Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

The pilot's failure to maintain altitude, which resulted in collision with the terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment from carbon monoxide exposure in flight. The source of the carbon monoxide could not be determined because the wreckage could not be completely recovered.

Shot down by the pilot of a Colombian Air Force fighter.

The mechanic's incorrect installation of two aileron cables and the subsequent inadequate functional checks of the aileron system before flight by both the mechanic and the pilot, which prevented proper roll control from the cockpit, resulting in the pilot's subsequent loss of control during flight. Contributing to the accident was the mechanic's and the pilot's self-induced pressure to complete the work that day.

The accident resulted from impact with the ground without loss of control due to the combination of the following factors:
- The aircraft's climb profile did not meet the manufacturer's recommendations for speed and rate of climb,
- The center of gravity was outside the flight envelope,
- The total weight of the aircraft at the time of the accident was 124 kilos above the MTOW,
- Both pilots were tired due to a lack of rest time and a shift of more than 18 hours,
- The captain did not fly this type of aircraft since 1997 and was used to flying jets,
- The copilot had no experience on this type of aircraft despite being in possession of a valid license,
- The pilots' knowledge and understanding of the aircraft's systems and operation was inadequate,
- The operational checklists found on board the aircraft were not up to date,
- The pilots flew for the first time at night on this aircraft and for the second time together,
- The aircraft was operated under commercial rules on behalf of a travel agency while it could only fly privately,
- The instructor in charge of the training of both pilots and the person in charge of scheduling the flight refused to be questioned by the board of inquiry,
- An excessive workload for the crew and a lack of rest contributed to the pilots' loss of situational awareness,
- Both engines' compressors were running at low speed on impact,
- Both engines' propellers were turning at a speed close to low pitch,
- No mechanical anomalies were found on the engines and their components,
- Insufficient qualifications of the crew to fly on this type of aircraft,
- Pressure from the aircraft's owner to complete the flight,
- Crew fatigue and stress,
- Inadequate maintenance of the aircraft.

The accident was the result of many contributing factors which culminated in a stall-induced loss of control. During the initial climb after takeoff, an intermittent discontinuity in engine number 2’s auto feather unit (AFU) may have caused the automatic take off power control system (ATPCS) sequence which resulted in the uncommanded autofeather of engine number 2 propellers. Following the uncommanded autofeather of engine number 2 propellers, the flight crew did not perform the documented abnormal and emergency procedures to identify the failure and implement the required corrective actions. This led the pilot flying (PF) to retard power of the operative engine number 1 and shut down it ultimately. The loss of thrust during the initial climb and inappropriate flight control inputs by the PF generated a series of stall warnings, including activation of the stick shaker and pusher. After the engine number 1 was shut down, the loss of power from both engines was not detected and corrected by the crew in time to restart engine number 1. The crew did not respond to the stall warnings in a timely and effective manner. The aircraft stalled and continued descent during the attempted engine restart. The remaining altitude and time to impact were not enough to successfully restart the engine and recover the aircraft.
The following findings related to probable causes were noted:
An intermittent signal discontinuity between the auto feather unit (AFU) number 2 and the torque sensor may have caused the automatic take off power control system (ATPCS):
- Not being armed steadily during takeoff roll,
- Being activated during initial climb which resulted in a complete ATPCS sequence including the engine number 2 autofeathering.
The available evidence indicated the intermittent discontinuity between torque sensor and auto feather unit (AFU) number 2 was probably caused by the compromised soldering joints inside the AFU number 2.
The flight crew did not reject the take off when the automatic take off power control system ARM pushbutton did not light during the initial stages of the take off roll.
TransAsia did not have a clear documented company policy with associated instructions, procedures, and notices to crew for ATR72-600 operations communicating the requirement to reject the take off if the automatic take off power control system did not arm.
Following the uncommanded autofeather of engine number 2, the flight crew failed to perform the documented failure identification procedure before executing any actions. That resulted in pilot flying’s confusion regarding the identification and nature of the actual propulsion system malfunction and he reduced power on the operative engine number 1.
The flight crew’s non-compliance with TransAsia Airways ATR72-600 standard operating procedures - Abnormal and Emergency Procedures for an engine flame out at take off resulted in the pilot flying reducing power on and then shutting down the wrong engine.
The loss of engine power during the initial climb and inappropriate flight control inputs by the pilot flying generated a series of stall warnings, including activation of the stick pusher. The crew did not respond to the stall warnings in a timely and effective manner.
The loss of power from both engines was not detected and corrected by the crew in time to restart an engine. The aircraft stalled during the attempted restart at an altitude from which the aircraft could not recover from loss of control.
Flight crew coordination, communication, and threat and error management (TEM) were less than effective, and compromised the safety of the flight. Both operating crew members failed to obtain relevant data from each other regarding the status of both engines at different points in the occurrence sequence. The pilot flying did not appropriately respond to or integrate input from the pilot monitoring.
The engine manufacturer attempted to control intermittent continuity failures of the auto feather unit (AFU) by introducing a recommended inspection service bulletin at 12,000 flight hours to address aging issues. The two AFU failures at 1,624 flight hours and 1,206 flight hours show that causes of intermittent continuity failures of the AFU were not only related to aging but also to other previously undiscovered issues and that the inspection service bulletin implemented by the engine manufacturer to address this issue before the occurrence was not sufficiently effective. The engine manufacturer has issued a modification addressing the specific finding of this investigation. This new modification is currently implemented in all new production engines, and another service bulletin is available for retrofit.
Pilot flying’s decision to disconnect the autopilot shortly after the first master warning increased the pilot flying’s subsequent workload and reduced his capacity to assess and cope with the emergency situation.
The omission of the required pre-take off briefing meant that the crew were not as mentally prepared as they could have been for the propulsion system malfunction they encountered after takeoff.

Shot down by the pilot of a Venezuelan Air Force fighter.

The following findings were identified:
- The first compressor turbine blade failed after a fatigue crack, which had begun at the trailing edge, propagated towards the leading edge. The blade finally fractured in tensile overload. The separated blade fragment caused other blades to fracture and the engine to stop.
- The fatigue crack in the trailing edge of the blade was likely initiated by the trailing edge radius having been below the specification for a new blade.
- The P&WC Repair Requirement Document 725009-SRR-001, at the time the blades were overhauled, had generic requirements for trailing edge thickness inspections but did not specify a minimum measurement for the trailing edge radius.
- The higher engine power settings used by the operator since August 2014 were within the flight manual limits. Therefore it was unlikely that the operator’s engine handling policy contributed to the engine failure.
- The operator had maintained the engine in accordance with an approved, alternative maintenance programme, but the registration of the engine into that programme had not been completed. The administrative oversight did not affect the reliability of the engine or contribute to the blade failure.
- It was likely that the maintenance provider had not followed fully the engine manufacturer’s recommended procedure for inspecting the compressor turbine blades. It could not be determined whether the crack might have been present, and potentially detectable, at the most recent borescope inspection.
- The operator had not equipped its pilots with flotation devices to cover the possibility of a ditching or an emergency bale-out over or near water.
- The pilot had demonstrated that he was competent and he had the required ratings. However, it was likely that the operator’s training of the pilot in emergency procedures was inadequate. This contributed to the pilot making a hasty exit from the aeroplane that jeopardized others.