Takeoff (climb)

Line personnel reported that as the airplane was being fueled, the second pilot loaded more than one bag in the left front baggage compartment. With fueling complete, line personnel saw the second pilot pull the front left baggage door down, but not lock or latch it. Witnesses near midfield of the 8,001-foot long runway, reported that the airplane was airborne, and the front left baggage door was closed. Witnesses near the end of the runway, reported that the airplane was about 200 feet above ground level (agl) and they noted that the front left baggage door was open and standing straight up. All of the witnesses reported that the airplane turned slightly left, leveled off, and was slow. The airplane began to descend, and the wings were slightly rocking before it stalled, broke right, and collided with the terrain. Investigators found no anomalies with the airframe or engines that would have precluded normal operation. The forward baggage doors' design incorporates a key lock in the lower center of each door, and two latches in the left and right bottom section of the doors. There are two hinges in the upper left and right sections of the door. The handles latched the door to the door frame in the fuselage. The key would be in the horizontal position in an unlocked condition, and in the vertical position in a locked condition. The front left baggage door was found within the main wreckage debris field and had sustained mechanical and thermal damage. The key lock was in the horizontal position. Several instances of a baggage door opening in flight have been recorded in Cessna Citation airplanes. In some cases, the door separated, and in others it remained attached. The crews of these other airplanes returned to the airport and landed successfully.

During the initial climb, a "throbbing or surging" sound was heard as the airplane departed in gusting wind conditions with a 600-foot ceiling and 1/2 mile visibility in snow. Moments later the airplane came "straight down" and impacted the ground. During examination of the wreckage, it was discovered that that the fuel selector switch for the right engine had been in the "X-FEED" position during the accident. Examination of documents discovered in the wreckage revealed, three documents pertaining to operation of an Aerostar. These documents consisted of two airplane flight manuals (AFMs) from two different manufacturers, and a checklist. Examination of the first of the AFMs revealed, that it had the name of both the pilot and the operator on the cover of the document. Further examination revealed that it had been published 4 years prior to the manufacture of the accident airplane, and contained information for a Ted Smith Aerostar Model 601P, which the operator had previously owned. This document contained no warnings regarding the use of the crossfeed system during takeoff. Examination of the second of the two AFMs found in the wreckage revealed that it was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved AFM for the accident airplane. Unlike the first AFM, the second AFM advised that the fuel selector "X-FEED" position should be used in "level coordinated flight only." It also advised that each engine fuel selector "must be in the ON position for takeoff, climb, descent, approach, and landing." It also warned that, if the airplane was not in a level coordinated flight attitude, "engine power interruptions may occur on one or both engines" when "X-FEED" is selected "due to unporting of the respective engine's fuel supply intake port." Review of the checklist contained in the FAA approved AFM for the Piper Aircraft Model 601P under "STARTING ENGINES," required a check of the crossfeed system prior to engine start by selecting each fuel selector to "ON," then selecting "X-FEED," and after verifying valve actuation and annunciator light illumination, returning the fuel selector to "ON." Additionally, under "BEFORE TAKEOFF" It also required that the fuel selectors be checked in the "ON" position, and that the "X-FEED" annunciator light was out, prior to takeoff. Examination of the pilot's checklist revealed that, it consisted of multiple pages inserted into plastic protective sleeves and included both typed, and hand written information. A review of the section titled "BEFORE TAKEOFF" revealed that the checklist item "Fuel Selectors - ON Position," which was listed in the AFM, had been omitted.

The aircraft departed Nairobi-Jomo Kenyatta Airport on a cargo flight to Baidoa, Somalia, carrying 3 crew members and a load consisting of 20 drums of fuel for the Somali interim Government in place in Baidoa, on behalf of the International Red Cross. Shortly after takeoff from runway 06, at a height of about 100 feet, the left engine lost power. The captain contacted ATC, declared an emergency and was cleared for an immediate return. After the engine was secured and the propeller was feathered, the crew initiated a turn when the aircraft lost height, collided with a power line and crashed onto a house, 3 minutes after takeoff. All three crew members were injured while no one was injured on ground.

While taking off from the grassy runway 01/19 which is 550 metres long, control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway and came to rest in a pond. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed Pie de la Cuesta AFB on a routine flight ro Santa Lucia AFB near Mexico City. Few minutes after takeoff, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in the sea about 9 km southeast of the airbase. All four crew members were killed.

The crew was performing a positioning flight from Buenos Aires-Ezeiza-Ministro Pistarini Airport to Buenos Aires-Aeroparque-Jorge Newbury Airport. Before departure, the captain switched off the Stall Alarm System for unknown reasons. Shortly after takeoff from runway 17, the climb gradient was small and landing gear were retracted at a very low altitude. The left wing stalled and struck the runway surface. Out of control, the aircraft impacted ground, slid for few dozen metres, overran the runway and came to rest in a field. Both pilots were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from Flamingo Bay, the single engine aircraft crashed in the sea few dozen metres offshore. The pilot was injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a demonstration flight on this second prototype to a group of invited guests staying on the ground. at Mindelheim-Mattsies Airport. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot completed a circuit to reach the approach pattern when the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in an open field located approximately 7 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and the French pilot Gérard Guillaumaud who was also the Chief Pilot by Grob Aerospace was killed.

After a normal takeoff roll from runway 29R at Tehran-Mehrabad Airport, the pilot-in-command pulled on the control column and started the rotation when one of the engine failed. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed, bursting into flames. Three passengers were seriously injured while 35 other occupants were killed. All three survivors died from their injuries few hours after the accident.

The single engine aircraft departed Tartu-Ülenurme Airport on a private flight to Dresden, carrying two passengers and one pilot. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing to a height of about 300-500 metres, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in a field located about 500 metres past the runway end. All three occupants were seriously injured and rescued an hour later. The aircraft was destroyed.