Takeoff (climb)

The twin engine aircraft departed Araracuara Airport runway 09 at 1503LT on a charter flight to Florencia, carrying eight passengers and two pilots. During initial climb, the right engine failed. The crew lost control of the airplane that stalled and crashed in a wooded area. The wreckage was found 8,2 km from the airport. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all 10 occupants were killed, among them a Swiss citizen.

The four engine aircraft was performing a cargo flight from Glasgow-Prestwick to Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, with intermediate stops in Ghardaïa and Tamanrasset. On board were seven crew members and a load consisting of oil equipment. About three minutes after takeoff from Tamanrasset-Aguenar-Hadj Bey Akhamok Airport, radio contact was lost when the aircraft crashed in a mountainous terrain located some 15 km south of the airport. The wreckage was found few hours later. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all seven crew members (six Ukrainians and one Russian) were killed.

According to the line service technician who worked for the fixed-base operator (FBO), before taking off for the air ambulance flight with two medical crewmembers and one patient onboard, the pilot verbally asked him to add 40 gallons of fuel to the airplane, but the pilot did not specify the type of fuel. The line service technician drove a fuel truck to the front of the airplane and added 20 gallons of fuel to each of the multiengine airplane's wing tanks. The pilot was present during the refueling and helped the line service technician replace both fuel caps. Shortly after takeoff, a medical crewmember called the company medical dispatcher and reported that they were returning to the airport because smoke was coming from the right engine. Two witnesses reported seeing smoke from the airplane Several other witnesses reported seeing or hearing the impact and then immediately seeing smoke or flames. On-scene evidence showed the airplane was generally eastbound and upright when it impacted terrain. A postimpact fire immediately ensued and consumed most of the airplane. Investigators who arrived at the scene the day following the accident reported clearly detecting the smell of jet fuel. The airplane, which was equipped with two reciprocating engines, should have been serviced with aviation gasoline, and this was noted on labels near the fuel filler ports, which stated "AVGAS ONLY." However, a postaccident review of refueling records, statements from the line service technician, and the on-scene smell of jet fuel are consistent with the airplane having been misfueled with Jet A fuel instead of the required 100LL aviation gasoline, which can result in detonation in the engine and the subsequent loss of engine power. Postaccident examination of the engines revealed internal damage and evidence of detonation. It was the joint responsibility of the line technician and pilot to ensure that the airplane was filled with aviation fuel instead of jet fuel and their failure to do so led to the detonation in the engine and the subsequent loss of power during initial climb.In accordance with voluntary industry standards, the FBO's jet fuel truck should have been equipped with an oversized fuel nozzle; instead, it was equipped with a smaller diameter nozzle, which allowed the nozzle to be inserted into the smaller fuel filler ports on airplanes that used aviation gasoline. The FBO's use of a small nozzle allowed it to be inserted in the accident airplane's filler port and for jet fuel to be inadvertently added to the airplane.

On August 10,2014, at 04:52 UTC daylight time, an AN-140-100 aircraft , Iranian registration EP-GPA ( MSN 90-05), operated by Sepahan Airlines flight # 5915, experienced engine number 2 shutdown just about 2 seconds before lift-off and crashed shortly after take-off nearby Mehrabad International Airport (THR), TEHRAN; IR. Of IRAN; the aircraft was on lift off from runway 29L. The airplane was completely destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. Fatality incorporates 34 of the 40 passengers; 4 of the 4 flight attendants, and 2 of the 2 flight crewmembers. The 11 passengers received serious injuries, which finally as a result of that accident there are 40 fatalities and 8 passengers recovered from injury. Sepahan Airline was operating under the provisions of CAO.IRI operational requirement for commercial air transport. Before the accident flight the airplane dispatch from Isfahan and arrived at Tehran about 03:30. The dispatcher and PIC perform the load calculation using the aircraft FM performance charts. Because of load limitation for 15° flap position, load sheet change and re-write with 10° flap position and re-calculated MTOM. The aircraft was enrouted to Airport Tabbas Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. Figure 1 below is a map showing the location of the accident and the aircraft flight path. Figure 2 shows THR runway 29L SID and figure 3 show timeline of event in the flight path. According to overview of flight crew performance, it is indicated that the crewmembers were provided with the flight release paperwork, which included weather information, notices to airmen (NOTAM), and the flight plan.

The crew was engaged in a crop spraying mission on rice paddy field located in Prototskiye (Krasnoarmeisk district of the Krasnodar region). Two minutes after takeoff, while flying at a height of about 50 metres, the engine lost power. The captain attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft nosed over and came to rest upside down, some 2 km east of Prototskiye. Those parts of the fuselage which were above the water were consumed by the erupting fire and both pilots escaped uninjured.

Shortly after takeoff from Foz do Iguaçu-Cataratas Airport, while climbing, the crew reported technical problems and elected to return. The crew realized he could not make it so he attempted an emergency landing in a corn field. Upon landing, the aircraft lost its undercarriage and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Among the four occupants, one passenger was slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was departing the private, fly-in community airport on a personal flight. He was familiar with the airport/fly-in community and was instrumental in its development. Fog was present at the time, and, according to witnesses, it was "rolling up the valley," which was a frequent event at the airport. The witnesses observed the airplane lift off the runway, drift to the left, and disappear into the fog with the landing gear extended. They heard the engine running normally, with no change in sound, until the crash. They heard two distinct "booms" about 4 to 6 seconds apart. They ran down to the departure end of the runway to look for a crash site and could not see the wreckage or any smoke or fire due to the fog. The wreckage was located on elevated terrain in a heavily wooded area, about 1,500 feet north of the departure end of the runway. The elevation at the crash site was about 250 feet higher than the elevation at the departure end of runway. A swath through the treetops leading to the main wreckage was indicative of a near-level flight path at impact. An examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure. A review of the weather by a NTSB meteorologist revealed that the departure airport was at the edge of an area of low-topped clouds. Airport remarks included "Mountainous terrain all quadrants."

Shortly after take off from Saint John Harbour, the single engine aircraft went out of control and crashed on the shore of the Athlone Island, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were injured.

The twin engine aircraft was engaged in a series of skydiving flights at Częstochowa-Rudniki Airport, Silesia. It took off from runway 26C with 11 skydivers and one pilot on board. During initial climb, at an altitude of 100 metres, the pilot encountered technical problems with the engines and elected to make an emergency landing. He informed the passengers about the emergency situation and reduced his altitude when the aircraft rolled to the left to an angle of 70° then stalled and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found 4,200 metres past the runway end. Three skydivers were seriously injured while 9 other occupants were killed. Few minutes later, two of the survivors died from their injuries.

On 2 July 2014, about 01.14 UTC, 5Y-CET, a Fokker F50, an international cargo flight, operated by Skyward International, crashed shortly after takeoff from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA), Nairobi, Kenya (JKIA). Instrument Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. The four crewmembers were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed and consumed by post-crash fire. The destination of the flight was Aden Adee International Airport, Mogadishu, Somalia. The airplane was repositioned from its home base at Wilson Airport in Nairobi, the day before. The accident captain (CAPT) and another first officer conducted the repositioning flight. (see Aircraft Information). At JKIA, the airplane was loaded with cargo in preparation for the accident flight. The accident crew consisted of the Capt and FO in addition to a maintenance engineer and loadmaster. According to air traffic control (ATC), the flight plan was filed for duration of 2.5 hours at an altitude of 19,000 feet along with 5 hours of fuel aboard. Based on flight recorder data, the Capt was the pilot-flying and the FO was the pilot-monitoring. The accident flight was reconstructed using data from air traffic control and flight recorder information. According to FDR data, engine start occurred at at 01.50.20. At about 01.10.59 the flight made initial contact with JKIA air traffic control tower and after routine communication, including the confirmation of the number of person and fuel endurance, the flight was cleared for takeoff at 0112.30. At 01.11.58, both engines accelerated to a high power setting with engine no. 1 stabilizing at 78% torque, 100% propeller speed and engine 2 stabilizing at 80% torque, 99% propeller speed. About six seconds later, the Capt indicates “power is set”. About 2 seconds afterwards the Capt indicated “the auto-feather is off, left” and then 5 seconds later, the FO calls out “seven eighty” (?). About 16 seconds after initial engine acceleration was applied, the first of a series of three chimes audio alerts occurred, and continued at 1 second interval throughout the CVR recording. Immediately after the initial chimes, the Capt said “you see” and “how much is that?”. The FO responded “okay niner”. The Capt then asked “it has gotten to?” The FO replied “thirty four thirty ninety two” and shortly afterward “the left one is thirty”. About 24 seconds after initial engine acceleration, engine 1 torque climbs over a period of 2 seconds to a recorded value of 119.9%, the maximum value the recorder is capable of recording. Simultaneously Engine 1 propeller speed falls from 100% to 57%. Other engine shaft speeds remain at approximately their original high power values. Airspeed at the point this change occurs was less than 30 knots. During this period, the FO called out “one twenty two now [pause] torque”. The Capt responded “it is rising eh? The FO then noted “torque one twenty six now”. About 31 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the FO called out “okay speed alive sixty”. About a second later the Capt asked “do we reduce or”? The FO responded “we can just cut”. The Capt inquired “do we abort or continue?” The FO responded, “okay one one twelve and nine four point three” and then “okay one sixteen [pause] ninety four.” The Capt acknowledged “yeah okay” About 47 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the Capt said twice “did I reduce it?”and the FO responded sequentially “yeah” and “okay”] About 52 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the Capt asked “how is it now?” and the FO replied “yeah one oh two [pause] ninety four”. About 7 seconds later the FO called out “okay, one sixteen ninety four”. About 1 minute after initial engine acceleration, the Capt inquired “Is it really going?” The FO replied “one oh one, ninety five”. The Capt acknowledged and shortly afterward he queried “is it going really, is the aircraft really moving”. The FO responded “okay, one oh one, ninety five”. About 4 seconds later, the Capt indicated “it is not giving power” About 1 minute 9 seconds after the initial engine acceleration the FO called out “okay speed has now reached about hundred”. The Capt responded “oh yeah” and immediately afterward the FO called out “okay one eleven, ninety five”. About 1 minute 18 seconds after the initial engine acceleration, the FO indicated “hundred now”. The Capt acknowledged. About 1 minute 26 seconds after the initial engine acceleration, the FO called out “V one V R rotate” About 1 minute 33 seconds after the initial engine acceleration a transition of the airplane from ground to air mode is recorded and the pressure altitude begins to climb along with the Capt immediately afterward expressing two exclamations. Following the transition to air mode there were 51 seconds of flight recorder data before the recording ended. During this time and over a period of about 3 seconds, the FO calls out “positive rate of climb” and the Capt responded “gear up”. About 3 second later, the Capt expressed “it doesn’t have power [pause] it’s on one side.” About 6 seconds afterward, the FO said “we can also turn back”. About 3 seconds later the first of seven “don’t sink” (GPWS aural warning alerts) begins over a period of 23 seconds. After the second GPWS alert the Capt queried “ok, we’re ok?” After the third GPWS alert, the FO said “we can turn back” and the Capt immediately responded “let’s just go”. The FO replied “okay”. After the fifth GPWS alert, the Capt indicated “and this one is showing one fourteen” and then queried? “we can turn back?”. About 2 seconds later, the FO called out “okay speed is one hundred” and the Capt responded “but this one has nothing” About 1 second later and about the time of the sixth GPW alert, JKIA control tower radioed “five yankee charlie echo tango contact radar one two three decimal three. Good morning.” After the seventh GPWS alert the recording ended about 13 seconds later. During this time, the controller called the aircraft again. The Capt expressed “tell him [pause] tell him we have no power”. The last CVR data indicates the FO radioed, “ah tower charlie echo” and the transmission abruptly ended along with simultaneous sounds of distress. According to FDR data, about 15 seconds after the airplane transitioned from ground to air mode the recorded altitude peaked about 5060 feet and accompanied by a maximum airspeed of 100 knots. Along with a variation of airspeed between 90 knots and 100 knots for the remainder of the recording, during the following 20 seconds the altitude decreased to about 5000 feet and then increased to 5050 feet over the next 10 seconds where it remained until the recording ended at 1.14.27. Witness Accounts (Air Traffic Controller Civilians). The aircraft crashed during the hours of darkness at geographical coordinates of 01° 17’16”S, 36° 57’5”E.