Crash of a Piaggio P.166S Albatross near Tzaneen: 6 killed

Date & Time: Aug 14, 2011 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
ZS-NJX
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Tzaneen - Johannesburg
MSN:
446
YOM:
1973
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Captain / Total flying hours:
4286
Aircraft flight hours:
6180
Circumstances:
Two aircraft, ZS-NJX and ZU-MMI, with 6 and 7 people on board respectively, took off from Tzaneen aerodrome (FATZ) on 14 August 2011 at approximately 0820Z, engaged in private flights with the intention of landing at Rand Airport (FAGM) on the same day. As both aircraft had not arrived at Rand Airport at their expected time of arrival, numerous attempts were made to contact the aircraft and these were unsuccessful. The search and rescue mission was initiated to try and locate these aircraft. The search and rescue mission was based around the area where the aircraft were believed to have had last contact with each other and with other traffic. Unfortunately due to bad weather in and around the area of last contact of these aircraft, they could only be located approximately two days after they had collided with a mountain in the Lekgalametse valley. Both aircraft were destroyed by post-impact fire and all the occupants of both aircraft were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain.
Contributory factors:
- Lack of proper flight planning,
- Low Clouds.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piaggio P.166S Albatross near Tzaneen: 7 killed

Date & Time: Aug 14, 2011 at 1030 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZU-MMI
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Tzaneen - Johannesburg
MSN:
462
YOM:
1973
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Captain / Total flying hours:
2893
Aircraft flight hours:
4501
Circumstances:
Two aircraft, ZS-NJX and ZU-MMI, with 6 and 7 people on board respectively, took off from Tzaneen aerodrome (FATZ) on 14 August 2011 at approximately 0820Z, engaged in private flights with the intention of landing at Rand Airport (FAGM) on the same day. As both aircraft had not arrived at Rand Airport at their expected time of arrival, numerous attempts were made to contact the aircraft and these were unsuccessful. The search and rescue mission was initiated to try and locate these aircraft. The search and rescue mission was based around the area where the aircraft were believed to have had last contact with each other and with other traffic. Unfortunately due to bad weather in and around the area of last contact of these aircraft, they could only be located approximately two days after they had collided with a mountain in the Lekgalametse valley. Both aircraft were destroyed by post-impact fire and all the occupants of both aircraft were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
The accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain.
Contributory factors:
- Lack of proper flight planning,
- Low Clouds.
Final Report:

Ground fire of a Boeing 777-266ER in Cairo

Date & Time: Jul 29, 2011 at 0911 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SU-GBP
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Cairo - Jeddah
MSN:
28423/71
YOM:
1997
Flight number:
MS667
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
307
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
16982
Captain / Total hours on type:
5314.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2247
Copilot / Total hours on type:
198
Aircraft flight hours:
48281
Aircraft flight cycles:
11448
Circumstances:
On July 29, 2011, the said Boeing 777-200, Egyptian registration SU-GBP, operated by EgyptAir, arrived from Madina, Saudi Arabia (Flight No 678) and stopped at Gate F7, terminal 3, Cairo international airport almost at 0500 UTC time. Necessary maintenance actions (After Landing Check ALC, Transit Check) have been performed by EgyptAir engineers and technicians, to prepare the aircraft for the following scheduled flight (Cairo/Jeddah, scheduled at 0730 UTC, same day 29 July 2011, flight number 667). The cockpit crew (Captain and F/O) for the event flight (Cairo/Jeddah), started the cockpit preparation including checking the cockpit crew oxygen system as per normal procedures. The F/O reported that the oxygen pressure was within normal range (730 psi). At almost 0711 UTC, and while waiting for the last passengers to board the aircraft, the F/O officer reported that a pop, hissing sound originating from the right side of his seat was heard, associated with fire and smoke coming from the right side console area below F/O window #3 (right hand lower portion of the cockpit area) [The aircraft was still preparing for departure at Gate F7, Terminal 3 at Cairo Airport at the time the crew detected the fire]. The Captain requested the F/O to leave the cockpit immediately and notify for cockpit fire. The captain used the cockpit fire extinguisher bottle located behind his seat in attempt to fight and extinguish the fire. The attempt was unsuccessful, the fire continued in the cockpit. The F/O left the cockpit, he asked the cabin crew to deplane all the passengers and crew from the aircraft, based on captain’s order. He moved to the stairs and then underneath the aircraft in attempt to find anyone with a radio unit but he could not. He returned to the service road in front of the aircraft and stopped one car and asked the person in the car to notify the fire department that the aircraft is burning on the stand F7 using his radio unit. The cabin crew deplaned the passengers using the two doors 1L and 2L. The passenger bridge was still connected to the entry doors that were used for deplaning. The first fire brigade arrived to the aircraft after three minutes. The fire was extinguished. Extinguishing actions and cooling of the aircraft were terminated at 0845 UTC (1045 Cairo local time). The aircraft experienced major damage resulting from the fire and smoke. Passengers deplaned safely, some (passengers, employees) suffered mild asphyxia caused by smoke inhalation. Passengers and crew were as follows: Passengers 307, Cockpit Crew 2, Cabin Crew 8.
Probable cause:
Probable causes for the accident can be reached through:
- Accurate and thorough reviewing of the factual information and the analysis sections
- Excluding the irrelevant probable causes included in the analysis section
Examination of the aircraft revealed that the fire originated near the first officer's oxygen mask supply tubing, which is located underneath the side console below the no. 3 right hand flight deck window. Oxygen from the flight crew oxygen system is suspected to have contributed to the fire's intensity and speed.
The cause of the fire could not be conclusively determined. It is not yet known whether the oxygen system breach occurred first, providing a flammable environment or whether the oxygen system breach occurred as a result of the fire.
Accident could be related to the following probable causes:
1. Electrical fault or short circuit resulted in electrical heating of flexible hoses in the flight crew oxygen system. (Electrical Short Circuits; contact between aircraft wiring and oxygen system components may be possible if multiple wire clamps are missing or fractured or if wires are incorrectly installed).
2. Exposure to Electrical Current
Final Report:

Crash of a Lockheed C-130H Hercules in Guelmim: 80 killed

Date & Time: Jul 26, 2011 at 0900 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CNA-OQ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Dakhla - Guelmim - Kenitra
MSN:
4892
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
72
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
80
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Dakhla on a flight to Kenitra with an intermediate stop in Guelmim, carrying 60 soldiers, 12 civilians and 8 crew members. While approaching Guelmim Airport, the pilot encountered poor visibility due to marginal weather conditions. Too low, the aircraft impacted the slope of a rocky mountain located 10 km short of runway. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. Two passengers survived the accident but died the following day.

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I in Kei Mouth

Date & Time: Jul 23, 2011
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
3009
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Swartkop AFB - Kei Mouth
MSN:
208-0159
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On final approach to Kei Mouth Airport in the Eastern Cape Province, the single engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances. While both occupants were uninjured, the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The crew was completing a positioning flight from Swartkop AFB.

Crash of a Cessna 560XL Citation XLS in Port Harcourt

Date & Time: Jul 14, 2011 at 1953 LT
Operator:
Registration:
5N-BMM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lagos – Port Harcourt
MSN:
560-5830
YOM:
2008
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11751
Captain / Total hours on type:
684.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
13302
Copilot / Total hours on type:
612
Aircraft flight hours:
982
Circumstances:
5N-BMM departed Lagos at 1856 hrs for Port Harcourt on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and estimated Port Harcourt at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to maintain FL330. The aircraft’s first contact with Port Harcourt was at 1914 hrs. The pilot reported maintaining FL330 with six souls onboard, four hours fuel endurance and estimating POT VOR at 1940hrs. The aircraft was cleared to POT, to maintain FL330 with no delay expected for ILS Approach Runway 21, QNH 1011 and to report when released by Lagos. At 1921 hrs the pilot reported 100 NM to POT and requested for descent. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL150. At 1927 hrs the pilot requested for further descent and was cleared to 3,300 feet on QNH 1011 but the pilot acknowledged 3500 feet. At 1931 hrs the aircraft was re-cleared to FL090 initially due to departing traffic on Runway 03. At 1934 hrs 5N-BMM reported maintaining FL090 and was re-cleared to FL050. The aircraft was re-cleared to 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 at 1936 hrs and cleared for the straight-in ILS Approach Runway 21 and to report on the localizer. At 1947 hrs the pilot reported final for Runway 21 and was asked to contact Tower on 119.2 and the Tower asked 5N-BMM to report on glide slope Runway 21. At 1950 hrs the Tower asked 5N-BMM to confirm on the glide slope and the crew confirmed “Charlie, we have three miles to run”. The Tower cleared 5N-BMM to land with surface wind calm but to exercise caution since the Runway surface was wet and 5N-BMM responded “wind calm”. At 1952:26 hrs the auto voice callout "minimums minimums” alerted the crew. At 1952:40 hrs the pilot flying (PF) said "I am not on the centerline". At 1952:48 hrs he said "I can't see down". At 1952:55 hrs the pilot monitoring (PM) said to the pilot flying; " I am telling you to go down" and the pilot flying said " I will go down", five seconds later the aircraft crashed. The crew exited the aircraft without accomplishing the Emergency Evacuation Checklist and therefore left the right engine running for about 28 minutes after the crash. The Fire Service eventually used their water hose to shutdown the running engine. At 19:54 hrs the Tower called 5N-BMM to pass on the landing time as 19:53 hrs, but no response from 5N-BMM. There was no indication that the aircraft was taxing on the Runway because it was dark and no light was visible hence the need to alert the Fire personnel. The watch room was asked to give the Tower information, which they could not give since they do not have a two – way contact with the Fire trucks. The Tower could not raise the Fire truck since there was no two - way communication between them; however, the Fire truck was later cleared to proceed to the Runway as the Tower could not ascertain the position of the aircraft. The aircraft was actually turned 90° because of the big culvert that held the right wing and made the aircraft spin and turned 90o facing the runway, two meters from the active runway, the culvert was uprooted due to the aircraft impact forces. The wheel broke off because of the gully that runs parallel to the runway.
Probable cause:
The decision of the pilot to continue the approach without the required visual references.
Contributory Factors:
- Poor crew coordination (CRM),
- Pairing two captains together,
- The weather was marginal.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-22 in Kisangani: 77 killed

Date & Time: Jul 8, 2011 at 1511 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9Q-COP
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kinshasa - Kisangani - Goma
MSN:
18933/185
YOM:
1965
Flight number:
EO952
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
108
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
77
Captain / Total flying hours:
7000
Captain / Total hours on type:
5000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
52613
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Kinshasa, the crew started the descent to Kisangani-Bangoka Airport in poor weather conditions with low visibility due to heavy rain falls. On final approach, the pilot did not establish any visual contact with the runway but continued until the aircraft impacted ground some 1,000 metres short of runway 31. On impact, the aircraft went out of control, veered to the right, exploded and disintegrated in a wooded area located to the right of the approach path. The wreckage was found about 500 metres southeast from the runway 31 threshold. Five crew and 72 passengers were killed.
Probable cause:
In a preliminary report, DRC authorities pointed out the following factors:
- The flight crew misjudged weather conditions,
- The airline assigned unqualified/non-licensed crew to operate the Boeing 727-100 (the pilot's licence was not up to date),
- Tower controllers were not licensed (two ATC's did not have a proper licence and above legal age)
- Tower control staff was insufficient (six only for the complete roster),
- Tower controllers provided erroneous/false weather data to flying crew,
- The airport authority lacked security plans,
- Phonic records between tower control and crew were erased (destroyed) before the commission of inquiry can start any investigation.

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 off Libreville

Date & Time: Jun 6, 2011 at 1025 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
TR-LII
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Port Gentil - Libreville
MSN:
75 04
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
SLN122A
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew departed Port Gentil on a cargo flight to Libreville on behalf of DHL Airways. On approach to Libreville-Léon Mba Airport, the captain informed ATC about hydraulic problems and initiated a go-around procedure. Shortly later, the aircraft stalled and crashed in the sea some 2,3 km southeast of the airport. All four occupants were rescued while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Due to the failure of the hydraulic system, the crew was unable to lower the gear.

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Kaduna: 2 killed

Date & Time: May 24, 2011 at 1154 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N364UZ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Old Kaduna - Old Kaduna
MSN:
LJ-805
YOM:
1979
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Aircraft flight hours:
9665
Circumstances:
On 24th May, 2011 at 11:54 h, a Beechcraft C90 aircraft with nationality and registration marks N364UZ, operated by Shoreline Energy International Limited (SEIL), departed Old Kaduna (Military) airport on a test flight with a pilot and another person onboard with three hours fuel endurance. The test flight was on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. According to an eye witness, the aircraft sound was unusual and the aircraft seemed not to be gaining altitude after takeoff. Another eye witness (a local farmer), stated that he saw the aircraft moving up and down with increasing and decreasing engine sound. Thereafter, the aircraft impacted a mango tree, turned and crashed. The local farmer further stated that he and some military personnel tried all they could to rescue the occupants inside the aircraft but their efforts were not successful. At 11:59 h, the aircraft crashed on a farm-land 878 meters short of RWY 23 (military) and engulfed into flames. The two occupants were fatally injured. Dornier Aviation Nigeria AIEP (DANA) and Nigerian Air Force (NAF) fire-fighting personnel were dispatched immediately. There was no direct access between the runway and the accident site, which delayed the fire trucks from reaching the aircraft at accident site on time. The accident occurred in day light, in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
Probable cause:
Causal Factor:
Inability of the pilot to control the aircraft to landing due to inadequate power to enable the pilot maintain the appropriate approach profile (height, speed and glide path) to cover the required distance to threshold.
Contributory factors:
1. Non-adherence to approved storage procedure.
2. Non-adherence to approved return from storage procedure.
3. Inadequate regulatory oversight by the authority on flight operation and maintenance of foreign registered aircraft in Nigeria.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-100ER in Kinshasa: 32 killed

Date & Time: Apr 4, 2011 at 1356 LT
Operator:
Registration:
4L-GAE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kisangani – Kinshasa
MSN:
7070
YOM:
1995
Flight number:
UNO834
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
29
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
32
Captain / Total flying hours:
2811
Captain / Total hours on type:
1622.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
495
Copilot / Total hours on type:
344
Circumstances:
On final approach to Kinshasa-N'Djili Airport, the crew encountered very poor weather conditions and decided to make a go around. After a climb process of 12 seconds, the aircraft nosed down and at a speed of 180 knots, hit the ground 170 meters to the left of the displaced threshold of runway 24. The aircraft slid for 400 meters before coming to rest in flames upside down. Three passengers were seriously injured and evacuated but of them died from their injuries few hours later. Finally, only one passenger survived the accident. Aircraft was performing a special flight from Kisangani to Kinshasa on behalf of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The only survivor reported that the aircraft suddenly plunged into the earth while on final approach. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were marginal with storm activity, heavy rain showers, scattered at 2,200 feet and cumulonimbus at 1,500 feet.
Probable cause:
Weather in Kinshasa was bad at the time of the accident, ATC failed to inform the crew about the degradation of the weather conditions and the runway in use was not closed to traffic while the visibility was below the minima. Despite this situation, the crew took the decision to continue the approach procedure while the aircraft was unstable and the approach speed was too high (180 knots). It is reported that the following factors contributed to the accident:
- the crew ignored the published approach procedures,
- improper crew resources management during the execution of the flight,
- during the go around process, the crew encountered adverse weather conditions with vertical wind gusts, downdrafts and a 'magenta' effect. This caused the aircraft to adopt nose down attitude while it was in the final stage of the flight, preventing the pilot to take over the control,
- the pilot training program was inadequate and did not include a proportionate number of flight in the simulator,
- the authority for civil aviation of Georgia has probably approved a small training program for upgrading the captain to his position,
- lack of oversight of the operator by the Georgian Civil Aviation Authority.
In conclusion, investigators believe that the most probable cause of the accident is the fact that the plane encountered a very dangerous meteorological phenomena similar to a microburst, to a very low level during the overshoot process. The dangerous vertical downdraft and gust caused a sudden and remarkable change in the attitude of the aircraft and a substantial loss of altitude. Flying at very low altitude, recovery of such disturbance was not possible.
Final Report: