Eleuthera Island

The pilot departed Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport on a solo flight to North Eleuthera, Bahamas. While approaching Eleuthera Island, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances into the sea some 27 km west of the island. No trace of the airplane nor the pilot was found.

The commercial pilot and three passengers were making a personal cross-country flight over ocean waters in the MU-2B airplane. During cruise flight at flight level (FL) 240, the airplane maintained the same relative heading, airspeed, and altitude for about 2.5 hours before radar contact was lost. While the airplane was in flight, a significant meteorological information notice was issued that warned of frequent thunderstorms with tops to FL440 in the accident area at the accident time. Satellite imagery showed cloud tops in the area were up to FL400. Moderate or greater icing conditions and super cooled large drops (SLD) were likely near or over the accident area at the accident time. Although the wreckage was not located for examination, the loss of the airplane's radar target followed by the identification of debris and a fuel sheen on the water below the last radar target location suggests that the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent after encountering adverse weather and impacted the water. Before beginning training in the airplane about 4 months before the accident, the pilot had 21 hours of multi engine experience accumulated during sporadic flights over 9 years. Per a special federal aviation regulation, a pilot must complete specific ground and flight training and log a minimum of 100 flight hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) in multi engine airplanes before acting as PIC of a MU-2B airplane. Once the pilot began training in the airplane, he appeared to attempt to reach the 100-hour threshold quickly, flying about 50 hours in 1 month. These 50 hours included about 40 hours of long, cross-country flights that the flight instructor who was flying with the pilot described as "familiarization flights" for the pilot and "demonstration flights" for the airplane's owner. The pilot successfully completed the training required for the MU-2B, and at the time of the accident, he had accumulated an estimated 120 hours of multi engine flight experience of which 100 hours were in the MU-2B. Although an MU-2B instructor described the pilot as a good, attentive student, it cannot be determined if his training was ingrained enough for him to effectively apply it in an operational environment without an instructor present. Although available evidence about the pilot's activities suggested he may not have obtained adequate restorative sleep during the night before the accident, there was insufficient evidence to determine the extent to which fatigue played a role in his decision making or the sequence of events.The pilot's last known weather briefing occurred about 8 hours before the airplane departed, and it is not known if the pilot obtained any updated weather information before or during the flight. Sufficient weather information (including a hazardous weather advisory provided by an air traffic control broadcast message about 25 minutes before the accident) was available for the pilot to expect convective activity and the potential for icing along the accident flight's route; however, there is no evidence from the airplane's radar track or the pilot's communications with air traffic controllers that he recognized or attempted to avoid the convective conditions or exit icing conditions.

The pilot provided an emergency briefing to the passengers before departure. The outboard fuel tanks were empty and the inboard fuel tanks were filled before departure. After takeoff, the flight climbed to 8,500 feet msl and proceeded towards the destination airport. During cruise flight while flying at 1,000 feet msl approximately 10 miles from the destination airport , the left engine started losing power, but the airplane did not yaw; the left cowl flap was closed at the time. The pilot reported the left fuel flow light was on, but the fuel pressure was in the green arc (indicating approximately 38 to 42 psi). He switched each fuel selector to its respective outboard fuel tank though the outboard tanks were empty, turned on both emergency fuel pumps, and also attempted cross feeding fuel to the left engine in an effort to restore engine power but was unsuccessful. The left engine manifold pressure decreased to 18 inHg, and he was maintaining "blue line" airspeed plus a few knots with the right engine at full power. He slowed the airplane to less than blue line airspeed in an attempt to "gain altitude", and approximately 2 to 3 minutes after first noticing the loss of engine power from the left engine with the manifold pressure indication of 15 inHg, and after seeing boats nearby, he moved the left propeller control to the feather position but later reported the propeller did not feather. The left engine rpm was in the upper green arc through the whole event, and he did not see any oil coming out of the left engine cowling. The flight was unable to maintain altitude, and he advised the passengers to don but not inflate their life vests. He maneuvered the airplane into the wind near boats, and ditched with the flaps and landing gear retracted. All occupants exited the airplane and were rescued by one of the nearby boats. Each inboard fuel tank is equipped with a "surge tank" and a flapper valve, and also a sensing probe installed at the outlet of the tank. The airplane POH/AFM indicates that if the fuel flow light illuminates, and there is fuel in the corresponding tank, a malfunction of the flapper valve has occurred. The airplane was not recovered; therefore no determination could be made as to the reason for the reported loss of engine power from the left engine, nor the reason for the failure of the left propeller to feather.

The pilot stated that on the day of the accident he ordered fuel only on the first flight of the day. He said he did not add additional fuel during subsequent flights. He said he flew the accident airplane from Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to Chubb Cay, Bahamas, to Big Whale Cay, Bahamas, back to the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport. He said he then departed Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport with his next load of passengers and flew to the North Eleuthera Airport, North Eleuthera, Bahamas, without having refueled, and was returning from North Eleuthera, Bahamas, to the Fort Lauderdale International Airport, when he ditched the airplane off Dania Beach, Florida, in the Atlantic Ocean. When asked whether the fuel on board the airplane had been exhausted, the pilot stated, " the way the engines were acting, it seemed like the airplane ran out of fuel." On scene examination of the airplane, as well as follow on examination of its engines revealed no pre accident anomalies with the airplane or its systems. Information obtained from the FAA showed that at 1757, the pilot contacted FAA Miami Approach Control and advised "minimum fuel, further stating that he was not declaring an emergency at that time. At 1758, the controller responded, passing communications control to the FAA Fort Lauderdale Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT). In response to the pilot's initial communications call to the Fort Lauderdale ATCT, the pilot was given a clearance to land on runway 09R, and told that he was number one. At 1758:43, the pilot replied, asking if there was any chance of getting runway 27L, and at 1759:17, the controller instructed the pilot to descend at his discretion and remain slightly south of final for landing on runway 27L, and to expect 27L. At 1800:07, the pilot contacted the controller and stated, "two five yankee would like to declare an emergency at this time." At 1800:10, the controller responded, "two five yankee yes sir runway two seven left you are cleared to land the wind zero one zero at six." At 1800:16 the pilot responded acknowledging the wind report, and at 1800:27, the controller asked whether the nature of the emergency was minimum fuel, to which the pilot responded, "exactly two five yankee may be coming in dead stick. At 1800:40, the pilot stated that he had the airport in sight and will try to glide, and at 1801:32, the pilot said "two five yankee I'm going to be short of the shore." At 1802, the pilot ditched the airplane about 300 yards from the Dania Beach shoreline, in the area of John Lloyd State Park, in about 15 feet of water. The occupants of the airplane consisted of the pilot and four passengers. All exited the airplane and one passenger drowned in the Atlantic Ocean when according to the pilot "he was in a state of panic" when he tried to instruct him in the use of the life vest while they was in the water, and subsequently tried to use him for flotation when he tried to help him. All remaining passengers confirmed that the pilot had not given them any pre departure safety related briefing prior to or during the accident flight.

The flight departed Fort Lauderdale at 1626 and at 1654 in the vicinity of Bimini was advised to contact Nassau radio. The flight failed to contact Nassau and there were no further communications with the flight. Search efforts produced negative results. IMC prevailed on the proposed route of flight. Radar depictions showed the most severe weather to be between Miami and Bimini. Sigmet 7 issued at 1455 showed an area of embedded thunderstorms extending to a point 100 miles east of Miami with tops to 40,000 feet that was moving ne at 15 knots. The wreckage and all three occupants were not recovered.