Ground fire of a Boeing 747-357 in Dhaka

Date & Time: Mar 25, 2008 at 0827 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TF-ARS
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Madinah - Dhaka
MSN:
22996/586
YOM:
1983
Flight number:
SV810
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
19
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
307
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
18137
Captain / Total hours on type:
5637.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7161
Copilot / Total hours on type:
261
Aircraft flight hours:
99327
Aircraft flight cycles:
18779
Circumstances:
TF-ARS (B747-300) was on a scheduled flight from Medina (Saudi Arabia) to Dhaka (Bangladesh), flight number SVA810. The flight crew consisted of a commander, copilot and a flight engineer. The cabin crew consisted of 15 crew members including one senior cabin attendant. Additionally to the cabin crew, one “off duty” cabin crew member was in the cabin. According to the commander, the flight from Medina and the landing at Dhaka was uneventful. During the landing roll, approximately 50 seconds after touchdown, the flight crew received a call from the tower controller where the tower controller inquired whether the aircraft was under control. The flight crew responded to the call by stating that the aircraft was completely under control and asked what the problem seemed to be. The controller then informed the flight crew that fire was observed at the right wing area. At this point the Aerodrome Fire Operator had already activated the fire fighters as well as the rescue team. As soon as the controller had informed the flight crew about the fire, the flight crew received a No. 3 engine fire alarm. The co-pilot immediately discharged the first engine fire bottle and the flight crew requested firefighter assistance and shut down all engines. The co-pilot waited 20 seconds until the second fire bottle was discharged. At this time the commander called the senior cabin attendant to the flight deck using the public address system (PA). This command was followed by a command to the cabin crew to remain seated. The commander informed the senior cabin attendant of the situation and instructed him to evaluate the situation and to evacuate the passengers if necessary. The senior cabin attendant went back down to the main deck and saw the smoke and the fire through the windows. He then commanded the cabin crew as well as passengers, by using a megaphone, to evacuate the aircraft. The cabin attendant at location L2 (see figure 6-7, page 21) had already operated the emergency exit and started evacuating the passengers. Cabin attendants at locations L1 and R2 (see figure 6-7, page 21) also operated their respective emergency exits. After realizing that smoke and fire were at the right hand side, the emergency exit at R2 was blocked by one of the cabin attendants. All passengers managed to evacuate without serious injuries and the fire department at Zia International Airport managed to extinguish the fire successfully. The damage to the aircraft was later evaluated as beyond economical repair.
Probable cause:
When TF-ARS was decelerating after landing on runway 14 at Zia International Airport, fuel leak at engine No. 3 resulted in a fire within the strut. The cause of the fire was that fuel was leaking through the flexible half coupling to the hot surface of the engine. The fuel leak was because the O-ring and retaining rings were not properly assembled within the coupling and one retaining ring was missing. The IAAIB considers unclear instructions in the aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) to be a contributing factor of the incorrect installation. Another incorrect installation was also found at the flexible half coupling at the front spar for engine No. 1. However there were no signs of a fuel leak in that area, most likely due to the fact that both the retaining rings and the O-ring were within the coupling even though they were incorrectly placed. During the investigation, it was not possible to determine the quantity of the fuel leak. However it is likely that the draining system within the strut of engine No. 3 could not manage the fuel leak. According to the manufacturer, the intention of the draining system is to drain drips or small running leaks. Furthermore the drain was clogged by debris, but IAAIB believes that this was a result of the fire. Two out of six suitable emergency exits on the left side were used (L1 and L2) to evacuate most of the passengers during the emergency evacuation. The reason for not opening doors at location L3, L4 and L5 initially was most likely due to the fact that the commander ordered the cabin crew to remain seated prior to the emergency evacuation. The cabin crew members at locations L3 to L5 most likely did not hear the emergency evacuation command from the senior cabin crew member as he was only using a megaphone. Furthermore these exits were not opened later since the passengers moved aggressively to the opened exits, L1 and L2. The reason for not opening emergency exit UDL at the upper deck was evaluated by the crew to be too risky for the passengers. The flight crew discharged both fire bottles for engine No. 3 without managing to extinguish the fire. The flight crew did not discharge fire bottles on other engines. According to the passenger evacuation checklist (see Appendix 2), the crew should discharge all fire bottles before evacuation.
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
- Incorrect assembly of the flexible half coupling at the front spar of engine No. 3.
- Retaining ring missing in flexible half coupling at the front spar engine No. 3.
- Lock wire fastened in such a way that the coupling nut might rotate slightly.
Findings as to risk:
- Unclear command made to the cabin crew to start emergency evacuation.
- Cabin crew did not open all suitable emergency exits.
- Flight crew did not follow company’s procedure regarding evacuation.
Other findings:
- Retaining rings and O-ring incorrectly inserted in the flexible half coupling on engine No. 1.
- Pliers used to tighten or loosen the coupling nuts, even though maintenance manual instructs to only hand tight the nuts.
Final Report:

Crash of a Dornier DO328-110 in Mannheim

Date & Time: Mar 19, 2008 at 1745 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
D-CTOB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Berlin - Mannheim
MSN:
3107
YOM:
1999
Flight number:
RUS1567
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
24
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1700.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
320
Copilot / Total hours on type:
130
Aircraft flight hours:
13029
Aircraft flight cycles:
13185
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Berlin-Tempelhof Airport, the crew started a LOC/DME approach to runway 27 at Mannheim Airport. The copilot was the pilot-in-command and reported to the captain he has difficulties to land in Mannheim. On approach, the aircraft descended below the prescribed altitude of 5,000 feet. At an altitude of 3,800 feet, some 100 feet below the Minimum Sector Altitude (MSA), the captain instructed the copilot to arrest the descent and climb back to 5,000 feet. After he was established on the localizer, the crew continued the approach. Shortly before landing, the aircraft floated over the runway and the touchdown zone and landed too far down the runway, about 530 metres past the runway threshold. After touchdown, the aircraft encountered difficulties to decelerate and was unable to stop within the remaining distance of 480 metres. It overran at a speed of 50 knots, lost its left main gear and came to rest against an embankment. All 27 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
 The following findings were identified:
- The throttle, after placement by the PIC (PF), could not be moved into 'ground idle' or reverse,
- The landing was not aborted after the plane had flown over the touchdown zone,
- The crew failed to initiate a go-around procedure,
- During the flare for landing, the engine throttles were not selected to 'flight idle', which was not noted by both pilots,
- The flight crew flew the approach not in accordance with SOPs, and thereby pushing and even exceeding the limits.
The following factors contributed to the accident:
- Many non-precision approaches and landings at Mannheim City were not performed according to air carriers OMs,
- The TRs and FOIs of the aircraft manufacturer were not incorporated into the OM/B and D of the air carrier,
- The practical training of the flight crew by the air carrier was inadequate in terms of preventing an erroneous operation of the throttle control on the basis of the manufacturer of the Do 328-100 issued instructions,
- The flight crew conducted a non-precision approach, which did not meet the procedural requirements of the OM of the air carrier and the AIP,
- The design of the power lever was not forgiving enough,
- The risks of existing problems in the operation of the power levers were not correctly identified and eliminated by by the relevant authorities and the relevant type certificate holder, in spite of several relevant events and various safety recommendations,
- The touchdown zone in Mannheim was not marked,
- The size and design of the safety area at the end of runway 27 was not sufficient to guarantee the operation of the flight within the safety levels set by ICAO and the legislator.
Final Report:

Crash of a Raytheon Premier in Udaipur

Date & Time: Mar 19, 2008 at 1507 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
VT-RAL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jodhpur - Udaipur
MSN:
RB-23
YOM:
2001
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2900
Captain / Total hours on type:
40.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
896
Copilot / Total hours on type:
58
Aircraft flight hours:
989
Aircraft flight cycles:
812
Circumstances:
The aircraft, after necessary met and ATC briefing took off at 0940 UTC from Jodhpur on direct route W58 at cruise FL 100 and sector EET 20 minutes as per Flight Plan. No abnormality was reported / recorded by the pilot during take off from Jodhpur. The crewmember of the aircraft while operating Jodhpur–Udaipur were the same who operated flight Delhi-Jodhpur on 18.3.2008. There were five passengers also on board the aircraft. The aircraft climbed to the assigned level where the pilot was experiencing continuous turbulence at FL100. The pilot communicated the same to the ATC Jodhpur and requested for higher level which was not granted and advised to continue at same level and contact ATC Udaipur for level change. It came in contact with Udaipur at 0944 UTC, approx 50 NM from Udaipur. At 0948 the weather passed by ATC was winds 180/07 kts. Vis 6 km. Temp 34, QNH 1006 Hpa and advised for ILS approach on runway 26. Consequently the pilot requested to make right base Rwy 26 visual approach, which was approved by the ATC. Aircraft did not report any defect/snag. Pilot further stated that during approach to land at Udaipur when flap 10 degree was selected, the flap didn’t respond and ‘Flaps-Fail’ message flashed. Thereafter he carried out the check list for flapless landing. At 1004 UTC when the aircraft reported on final the ATC cleared the aircraft to land on runway 26 with prevailing wind 230/10 Kts. The same was acknowledged by the crew and initiated landing. At about 20 to 30 feet above ground the pilot stated to have experienced sudden down-draft thereby the aircraft touched down heavily on the runway. The touch-down was on the centerline, at just before the touchdown Zone (TDZ), on the paved runway, after the threshold point. Consequent to the heavy impact both the main wheel tyre got burst; first to burst was right tyre. The aircraft rolled on the runway centerline for a length of about 1,000 feet in the same condition. Thereafter it gradually veered to the right of the runway 26 at distance of approx 2,200 feet runway length from the threshold of the runway. The aircraft left the runway shoulder and after rolling almost straight for another 90 ft it stopped after impact with the airport boundary wall.
Probable cause:
The approach speed for flapless landing was about 149 knots against the calculated speed 130-135 knots approx. Incident occurred as the aircraft impacted runway with higher speed while carrying out flapless approach and landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 737-408 in Batam

Date & Time: Mar 10, 2008 at 1020 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-KKT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jakarta - Batam
MSN:
24353/1721
YOM:
1989
Flight number:
DHI292
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
171
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On 10 March 2008, a Boeing Company 737-400 aircraft, registered PK-KKT, was being operated by Adam SkyConnection Airlines (Adam Air) as scheduled passenger flight with flight number DHI292. The flight departed Soekarno – Hatta Airport, Jakarta at 01:30 UTC with destination Hang Nadim Airport, Batam and the estimated time of arrival was 03:05 UTC. On board in this flight were 177 people consisted of two pilots, four flight attendants, and 171 passengers. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as pilot flying (PF) and the Second in Command (SIC) acted as pilot monitoring (PM). The flight until commencing descend was uneventful. Prior to descend, the flight crew received weather information indicating that the weather was fine. At 0302 UTC the flight crew contacted Hang Nadim tower controller and informed them that the visibility was 1,000 meters and they were sequence number three for landing runway 04. The flight crew of the aircraft on sequence number two informed to Hang Nadim tower controller that the runway was insight at an altitude of about 500 feet. The Hang Nadim tower controller forwarded the information to the flight crew of DHI 292, and followed this by issuing landing clearance, and additional information that the wind velocity was 360 degrees at 8 knots and heavy rain. The DHI 292 flight crew acknowledged the information. The landing configuration used flaps 40 degrees with landing speed of 136 knots. The flight crew were able to see the runway prior to the Decision Altitude (DA), however the PIC was convinced that continuing the approach to landing was unsafe and elected to go around. The Hang Nadim tower controller instructed the flight crew to climb to 3000 feet, maintain runway heading, and contact Singapore Approach. At 0319 UTC, DHI 292 was established on the localizer runway 04, and the Hang Nadim tower controller informed them that the visibility improved to 2,000 meters. While on final approach, the flight crew DHI 292 reported that the runway was in sight and the Hang Nadim tower controller issued a landing clearance. On touchdown, the crew felt that the main wheels barely touch the runway first. During the landing roll, as the ground speed decreased below 30 knots, the aircraft yawed to the right. The flight crew attempted to steer the aircraft back to centerline by applying full left rudder. The aircraft continued yaw to the right and came to stop on the runway shoulder at approximately 40 meters from the right side of the runway edge, and 2,760 meters from the runway 04 threshold. No one was injured in this accident. The aircraft was seriously damaged with the right main landing gear assembly detached and collapsing backward and damaging the right wing and flaps. The right engine was displaced from its attachment point.
Probable cause:
The Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) data were downloaded. The CVR data showed that the aircraft was flying below the correct glide path indicated by a glide slope aural warning, and the crew had difficulty in recovering the condition. The CVR also recorded landing gear warning after touchdown which indicated the landing gear had collapsed. The FDR data showed that the vertical acceleration during landing was 2.97 g, however this amount of vertical acceleration should not damage the landing gear. The FDR data showed that just after touchdown, the right main landing gear collapsed. The FDR also recorded that the aircraft experienced hard landing and had bounced on a previous flight, and the value of the vertical acceleration recorded was 1.78 g. It was most likely that the hard landing and bounce had affected the strength of the landing gear. The examination of the failed landing gear also found corrosion on the fracture surface of the right main landing gear strut.
Final Report:

Ground fire of a Transall C-160NG in Wamena

Date & Time: Mar 6, 2008 at 0920 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-VTQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jayapura – Wamena
MSN:
F235
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On 6 March 2008, a Transall C-160 aircraft, registered PK-VTQ, operated by PT. Manunggal Air, was on an unscheduled freight flight from Sentani Airport, Jayapura, to Wamena Airport, Papua. There were seven people on board; two pilots, two engineers, and three flight officers. The pilots reported that the approach and landing were normal. However, they told the investigators that both Beta lights did not illuminate during the landing roll, so they could not use reverse thrust. They reported that they used maximum brakes to slow the aircraft, and rolled through to the end of runway 15. During the 180-degree right turn at the end of the runway, they felt the left brakes grabbing, and had to use increased thrust on the left engine to assist the turn. After completing the turn, the pilots backtracked the aircraft towards taxiway “E”, about 450 meters from the departure end of runway 15. The air traffic controller informed the Transall crew that heavy smoke was coming from the left main wheels, and that they should proceed to taxiway “E” and stop on the taxiway. Before the aircraft entered taxiway “E”, the controller activated the crash alarm. The pilots stopped the aircraft on taxiway “E”, and the occupants disembarked and attempted to extinguish the wheel-bay fire with a hand held extinguisher. The airport rescue fire fighting service (RFFS) arrived at the aircraft 10 minutes after the aircraft came to a stop on taxiway “E”. It took a further 5 minutes to commence applying foam. The attempts to extinguish the fire were unsuccessful, and the fire destroyed the aircraft and its cargo of fuel in drums. Investigators found molten metal on the runway along the left wheel track for about 16 meters, about 100 meters from taxiway “E”, between taxiway “E” and the departure end of runway 15. There was also molten metal along the left wheel track on taxiway “E”.
Probable cause:
The aircraft’s left main wheels’ brakes overheated during the landing roll and a fire commenced in the brake assembly of one or more of the left main landing gear wheels. The evidence indicated that a brake cylinder and/or hydraulic line may have failed. It is likely that brake system hydraulic fluid under pressure, was the propellant that fed the fire. There was no Emergency Response Plan at Wamena. The RFFS delay in applying fire suppressant resulted in the fire engulfing the aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 500 Citation I in Oklahoma City: 5 killed

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2008 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N113SH
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Oklahoma City - Mankato
MSN:
500-0285
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
6100
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1378
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2
Aircraft flight hours:
6487
Circumstances:
On March 4, 2008, about 1515 central standard time, a Cessna 500, N113SH, registered to Southwest Orthopedic & Sports Medicine Clinic PC of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, entered a steep descent and crashed about 2 minutes after takeoff from Wiley Post Airport (PWA) in Oklahoma City. None of the entities associated with the flight claimed to be its operator. The pilot, the second pilot, and the three passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The flight was operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 with an instrument flight rules flight plan filed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated from the ramp of Interstate Helicopters (a 14 CFR Part 135 on demand helicopter operator at PWA) and was en route to Mankato Regional Airport, Mankato, Minnesota, carrying company executives who worked for United Engines and United Holdings, LLC.
Probable cause:
Airplane wing-structure damage sustained during impact with one or more large birds (American white pelicans), which resulted in a loss of control of the airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in Orenburg

Date & Time: Feb 29, 2008
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-43990
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1G211-09
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Orenburg-Tsentralny Airport, while climbing with a tailwind component, the skis collided with a concrete perimeter wall. The aircraft lost height and crashed 20 metres further. All 4 crew escaped unhurt while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900D in Kayenta

Date & Time: Feb 22, 2008 at 0745 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N305PC
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Flagstaff – Kayenta
MSN:
UE-299
YOM:
1997
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
5080
Captain / Total hours on type:
2700.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5524
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4207
Aircraft flight hours:
6497
Circumstances:
The captain initially flew the GPS (global positioning system) runway 2 approach down to minimums and executed a missed approach. The approach chart listed the minimum visibility for the straight-in approach as 1 mile, the minimum descent altitude (MDA) as 6,860 feet mean sea level (329 feet above ground level), and the missed approach point as the runway threshold. The audio information extracted from the CVR indicated the flight crew listened to the automated weather station at the airport twice during the second approach; both times the report stated, in part, "visibility one half [mile] light snow sky conditions ceiling two hundred broken one thousand overcast." At 0744:09, the first officer said, "there's MDA," and at 0744:27, "there's the runway right below ya." The CVR recorded the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) audio alert "sink rate, sink rate, sink rate, sink rate" at 0744:37, the sound of touchdown at 0744:52, and the sound of impact at 0745:00. According to both pilots, the airplane touched down even with the midfield windsock. The captain applied brakes and full reverse on both propellers; however, the airplane did not slow down and continued off the end of the runway, impacted and knocked down a chain link fence, and continued into downsloping rough terrain. The landing gear collapsed and the airplane slid to a stop. The operator reported that there was 2 to 3 inches of slush on the runway. The runway was equipped with pilot activated medium intensity runway lights, runway end identifier lights, and a visual approach slope indicator. The first officer said that on both approaches, he attempted to turn on the lights, but the lights did not activate. The Federal Aviation Regulation that specifies the instrument flight rules for takeoff and landing states, in part, that no pilot may operate an aircraft below the authorized MDA unless (1) the aircraft is continuously in a position from which a descent to a landing on the intended runway can be made at a normal rate of descent using normal maneuvers, and (2) the flight visibility is not less than the visibility prescribed in the standard instrument approach being used. The regulation further states that if these conditions are not met when the aircraft is being operated below the MDA or upon arrival at the missed approach point, the pilot shall immediately execute an appropriate missed approach procedure. In this case, the minimum required visibility was 1 mile versus the 1/2- mile visibility reported by the automated weather station. Additionally, the activation of the GPWS "sink rate" audio alert indicates a normal rate of descent was exceeded during the landing. Both of these conditions should have prompted the flight crew to execute a missed approach, which would have prevented the accident.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's failure to execute a missed approach, which resulted in a runway excursion after landing. Contributing to the accident were the inoperative lights, weather conditions below published approach minimums, and the slush contaminated runway.
Final Report:

Crash of an ATR72-212 in Putao

Date & Time: Feb 19, 2008
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XY-AIE
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Putao - Myitkyina
MSN:
458
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
JAB252
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
53
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll, the captain noticed an asymmetrical engine thrust and decided to reject takeoff. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, rolled for about 30 metres and collided with an embankment, coming to rest broken in two. All 57 occupants evacuated safely.

Crash of a Cessna 414 Chancellor in Benton: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 16, 2008 at 1845 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N41LP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Benton - Wichita
MSN:
414-0491
YOM:
1980
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
565
Captain / Total hours on type:
52.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6656
Circumstances:
According to witnesses, the airplane departed runway 35 and was observed flying in and out of the clouds. Several of the witnesses observed the airplane initiate a turn to the west. One witnesses commented that it was dark but he could still see the silhouette of the airplane. He observed the airplane descend below the trees. All of the witnesses reported flames and "fireballs." On scene evidence was consistent with the airplane impacting trees in a left turn. The airplane was destroyed. An examination of the airplane, flight controls, engines, and remaining systems revealed no anomalies. Weather observations and radar data depicted low clouds, and restricted visibility due to rain and mist, in the vicinity of the airport. Toxicological examination revealed cetirizine, an antihistamine, consistent with use within the previous 12 hours. Most studies have not found any significant impairment from the medication, though it is reported to cause substantial sedation in some individuals.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from the trees. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's flight into known adverse weather conditions and the low clouds and visibility.
Final Report: