Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation V Ultra in Gainesville

Date & Time: Jun 6, 2016 at 2317 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N145KK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Boston – Gainesville
MSN:
560-0276
YOM:
1994
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Boston-Logan, the crew initiated the descent to Gainesville Airport. Weather conditions at destination were considered as marginal due to the presence over the area of the tropical storm 'Colin'. After landing on a wet runway, the aircraft rolled for about 1,000 feet then veered off runway to the left. While contacting soft ground, the left main gear and the nose gear collapsed then the aircraft came to rest in a grassy area. All three occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
No investigations were conducted by the NTSB on the event.

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in San Bernardino

Date & Time: May 6, 2016 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N2AN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Upland - San Bernardino
MSN:
1G210-55
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3350
Captain / Total hours on type:
58.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2924
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot was entering the airport traffic pattern for landing during a familiarization flight. He reported that he turned on the carburetor heat, switched the fuel tank selector to the right fuel tank, and shortly thereafter, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot attempted numerous times to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. After realizing that he would not be able to reach the runway, he decided to make a forced landing to a small field. During the landing approach, the airplane contacted a power line, nosed over, and came to rest inverted, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. During the postaccident examination of the airplane, about 16 ounces of water were removed from the fuel system. Water was present in the lower gascolator, the fine fuel filter (upper gascolator), and subsequent fuel line to the carburetor inlet. A brass screen at the carburetor inlet and 2 carburetor fuel bowl thumb screens also contained corrosion, water, and rust. The approved aircraft inspection checklist called for washing the carburetor and main fuel filter every 50 hours and cleaning and/or replacing the fine fuel filter every 100 hours. The fine fuel filter is not easily accessible and not able to be drained during a preflight inspection. The mechanic who completed the most recent inspection stated that he did not drain or check the fine fuel filter. The last logbook entry that specifically stated the fuel filters were cleaned was about 4 years before the accident.
Probable cause:
The mechanic's failure to inspect the fine fuel filter gascolator as required during the most recent inspection, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel contamination.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-580 in Manning

Date & Time: May 5, 2016 at 1611 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FEKF
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Manning - Manning
MSN:
80
YOM:
1953
Flight number:
Tanker 45
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged in a fire fighting mission over the Fort McMurray area as 'Tanker 45'. Following an uneventful mission, the crew returned to Manning Airport. After landing on runway 25, the aircraft suffered directional control problems and veered off runway to the right. It collided with a drainage ditch, lost its nose gear and came to rest in a grassy area. The propeller separated from the right engine while the propeller on the left engine was bent. The fuselage broke in two just behind the cockpit area. Both pilots evacuated with minor injuries.

Crash of a Fokker 50 in Catania

Date & Time: Apr 30, 2016 at 1135 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-LEZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Rimini – Catania
MSN:
20128
YOM:
1988
Flight number:
RVL233
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
18
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6850
Captain / Total hours on type:
781.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2680
Copilot / Total hours on type:
10
Circumstances:
On April 30, 2016, the aircraft Fokker F27 MK50 registration marks SE-LEZ, operating Air Vallee flight number RVL233, took off from Rimini airport at 06.48 hrs with 18 passengers and 3 crew on board. During the final approach to Catania airport, with the aircraft stabilized on ILS Z RWY 08, the crew noticed that the right and left main landing gear lights were green but the nose landing gear light was amber. The crew informed the ATS (Catania APP) that they were in contact with the problem and informed them of their intention to continue the approach to perform a low pass on the runway followed by a standard missed approach procedure, in order to request a visual verification from the control tower of the actual extension of the nose gear. During the low passage, the control tower informed the crew that the nose gear was not extended despite the opening of the nose gear compartment. After the passage, all lights, including the amber light of the nose landing gear, went off. The aircraft proceeded to the INDAX point to perform a holding at an altitude of 3000 feet as agreed with ATS during which the crew applied the abnormal procedures for nose gear unsafe down after selection and alternate down procedures. Both procedures were unsuccessful and the crew declared an "emergency" informing ATS of their intention to perform a final maneuver (leveled 2G turn). The captain of the flight, who had been PNF up to that moment, took the controls as PF and executed the turn: also in this case without any positive outcome. The crew informed ATS of the situation, stating the number of passengers, the amount of fuel on board and the absence of dangerous goods. The crew decided to follow a VOR procedure for RWY26 followed by a visual approach in order to make a last low passage to check the condition of the nose gear. After this second missed approach, the aircraft was instructed to perform an ILS procedure for RWY 08. Landing took place at 09:34 hrs with the main gear properly extracted and locked, the nose gear in "up" position and the doors open. The following is a sequence of pictures taken from a video of the accident, acquired by ANSV through the Catania airport operator, in which the aircraft is seen landing with the nose landing gear not extended and touching the ground only when it reached the speed necessary to sustain it in the absence of nose landing gear support. After completion of the landing run, with the aircraft remaining in the middle of the runway, the engines were shut down and passengers and crew disembarked without further incident. Some of the passengers were transferred to the airport emergency room and subsequently some of them were sent to hospital for further examination; no passenger was reported to have sustained injuries as a result of the event.
Probable cause:
The accident was caused by the failure of the nose landing gear (nose gear up) due to over-extension of the shock absorber which caused interference between the tires and the NLG compartment and locked the NLG in a retracted position. The over-extension was caused by the incorrect installation of some internal components of the shock absorber during the replacement of the internal seals the day before the accident.
The following factors contributed significantly to the improper activity conducted at maintenance:
- the insufficient experience of technical personnel in carrying out the maintenance tasks conducted on the NLG;
- the lack of controls on the operations carried out, deemed unnecessary by the CAMO engineering department;
- the lack of definition of roles and tasks during the planning phase of the maintenance work;
- the operational pressure on maintenance personnel, arising from the need to conclude maintenance operations quickly in order not to penalize the management of the aircraft;
- the insufficient clarity and lack of sensitive information in the maintenance tasks and related figures contained in the AMM, regarding the replacement of internal shock absorber seals, subsequently made clearer by the manufacturer;
- the reported black and white printing of the applied AMM procedures, which could have made the warnings in the manual barely legible.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 in El Obeid: 5 killed

Date & Time: Apr 30, 2016
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Circumstances:
Crashed on final approach to El Obeid Airport, killing all five crew members. The accident was caused by a technical failure according to the Sudanese Air Force while local rebels claimed they shot down the aircraft with a mortar shell.

Crash of an Embraer ERJ-190-100AR in Cuenca

Date & Time: Apr 28, 2016 at 0751 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
HC-COX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Quito – Cuenca
MSN:
190-00372
YOM:
2010
Flight number:
EQ173
Country:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
87
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17523
Captain / Total hours on type:
2113.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3545
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2077
Aircraft flight hours:
11569
Aircraft flight cycles:
9707
Circumstances:
Following en uneventful flight from Quito, the crew initiated the descent to Cuenca-Mariscal La Mar Airport Runway 23. Weather conditions at destination were poor with rain falls and a contaminated runway. The pilot-in-command continued the approach below the glide and the aircraft passed over the runway threshold at a height of 37 feet instead the recommended 50 feet. The airplane landed 277 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 127 knots and the crew activated the spoilers and the reverse thrust systems. Due to poor braking action, the captain activated the autobrake system, without success. As the aircraft could not be stopped within the remaining distance, the captain intentionally turn to the right when the aircraft ground looped, overran and came to rest in a grassy area. All 93 occupants were rescued, among them two passengers were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The condition of the runway at Cuenca airport, which at the time of the plane's landing was contaminated with water and slippery.
- The landing was made after a non-stabilized approach with a tailwind.
- During seven seconds, the crew continued the approach with an excessive rate of descent of 1,186 feet, 186 feet above the limit of 1,000 feet.
- The non-application of the Maximum Performance Landing procedure recommended by the aircraft manufacturer for landing on contaminated runways.
- The dispatch of the flight with 1,500 kg of fuel more than the amount of fuel usually used for this flight.
- Omission of the runway length calculation necessary to perform the landing using the braking efficiency information.
- The crew's decision to make the final approach with three red and one white lights, using the PAPI system, induced by the information in the Terminal Information document issued by the company, which authorized this procedure.
- The use of confusing terminology in the Terminal Information document, which used terms applicable to the Airbus fleet, instead of Embraer's.
- The crew's decision not to perform the thwarted approach maneuver after the maximum allowable vertical speed was exceeded and visibility was apparently limited after the minima were exceeded.
- Incorrect use of aircraft braking aids, in this case reverse braking aids
- The application of the emergency brake that inhibits the antiskid system.
- Lack of implementation of adequate management of crew resources, particularly within the cockpit.
- Lack of training in the use of tables for track distance calculation.
- In reference to landing conditions, the aircraft needed a runway length of 2,122 metres while the available distance was 1,900 metres.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226T Merlin III in Andorra

Date & Time: Apr 26, 2016 at 1535 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N125WG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Alicante - Andorra
MSN:
T-250
YOM:
1974
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4750
Captain / Total hours on type:
1200.00
Circumstances:
The twin engine airplane departed Alicante-Mutxamel Airport at 1221LT on a private flight to Andorra, carrying four passengers and one pilot. Following an uneventful flight at an altitude of 12,500 feet, the pilot informed ATC about electrical problems then initiated the descent to Andorra. About two minutes later, the electrical system totally failed. The pilot continued the approach to Andorra-La Seu d'Urgell Airport. After touchdown on runway 21, the undercarriage collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the right and came to rest in a grassy area. All five occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
It is considered that the accident was caused by an error in the application of the emergency extension procedure of the landing gear following a total failure of the electrical system.
Contributing factors :
- Start a visual flight with a deferred pending repair in the electrical system, specifically with the generator on the right side.
- Lack of recent training and simulation with emergency procedures.
- The versatility of the pilot and diversity of different aircraft types flown.
- The non-activation of the warning light on the left-hand side of the cockpit panel when the electrical system failed about 30 minutes prior to the total exhaustion of all batteries.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AT Merlin IVA in Girona

Date & Time: Apr 24, 2016 at 1520 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EC-GFK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Girona - Girona
MSN:
AT-062
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2402
Captain / Total hours on type:
27.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7992
Copilot / Total hours on type:
6868
Aircraft flight hours:
16128
Circumstances:
The crew (one pilot under supervision and one instructor) departed Girona-Costa Brava on a local training flight. Following two successful landings and touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew initiated a new approach to complete a full stop landing. The aircraft belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that the crew failed to actuate the lever used to deploy the landing gear. Inadequate presentation, in the operator's operating manuals, of the flight tasks to be performed by each crew member and the timing of these tasks is identified as a contributing factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 300 Super King Air in Porto Seguro

Date & Time: Apr 21, 2016 at 1140 LT
Registration:
PT-MCM
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Rio de Janeiro – Porto Seguro
MSN:
FA-52
YOM:
1985
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
9
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1000.00
Circumstances:
On final approach to Porto Seguro-Terravista Golf Club Airport Runway 15, the twin engine aircraft descended too low, causing the left main gear to impact the ground short of runway threshold. On impact, the left main landing gear was torn off. The aircraft slid on runway for few dozen metres then veered to the left and came to a halt. All 10 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The following factors were identified:
- Application of the commands - contributed
There was no effective action on the aircraft controls during the final approach to avoid a brutal impact with the ground prior to the runway threshold.
- Adverse weather conditions - undetermined
It is possible that the aircraft was under the effect of the phenomenon known as windshear, which affected the approach profil and the subsequent impact with the ground short of runway.
- Pilot judgement - contributed
The risks of a possible windshear during the final approach were not adequately considered by the pilot. The decision to proceed for the landing, to the detriment of the alternative recommended by experts to perform a missed approach, proved decisive for the development of the accident.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900D in Gander

Date & Time: Apr 20, 2016 at 2130 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FEVA
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Goose Bay – Gander
MSN:
UE-126
YOM:
1994
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
14
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2381
Captain / Total hours on type:
1031.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1504
Copilot / Total hours on type:
174
Aircraft flight hours:
32959
Circumstances:
The Exploits Valley Air Services Beechcraft 1900D (registration C-FEVA, serial number UE-126), operating as Air Canada Express flight EV7804, was on a scheduled passenger flight from Goose Bay International Airport, Newfoundland and Labrador, to Gander International Airport, Newfoundland and Labrador. At 2130 Newfoundland Daylight Time, while landing on Runway 03, the aircraft touched down right of the centreline and almost immediately veered to the right. The nosewheel struck a compacted snow windrow on the runway, causing the nose landing gear to collapse. As the aircraft’s nose began to drop, the propeller blades struck the snow and runway surface. All of the left-side propeller blades and 3 of the right-side propeller blades separated at the blade root. A portion of a blade from the right-side propeller penetrated the cabin wall. The aircraft slid to a stop on the runway. All occupants on board — 14 passengers and 2 crew members — were evacuated. Three passengers sustained minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. There was no post-impact fire. There were insufficient forward impact forces to automatically activate the 121.5 MHz emergency locator transmitter. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. Neither pilot had considered that the combination of landing at night, in reduced visibility, with a crosswind and blowing snow, on a runway with no centreline lighting, was a hazard that may create additional risks.
2. The blowing snow made it difficult to identify the runway centreline markings, thereby reducing visual cues available to the captain. This situation was exacerbated by the absence of centreline lighting and a possible visual illusion caused by blowing snow.
3. Due to the gusty crosswind conditions, the aircraft drifted to the right during the landing flare, which was not recognized by the crew.
4. It is likely that the captain had difficulty determining aircraft position during the landing flare.
5. The flight crew’s decision to continue with the landing was consistent with plan continuation bias.
6. During landing, the nosewheel struck the compacted snow windrow on the runway, causing the nose landing gear to collapse.

Findings as to risk:
1. If aircraft are not equipped with a 406 MHz-capable emergency locator transmitter, flight crews and passengers are at increased risk of injury or death following an accident because search-and-rescue assistance may be delayed.
2. If operators do not have defined crosswind limits, there is a risk that pilots may land in crosswinds that exceed their abilities, which could jeopardize the safety of flight.
3. If composite propeller blades contact objects and separate, and then strike or penetrate the cabin, there is a risk of injury or death to occupants seated in the propeller’s plane of rotation.
4. If modern crew resource management training is not a regulatory requirement, then it is less likely to be introduced by operators and, as a result, pilots may not be fully prepared to recognize and mitigate hazards encountered during flight.
5. If organizations do not use modern safety management practices and do not have a robust safety culture, then there is an increased risk that hazards will not be identified and mitigated.
6. When testing an emergency locator transmitter’s (ELT) automatic activation system, a sticking g-switch may go undetected if more than 1 football throw is necessary to activate the ELT. As a result, the ELT might not activate during an accident, and search-and-rescue assistance may be delayed, placing flight crews and passenger at an increased risk for injury or death.
Final Report: