Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

On October 17, 2019, a Saab SA-2000 airplane, operated by Peninsula Aviation Services Inc. d.b.a. PenAir flight 3296, overran the end of runway 13 at Unalaska Airport (DUT), Unalaska, Alaska. The flight crew executed a go-around during the first approach to runway 13; the airplane then entered the traffic pattern for a second landing attempt on the same runway. Shortly before landing, the flight crew learned that the wind at midfield was from 300° at 24 knots, indicating that a significant tailwind would be present during the landing. Because an airplane requires more runway length to decelerate and stop when a tailwind is present during landing, a landing in the opposite direction (on runway 31) would have favored the wind at the time. However, the flight crew continued with the plan to land on runway 13. Our postaccident calculations showed that, when the airplane touched down on the runway, the tailwind was 15 knots. The captain reported after the accident that the initial braking action after touchdown was normal but that, as the airplane traveled down the runway, the airplane had “zero braking” despite the application of maximum brakes. The airplane subsequently overran the end of the runway and the adjacent 300-ft runway safety area (RSA), which was designed to reduce airplane damage during an overrun, and came to rest beyond the airport property. The airplane was substantially damaged during the runway overrun; as a result, of the 3 crewmembers and 39 passengers aboard, 1 passenger sustained fatal injuries, and 1 passenger sustained serious injuries. Eight passengers sustained minor injuries, most of which occurred during the evacuation. The crewmembers and 29 passengers were not injured.

The pilot reported that, during the approach and while the airplane was about 500 ft above ground level and 81 knots, he "felt the descent rate increase significantly." The pilot increased engine power, but "the high rate of descent continued," and he then increased the engine power further. A slow left roll developed, and he applied full right aileron and full right rudder to arrest the left roll. He also reduced the engine power, and the left roll stopped. The pilot regained control of the airplane, but the airplane's heading was 45° left of the runway heading, and the airplane impacted trees and then terrain. The airplane caught fire, and the pilot and passenger exited through the emergency exit. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the windscreens and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

On October 11, 2019 at about 0902 Kenya daylight time, a Silverstone Air Services Fokker 27 Mark 050 registration 5Y-IZO experienced runway excursion on takeoff runway 14 at Wilson Airport with 55 occupants onboard (5 crew and 50 passengers). The aircraft was performing a scheduled flight from Wilson airport to Mombasa, Lamu and back to Wilson airport. The aircraft was fueled then the passengers boarded the plane before the normal pre take off procedures which were reported as uneventful as collaborated by the information from the FDR. The Right Hand engine receded the Left Hand engine in startup as depicted by the parameters from the recorders. From engine startup, taxi, lineup runway 14, power up and including the initial stages of ground roll were uneventful. At 06.02.50 GMT, while still on ground roll take off, the LH engine ITT began to fluctuate, dropped from 707.8 to 175.8. The RH ITT remained stable. The other parameters of both engines were stable. Subsequent power down ensued at 06.03.01, IAS dropped from 110.2Knots and the aircraft magnetic heading increased gradually to 144 consistent with the deviation of the aircraft to the right of the runway axis when it left the paved surface of the runway, before colliding with the airport perimeter fence, went through an embankment before coming to rest tilted to the right after the starboard wing made contact with a tree. The passengers were deplaned through the two left hand side front and rear exit doors. Immediately the event occurred, ATS Wilson airport issued a crash alert and Wilson Airport Fire Service (AFS) responded without delay, found the passengers already evacuated from the aircraft and applied foam to the sections of the aircraft with leaking fuel. Runway 14/32 was closed and all inbound and departure traffic made use of the remaining runway. Preliminary information retrieved from the Flight Data Recorder Radar regarding the engine ITT seems to correlate with the flight crew statements regarding the observed fluctuations on the LHS engine ITT.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 11 at Monterrey-Del Norte Airport, while in initial climb, the single engine airplane lost height and crashed on a highway located past the runway end. Fortunately, the airplane did not struck any vehicles and eventually crashed in a field, about 15 meters below the motorway. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airline transport pilot arrived at the departure airport in the reciprocating engine-powered airplane where it was fueled with Jet A jet fuel by an airport employee/line service technician. A witness stated that she saw a "low flying" airplane flying from north to south. The airplane made a "sharp left turn" to the east. The left wing "dipped low" and she then lost sight of the airplane, but when she approached the intersection near the accident site, she saw the airplane on the ground. The airplane impacted a field that had dry, level, and hard features conducive for an off-airport landing, and the airplane was destroyed. The wreckage path length and impact damage to the airplane were consistent with an accelerated stall. Postaccident examination of the airplane found Jet A jet fuel in the airplane fuel system and evidence of detonation in both engines from the use of Jet A and not the required 100 low lead fuel. Use of Jet A rather than 100 low lead fuel in an engine would result in detonation in the cylinders and lead to damage and a catastrophic engine failure. According to the Airplane Flying Handbook, the pilot should witness refueling to ensure that the correct fuel and quantity is dispensed into the airplane and that any caps and cowls are properly secured after refueling.

On 03.10.2019, the crew of An-12BK UR-CAH aircraft operated by PJSC «AIRLINE «UKRAINE-AIR ALLIANCE», consisting of flight crew members and two aircraft technicians, performed flight UKL4010 en-route Toronto (Canada) - Toulouse (France) and at 06:15 UTC, it landed at the Toulouse aerodrome (France). The plane delivered 1537 kg cargo to the Toulouse aerodrome (France). After the completion of post-flight procedures, the flight crew went to rest at the hotel, while the technicians remained on the aircraft to perform technical works. The next flight was scheduled from Toulouse to Birmingham airport (Great Britain). However, during the day, at the initiative of the operator, it was decided to change the route and perform the flight en-route Toulouse - Vigo (Spain) - Istanbul (Turkey). At the Toulouse aerodrome, the plane was filled with 6,000 liters of fuel. Also in Toulouse, a flight engineer was replaced. At 16:16 UTC, the plane took off from Toulouse to Vigo without cargo. Landing at the Vigo aerodrome (Spain) was performed on 03.10.2020 at 18:20 UTC. At the Vigo aerodrome, the plane was loaded with vehicle spare parts with a total weight of probably 14078 kg. From the Vigo aerodrome (Spain), the plane took off on 03.10.2019 at 22:20, flight UKL4050, with a delay of 2 h 20 minutes. On 04.10.2020, at 03:17:29 UTC, the plane approached the airspace border of the Lviv control area. The crew contacted the controller of the Lviv ACC of LVE + LVW sector and reported about the approach to waypoint MALBE at FL250. The controller informed the crew about the establishment of the radar identification of the aircraft and instructed to wait for the procedure for radar guidance to RW-31 using the ILS system. At 03:20:27, under instruction the ACC controller, the crew listened to the ATIS "Romeo" information as follows: “Lviv, ATIS “Romeo” for 03:20. The ILS approach at the aerodrome uses low visibility procedures. Runway in use is RW-31. Runway surface condition known at 19:53 - wet, clear. The measured friction coefficient is 0.55. Estimated surface friction assessed as good. Transition level - 110. Warning: large flocks of birds in the aerodrome area and on the landing final. There is no wind. Visibility - 150 meters; visibility range on the runway at the touchdown point - 550 meters, in the middle of the runway - 550 meters, at the end of the runway - 550 meters, fog. Vertical visibility - 50 meters. Temperature + 3ºС, dew point + 3ºС. Atmospheric pressure QNH - 1013 hectopascals, QFE - 974 hectopascals. Weather forecast for TREND landing: visibility sometimes is 400 meters, fog; vertical visibility - 60 meters. Attention: the frequency "Lviv-taxiing" does not work, while taxiing, get in touch with the "LvivTower" at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. Please acknowledge receipt of Romeo's information." ATIS information was transmitted in English. At 03:22:14, the crew informed the controller about the completion of listening to ATIS information and received clearance to descend to FL120. At 03:22:40, the aircraft began its descent from FL250 and at 03:28:35 switched to the frequency of the ACC controller of the LVT sector. After contacting the controller of the ACC of the LVT sector, the crew reported a descend to FL120 to KOKUP point. At 03:29:08, the ACC controller of the LVT sector instructed the crew to continue descending to an altitude of 10,000 feet at atmospheric pressure QNH-1013 hPa, reported the transition level, and instructed to wait for radar guidance for ILS approach on RW-31. The crew confirmed the instruction to descent to 10,000 feet, QNH, transition level and reported expectation for radar guidance. At 03:30:14, LVT sector ACC controller began radar guidance. At 03:32:49, the controller instructed the crew to descend to 4,000 feet. At 03:35:33, LVT sector ATC controller instructed to descend to an altitude of 3200 feet, taking into account the temperature correction. The procedure for temperature correction at determination of flight levels by an air traffic controller during the radar vectoring was published in the Aeronautical Information Publication of Ukraine, UKLL AD 2.24.7-1 dated 12.09.2019. At 03:38:33, the ATC controller of the LVT sector provided the crew with information about its location of 27 km from VOR/DME LIV, instructed by the left turn to take a 340º heading, cleared the ILS landing approach to runway 31 and gave the control instruction to inform of “the localizer beam capture.” At 03:40:01 (the height above the runway was 1170 m, descent rate: -4 ... -4.5 m/s, speed 352 km/h, distance from the runway threshold: 15.7 km), the crew reported of the localizer beam capture. At 03:40:09, ATC controller of LVT sector instructed the crew to continue the ILS approach to RWY 31. At 03:40:26, the controller informed the crew about the weather conditions at the aerodrome: RW-31 runway visual range (RVR) in the touchdown zone – 800 meters, in the middle of the runway – 800 meters, at the end of the runway – 750 meters, vertical visibility – 60 meters, fog. The crew confirmed receipt of the information. At 03:41:22, the ATC controller of LVT sector instructed to switch the communication to the ATC Lviv controller at a frequency of 128.0 MHz. There were no irregularities in air traffic servicing of the An-12 aircraft, flight UKL4050, during the flight in the area of responsibility of the TMA Lviv "LVT" sector. To enter the glide path, the PIC increased the vertical descent rate. At 03:41:47, the crew established communication with the Tower controller. The distance from the threshold was 11.3 km, the elevation over the glide path was 70 m, the vertical rate of descent was -5.5 ... -6 m/s. After communication with the air traffic controller, the crew reported an ILS approach to RW-31 and the atmospheric pressure QNH setting of 1013 hPa. At 03:41:58, the Tower controller informed the crew about the absence of wind on the surface of RW-31 and gave clearance to land. The crew confirmed the landing clearance. According to the recorders, at this time the distance to the touchdown point was 7.58 km, the plane was 11 m below the glide path, the vertical descent rate was -4.5-5.5 m/s, and the speed was 290 km/h, the flight heading – 315º. At a distance of 5.0 km to the touchdown point, the plane was 25 m below the glide path. At a distance of 3 km from the touchdown, the plane descended to an altitude of 105 meters and continued the flight with the constant descent. At an altitude of 60 meters, an audible alarm was triggered on board the aircraft, when the decision height had been reached, to which none of the crew members responded. At a distance of 1348 meters from the threshold of the RW-31, at an altitude of 5-7 meters, the aircraft collided with trees, fell to the ground and came to rest at a distance of 1117 meters from the runway threshold. All three passengers were seriously injured and all five crew members were killed.

The pilot was conducting an instrument approach at the conclusion of a cross-country flight when the airplane entered a shallow climb and left turn away from the runway heading about 0.5-mile from the intended runway. According to airspeeds calculated from automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast position data, the airplane’s calibrated airspeed was 166 knots when it crossed over the final approach fix inbound toward the runway and was about 84 knots when it was on a 0.5-mile final approach. The airplane continued to decelerate to 74 knots while it was in a shallow climb and left turn away from the runway heading. At no point during the approach did the pilot maintain the airframe manufacturer’s specified approach speed of 85 knots. The airplane impacted the ground in an open grass field located to the left of the extended runway centerline. The airplane was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain in a wings level attitude. The postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The altitude and airspeed trends during the final moments of the flight were consistent with the airplane entering an aerodynamic stall at a low altitude. Based on the configuration of the airplane at the accident site, the pilot likely was retracting the landing gear and flaps for a go around when the airplane entered the aerodynamic stall. The airplane was operating above the maximum landing weight, and past the aft center-of-gravity limit at the time of the accident which can render the airplane unstable and difficult to recover from an aerodynamic stall. Additionally, without a timely corrective rudder input, the airplane tends to roll left after a rapid application of thrust at airspeeds less than 70 knots, including during aerodynamic stalls. Although an increase in thrust is required for a go around, the investigation was unable to determine how rapidly the pilot increased thrust, or if a torque-roll occurred during the aerodynamic stall.

The vintage, former US military bomber airplane was on a tour that allowed members of the public to purchase an excursion aboard the airplane for an LHFE flight. The accident flight was the airplane’s first flight of the day. During the initial climb, one of the pilots retracted the landing gear, and the crew chief/flight engineer (referred to as the loadmaster) left the cockpit to inform the passengers that they could leave their seats and walk around the airplane. One of the pilots reported to air traffic control that the airplane needed to return to the airport because of a rough magneto. At that time, the airplane was at an altitude of about 600 ft above ground level (agl) on the right crosswind leg of the airport traffic pattern for runway 6. The approach controller asked the pilot if he needed any assistance, to which the pilot replied, “negative.” When the loadmaster returned to the cockpit, he realized that the airplane was no longer climbing, and the pilot, realizing the same, instructed the copilot to extend the landing gear, which he did. The loadmaster left the cockpit to instruct the passengers to return to their seats and fasten their seat belts. When the loadmaster returned again to the cockpit, the pilot stated that the No. 4 engine was losing power; the pilot then shut down that engine and feathered the propeller without any further coordination or discussion. When the airplane was at an altitude of about 400 ft agl, it was on a midfield right downwind leg for runway 6. Witness video showed that the landing gear had already been extended by that time, even though the airplane still had about 2.7 nautical miles to fly in the traffic pattern before reaching the runway 6 threshold. During final approach, the airplane struck the runway 6 approach lights in a right-wing-down attitude about 1,000 ft before the runway and then contacted the ground about 500 ft before the runway. After landing short of the runway, the airplane traveled onto the right edge of the runway threshold and continued to veer to the right. The airplane collided with vehicles and a deicing fluid tank before coming to rest upright about 940 ft to the right of the runway. A postcrash fire ensued. Both pilots and five passengers were killed and all six other occupants as well as one people on the ground were injured, five seriously.

The owner of the airplane had purchased the airplane with the intent to resell it after repairs had been made. As part of that process, a mechanic hired by the owner had assessed the airplane’s condition, proposed the necessary repairs to the airplane’s owner, and had identified a pilot who would, once the repairs and required inspection annual inspection had been completed, fly the airplane from where it was located to where the owner resided. While the mechanic had identified a potential pilot for the relocation flight, he had not yet completed the repairs to the airplane, nor had he completed the necessary logbook entries that would have returned the airplane to service. The pilot-rated passenger onboard the airplane for the accident flight, was the pilot who had been identified by the mechanic for the relocation flight. Review of the pilot-rated passenger’s flight experience revealed that he did not possess the necessary pilot certificate rating, nor did he have the flight experience necessary to act as pilot-in-command of the complex, highperformance, pressurized, multi-engine airplane. Additionally, the owner of the airplane had not given the pilot-rated-passenger, or anyone else, permission to fly the airplane. The reason for, and the circumstances under which the pilot-rated passenger and the commercial pilot (who did hold a multi-engine rating) were flying the airplane on the accident flight could not be definitively determined, although because another passenger was onboard the airplane, it is most likely that the accident flight was personal in nature. Given the commercial pilot’s previous flight experience, it is also likely that he was acting as pilot-in-command for the flight. One witness said that he heard the airplane’s engines backfiring as it flew overhead, while another witness located about 1 mile from the accident site heard the accident airplane flying overhead. The second witness said that both engines were running, but they seemed to be running at idle and that the flaps and landing gear were retracted. The witness saw the airplane roll to the left three times before descending below the tree line. As the airplane descended toward the ground, the witness heard the engines make “two pop” sounds. The airplane impacted a wooded area about 4 miles from the departure airport, and the wreckage path through the trees was only about 75-feet long. While the witnesses described the airplane’s engines backfiring or popping before the accident, the postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, examination of both propeller blades showed evidence of low rotational energy at impact, and that neither propeller had been feathered in flight. Given the witness statement describing the airplane “rolling three times” before it descended from view toward the ground, it is most likely that the pilot lost control of the airplane and while maneuvering. It is also likely that the pilot’s lack of any documented previous training or flight experience in the accident airplane make and model contributed to his inability to maintain control of the airplane. Toxicology testing was performed on the pilot’s chest cavity blood. The results identified 6.7 ng/ml of delta-9-tetrahydracannabinol (THC, the active compound in marijuana) as well as 2.6 ng/ml of its active metabolite, 11-hydroxy-THC and 41.3 ng/ml of its inactive metabolite delta9-carboxy-THC. Because the measured THC levels were from cavity blood, it was not possible to determine when the pilot last used marijuana or whether he was impaired by it at the time of the flight. As a result, it could not be determined whether effects from the pilot’s use of marijuana contributed to the accident circumstances.

Upon landing at San Salvador de Paúl Airfield, the single engine airplane lost its nose gear and came to rest upside down. All seven occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.