Landing (descent or approach)

Before the ferry flight, the pilot (PIC) & inexperienced copilot noted the left & right, float-type, underwing, fuel gauges indicated about 3,900 & 4,050 lbs of fuel, respectively. After takeoff, they noted that the cockpit gauges showed an opposite fuel imbalance of 4,100 & 3,600 lbs in the left & right tanks. Due to this indication, the PIC crossfed fuel from the left tank to both engines for about 30 min to rectify the perceived fuel imbalance. Later as they approached the destination, the left tank was exhausted of fuel, & the left engine lost power, although the left gauge indicated about 500 lbs of fuel remaining in that tank. The PIC then crossfed fuel from the right tank to both engines, & left engine power was restored. ATC vectored the flight for an emergency ILS runway 3 approach. The PIC was distracted during the approach & maneuvered the airplane to re-intercept the localizer. About 500' agl in IMC, both engines lost power. During a forced landing at night, the airplane struck a raised berm & was damaged. No evidence of fuel was found in the left tank; 125 gal of fuel was found in the right tank. Unusable fuel was published as 3 gal. During an exam of the engines & fuel system components, no preimpact failure was found. Historical data from the manufacturer indicated that when the airplane had a low fuel state, unporting of fuel tank outlets could occur during certain maneuvers. This information was not in the Convair 340 flight manual, although unporting of the outlets on this flight was not verified.

The pilots obtained a complete weather briefing for their IFR flight. Before landing at their destination, they attempted to obtain an airport advisory on Unicom, but received no response. They landed on the runway in low visibility with the runway lights visible. After touchdown, the left main landing gear contacted a berm or snowbank on the left side of the plowed area, and the pilots were unable to maintain directional control. The aircraft drifted off the left side of the runway and came to rest on a reverse heading. The runway, which was 100 feet in width, had been plowed to about 45.5 feet width along the centerline. No notams had been filed concerning the partially plowed condition of the runway. The second officer (commercial pilot) noted that during the weather briefing, the pilot-in-command had been advised of thin, loose snow on the runway.

The single engine aircraft departed Essen-Mülheim Airport on a private flight to Westerland-Sylt Airport, carrying one passenger and one pilot. While descending to Westerland-Sylt Airport, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to fog and snow falls. On approach, the aircraft crashed few km from the airfield, killing both occupants.

The flight was cleared for the VOR/DME approach to runway 17 at the Marco Island Airport. The CVR recorded conversation between the pilot and co-pilot reference to the approach, specifically the MDA both in mean sea level and absolute altitude for a straight-in-approach to runway 17. The flight crew announced that the flight was landing on runway 35. The flight crew did not discuss the missed approach procedure nor the circling minimums. The flight continued and the co-pilot announced that the flight was 5 miles from the airport to descend to the MDA to visually acquire the airport. While descending about 8.5 feet of the left wing of the airplane was severed by a guy wire about 587 feet above ground level from an antenna that was 3.36 nautical miles from the threshold of runway 17. The tower is listed on the approach chart that was provided to the flight crew. The airplane then rolled left wing low, recovered to wings level, then was observed to roll to the left, pitch nose down, and impacted the ground. A fireball was then observed by witnesses. The altimeters, air data computer, and pilot's airspeed indicator were last calibrated about 8 months before the accident. The co-pilots altimeter was found set .01 high from the last known altimeter setting provided to the flight crew. The CVR did not record any conversation pertaining to failure or malfunction of either the pilot or copilot's HSI, the DME or Altimeters. There were no alarms from the VOR/DME monitoring equipment the day of the accident. The flight crew of another airplane executed the same approach about 30 minutes before the accident and they reported no discrepancies with the approach. The MDA for the segment of the approach between where the tower is located is no lower than 974 feet above ground level.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft belly landed and was damaged beyond repair. There were no casualties.

The approach and landing at Istanbul-Atatürk was completed in marginal weather conditions with sleet, strong winds and turbulences. The copilot was the pilot-in-command. Upon touchdown on runway 36, the aircraft landed hard and bounced. On the second impact, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft went out of control, veered off runway to the right at a speed of 60 knots and came to rest. All 81 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The wind was gusting up to 29 knots at the time of the accident with a visibility limited to 4 km.

The airplane was circling to land on runway 22 after executing a VOR/DME approach. The airplane impacted the ground approximately one quarter mile northeast of the runway 22 threshold. The wreckage path covered a distance of approximately 350 feet. Control continuity was established. Airframe, engine and navaid examination revealed no abnormalities. The left wing and horizontal stabilizer leading edges had approximately one-eighth inch of rime ice adhering to their leading edges. Two witnesses reported seeing the airplane rolling from the left to the right. The Eagle River AWOS was not available on a VHF radio frequency, due to radio frequency congestion at the O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.

The crew was completing a night cargo flight from Tolyatti to Saransk. On final approach, while completing a last turn to join the approach path, the left wing tip struck the ground. Out of control, the aircraft crashed few km from the runway threshold. All five crew members were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing, the aircraft flipped over and came to rest. There were no casualties.

The aircraft impacted mountainous terrain in controlled flight during hours of darkness and marginal VFR conditions. The flight was being vectored for an instrument approach during the pilot's 14 CFR Part 135 instrument competency check flight. The flight was instructed by approach control to maintain VFR conditions, and was assigned a heading and altitude to fly which caused the aircraft to fly into another airspace sector below the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA). FAA Order 7110.65, Section 5-6-1, requires that if a VFR aircraft is assigned both a heading and altitude simultaneously, the altitude must be at or above the MVA. The controller did not issue a safety alert, and in an interview, said he was not concerned when the flight approached an area of higher minimum vectoring altitudes (MVA's) because the flight was VFR and 'pilots fly VFR below the MVA every day.' At the time of the accident, the controller was working six arrival sectors and experienced a surge of arriving aircraft. The approach control facility supervisor was monitoring the controller and did not detect and correct the vector below the MVA.