Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

The crew was completing a training flight consisting of dropping survival equipment when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in the sea off Port de Pollença. Two crew members were rescued while two others were killed.

The pilot was conducting a charter positioning flight from Hamilton Island Marina to Whitehaven Beach, Whitsunday Island. At approximately 1615LT, pilot was landing the aircraft towards the south, about 600 metres off the beach, to avoid mechanical turbulence associated with terrain at the southern end of Whitehaven Beach. He reported that the approach and flare were normal, however, as the aircraft touched down on the right float, the aircraft swung sharply right and then sharply left. The left wing contacted the water, and the aircraft overturned. The pilot exited the upturned aircraft through the left rear passenger door and activated a 121.5 MHz distress beacon.

The aircraft was chartered by the Afghan Government to carry a delegation from Karachi to Kabul. After takeoff from Karachi-Quaid-e-Azam Airport, the twin engine aircraft continued to climb to an altitude of 9,000 feet when it entered an uncontrolled descent. At an altitude of 2,500 feet, the aircraft disappeared from radar screens then crashed in the Arabian Sea few km offshore. The stabilizers and the tail were found few hundred metres from the main wreckage. All eight occupants were killed, among them Juma Mohammad Mohammadi, Afghan Minister of Industry and four members of his cabinet as well as one Chinese businessman.

The fuel tanks were filled the day before the accident date, and on the day of the accident, the airplane was flown from that airport to the Miami International Airport, where the pilot picked up 2 passengers and flew uneventfully to Cuba. He performed a preflight inspection of the airplane in Cuba and noted both auxiliary fuel tanks were more than half full and both main tanks were half full. The flight departed, climbed to 8,000 feet; and was normal while in Cuban airspace. When the flight arrived at TADPO intersection, he smelled strong/fumes of fuel in the cabin. The engine instruments were OK at that time. The flight continued and when it was 10-12 miles from Marathon, he smelled something burning in the cabin like plastic material/paper; engine indications at that time were normal. He declared "PAN" three times with the controller, and shortly thereafter the right engine began missing and surging. He then observed fire on top of the right engine cowling near the louvers. He secured the right engine however the odor of fuel and fumes got worse to the point of irritating his eyes. He declared an emergency with the controller, began descending at blue line airspeed, and the fumes/odor got worse. Approximately 5 minutes after the right engine began missing and surging, the left engine began acting the same way. He secured the left engine but the propeller did not completely feather. At 400 feet he lowered full flaps and (contrary to the Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual) the landing gear in preparation for ditching. He intentionally stalled the airplane when it was 5-7 feet above the water, evacuated the airplane with a life vest, donned then inflated it. The airplane sank within seconds and he was rescued approximately 20 minutes later. The pilot first reported 4 months and 19 days after the accident that his passport which was in the airplane at the time of the accident had burned pages. He was repeatedly asked for a signed, dated statement that explained where it was specifically located in the airplane, and that it was not burned before the accident flight; he did not provide a statement. Examination of the airplane by FAA and NTSB revealed no evidence of an in-flight fire to any portion of the airplane, including the right engine or engine compartment area, or upper right engine cowling. Examination of the left engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The left magneto operated satisfactorily on a test bench, while the right magneto had a broken distributor block; and the electrode tang which fits in a hole of the distributor gear; no determination was made as to when the distributor block fractured or the electrode tang became bent. The left propeller blades were in the feathered position. Examination of the right engine revealed no evidence or preimpact failure or malfunction. The right hand stack assembly was fractured due to overload; no fatigue or through wall thickness erosion was noted. Both magnetos operated satisfactorily on a test bench. The right propeller was in the feathered position. An aluminum fuel line that was located in the cockpit that had been replaced the day before the accident was examined with no evidence or failure or malfunction; no fuel leakage was noted.

The twin engine airplane departed Santo Domingo-Las Américas International Airport on a short flight to the Santo Domingo-Herrera Airport located downtown. Following a night takeoff, the pilot encountered a loss of power on the right engine and was unable to feather its propeller. As the propeller was windmilling, he was unable to maintain a safe altitude and elected to ditch the aircraft that crashed in the sea about 800 metres offshore. The pilot was seriously injured and the passenger was killed.

At 0029, the pilot contacted Norfolk Approach and stated he was ready for takeoff on runway 01 at Elizabeth City. The controller instructed the pilot to fly runway heading and climb to 3,000 feet. At 0032, the controller advised the pilot that the flight was radar contact and for the pilot to fly heading 160 degrees. At 0034, the Norfolk Approach controller instructed the pilot to contact the FAA Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center. At 0034, the pilot of N1122Y contacted the controller at Washington Center, stating he was coming up on 3,000 feet. The controller acknowledged, and the pilot requested the non-directional beacon (NDB) approach to runway 5 at Dare County Airport, Manteo. At 0036, the controller instructed the pilot to fly heading 145 degrees for Manteo and fly direct to the NDB when he receives the signal. The pilot acknowledged and the controller also asked the pilot if he had the current weather for Manteo. The pilot responded that he did have the current weather. At 0043, the controller cleared the pilot for the NDB runway 5 approach at Manteo and to maintain 2,000 feet until the flight crossed the beacon outbound. The pilot acknowledged. At 0046, the controller informed the pilot that radar contact with the flight was lost and for the pilot to report a cancellation or a downtime on his radio frequency. The pilot acknowledged. At 0057:21, the controller called the pilot and the pilot responded by reporting the flight was procedure turn inbound. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. When the pilot did not report that he was on the ground, and further radio contact could not be established, controllers initiated search and rescue efforts. The wreckage of the airplane was located in the waters of Croatan Sound, about 1.5 miles west of the Dare County Regional Airport about 1000. The pilot was not located in the airplane. The body of the pilot was located in the waters of Croatan Sound on February 11, 2003. Post crash examination of the airplane, flight controls, and engine showed no evidence of precrash failure or malfunction. The propeller separated from the airplane and was not located after the accident. Damage to the mounting bolts for the propeller was consistent with the propeller separating due to impact with the water. Postmortem examination of the pilot showed no findings which could be considered causal to the accident.

The aircraft departed Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek Airport at 0105LT on a cargo flight to Macau with two pilots on board and a load consisting of leather parts and electronic materials. While cruising at an altitude of 18,000 feet off the Penghu Islands, the crew contacted ATC and was cleared to descend to 16,000 feet due to icing conditions. At 01h52, at an altitude of 17,853 feet, the stall warning sounded and the stick shaker activated. The crew disconnected the autopilot system and elected to maintain control of the airplane. Sixteen seconds later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and reached the speed of 320 knots with a rate of descent of 603 feet per second (more than 36,000 feet per minute) before crashing in the sea 17 km southwest of the city of Magong. Few debris were found floating on water and both pilots were killed.

Following an uneventful flight from Sanga-Sanga Airport (Tawi-Tawi Island), the pilot started the descent to Zamboanga Airport. On final approach, the twin engine aircraft lost height and crashed in the sea 300 metres offshore. All 14 occupants were rescued while the aircraft sank.

Shortly after takeoff from Manila-Ninoy Aquino Airport runway 31, while in initial climb, the captain reported technical problems and elected to return for an emergency landing. Finally, he attempted to ditch the aircraft off Manila. While contacting water, the aircraft lost its tail and sank by a depth of about 15 metres. Fifteen people were rescued while 19 others were killed, among them a crew member.

The airplane was destroyed by impact forces. There was no evidence of fire. Wreckage examinations and all recovered wreckage from the impact area revealed no evidence of an inflight collisionor breakup, or of external contact by a foreign object. An examination of the engine and the propeller indicated that the engine was producing power at impact. The recovered components showed no evidence of preexisting powerplant, system, or structural failures. Wreckage examinations showed crushing and bending consistent with a moderate angle of descent and a moderate right-wing-down attitude at impact. The amount of wreckage recovered indicates that all parts of the airplane were at the crash site. The wreckage was scattered over an area of about 600 feet. An examination of radar and airplane performance data indicated that the accident airplane initiated a descent from 3,000 feet immediately after the accident pilot was given a second traffic advisory by air traffic control. The pilot reported that the traffic was above him. At the time the pilot stated that he needed to deviate, data indicate that the accident airplane was in or entering an uncontrolled descent. Radar data indicated that, after departure from the airport, the closest identified airplane to the accident airplane was a DC-10, which was at an altitude of about 4,000 feet. The horizontal distance between the two airplanes was about 1.1 nautical miles, and the vertical distance between the airplanes was about 1,600 feet. The accident airplane was never in a location at which wake turbulence from the DC-10 would have intersected the Cessna's flightpath (behind and below the DC-10's flightpath). Given the relative positions of the accident airplane and the DC-10, wake turbulence was determined to not be a factor in this accident. Although the DC-10 was left of the position given to the pilot by Mobile Terminal Radar Approach Control, air traffic controllers do not have strict angular limits when providing traffic guidance. The Safety Board's airplane performance simulation showed that, beginning about 15 seconds before the time of the pilot's last transmission ("I needed to deviate, I needed to deviate"), his view of the DC-10 moved diagonally across the windscreen from his left to straight in front of the Cessna while tripling in size. The airplane performance simulation also indicated that the airplane experienced high bank and pitch angles shortly after the pilot stated, "I needed to deviate" (about 13 seconds after the transmission, the simulation showed the airplane rolling through 90° and continuing to roll to a peak of about 150° 3 seconds later) and that the airplane appeared to have nearly recovered from these extreme attitudes at impact. Performance data indicated that the airplane would had to have been structurally/aerodynamically intact to reach the point of ground impact from the point of inflight upset. There was no evidence of any other aircraft near the accident airplane or the DC-10 at the time of the accident. Soon after the accident, U.S. Coast Guard aircraft arrived at the accident scene. The meaning of the pilot's statement that he needed to deviate could not be determined. A review of air traffic control radar and transcripts revealed no evidence of pilot impairment or incapacitation before the onset of the descent and loss of control. A sound spectrum study conducted by the Safety Board found no evidence of loud noises during the pilot's last three radio transmissions but found that background noise increased, indicating that the cockpit area was still intact and that the airspeed was increasing. The study further determined that the overspeed warning had activated, which was consistent with the performance study and extreme fragmentation of the wreckage. Radar transponder data from the accident airplane were lost below 2,400 feet. The signal loss was likely caused by unusual attitudes, which can mask transponder antenna transmissions. A garbled transponder return recorded near the DC-10 was likely caused by the accident airplane's transponder returns masking the DC-10's returns (since the accident airplane was projected to be in line between the DC-10 and the ground radar) or by other environmental phenomena. Red transfer or scuff marks were observed on many pieces of the airplane wreckage, and these marks were concentrated on the lower airframe skin forward of the main landing gear and the nose landing gear area. The Safety Board and four laboratories compared the red-marked airplane pieces to samples of red-colored items found in the wreckage. These examinations determined that most of the red marks were caused by parts of the airplane, cargo, and items encountered during the wreckage recovery. The marks exhibited random directions of motion, and none of the marks exhibited evidence of an in-flight collision with another aircraft. A small piece of black, anodized aluminum found embedded in the left wing was subsequently identified as a fragment from a cockpit lighting dimmer. The accident occurred at night, with the moon obscured by low clouds. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, although visual conditions were reported between cloud layers. The terminal aerodrome forecast reported a possible cloud layer at 3,000 feet. Weather data and observations by the DC-10 pilot indicated that, after flying about 100 to 500 feet above the cloud layer and soon after sighting the DC-10, the accident airplane would have entered clouds. A number of conditions were present on the night of the accident that would have been conducive to spatial disorientation. For example, no visible horizon references existed between the cloud layers in which the pilot was flying because of the night conditions. In addition, to initiate a visual search and visually acquire the DC-10, varying degrees of eye and head movements would have accompanied the pilot's shifting of attention outside the cockpit. Once the DC-10 was visually acquired by the pilot, it would have existed as a light source moving against an otherwise featureless background, and its relative motion across and rising in the Cessna's windscreen could have been disorienting, especially if the pilot had fixated on it for any length of time. Maneuvering the airplane during this search would likely have compounded the pilot's resultant disorientation.