Crash of an Embraer ERJ-190-100AR in Cuenca

Date & Time: Apr 28, 2016 at 0751 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HC-COX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Quito – Cuenca
MSN:
190-00372
YOM:
2010
Flight number:
EQ173
Country:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
87
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17523
Captain / Total hours on type:
2113.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3545
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2077
Aircraft flight hours:
11569
Aircraft flight cycles:
9707
Circumstances:
Following en uneventful flight from Quito, the crew initiated the descent to Cuenca-Mariscal La Mar Airport Runway 23. Weather conditions at destination were poor with rain falls and a contaminated runway. The pilot-in-command continued the approach below the glide and the aircraft passed over the runway threshold at a height of 37 feet instead the recommended 50 feet. The airplane landed 277 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 127 knots and the crew activated the spoilers and the reverse thrust systems. Due to poor braking action, the captain activated the autobrake system, without success. As the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining distance, the captain intentionally turn to the right when the aircraft ground looped, overran and came to rest in a grassy area. All 93 occupants were rescued, among them two passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The condition of the runway at Cuenca airport, which at the time of the plane's landing was contaminated with water and slippery.
- The landing was made after a non-stabilized approach with a tailwind.
- During seven seconds, the crew continued the approach with an excessive rate of descent of 1,186 feet, 186 feet above the limit of 1,000 feet.
- The non-application of the Maximum Performance Landing procedure recommended by the aircraft manufacturer for landing on contaminated runways.
- The dispatch of the flight with 1,500 kg of fuel more than the amount of fuel usually used for this flight.
- Omission of the runway length calculation necessary to perform the landing using the braking efficiency information.
- The crew's decision to make the final approach with three red and one white lights, using the PAPI system, induced by the information in the Terminal Information document issued by the company, which authorized this procedure.
- The use of confusing terminology in the Terminal Information document, which used terms applicable to the Airbus fleet, instead of Embraer's.
- The crew's decision not to perform the thwarted approach maneuver after the maximum allowable vertical speed was exceeded and visibility was apparently limited after the minima were exceeded.
- Incorrect use of aircraft braking aids, in this case reverse braking aids
- The application of the emergency brake that inhibits the antiskid system.
- Lack of implementation of adequate management of crew resources, particularly within the cockpit.
- Lack of training in the use of tables for track distance calculation.
- In reference to landing conditions, the aircraft needed a runway length of 2,122 metres while the available distance was 1,900 metres.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 300 Super King Air in Porto Seguro

Date & Time: Apr 21, 2016 at 1140 LT
Registration:
PT-MCM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Rio de Janeiro – Porto Seguro
MSN:
FA-52
YOM:
1985
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Circumstances:
On final approach to Porto Seguro-Terravista Golf Club Airport Runway 15, the twin engine aircraft descended too low, causing the left main gear to impact the ground short of runway threshold. On impact, the left main landing gear was torn off. The aircraft slid on runway for few dozen metres then veered to the left and came to a halt. All 10 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following factors were identified:
- Application of the commands - contributed
There was no effective action on the aircraft controls during the final approach to avoid a brutal impact with the ground prior to the runway threshold.
- Adverse weather conditions - undetermined
It is possible that the aircraft was under the effect of the phenomenon known as windshear, which affected the approach profil and the subsequent impact with the ground short of runway.
- Pilot judgement - contributed
The risks of a possible windshear during the final approach were not adequately considered by the pilot. The decision to proceed for the landing, to the detriment of the alternative recommended by experts to perform a missed approach, proved decisive for the development of the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-3C in Puerto Gaitán

Date & Time: Apr 6, 2016 at 0625 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HK-2663
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Puerto Gaitán – Villavicencio
MSN:
10210
YOM:
1945
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4058
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7934
Aircraft flight hours:
23291
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Puerto Gaitán Airport Runway 04, while on a cargo flight to Villavicencio, the left engine exploded and caught fire. As the aircraft was losing speed and height, the crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed in an open field located 2,6 km southwest from the airport, bursting into flames. All three crew members escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
Failure of the left engine following the detachment of the head of a cylinder shortly after takeoff. Deficiencies in maintenance processes contributed to this situation. The crew failed to follow the emergency procedures when the left engine caught fire and exploded, reducing the power on the right engine. In such conditions, the aircraft was unable to maintain a safe altitude and the crew was forced to attempt an emergency landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II off Sabaneta de Palmas

Date & Time: Apr 1, 2016 at 2200 LT
Operator:
Registration:
HI938
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
421B-0129
YOM:
1971
Country:
Crew on board:
0
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While flying by night, the twin engine airplane crashed under unknown circumstances in the lake of Maracaibo and came to rest few dozen metres off Sabaneta de Palmas. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Comp Air CA-9 in Campo de Marte: 7 killed

Date & Time: Mar 19, 2016 at 1523 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PR-ZRA
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Campo de Marte – Rio de Janeiro
MSN:
0420109T01
YOM:
2012
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
215
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Campo de Marte Airport runway 30, the single engine airplane entered a right turn without gaining altitude. Less than one minute after liftoff, the aircraft impacted a building located in the Frei Machado Street, some 370 metres from runway 12 threshold. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all seven occupants were killed. One people on the ground was slightly injured. Owned by the Brazilian businessman Roger Agnelli, the aircraft was on its way to Santos Dumont Airport in Rio de Janeiro. Among the victims was Roger Agnelli, his wife Andrea, his both children John and Anna Carolina, the pilot and two other friends. They were enroute to Rio to take part to the wedding of the nephew of Mr. Agnelli.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors
- Pilot judgment - undetermined
The absence of manuals and performance charts to guide the operation and actions based only on empirical knowledge about the aircraft may have taken to an inadequate evaluation of certain parameters related to its operation. In this case, the performance of the aircraft under conditions of weight, altitude and high temperatures may have provided its conduction with reduced margins of safety during takeoff that resulted in the on-screen accident.
- Flight planning - undetermined
The informality present in the field of experimental aviation, associated with the absence of support systems, may have resulted in an inadequacy in the work of flight preparation, particularly with regard to performance degradation in the face of adverse conditions (high weight, altitude and temperature), compromising the quality of the planning carried out, thus contributing to it being carried out a takeoff under marginal conditions.
- Project - undetermined
During the PR-ZRA assembly process, changes were incorporated into the Kit's original design that directly affected the airplane's take-off performance. Since the submission of documentation related to in-flight testing or performance graphics was not required by applicable law, it is possible that the experimental nature of the project has enabled the operation of the aircraft based on
empirical parameters and inadequate to their real capabilities.
- Support systems - undetermined
The absence of a support system, in the form of publications that allowed obtaining equipment performance data in order to carry out proper planning, added risk to operations and may have led to an attempt to take off under unsafe conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Oeiras

Date & Time: Mar 18, 2016 at 1630 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PP-JBL
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Teresina - Oeiras
MSN:
LJ-861
YOM:
1979
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Teresina on a business flight to Floriano, carrying seven passengers and one pilot, among them Ciro Nogueira, Senator of the State of Piauí and Margarete Coelho, Vice-Governor of the State of Piauí. En route to Floriano, the pilot was informed about the deterioration of the weather conditions at destination and decided to divert to Oeiras Airfield. After touchdown on runway 11 that was wet due to recent rain falls, the aircraft started to skid. Control was lost and the aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest in a wooded area, some 10 metres from the runway. All eight occupants were rescued, among them one passenger was slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors:
- Application of commands - undetermined
It is possible that the pilot has not acted properly in the controls after touchdown to avoid a runway excursion.
- Flight indiscipline - contributed
Having landed on a non-approved runway, without justifiable reason, the crew member did not comply with the provisions of civil aviation regulations.
- Influence of the environment - undetermined
The wet and puddled runway may have affected directional control and aircraft braking performances during the landing roll.
- Pilot judgment - contributed
The crew member had not correctly assessed the risks involved in the operation in an unapproved runway, without justifiable reason. In addition, the pilot had no considering that the wet and puddle conditions of the runway could affect the directional control and braking performances of the aircraft.
- Decision-making process - contributed
The decision to land at an unapproved aerodrome, as well as having used a wet runway and the presence of puddles denoted an inadequate assessment of the risks present in the context. Failures related to decisions assumed by the pilot contributed to the occurrence insofar as they resulted in the entry of the aircraft into a critical condition, affecting its control.
Final Report:

Crash of an IAI Arava 201 near Fátima: 22 killed

Date & Time: Mar 15, 2016 at 1430 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
E-206
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Shell - Shell
MSN:
090
YOM:
1992
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
19
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
22
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Shell Airport at 1251LT for a local training exercice with a crew of three and 19 paratroopers on board. About an hour into the flight, the crew informed ground he was returning to his base due to the deterioration of the weather conditions. Shortly later, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a wooded area. All 22 occupants were killed. Up to date, this is the worst accident involving an IAI Arava 201.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-820C Navajo in Santa Isabel

Date & Time: Feb 16, 2016 at 1430 LT
Operator:
Registration:
PT-WZA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jacarepaguá – Campinas
MSN:
820-020
YOM:
1976
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
En route, the pilot encountered an unexpected situation and attempted an emergency landing. After landing on a road in Santa Isabel, the airplane collided with various obstacles and came to rest. All three occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a Socata TBM-900 off Florianópolis: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 1, 2016 at 0519 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
PP-LIG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Florianópolis – Ji-Paraná
MSN:
1071
YOM:
2015
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1535
Captain / Total hours on type:
154.00
Aircraft flight hours:
195
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Florianópolis-Hercilio Luz Airport at 0515LT on a private flight to Ji-Paraná, carrying one passenger and one pilot. While climbing by night at an altitude of 3,600 feet, the pilot initiated a right turn. Then the aircraft completed a 360 turn and crashed in the sea off Campeche Island. Few debris were found the following morning floating on water and the main wreckage was found two weeks later. Both occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors:
- Application of commands – undetermined
Considering the hypothesis of spatial disorientation, of the disabling type, it is possible that the pilot has reached a situation of complete inability to operate correctly controls the aircraft in order to regain control of the flight.
- Attitude – undetermined
It is possible that the high subordination of the pilot to the requests of his boss has made it difficult for you to position yourself in relation to your limitation in flying at night and in instrument flight meteorological conditions.
- Disorientation – undetermined
Conditions favorable to disorientation, that is, the night flight over the sea, within clouds and manual operation, as well as the dynamics of the aircraft trajectory recorded by the radar, among other factors, make spatial disorientation the main hypothesis for the accident.
- Visual illusions – undetermined
It is also possible that the pilot suffered visual illusions when flying over the sea in night time. When not seeing the lighting on land, and being at night dark, with cloudiness, the pilot may have confused spatial references.
- Instruction – undetermined
It is possible that the lack of familiarity with the English language has made it difficult, in to some degree, knowledge of the resources, equipment and systems present in the aircraft, as well as in the instruction received in a flight simulator.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90GTi King Air in Paraty: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 3, 2016 at 1430 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PP-LMM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Campo de Marte - Paraty
MSN:
LJ-1866
YOM:
2008
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
801
Captain / Total hours on type:
319.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
159
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Campo de Marte Airport at 1334LT on a positioning flight to Paraty, with an ETA at 1415LT. While descending to Paraty Airport, the crew encountered instrument meteorological conditions. On final, while approaching under VFR mode, the aircraft impacted trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located in hilly terrain few km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors:
- Attention - undetermined
Moments before the accident, another aircraft successfully completed the landing at the Paraty aerodrome. It is possible that the pilot's attention was focused on this information, which indicated the possibility of landing, despite the critical conditions faced, leading him to take high risks to make the landing in critical conditions.
Also, the presence of a copilot not qualified to operate the aircraft may have influenced the pilot's cognitive processes, causing deconcentration or deviation of attention from the pilot.
- Attitude - contributed
Recurring attempts to make the landing indicated an excess of self-confidence on the part of the pilot, leading him to continue the flight to the Paraty aerodrome, even in adverse weather conditions.
The bold operational profile of the pilot, his past experience and the rules and values ​​adopted informally in the group of pilots are possible factors that influenced the development of this attitude of excessive self-confidence.
- Adverse weather conditions - contributed
On the day of the accident, the weather conditions were not favorable for visual flight at the Paraty aerodrome.
- Culture of the working group - contributed
Among the pilots who operated in the Paraty region, competitive behavior had been installed, valued by the social recognition attributed to those who managed to operate in critical conditions. Above all, landing under conditions adverse weather conditions in the region was considered a manifestation of proficiency and professional competence. The values ​​shared by that group of pilots favored the weakening of the collective perception about the present operational risks. The presence of other pilots who were also trying to land in the region on the day of the occurrence, as well as the landing made by one of these aircraft, moments before the accident, and also the accomplishment of two failed attempts of the PP-LMM aircraft, translates clear evidence of that behavior.
- Pilot forgetfulness - undetermined
The fact that the landing gear was not retracted during the second launch in the air indicated a failure, fueled by the possible forgetfulness of the crew, to perform the planned procedure. Maintaining the landing gear in the lowered position affected the aircraft's performance during the ascent, which may have contributed to the aircraft not reaching the height required to clear obstacles.
- Pilotage Judgment - undetermined
The possible decision not to retract the landing gear during the launch affected the aircraft's performance during the climb, which may have contributed to the aircraft not reaching the height necessary to clear the obstacles.
- Motivation - undetermined
The successful landing by the pilot of another aircraft, even under unfavorable conditions, may have increased the motivation of the pilot of the PP-LMM aircraft to complete the landing, in order to demonstrate his proficiency and professional competence.
- Perception - contributed
The occurrence of a collision with the ground, in controlled flight, indicated that the crew had a low level of situational awareness at the time of the occurrence. This inaccurate perception of the circumstances of the flight made it impossible to adopt the possible measures that could prevent the collision.
- Decision making process - contributed
The pilot chose to make two landing attempts at the Paraty aerodrome, despite adverse weather conditions, indicating an inaccurate assessment of the risks involved in the operation. This evaluation process may have been adversely affected by the competition behavior installed among the pilots. In this context, it is possible that the pilot based his decision only on the successful landing of another aircraft, a fact that limited his scope of evaluation.
- Organizational processes - undetermined
The PP-LMM aircraft was operated by a group of pilots, mostly composed of freelance professionals, who were informally managed by a hired pilot. Therefore, there was no formal system used by the operator to recruit, select, monitor and evaluate the performance of professionals. The failures related to the management of this process, possibly, caused inadequacies in the selection of pilots, in the crew scale, in untimely activations and, as in the case in question, in the choice of crew member not qualified to exercise function on board.
Final Report: