present in the operation in SDTK.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 525C CitationJet CJ4 off Cleveland: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 29, 2016 at 2257 LT
Type of aircraft:
Cessna 525 CitationJet CJ4
Operator:
Registration:
N614SB
Flight Phase:
Takeoff (climb)
Flight Type:
Private
Survivors:
No
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Cleveland – Columbus
MSN:
525C-0072
YOM:
2012
Location:
Cleveland-Burke Lakefront
Ohio
Country:
United States of America
Region:
North America
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
1205
Captain / Total hours on type:
56.00
Aircraft flight hours:
861
Circumstances:
The airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and proceeded out over a large lake. Dark night visual conditions prevailed at the airport; however, the airplane entered instrument conditions shortly after takeoff. The airplane climb rate exceeded 6,000 fpm during the initial climb and it subsequently continued through the assigned altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. The flight director provided alerts before the airplane reached the assigned altitude and again after it had passed through it. The bank angle increased to about 62 degrees and the pitch attitude decreased to about 15 degrees nose down, as the airplane continued through the assigned heading. The bank angle ultimately decreased to about 25 degrees. During the subsequent descent, the airspeed and descent rate reached about 300 knots and 6,000 fpm, respectively. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) provided both "bank angle" and "sink rate" alerts to the pilot, followed by seven "pull up" warnings. A postaccident examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. It is likely that the pilot attempted to engage the autopilot after takeoff as he had been trained. However, based on the flight profile, the autopilot was not engaged. This implied that the pilot failed to confirm autopilot engagement via an indication on the primary flight display (PFD). The PFD annunciation was the only indication of autopilot engagement. Inadequate flight instrument scanning during this time of elevated workload resulted in the pilot allowing the airplane to climb through the assigned altitude, to develop an overly steep bank angle, to continue through the assigned heading, and to ultimately enter a rapid descent without effective corrective action. A belief that the autopilot was engaged may have contributed to his lack of attention. It is also possible that differences between the avionics panel layout on the accident airplane and the airplane he previously flew resulted in mode confusion and contributed to his failure to engage the autopilot. The lack of proximal feedback on the flight guidance panel might have contributed to his failure to notice that the autopilot was not engaged.The pilot likely experienced some level of spatial disorientation due to the dark night lighting conditions, the lack of visual references over the lake, and the encounter with instrument meteorological conditions. It is possible that once the pilot became disoriented, the negative learning transfer due to the differences between the attitude indicator display on the accident airplane and the airplane previously flown by the pilot may have hindered his ability to properly apply corrective control inputs. Available information indicated that the pilot had been awake for nearly 17 hours at the time of the accident. As a result, the pilot was likely fatigued which hindered his ability to manage the high workload environment, maintain an effective instrument scan, provide prompt and accurate control inputs, and to respond to multiple bank angle and descent rate warnings.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain due to pilot spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was pilot fatigue, mode confusion related to the status of the autopilot, and negative learning transfer due to flight guidance panel and attitude indicator differences from the pilot's previous flight experience.
Final Report:

Crash of a Tupolev TU-154B-2 off Sochi: 92 killed

Date & Time: Dec 25, 2016 at 0525 LT
Type of aircraft:
Tupolev TU-154
Operator:
Registration:
RA-85572
Flight Phase:
Takeoff (climb)
Flight Type:
Military
Survivors:
No
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Moscow - Sochi - Hmeimim
MSN:
83A-572
YOM:
1983
Location:
Sochi-Adler
Krasnodar Krai
Country:
Russia
Region:
Asia
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
84
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
92
Aircraft flight hours:
6689
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Moscow-Chkhalovksy AFB at 0138LT on a flight to Hmeimin AFB located near Latakia, Syria, carrying 84 passengers and 8 crew members. At 0343LT, the aircraft landed at Sochi-Adler Airport to refuel. At 0525LT, the takeoff was initiated from runway 24. After a course of 34 seconds, the pilot-in-command initiated the rotation at a speed of 300 km/h. Shortly after liftoff, the undercarriage were raised and the pilot continued to climb with a nose-up angle of 15°. About 53 seconds after takeoff, at an altitude of 157 metres, the captain asked the flaps to be retracted while the aircraft was climbing to a height of 231 metres with a speed of 360 km/h. Following erroneous movements on the control column, the aircraft nosed down and its speed increased to 373 km/h when the GPWS alarm sounded in the cockpit. With a rate of descent of 30 metres per second, the aircraft reached the speed of 540 km/h, rolled to the left to an angle of 50° and eventually crashed in the sea some 1,270 metres offshore, at 05:25 and 49 seconds. The flight took 73 seconds between liftoff and impact with water. The wreckage was found 2,760 metres from the end of runway 24 and 340 metres to the left of its extended centerline, at a depth of 30 metres. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 92 occupants were killed, among them 64 members of the Alexandrov Choir of the Red Army, their Artistic Director, nine journalists, seven officers from the Ministry of Defence, two senior officials and one representative of a public Company who were traveling to Hmeimim Air Base to commemorate the New Year's Eve celebrations with Russian soldiers based in Syria.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a loss of control that occurred during initial climb by night over the sea after the pilot-in-command suffered a spatial disorientation due to an excessive neuropsychic stress combined with fatigue.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec M28 Skytruck off Tanjung Pinang: 13 killed

Date & Time: Dec 3, 2016 at 1022 LT
Type of aircraft:
PZL-Mielec AN-28
Operator:
Registration:
P-4201
Flight Phase:
Flight
Flight Type:
Government
Survivors:
No
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Pangkal Pinang – Batam
MSN:
AJE003-03
YOM:
2004
Location:
Tanjung Pinang
Riau Islands
Country:
Indonesia
Region:
Asia
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
13
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Pangkal Pinang Airport at 0924LT bound for the Hang Nadim Airport located on the Batam Island. En route, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens and crashed in the sea about 74 km southeast of Tanjun Pinang, in the Riau Islands. An hour later, around 1130LT, few debris and bodies were found by fishermen floating on water off Pulau Senayang. All 13 occupants were killed.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver I off Lopez Island

Date & Time: Sep 30, 2016 at 0837 LT
Type of aircraft:
De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver
Operator:
Registration:
N6781L
Flight Phase:
Landing (descent or approach)
Flight Type:
Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Kenmore – Roche Harbor
MSN:
788
YOM:
1955
Location:
Lopez Island
Washington
Country:
United States of America
Region:
North America
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
25000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1630.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7395
Circumstances:
While maneuvering at low altitude for a water landing, the commercial pilot of the float equipped airplane encountered low visibility due to ground fog. The pilot initiated a go-around, but the airplane impacted the water, bounced, and impacted the water a second time before coming to rest upright. The airplane subsequently sank, and all four occupants were later rescued. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical anomalies with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The operator further reported that other company pilots who were flying on the day of the accident stated that the low visibility conditions were easily avoided by a slight course deviation.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to land in an area of low visibility and ground fog, which resulted in collision with water.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Iliamna

Date & Time: Aug 8, 2016 at 1651 LT
Type of aircraft:
De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver
Operator:
Registration:
N95RC
Flight Phase:
Takeoff (climb)
Flight Type:
Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Lake, Sea, Ocean, River
Schedule:
Crosswind Lake - King Salmon
MSN:
970
YOM:
1956
Location:
Iliamna
Alaska
Country:
United States of America
Region:
North America
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
9780
Captain / Total hours on type:
535.00
Aircraft flight hours:
7632
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot of the float-equipped airplane was attempting a takeoff with the load of passengers that he had flown to the lake earlier in the day. The pilot's calculated takeoff distances for the water run and over a 50-ft obstacle were 1,050 ft and 2,210 ft, respectively. The pilot did not add a safety margin to his takeoff distance calculations. The approximate shore-to-shore distance of the takeoff path was 1,800 ft. During taxi, the pilot retracted the wing flaps, where they remained for the takeoff. GPS data showed that the airplane attained a speed of about 49 knots before impacting terrain just beyond the shoreline. The airplane's stall speed with flaps retracted was about 52 knots. Postaccident examination revealed that the left wing flap was in the fully retracted position; the right wing flap assembly was damaged. The airplane flight manual takeoff checklist stated that flaps were to be selected to the "TAKE-OFF" position before takeoff. Additionally, the takeoff performance data contained in the flight manual was dependent upon the use of "TAKE-OFF" flaps and did not account for no-flaps takeoffs. Even if the pilot had used the correct flap setting for takeoff, the calculated takeoff distances were near the available takeoff distance, and it is likely that the airplane would still not have been able to avoid a collision with terrain. The pilot stated that there was no mechanical malfunction/failure with the airplane, and he should have "done the right thing," which was to conduct two flights, each with a half load of passengers.
Probable cause:
The pilot's decision to perform the takeoff despite calculations showing that the distance available was inadequate, which resulted in impact with terrain.
Final Report:
Subscribe to Lake, Sea, Ocean, River