Oceania

During the takeoff roll from a grassy runway (780 metres long), the pilot noted standing water on the ground. He attempted to take off prematurely to avoid these puddles but the aircraft stalled and crash landed. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On the morning of 19 December 2003, the pilot began work about 0630 hours, flying from Te Kuiti aerodrome to an agricultural airstrip about eight nautical miles to the west. At that strip he completed a 150 tonne lime contract that had been started by two other aircraft the day before. Refuelling of the aircraft was completed approximately every hour, and the pilot stopped for a break with about four loads remaining. At 1400 hours, with the job completed, he flew to the strip from which he operated until the time of the accident. On arrival at this strip, the pilot completed a reconnaissance flight with the pilot of ZK-EMW, discussed their sowing plan, and agreed on a 1.1 tonne load with the loader driver. Take-offs were made to the south-west, landings in the opposite direction. The loader driver reported that the job was going smoothly, and that the pilot seemed in good spirits, at one stage miming wiping his brow, which the loader driver took to be a comment on the heat of the day. During this time, a third company aircraft, ZK-JAL, arrived at the strip and shut down, as the loader driver was able to handle only two aircraft at a time. The pilot of ZK-JAL flew a briefing sortie with the pilot of ZK-BXZ prior to the planned departure of ZK-BXZ. After each take-off, ZK-BXZ would turn left on to a downwind leg and then cross over the top (loading) end of the strip on the way to the sowing area. ZK-BXZ was working inward from the eastern boundary of the property, and ZK-EMW from the western boundary. While topdressing was in progress, fresh lime was being trucked to the strip and placed in the large fertilizer bin from which the loader was replenishing the aircraft. The lime was received directly from the processing plant, and was dry and free-flowing. As each load arrived, the farmer would mix a cobalt supplement with it in the bin. One of the truck drivers, who himself held a Commercial Pilot Licence (Aeroplane), took several photographs of the aircraft landing and taking off. One photograph showed ZK-BXZ leaving the end of the strip on probably its penultimate take-off, with ZK-EMW on final approach on the reciprocal heading. On this occasion ZK-EMW passed over ZK-BXZ just after the latter became airborne. The next photograph showed ZK-BXZ approximately two thirds of the way down the strip, with 20° of flap set on its final take-off, with dirt being thrown up by the wheels as it hit the soft spots in the strip. The driver did not watch the take-off beyond this point. The pilot of ZK-EMW initially reported that on his landing approach, he flew over ZK-BXZ while it was still on its take-off run. He later disputed this and claimed that ZK-BXZ had just become airborne when it disappeared from view under his right wing. In any event, ZK-BXZ only flew approximately 170 metres, so the proximity of these two aircraft was very close if ZK-BXZ was already airborne at this point in time. The close proximity of the two aircraft is significant as it is possible that ZKBXZ, being the lower of the two aircraft, may have encountered wake turbulence from ZK-EMW. All aircraft produce wake turbulence as a by-product of generating lift from their wings, the intensity varying with the aircraft’s speed, weight and configuration. The weather conditions, as discussed in the article appended to this report, were favourable for ZK-BXZ to encounter the wake vortices from the aircraft passing above. The first indication of the accident was a loud bang heard by the farmer – he was in the bin mixing in the cobalt supplement, and initially thought he had heard a truck tailgate slamming. Looking towards the end of the strip, he saw a plume of smoke and immediately went by motorcycle to investigate. On arrival at the scene, he found the aeroplane well ablaze, and was unable to get close because of the heat. As the accident occurred, a fourth company aircraft, ZK-EGV, arrived at the strip. The pilot did not see the actual impact, but flew over the burning wreckage on approach. As soon as he landed he went by foot to the accident site, as he had arrived too late to join those that had gone on board the loading vehicle. The loader driver used his fire extinguisher to quell the flames, but could do nothing to assist the pilot. After the extinguisher ran out, the fire flared up again, and all those present could do was to await the arrival of the Fire Service. The accident occurred in daylight, at approximately 1500 hours NZDT, at Mairoa, 10 nm south-west of Te Kuiti aerodrome, at an elevation of 1150 ft. Latitude: S 38° 22.9', longitude: E 174° 57.0'; grid reference: 260-R16-806117.

On Friday 3 October 2003, Convair 580 ZK-KFU was scheduled for 2 regular return night freight flights from Christchurch to Palmerston North. The 2-pilot crew arrived at the operatorís base on Christchurch Aerodrome at about 1915 and together they checked load details, weather and notices for the flight. The flight, using the call sign Air Freight 642 (AF642), was to follow a standard route from Christchurch to Palmerston North via Cape Campbell non-directional beacon (NDB), Titahi Bay NDB, Paraparaumu NDB and Foxton reporting point. The pilots completed a pre-flight inspection of ZK-KFU and at 2017 the co-pilot (refer paragraph 1.10.4) called Christchurch Ground requesting a start clearance. The ground controller approved engine start and cleared AF 642 to Palmerston North at flight level 210 (FL 210) and issued a transponder code of 5331. The engines were started and the aircraft taxied for take-off on runway 20. At 2032 AF 642 started its take-off on schedule and tracked initially south towards Burnham NDB before turning right for Cape Campbell NDB, climbing to FL210. The flight progressed normally until crossing Cook Strait. After crossing Cape Campbell NDB, the crew changed to the Wellington Control frequency and at 2108 advised Wellington Control that AF 642 was at FL210, and requested to fly directly to Paraparaumu NDB. The change in routing was common industry practice and offered a shorter distance and flight time with no safety penalty. The Wellington controller approved the request and AF 642 tracked directly to Paraparaumu NDB. At 2113 the Wellington controller cleared AF 642 to descend initially to FL130 (13 000 feet (ft)). The co-pilot acknowledged the clearance. At 2122 the Wellington controller cleared AF 642 for further descent to 11 000 ft, and at 2125 instructed the crew to change to the Ohakea Control frequency. At 2125:14, after crossing Paraparaumu NDB, the co-pilot reported to Ohakea Control that AF 642 was in descent to 11 000 ft. The Ohakea controller responded 'Air Freight 642 Ohakea good evening, descend to 7000 ft. Leave Foxton heading 010, vectors [to] final VOR/DME 076 circling for 25. Palmerston weather Alfa, [QNH] 987.' At 2125:34 the co-pilot replied ìRoger down to 7000 and leaving Foxton heading 010 for 07 approach circling 25 and listening for Alfa. Air Freight 642. At 2125:44 the Ohakea controller replied 'Affirm, the Ohakea QNH 987.' The crew did not respond to this transmission. A short time later the controller saw the radar signature for AF 642 turn left and disappear from the screen. At 2126:17 the Ohakea controller attempted to contact AF 642 but there was no response from the crew. The controller telephoned Police and a search for AF 642 was started. Within an hour of the aircraft disappearing from the radar, some debris, later identified as coming from AF 642, was found washed ashore along Paraparaumu Beach. Later in the evening an aerial search by a Royal New Zealand Air Force helicopter using night vision devices and a sea search by local Coastguard vessels located further debris offshore. After an extensive underwater search lasting nearly a week, aircraft wreckage identified as being from ZK-KFU was located in an area about 4 km offshore from Peka Peka Beach, or about 10 km north of Paraparaumu. Police divers recovered the bodies of the 2 pilots on 11 October and 15 October.

Crashed during bad weather. Andrew Wilde was flying and George Muir was a passenger. While enroute from Motu - Opotiki the gully became un-negotiable, so Andrew decided to return to Motu by flying a reciprocal course low level, depicted by arrows on his hand held marine GPS. During the return trip to Motahora up the Otara river valley, he found that the cloud base had lowered even further than when he entered the valley 6 minutes prior & he became fully reliant on that little GPS. The GPS became our enemy & lured Andrew into the cloud base, which ended our flight abruptly.
Testimony from George Muir, loader driver and passenger during this flight.

The aircraft took off from runway 24 right (24R) at Jandakot Airport, WA. One pilot and five passengers were on board the aircraft. The flight was being conducted in the aerial work category, under the instrument flight rules. Shortly after the aircraft became airborne, while still over the runway, the pilot recognized symptoms that he associated with a failure of the right engine and elected to continue the takeoff. The pilot retracted the landing gear, selected the wing flaps to the up position and feathered the propeller of the right engine. The pilot later reported that he was concerned about clearing a residential area and obstructions along the flight path ahead, including high-voltage powerlines crossing the aircraft’s flight path 2,400 m beyond the runway. The aircraft was approximately 450 m beyond the upwind threshold of runway 24R when the pilot initiated a series of left turns. Analysis of radar records indicated that during the turns, the airspeed of the aircraft reduced significantly below the airspeed required for optimum single-engine performance. The pilot transmitted to the aerodrome controller that he was returning for a landing and indicated an intention to land on runway 30. However, the airspeed decayed during the subsequent manoeuvring such that he was unable to safely complete the approach to that runway. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude and the aircraft descended into an area of scrub-type terrain, moderately populated with trees. During the impact sequence at about 1537, the outboard portion of the left wing collided with a tree trunk and was sheared off. A significant quantity of fuel was spilled from the wing’s fuel tank and ignited. An intense postimpact fire broke out in the vicinity of the wreckage and destroyed the aircraft. Four passengers and the pilot vacated the aircraft, but sustained serious burns in the process. One of those passengers died from those injuries 85 days after the accident. A fifth passenger did not survive the post-impact fire.

The aircraft was on an air transport charter flight from Palmerston North to Christchurch with one pilot and 9 passengers. At 1907 it was on an instrument approach to Christchurch Aerodrome at
night in instrument meteorological conditions when it descended below minimum altitude, in a position where reduced visibility prevented runway or approach lights from being seen, to collide with trees and terrain 1.2 nm short of the runway. The pilot and 7 passengers were killed, and 2 passengers received serious injury. The aircraft was destroyed. The accident probably resulted from the pilot becoming distracted from monitoring his altitude at a critical stage of the approach. The possibility of pilot incapacitation is considered unlikely, but cannot be ruled out.

The aircraft impacted the sea or a reef about 6 km north-east of Coffs Harbour airport. The impact occurred immediately after the pilot initiated a go-around during an instrument approach to runway 21 in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) that included heavy rain and restricted visibility. Although the aircraft sustained structural damage and the left main gear detached, the aircraft remained airborne. During the initial go-around climb, the aircraft narrowly missed a breakwater and adjacent restaurant at the Coffs Harbour boat harbour. Shortly after, the pilot noticed that the primary attitude indicator had failed, requiring him to refer to the standby instrument to recover from an inadvertent turn. The pilot positioned the aircraft over the sea and held for about 30 minutes before returning to Coffs Harbour and landing the damaged aircraft on runway 21. There were no injuries or any other damage to property and/or the environment because of the accident. The aircraft was on a routine aeromedical flight from Sydney to Coffs Harbour with the pilot, two flight nurses, and a stretcher patient on board. The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) in predominantly instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). During the descent, the enroute air traffic controller advised the pilot to expect the runway 21 Global Positioning System (GPS) non-precision approach (NPA). The pilot reported that he reviewed the approach diagram and planned a 3-degree descent profile. He noted the appropriate altitudes, including the correct minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 580 ft, on a reference card. A copy of the approach diagram used by the pilot is at Appendix A. The aerodrome controller advised the pilot of the possibility of a holding pattern due to a preceding IFR aircraft being sequenced for an instrument approach to runway 21. The controller subsequently advised that holding would not be required if the initial approach fix (SCHNC)2 was reached not before 0825. At about 0818, the aerodrome controller advised the pilot of the preceding aircraft that the weather conditions in the area of the final approach were a visibility of 5000 m and an approximate cloud base of 1,000 ft. At 0825 the aerodrome controller cleared the pilot of the King Air to track the aircraft from the initial approach fix to the intermediate fix (SCHNI) and to descend to not below 3,500 ft. The published minimum crossing altitude was 3,600 ft. About one minute later the pilot reported that he was leaving 5,500 ft and was established inbound on the approach. At 0828 the pilot reported approaching the intermediate fix and 3,500 ft. The controller advised that further descent was not available until the preceding aircraft was visible from the tower. At 0829 the controller, having sighted the preceding aircraft, cleared the pilot of the King Air to continue descent to 2,500 ft. The pilot advised the controller that he was 2.2 NM from the final approach fix (SCHNF). At that point an aircraft on a 3-degree approach slope to the threshold would be at about 2,500 ft. The controller then cleared the pilot for the runway 21 GPS approach, effectively a clearance to descend as required. The pilot subsequently explained that he was high on his planned 3-degree descent profile because separation with the preceding aircraft resulted in a late descent clearance. He had hand flown the approach, and although he recalled setting the altitude alerter to the 3,500 ft and 2,500 ft clearance limits, he could not recall setting the 580 ft MDA. He stated that he had not intended to descend below the MDA until he was visual, and that he had started to scan outside the cockpit at about 800 ft altitude in expectation of becoming visual. The pilot recalled levelling the aircraft, but a short time later experienced a 'sinking feeling'. That prompted him to go-around by advancing the propeller and engine power levers, and establishing the aircraft in a nose-up attitude. The passenger in the right front seat reported experiencing a similar 'falling sensation' and observed the pilot's altimeter moving rapidly 'down through 200 ft' before it stopped at about 50 ft. She saw what looked like a beach and exclaimed 'land' about the same time as the pilot applied power. The pilot felt a 'thump' just after he had initiated the go-around. The passenger recalled feeling a 'jolt' as the aircraft began to climb. Witnesses on the northern breakwater of the Coffs Harbour boat harbour observed an aircraft appear out of the heavy rain and mist from the north-east. They reported that it seemed to strike the breakwater wall and then passed over an adjacent restaurant at a very low altitude before it was lost from sight. Wheels from the left landing gear were seen to ricochet into the air and one of the two wheels was seen to fall into the water. The other wheel was found lodged among the rocks of the breakwater.During the go-around the pilot unsuccessfully attempted to raise the landing gear, so he reselected the landing gear selector to the 'down' position. He was unable to retract the wing flaps. It was then that he experienced a strong g-force and realised that he was in a turn. He saw that the primary attitude indicator had 'toppled' and referred to the standby attitude indicator, which showed that the aircraft was in a 70-degree right bank. He rapidly regained control of the aircraft and turned it onto an easterly heading, away from land. The inverter fail light illuminated but the pilot did not recall any associated master warning annunciator. He then selected the number-2 inverter to restore power to the primary attitude indicator, and it commenced to operate normally. The pilot observed that the left main landing gear had separated from the aircraft. He continued to manoeuvre over water while awaiting an improvement in weather conditions that would permit a visual approach. About 4 minutes after the King Air commenced the go-around, the aerodrome controller received a telephone call advising that a person at the Coffs Harbour boat harbour had witnessed an aircraft flying low over the harbour, and that the aircraft had '…hit something and the wheel came off'. The controller contacted the pilot, who confirmed that the aircraft was damaged. The controller declared a distress phase and activated the emergency response services to position for the aircraft's landing. Witnesses reported that the landing was smooth. As the aircraft came to rest on the runway, foam was applied around the aircraft to minimise the likelihood of fire. The occupants exited the aircraft through the main cabin door.

The pilot had arranged to topdress properties for three clients, one of whom had three separate blocks to be treated. He departed from Stratford Aerodrome at 0653 hours in ZK-LTF for the first airstrip, located some 7 km to the north-east. After an initial reconnaissance flight, he began topdressing at 0722, and finished this block at 1034 hours. Via brief landings at Stratford and another airstrip 11 km to the north, he positioned the aircraft to a strip near Huiroa. The remainder of the day’s work was carried out from this strip. Four blocks were treated from this location: the first was 8 km to the north-west of the strip, the second immediately to the north, the third some 3 km west and the last 4.5 km to the south, adjacent to the Strathmore Saddle. A reconnaissance of the fourth block was flown at 1518, but actual spreading on this property was not commenced until 1755 hours. Two loads of urea were spread on the fourth block between 1755 and 1812 hours, with a 12-minute pause until the final take-off at 1824. During this break, the last of the urea was loaded, the fertiliser bins secured and the loading vehicle parked. It is not known if the aircraft was refuelled at this time. The loader driver boarded the aircraft after completing his duties, the apparent intention being to accompany the pilot back to Stratford on completion of the last drop. On arrival over the property at 1825, the pilot performed one run towards the south, made a left reversal turn, spread another swath on a northerly heading, and pulled up to commence another reversal turn to the left. At some time after this pull-up, the aeroplane struck the ground heavily on a south-westerly heading, killing both occupants on impact. Later in the evening, the pilot’s wife reported the aircraft and its occupants overdue, and a ground search was commenced, initially by friends and associates. The wreckage and the bodies of the crew were found about half an hour after midnight. The accident occurred during evening civil twilight, at approximately 1830 hours NZST, adjacent to the Strathmore Saddle, at an elevation of about 530 feet.

The pilot was conducting a charter positioning flight from Hamilton Island Marina to Whitehaven Beach, Whitsunday Island. At approximately 1615LT, pilot was landing the aircraft towards the south, about 600 metres off the beach, to avoid mechanical turbulence associated with terrain at the southern end of Whitehaven Beach. He reported that the approach and flare were normal, however, as the aircraft touched down on the right float, the aircraft swung sharply right and then sharply left. The left wing contacted the water, and the aircraft overturned. The pilot exited the upturned aircraft through the left rear passenger door and activated a 121.5 MHz distress beacon.

The Airwork F-27 was on a training flight, during which the crew carried out an exercise that simulated a gear problem. They extended the gear using the emergency system. However, after landing they did not select the main gear handle down and in addition did not install the gear locking pins. The crew were then distracted by other events and during this the co-pilot selected the emergency gear handle up to reset the system. The main gear then partially collapsed.