Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

A loss of control as a result of an aerodynamic stall while completing a left turn due to an insufficient speed. During the last turn facing the setting sun, the pilot-in-command reduced the engine power excessively, possibly after suffering a loss of situational awareness. The short distance between the aircraft and the ground did not allow the crew to expect a stall recovery.

The failure of the right engine was the result of the failure of the fuel pump due to poor maintenance and a possible use beyond prescribed limits. The presence of iron oxide inside and outside the fuel pump as well as the lack of cleanliness of the internal components indicates a probable lack of maintenance. When the right engine stopped running, the generator No. 1 was then responsible for powering the aircraft's electrical system. As the latter was not in good working order, the primary generator could not withstand the overload and ceased to function, leaving only the battery to power the entire electrical system. To maintain power to critical systems, the crew would have had to select the backup power system. Since after the engine stopped, there was no monitoring of the electrical system, the pilots only realized the failure of the electrical system when they attempted to extend the landing gears. The emergency hydraulic system was then used to lower the gears, after which the crew did not return the system selection valve to the 'normal' position, resulting in the brakes and the steering systems to be inoperative after landing. The chain of failures may be associated with not reading the checklist when performing procedures after the engine failure.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor flight preparation,
- The crew failed to follow the SOP's, and took the decision to initiate the flight with an aircraft that was overloaded by 503 kilos,
- When the emergency situation presented itself to the crew, they failed to follow the checklist,
- On an organizational level, the company did not have an effective personnel training system in place, so that the crew did not have sufficient skills to respond to emergency situations,
- Because the aircraft was overloaded and that one engine was inoperative, the crew was forced to complete the approach with a speed higher than the reference speed,
- An improper use of the controls allowed the aircraft to land 700 meters past the runway 28 threshold, reducing the landing distance available,
- The crew focused their attention on the failure of the right engine and did not identify the failure of the electrical system, which delayed their tasks assignment, all made worse by the failure to comply with the checklist,
- The operations cleared the crew to start the flight despite the fact that the aircraft was overloaded on takeoff based on weight and balance documents,
- The crew did not prepare the flight according to published procedures and did not consider the total weight of the aircraft in relation to the number of passengers on board and the volume of fuelin the tanks, which resulted in an aircraft to be overloaded by 503 kilos and contributed to the failure of the right engine,
- A lack of maintenance on the part of the operator.

The accident was the consequence of a premature descent on part of the crew, combined with an incorrect evaluation of the altitude while completing a visual approach by night. The crew had little experience with night flights, which was considered as a contributing factor.

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from a truck while landing, and the vehicle operator's decision to ignore runway warning signals. Contributing to the accident was an inoperative vehicle gate system and the failure of airport management to adequately maintain the gate system and issue a NOTAM.

The crew was supposed to conduct several touch-and-go maneuvers and the instructor wanted to simulate an engine failure. Shortly after takeoff from runway 12, the aircraft rolled to the right while the right engine was turning at low RPM, presumably as a result of the instructor's decision to reduce the engine power. Due to a poor reaction by the pilot under supervision and an insufficient altitude to regain control, the aircraft lost altitude and crashed. The crew was supposed to initiate a left turn during initial climb, according to ATC instructions, but due to the power reduction on the right engine, the aircraft banked right then turned right and entered an uncontrolled descent. A wind from 090 gusting at 18 knots remained a contributing factor as it contributed to the aircraft rolling to the right.

The decision of the captain to continue the approach under VFR mode in IMC conditions to an airport that was not suitable for IFR operations. The following contributing factors were identified:
- The lack of ground references may have contributed to the commander's spatial disorientation,
- Although the weather conditions made it impossible to land under VFR conditions, the captain insisted on landing, neglecting IFR procedures,
- The captain ignored the copilot's advice and continued with the approach procedure,
- The captain put the aircraft in an attitude that caused it to stall,
- Poor judgment on part of the captain,
- Despite the implementation of a CRM program, the operator was unable to identify that the captain was violating the published procedures.