Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

The aircraft left an airfield located somewhere in the State of Apure, Venezuela, apparently bound for the US with three people on board. While flying north of Punto Fijo, above the sea, the crew was contacted by ATC but failed to respond. Convinced this was an illegal flight, the Venezuelan Authorities decided to send a fighter to intercept the Challenger that was shot down. Out of control, it dove into the Caribbean Sea and crashed off the coast of Aruba Island. All three occupants were killed and on site, more than 400 boxes containing cocaine were found.

On 7 January 2015 a Pacific Aerospace Limited 750XL aeroplane was being used for tandem parachuting (or ‘skydiving’) operations at Taupō aerodrome. During the climb on the fourth flight of the day, the Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-34 engine failed suddenly. The 12 parachutists and the pilot baled out of the aeroplane and landed without serious injury. The aeroplane crashed into Lake Taupō and was destroyed.

The aircraft left Surabaya-Juanda Airport at 0535LT and climbed to its assigned altitude of FL320 that he reached 19 minutes later. The crew contacted ATC to obtain the authorization to climb to FL380 and to divert to 310° due to bad weather conditions. At 0617, the radio contact was lost with the crew and a minute later, the transponder stopped when the aircraft disappeared from the radar screen. At this time, the aircraft was flying at the altitude of 36,300 feet and its speed was decreasing to 353 knots. It is believed the aircraft crashed some 80 nautical miles southeast off the Pulau Belitung Island, some 200 km from the Singapore Control Area. The Indonesian Company confirmed there were 156 Indonesian Citizens on board, three South Korean, one Malaysian, one Singapore and one French (the copilot) as well. At the time of the accident, the weather conditions were marginal with storm activity, rain falls and turbulence in the area between Pulau Belitung and Kalimantan. First debris were spotted by the Indonesian Navy some 48 hours later, about 150 NM east-south-east off the Pulau Belitung Island. About forty dead bodies were found up to December 30. The tail was recovered on January 10, 2015 and the black boxes were localized a day later. On January 12 and 13 respectively, the DFDR and the CVR were out of water and sent to Jakarta for analysis and investigations.

After landing at Belize City-Sir Barry Bowen Municipal Airport in marginal weather conditions, the single engine aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its right main gear, plunged into the sea and came to rest in shallow water. All six occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On Tuesday December 2nd, 2014 at approximately 8:45 am (1345Z) a Ferg’s Air Limited, Piper PA-31-350 Navajo aircraft, registration C6-REV, operated as Southern Air Limited Flight 302, ditched in waters approximately 6nm from shore in the southwestern district of New Providence. The flight originated at Governor’s Harbour, Eleuthera (MYEM) with 10+1 persons on board at approximately 8:15 am in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). At around 8:30am, the aircraft 15 nautical miles east of Lynden Pindling International Airport at 4,500 feet contacted Nassau Air Traffic Control Tower. The aircraft was instructed that runway 09 was in use and they can expect a landing on that runway. Upon final approach to runway 09, with the landing gears selected to the “EXTEND” position, only the nose and right main landing gear lights indicated the “down and locked” position. The left main landing gear light did not illuminate to indicate the “down and locked” position, so the landing was aborted and the pilot requested to go around so he could recycle and troubleshoot the landing gear issue. The pilot made a left turn, flew over the north western shoreline and recycled the landing gears a few times and also tried the emergency hand pump in an attempt to extend the gear. Despite all efforts, the left main landing gear light still did not illuminate to indicated the gear was in the safe “down and locked” position. At this time the aircraft was allowed to fly by the tower so that the controller may make a visual check of the landing gears to see if they were in the extended position. The controller advised the pilot that all gears “appeared to be extended”. Once again the pilot proceeded outbound to make another attempt for landing. For this approach the pilot made a right turn over the southwestern shoreline and proceeded downwind to runway 09. While on the downwind to runway 09 the pilot stated he began to experience problems with the right engine. The engine eventually stopped and all attempts to restart were unsuccessful. As a result of single engine operation, level flight could not be maintained even after retracting the gears and cleaning up the airplane. The decision was made by the pilot to ditch in the water vs. attempting to make the airport where numerous trees and obstacles would make the landing more difficult if the runway could not be made. After touching down on the water the most of the occupants were able to evacuate the aircraft through the normal and emergency exits before the aircraft sank into the ocean. One passenger died during the process. Witness stated that “the plane skipped across the water three times before rotating and hitting with a severe impact. The port (left) tail section received the bulk of the impact as did the port side of the plane.” Eye witness further stated that the passenger that died and “luggage from the baggage compartment were ejected from the rear of the plane on the port side.” “Multiple passengers could not swim or were extremely limited in their ability to swim.” Despite the plane having the full complement of survival equipment (life vests), only two were taken out of the aircraft. Passengers were holding on to bags and other debris that floated out of the aircraft as it submerged. Passengers helped each other until rescuers arrived to assist. Estimates from eye witness were that “the entire plane disappeared under water from 30 to 60 seconds after impact.” The depth where the aircraft came to rest on the water was reported as in excess of 6,500 feet. Once the aircraft settled, it submerged and was not able to be recovered. Safety concerns raised by eye witness could not be confirmed as the plane was never recovered.

The Air Tindi Ltd. Cessna 208B Caravan departed Yellowknife Airport, Northwest Territories, on 20 November 2014 at 0642 Mountain Standard Time under instrument flight rules as Discovery Air flight DA223 to Fort Simpson, Northwest Territories. The flight had been rescheduled from the previous night because of freezing drizzle at Fort Simpson. During the climb to 8000 feet above sea level, DA223 encountered icing conditions that necessitated a return to Yellowknife. On the return to Yellowknife, DA223 was unable to maintain altitude. At 0721, flying in darkness approximately 18 nautical miles west of Yellowknife, it contacted the frozen surface of the North Arm of Great Slave Lake. The aircraft sustained substantial damage when it struck a rock outcropping, but there were no injuries to the pilot or to the 5 passengers. The pilot established communication with Air Tindi via satellite phone, and the pilot and passengers were recovered approximately 4 hours after the landing. The emergency locator transmitter did not activate during the landing, but was activated manually by the pilot.

On October 29, 2014, at about 1840 Atlantic Standard Time, a Shorts SD3-60, United States registered N380MQ was destroyed when it crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff from Runway 28 at Princess Juliana International Airport, Sint Maarten, Dutch Antilles, Kingdom of the Netherlands. The two crewmembers on board sustained fatal injuries. The aircraft was operated by SkyWay Enterprises Inc. on a scheduled FedEx contract cargo flight to Luis Munoz Marin International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico. At 1839 local, Juliana Tower cleared the aircraft for takeoff Runway 28 - maintain heading 230 until passing 4000 feet. At 1840 local, Tower observed the aircraft descending visually and the radar target and data block disappeared. There were no distress calls. Night conditions and rain prevailed at the time of the accident. Coast Guard search crews discovered aircraft debris close to the shoreline about 1 ½ hours later. The Sint Maarten Civil Aviation Authority initiated an investigation in accordance with ICAO Annex 13. Local investigation authority personnel were joined by Accredited Representatives and advisors from the following states: the USA (NTSB/FAA), United Kingdom (AAIB and Shorts Brothers PLC), and Canada (TSB, TC, PWC). Organization of the investigation included the following groups: Operations, Accident Site and Wreckage, Powerplants, Aircraft Maintenance, Air Traffic Services, Meteorology, and GPS Study. The operator made available personnel for interviews but deferred to participate in the groups. Flight recorders were not installed nor required on this cargo configured aircraft. The original FDR and CVR were removed following conversion to cargo only operations. A handheld GPS recovered from submerged wreckage was successfully downloaded. Data revealed the aircraft past the departure runway threshold on takeoff and attained a maximum GPS recorded altitude of 433 feet at 119 knots groundspeed at 18:39:30. The two remaining data points were over the sea and recorded decreasing altitude and increasing airspeed. The wreckage was recovered from the sea and examined by technical experts. Assessment of the evidence concluded there were no airframe or engine malfunctions that would have affected the airworthiness of the aircraft. The experts concluded that the aircraft struck the sea while under normal engine operation. Operations and human performance investigators evaluated the evidence and analyzed extensive interviews. The investigation concluded that the aircraft departed from the expected flight path in an unusual attitude. The pilot flying most likely experienced a somatographic illusion as a result of a stressful takeoff and acceleration from flap retraction. The pilot’s reaction to pitch down while initiating a required heading change led to an extreme unusual attitude. Circumstances indicate the pilot monitoring did not perceive/respond/intervene to correct the flight path and recover from the unusual attitude. The aircraft exceeded the normal maneuvering parameters, the crew experienced a loss of control, and lacking adequate altitude for recovery, the aircraft crashed into the sea.

The crew departed Laguna de Tres Palos on a positioning flight to the Acapulco-General Juan N. Álvarez International Airport. During the takeoff procedure, the seaplane started to oscillate from left to right. At a speed of about 45 knots, the crew abandoned the takeoff procedure when the aircraft nosed down, plunged into water and came to rest, inverted and submerged. Both pilots evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine aircraft was performing a private flight from the island of Los Roques to Charallave-Óscar Machado Zuloaga Airport. Shortly after take off, while in initial climb, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in a lagoon, few metres off shore. All seven occupants evacuated and were slightly injured while the aircraft broke in two in shallow water.

The commercial pilot and his wife departed New York in their turboprop airplane on a crosscountry flight to Florida. About 1 hour 40 minutes into the flight and while cruising at flight level (FL) 280, the pilot notified air traffic control (ATC) of an abnormal indication in the airplane and requested a descent to FL180. The responding controller instructed the pilot to descend to FL250 and turn left 30°, and the pilot acknowledged and complied with the instruction; he then again requested a lower altitude. Although the pilot declined emergency handling and did not specify the nature of the problem, the controller independently determined that the flight had encountered a pressurization issue and immediately coordinated with another ATC facility to clear nearby traffic. The controller then issued instructions to the pilot to descend to FL200 and change course; however, the pilot did not comply with the assignments despite acknowledging the instructions multiple times. The pilot's failure to comply with the controller's instructions, his long microphone pauses after concluding a statement over the radio, and his confusion were consistent with cognitive impairment due to hypoxia. Further, the pilot's transmissions to ATC indicated impairment within 2 minutes 30 seconds of reporting the abnormal indication, which is consistent with the Federal Aviation Administration's published time of useful consciousness/effective performance time ranges for the onset of hypoxia. Military airplanes were dispatched about 30 minutes after the pilot's final transmission to ATC to intercept and examine the airplane. The pilots of the military airplanes reported that the airplane appeared to be flying normally at FL250, that both occupants appeared to be asleep or unconscious, and that neither occupant was wearing an oxygen mask. Photographs taken from one of the military airplanes revealed that the airplane's emergency exit door was recessed into the fuselage frame, consistent with a depressurized cabin. The military airplanes escorted the airplane as it continued on a constant course and altitude until it approached Cuban airspace, at which point they discontinued their escort. Radar data indicated that the airplane continued on the same flight track until about 5 hours 48 minutes after takeoff, when it descended to impact in the Caribbean Sea north of Jamaica. The flight's duration was consistent with a departure with full fuel and normal cruise endurance. Some of the wreckage, including fuselage and engine components, was recovered from the ocean floor about 4 months after the accident. Data recovered from nonvolatile memory in the airplane's global air system controller (GASC) indicated that several fault codes associated with the cabin pressurization system were registered during the flight. These faults indicated that the overheat thermal switch (OTSW), which was associated with overheat protection, had activated, which resulted in a shutdown of the engine bleed air supply to the cabin pressurization system. Without a bleed air supply to maintain selected cabin pressure, the cabin altitude would have increased to the altitude of the outside environment over a period of about 4 minutes. The faults recorded by the GASC's nonvolatile memory and associated system alerts/warnings would have been displayed to the pilot, both as discrete system anomaly messages on the crew alerting system (CAS) and as master warning and/or master caution annunciations. A witness report indicated that the pilot was known to routinely monitor cabin altitude while flying in the airplane and in his previous pressurized airplanes. Based on his instrument scanning practices and the airplane's aural warning system, he likely would have observed any CAS message at or near its onset. Thus, the CAS messages and the associated alerts were likely the precipitating event for the pilot's call to ATC requesting a lower altitude. The pilot was likely not familiar with the physiological effects of hypoxia because he had not recently been in an altitude chamber for training, but he should have been familiar with the airplane's pressurization system emergency and oxygen mask donning procedures because he had recently attended a transition course for the accident airplane make and model that covered these procedures. However, the pressurization system training segment of the 5-day transition course comprised only about 90 minutes of about 36 total hours of training, and it is unknown if the pilot would have retained enough information to recognize the significance of the CAS messages as they appeared during the accident flight, much less recall the corresponding emergency procedures from memory. Coupled with the pilot's reported diligence in using checklists, this suggests that he would have attempted a physical review of the emergency procedures outlined in the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH). A review of the 656-page POH for the airplane found that only one of the four emergency checklist procedures that corresponded to pressurization system-related CAS messages included a step to don an oxygen mask, and it was only a suggestion, not a mandatory step. The combined lack of emergency guidance to immediately don an oxygen mask and the rapid increase in the cabin altitude significantly increased the risk of hypoxia, a condition resistant to self-diagnosis, especially for a person who has not recently experienced its effects in a controlled environment such as an altitude chamber. Additionally, once the pilot reported the problem indication to ATC, he requested a descent to FL180 instead of 10,000 ft as prescribed by the POH. In a second transmission, he accepted FL250 and declined priority handling. These two separate errors were either early signs of cognitive dysfunction due to hypoxia or indications that the pilot did not interpret the CAS messages as a matter related to the pressurization system. Although the cabin bleed-down rate was 4 minutes, the pilot showed evidence of deteriorating cognitive abilities about 2 minutes 30 seconds after he initially reported the problem to ATC. Ultimately, the pilot had less than 4 minutes to detect the pressurization system failure CAS messages, report the problem to ATC, locate the proper procedures in a voluminous POH, and complete each procedure, all while suffering from an insidious and mentally impairing condition that decreased his cognitive performance over time. Following the accident, the airplane manufacturer revised the emergency procedures for newly manufactured airplanes to require flight crews to don their oxygen masks as the first checklist item in each of the relevant emergency checklists. Further, the manufacturer has stated that it plans to issue the same revisions for previous models in 2017. The airplane manufacturer previously documented numerous OTSW replacements that occurred between 2008 and after the date of the accident. Many of these units were removed after the GASC systems in their respective airplanes generated fault codes that showed an overheat of the bleed air system. Each of the OTSWs that were tested at the manufacturer's facility showed results that were consistent with normal operating units. Additionally, the OTSW from the accident airplane passed several of the manufacturer's functional tests despite the presence of internal corrosion from sea water. Further investigation determined that the pressurization system design forced the GASC to unnecessarily discontinue the flow of bleed air into the cabin if the bleed air temperature exceeded an initial threshold and did not subsequently fall below a secondary threshold within 30 seconds. According to the airplane manufacturer, the purpose of this design was to protect the structural integrity of the airplane, the system, and the passengers in case of overheat detection. As a result of this accident and the ensuing investigation, the manufacturer made changes to the programming of the GASC and to the airplane's wiring that are designed to reduce the potential for the GASC to shut off the flow of bleed air into the cabin and to maximize the bleed availability. Contrary to its normal position for flight, the cockpit oxygen switch was found in the "off" position, which prevents oxygen from flowing to the oxygen masks. A witness's description of the pilot's before starting engine procedure during a previous flight showed that he may not have precisely complied with the published procedure for turning on the oxygen switch and testing the oxygen masks. However, as the pilot reportedly was diligent in completing preflight inspections and checklists, the investigation could not determine why the cockpit oxygen switch was turned off. Further, because the oxygen masks were not observed on either occupant, the position of the oxygen switch would not have made a difference in this accident.