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USAir Flight 1016 was a domestic flight from Columbia (CAE) to Charlotte (CLT). The DC-9 departed the gate on schedule at 18:10. The first officer was performing the duties of the flying pilot. The weather information provided to the flightcrew from USAir dispatch indicated that the conditions at Charlotte were similar to those encountered when the crew had departed there approximately one hour earlier. The only noted exception was the report of scattered thunderstorms in the area. Flight 1016 was airborne at 18:23 for the planned 35 minute flight. At 18:27, the captain of flight 1016 made initial contact with the Charlotte Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) controller and advised that the flight was at 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The controller replied "USAir ten sixteen ... expect runway one eight right." Shortly afterward the controller issued a clearance to the flightcrew to descend to 10,000 feet. At 18:29, the first officer commented "there's more rain than I thought there was ... it's startin ...pretty good a minute ago ... now it's held up." On their airborne weather radar the crew observed two cells, one located south and the second located east of the airport. The captain said "looks like that's [rain] setting just off the edge of the airport." One minute later, the captain contacted the controller and said "We're showing uh little buildup here it uh looks like it's sitting on the radial, we'd like to go about five degrees to the left to the ..." The controller replied "How far ahead are you looking ten sixteen?" The captain responded "About fifteen miles." The controller then replied "I'm going to turn you before you get there I'm going to turn you at about five miles northbound." The captain acknowledged the transmission, and, at 18:33, the controller directed the crew to turn the aircraft to a heading of three six zero. One minute later the flightcrew was issued a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet, and shortly thereafter contacted the Final Radar West controller. At 18:35 the Final Radar West controller transmitted "USAir ten sixteen ... maintain four thousand runway one eight right.'' The captain acknowledged the radio transmission and then stated to the first officer "approach brief." The first officer responded "visual back up ILS." Following the first officer's response, the controller issued a clearance to flight 1016 to "...turn ten degrees right descend and maintain two thousand three hundred vectors visual approach runway one eight right.'' At 18:36, the Final Radar West controller radioed flight 1016 and said "I'll tell you what USAir ten sixteen they got some rain just south of the field might be a little bit coming off north just expect the ILS now amend your altitude maintain three thousand." At 18:37, the controller instructed flight 1016 to ''turn right heading zero niner zero." At 18:38, the controller said "USAir ten sixteen turn right heading one seven zero four from SOPHE [the outer marker for runway 18R ILS] ... cross SOPHE at or above three thousand cleared ILS one eight right approach." As they were maneuvering the airplane from the base leg of the visual approach to final, both crew members had visual contact with the airport. The captain then contacted Charlotte Tower. The controller said "USAir ten sixteen ... runway one eight right cleared to land following an F-K one hundred short final, previous arrival reported a smooth ride all the way down the final." The pilot of the Fokker 100 in front also reported a "smooth ride". About 18:36, a special weather observation was recorded, which included: ... measured [cloud] ceiling 4,500 feet broken, visibility 6 miles, thunderstorm, light rain shower, haze, the temperature was 88 degrees Fahrenheit, the dewpoint was 67 degrees Fahrenheit, the wind was from 110 degrees at 16 knots .... This information was not broadcast until 1843; thus, the crew of flight 1016 did not receive the new ATIS. At 18:40, the Tower controller said "USAir ten sixteen the wind is showing one zero zero at one nine." This was followed a short time later by the controller saying "USAir ten sixteen wind now one one zero at two one." Then the Tower controller radioed a wind shear warning "windshear alert northeast boundary wind one nine zero at one three.'' On finals the DC-9 entered an area of rainfall and at 18:41:58, the first officer commented "there's, ooh, ten knots right there." This was followed by the captain saying "OK, you're plus twenty [knots] ... take it around, go to the right." A go around was initiated. The Tower controller noticed Flight 1016 going around "USAir ten sixteen understand you're on the go sir, fly runway heading, climb and maintain three thousand." The first officer initially rotated the airplane to the proper 15 degrees nose-up attitude during the missed approach. However, the thrust was set below the standard go-around EPR limit of 1.93, and the pitch attitude was reduced to 5 degrees nose down before the flightcrew recognized the dangerous situation. When the flaps were in transition from 40 to 15 degrees (about a 12-second cycle), the airplane encountered windshear. Although the DC-9 was equipped with an on-board windshear warning system, it did not activate for unknown reasons. The airplane stalled and impacted the ground at 18:42:35. Investigation revealed that the headwind encountered by flight 1016 during the approach between 18:40:40 and 18:42:00 was between 10 and 20 knots. The initial wind component, a headwind, increased from approximately 30 knots at 18:42:00 to 35 knots at 18:42:15. The maximum calculated headwind occurred at 18:42:17, and was calculated at about 39 knots. The airplane struck the ground after transitioning from a headwind of approximately 35 knots, at 18:42:21, to a tailwind of 26 knots (a change of 61 knots), over a 14 second period.

The airplane stalled and crashed 1.2 nautical miles east of runway 28L during an ILS approach. The captain initiated the approach at high speed & crossed the FAF at a high speed without first having the airplane properly configured for a stabilized approach. The airspeed was not monitored nor maintained by the flightcrew. The airline had no specified callouts for airspeed deviations during instrument approaches. The captain failed to apply full power & configure the airplane in a timely manner. Both pilots had low flight time and experience in in the airplane and in any EFIS-equipped airplane. Additionally, the captain had low time and experience as a captain. Inadequate consideration was given to the possible consequences of pairing a newly upgraded captain, on a new airplane, with a first officer who had no airline experience in air carrier operations, nor do current FAA regulations address this issue.

The pilot had planned to conduct a night charter flight over Melbourne and Port Phillip Bay, starting from and returning to Essendon Airport. Dinner was to be served in flight. The pilot gave a safety briefing to the passengers before starting the engines. He completed engine runups and pre-takeoff checks, including selecting 20° of flap. At 2036 ESuT, in daylight, the pilot initiated takeoff on runway 17 using standard take-off power setting of 7.5 lb/in2 of boost and 3,000 RPM. Wind conditions were light and variable, visibility was about 10 km and the temperature was 19°C. The aircraft became airborne and, just as it achieved the take-off safety speed of 84 kts, at a height not above 50 ft, the right engine lost power. The aircraft yawed right. The pilot reported to the investigation team that he briefly noticed a reading of 3 lb of boost on the MAP gauge and assessed the problem as a possible partial right engine failure. He then selected the landing gear up but it did not retract. He cycled the landing gear selector once and the gear then retracted. By this time several seconds had elapsed and the airspeed had decayed to 76 kts. The pilot then assessed the airspeed as too low to retract the flaps and left them at 20°. The airspeed continued to decay until VMCA, 72 kts, was reached. When indicated airspeed had further decayed to 68 kts, the pilot reduced power on the left engine to avoid an uncontrollable roll to the right. He was able to maintain wings level and attempted to track the aircraft toward a street but was unable to maintain height. The aircraft collided with powerlines and then struck the roofs of several houses before coming to rest, on its left side, against the front wall of a house. About one minute had elapsed from initiation of takeoff until the accident. The pilot and all but one of the passengers remained conscious throughout the accident sequence. All occupants were evacuated, some without assistance and others with the assistance of the pilot, other passengers, emergency services personnel or bystanders.

Shortly after takeoff from Bogotá-El Dorado Airport, while climbing, the crew informed ATC about the failure of the left engine and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. While turning to the left, the aircraft stalled and crashed on a building housing a car dealership. All seven occupants on board the Cessna as well as six people on the ground were killed, among them the Director and the Deputy Director of the Civil Aviation Authority of Colombia. Seven other people on the ground were injured.

Shortly after takeoff from Güvercinlik AFB, while climbing in poor weather conditions, the crew reported engines problems and severe vibrations. He was cleared to divert to Ankara-Esenboğa Airport when the aircraft lost height and crashed on the parking of a post office located in the district of Yenimahalle in Ankara. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all five occupants were killed as well as one people on the ground, among them General Eşref Turgut Bitlis, Chief of the Turkish Police. At the time of the accident, visibility was limited to 1,500 metres due to snow falls with an OAT of -4° C.
Crew:
Yaşar Erian, pilot,
Yüzbaşı Tuğrul Sezginler, pilot.
Passengers:
Gen Eşref Turgut Bitlis,
Col Fahir Işık,
Sgt-Maj Emin Öner.

Shortly after takeoff from Cologne-Bonn Airport, while in initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and was cleared to return. While completing a turn, he lost control of the airplane that entered a dive and crashed onto a house located in Lind, less than 2 km south of the airport. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. There were no casualties on the ground.

The descent to Quito-Mariscal Sucre Airport was completed by night and poor weather conditions. On short final, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck a 10-floor building under construction and crashed about 3 km short of runway 35. All 10 occupants as well as three people on the ground were killed, among them General Carlomagno Andrade, Chief of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces.

The single engine aircraft departed Stockholm-Bromma Airport runway 12 at 0703LT on a charter flight to Biggin Hill, carrying two passengers and one pilot. During climbout, at an altitude of 1,500 feet, the pilot was cleared to turn right and to continue to climb to FL040. At an altitude of 2,200 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent then partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a residential area located in Åkeslund, south of the airport, three minutes after takeoff. Several cars and apartments were destroyed but no one on the ground was injured. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with clouds and turbulences.

The crew departed Martinsburg-Eastern West Virginia-Shepherd Field for a local training flight. While flying at low height, the four engine aircraft struck power cables and crashed onto a house located 3 km northwest of Berkeley Springs. All six crew members were killed while the unique person in the house was slightly injured.

The aircraft was on a flight from John F . Kennedy International Airport, New York, to Ben Gurion International Airport, Tel Aviv, with an intermediate stop at Schiphol Airport for a crew change and cargo processing. The aircraft arrived in Amsterdam at 13:40 and was scheduled for departure at 16:30 but received an air traffic control slot time of 17:20 for departure. The maintenance transit check was carried out. The aircraft was refuelled with 74,200 litres of Jet A1 fuel, making the total amount of fuel on board of 72 metric tons. The four people on board the aircraft at take off were the captain, copilot, flight engineer, and one non-revenue passenger. There was a total of 114.7 metric tons of cargo on board of which 6.5 metric tons were considered low grade dangerous goods. The flightcrew involved in the accident had arrived at Schiphol Airport on a previous El Al flight and had 20 hours crew rest prior to the beginning of their crew duty. The air traffic situation at Schiphol Airport prior to the departure of EI Al 1862 was not extraordinary, according to ATC witnesses. Two runways were in use, 01L for take off and 06 for landing. There was moderate inbound traffic for runway 06, a moderate number of departures from 01L and several VFR flights over the northern part of the city of Amsterdam. From the beginning of El Al 1862's emergency declaration, air traffic services for the flight were provided by Amsterdam Radar on 124.87, Schiphol Approach on 121.2, Schiphol Arrival on 118.4 and indirectly by Schiphol Tower. The captain requested clearance for push back at 17:04. The aircraft taxied out at 17:14. The copilot was to be the pilot flying (PF), and the captain was to be the pilot not flying (PNF). The takeoff roll on runway 01L started at 17:21, with a takeoff gross weight of 338.3 metric tons, and the aircraft followed the Pampus departure as cleared by ATC. The performance limited maximum takeoff gross weight for the prevailing conditions of the flight was 359.3 metric tons. No anomalies were evident during the initial climb until 17:27.30, as the aircraft was passing through an altitude of about 6,500 feet. The flight data recorder revealed that the n°3 and 4 engines and their pylons departed the right wing at this time. The copilot then transmitted the emergency call, "El Al 1862, mayday, mayday, we have an emergency". The aircraft turned to the right, and according to witnesses on the ground, started dumping fuel immediately. The Amsterdam Radar controller confirmed the emergency call and immediately cleared the area of other traffic. At 17:28.06 the controller, not knowing the reason for the emergency call, asked the crew if they wanted to return to Schiphol Airport. After the acknowledgement by the crew of their intention to return to the airport they were instructed to turn to heading 260 and were informed about their position relative to Schiphol Airport. At 17:28.17 the crew reported a fire on engine n°3 and subsequently they indicated loss of thrust on engines n°3 and 4. Witnesses heard one or more banging sounds and saw a dark plume of smoke trailing the aircraft. Some witnesses saw objects fall. Other witnesses also saw fire on the right wing which eventually disappeared. When the aircraft turned right two vapour trails were seen to emerge from the wingtips. At 17:28.57, El Al 1862 was informed that runway 06 was in use and the wind was 040° at 21 knots. The flight crew however requested runway 27 for landing. ATC then asked the crew if they could switch radio frequency to Schiphol Approach Control on 121.2 megahertz. The crew immediately switched frequency to Approach Control. Subsequently the flightcrew was instructed to switch to Schiphol Arrival on 118.4 megahertz. Because the aircraft was only 7 miles from the airport and still flying at an altitude of 5,000 feet, a straight in approach was not feasible and the crew was instructed to turn right to heading 360 and descend to 2,000 feet. The crew was again informed about the wind (by then 050° at 22 knots). About one minute later at 17:31.17 the controller asked what distance they required to touchdown. Shortly thereafter, the controller asked for the number of track miles the flight crew required for an approach. The crew stated that they needed "12 miles final for landing". Together with this reply to ATC, the call "Flaps 1" could be heard as background conversation in the cockpit. ATC instructed El Al 1862 to turn right to heading 100. During the turn the controller asked for the status of the aircraft and was informed : "n°3 and 4 are out and we have problems with the flaps". The airplane had turned through heading 100 and was maintaining heading 120. No corrective action was taken by the controller. The aircraft maintained an airspeed of 260 knots and was in a gradual descent. El Al 1862 was cleared for the approach and directed to turn right to heading 270 to intercept the final approach course. The airplane was then at an altitude of about 4,000 feet, with a ground speed of approximately 260 knots and on heading 120. The position was 3 nautical miles north of the centreline of runway 27 at a distance of about 11 miles projected on the extended centreline of runway 27. According to the radar plot, it took about thirty seconds before the aircraft actually changed heading. When it became apparent that the airplane was going to overshoot the localizer, the controller informed the crew accordingly and directed the aircraft to turn further to heading 290 in an attempt to intercept the final approach again but now from the south. Twenty seconds later a new heading instruction to 310 was given, along with descent clearance to 1,500 feet. The flightcrew acknowledged this instruction at 17:35.03 and added, "and we have a controlling problem". Approximately 25 seconds later the copilot called, "Going down 1862, going down ". In the first part of this transmission commands from the captain to raise all the flaps and to lower the landing gear could be heard. During the middle part of this transmission a sound was heard, and in the final part of the transmission another sound was audible. These sounds were later analyzed and determined to be the stick shaker and the ground proximity warning system respectively. The airplane crashed at 17:35.42 into an eleven-floor apartment building in the Bijlmermeer, a suburb of Amsterdam, approximately 13 km east of Schiphol Airport. The impact was centred at the apex of two connected and angled blocks of apartments and fragments of the aircraft and the buildings were scattered over an area approximately 400 meters wide and 600 meters long. Firefighting and rescue operations started shortly after the crash. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and the resulting fire. The accident occurred during dusk. All four occupants as well as 43 people on the ground were killed. 26 other people on the ground were injured, 11 of them seriously.