Landing (descent or approach)

At 1448 hrs, the pilot took off from Gransee Special Airfield with the Cessna 208 Caravan to a commercial flight in accordance with visual flight rules. On board were the pilot and 15 skydivers, which were dropped at flight level 130. On this day, the pilot had already conducted three flights dropping skydivers with a total flight time of 48 min. After having dropped the skydivers during the fourth flight, the airplane was last captured by the radar at 1505:49 hrs, during approach to land at the airfield, close to the accident site at about 550 ft AMSL. At the time, ground speed was 168 kt and heading 330°. The Flugleiter stated that he had observed the last phase of the approach. The airplane had been in a left-hand turn with a bank angle of up to 90° close to the ground. He assumed that the pilot might have “overshot” the extended centre line of runway 29 when he entered the final approach coming from the south. Then the airplane had vanished behind the trees. The pilot did not transmit an emergency call. The Flugleiter also stated that with the previous flight he had witnessed a similar manoeuvre. The radar recording of the third flight ended at 1417:54 hrs with a recorded altitude of about 1,400 ft AGL. At the time, ground speed was 168 kt and heading 355°. During both flights the skydivers had been dropped at flight level 130 at a heading of about 300° south of the airfield. After dropping the skydivers, at 1415:07 hrs and at 1502:52 hrs, respectively, the airplane entered a descent with a very high rate of descent and flew in a wide left-hand turn back to the airfield. During the third flight a right-left-hand turn with bank angles of about 50° to 60° occurred during descent.

The accident occurred during the second of a two-leg nonscheduled cargo flight. The initial leg of the flight departed the preceding evening. The pilots landed about 3.5 hours later for fuel and departed on the accident flight an hour after refueling. The flight entered a cruise descent about 39 miles from the destination airport in preparation for approach and landing. The pilots reported to air traffic control that they were executing a wide base and were subsequently cleared for a visual approach and landing. The landing clearance was acknowledged, and no further communications were received. No problems or anomalies were reported during the flight. The airplane was briefly established on final approach before radar contact was lost. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 0.5 mile short of the runway and came to rest in a trucking company parking lot. A postimpact fire ensued. Damage to the landing gear indicated that it was extended at the time of impact. The position of the wing flaps could not be determined. Disparities in the propeller blade angles at impact were likely due to the airplane’s encounter with the wooded area and the impact sequence. No evidence of mechanical anomalies related to the airframe, engines, or propellers was observed. A review of air traffic control radar data revealed that the airplane airspeed decayed to about 70 to 75 kts on final approach which was at or below the documented aerodynamic stall speed of the airplane in the landing configuration. Although there was limited information about the flight crew’s schedules, their performance was likely impaired by fatigue resulting from both the total duration of the overnight flights and the approach being conducted in the window of the circadian low. This likely resulted in the flight crew’s failure to maintain airspeed and recognize the impending aerodynamic stall conditions.

On 27 Aug 19, M/s Air Charter Services Pvt Ltd Cessna Citation 560 XL aircraft (VTAVV), while operating a flight from Delhi to Aligarh (Dhanipur Airstrip) was involved in an accident during landing on runway 11.The operator is having a maintenance facility at Aligarh Airport and aircraft was scheduled to undergo ADS-B modification. There were 02 cockpit crew and 04 SOD onboard the aircraft. The aircraft was under the command of a PIC, who was an ATPL holder duly qualified on type with a CPL holder co-pilot, duly qualified on type as Pilot Monitoring. This was the first flight of the day for both pilots. Both, PIC and Co-Pilot had prior experience of operating to Aligarh airport, which is an uncontrolled airport. As per the flight plan, ETD from Delhi was 0800 IST and ETA at Aligarh was 0820 IST. The crew had reported around 0630 IST at Delhi airport and underwent BA test. The MET report to operate the aircraft to Aligarh was well within the VFR conditions. The aircraft Take-off weight was within limits including 1900 Kgs of fuel on board. As per the statement of PIC, the Co-pilot was briefed about pre departure checklists including METAR before approaching the aircraft. Once at the aircraft, prefight checks were carried out by PIC before seeking clearance from Delhi delivery (121.95 MHz). Aircraft was accorded start up clearance by Delhi ground (121.75 Mhz) at 0800 IST.ATC cleared the aircraft to line up on runway 11 and was finally cleared for takeoff at 0821 IST. After takeoff, aircraft changed over to Delhi radar control from tower frequency for further departure instructions. Aircraft was initially cleared by Radar control to climb to FL090 and was given straight routing to Aligarh with final clearance to climb to FL130. Thereafter, aircraft changed to Delhi area control for further instructions. While at approximately 45 Nm from Aligarh, VT-AVV made contact with Aligarh (personnel of M/s Pioneer Flying Club manning radio) on 122.625 MHz. Ground R/T operator informed “wind 100/2-3 Kts, QNH 1005, Runway 11 in use” and that flying of Pioneer Flying Club is in progress. Further, he instructed crew to contact when at 10 Nm inbound. After obtaining initial information from ground R/T operator, VT-AVV requested Delhi area control for descent. The aircraft was cleared for initial descent to FL110 and then further to FL080. On reaching FL080, aircraft was instructed by Delhi area control to change over to Aligarh for further descent instruction in coordination with destination. At approx 10 Nm, VT-AVV contacted ground R/T operator on 122.625 MHz and requested for long finals for runway 11. In turn, ground R/T operator asked crew to report when at 5 Nm inbound. As per PIC, after reaching 5 Nm inbounds, Aligarh cleared VTAVV to descend to circuit altitude and land on runway 11. Aircraft had commenced approach at 5 Nm at an altitude of 2200 ft. Approach and landing checks briefing including wind, runway in use were carried out by PIC. During visual approach, Co-pilot called out to PIC “Slightly low on profile”. As per PIC, Co-pilot call out was duly acknowledged and ROD was corrected. Thereafter, PIC was visual with runway and took over controls on manual. Co-pilot was monitoring instruments and parameters. While PIC was focused on landing, a loud bang from left side of the aircraft was heard by PIC when the aircraft was below 100 feet AGL. Aircraft started pulling towards left and impacted the ground short of runway 11 threshold. After impact, aircraft veered off the runway and its left wing caught fire. The aircraft stopped short of airfield boundary wall. Crew carried out emergency evacuation. Co-pilot opened main exit door from inside of the aircraft for evacuation of passengers. Aircraft was destroyed due to post crash fire. The fire tender reached the crash site after 45 Minutes.

Following an uneventful flight from Nairobi-Wilson Airport, the crew landed on a gravel runway at Kichwa Tembo Airport. After touchdown, the aircraft collided with two wildebeests. Upon impact, the left main gear was torn off and the aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Both wildebeests were killed.

The pilots were conducting a visual flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers onboard. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions of the flight were uneventful. During the initial approach to the airport, the flight crew discussed having some difficulty visually acquiring the airport. They also discussed traffic in the area and were maneuvering around clouds, which may have increased the pilots' workload. As the approach continued, the airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level (agl), which triggered a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. Further, the flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach. At 1535:57 (about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing), the pilot pulled back the throttles to idle, where they stayed for the remainder of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane for landing, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes when the airplane was below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited in the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the airplane's descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), which exceeded the maximum allowed for landing per the AFM of 600 fpm. When the airplane first touched down, it was traveling about 18 knots above Vref. The pilot did not extend the speedbrakes upon touchdown, which the landing checklist required, but instead attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately after touchdown, which was a later item on the landing checklist. However, the thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and was airborne again before the command could be executed, which was consistent with system design and logic: the thrust reversers will not unlock until all three landing gear are on the ground. The airplane touched down four times total; on the third touchdown (after the second bounce), when all three landing gear contacted the runway, the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded during the first touchdown. Although the pilot subsequently advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the thrust reversers, the airplane had bounced a third time and had already become airborne again before the thrust reversers could stow. When the airplane became airborne, the system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators; thus the reversers would not stow. The thrust reversers were subsequently pulled open due to the aerodynamic forces. The pilot attempted to go around by advancing the throttles when the airplane was airborne. However, the electronic engine controls prevented the increase in engine power because the thrust reversers were not stowed. When the airplane touched down the fourth and final time, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead on the runway; the airplane touched down hard and the right main landing gear then collapsed under the wing. The airplane departed the paved surface and came to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew eventually evacuated the airplane through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a postaccident fire. A postaccident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane's approach was unstabilized: its airspeed during the approach and landing well exceeded Vref and its descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing just seconds before touchdown. Both the pilot and copilot commented on the airplane's high speed several times during the approach. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded, "no." Although the copilot was the director of operations for the flight department and the direct supervisor of the pilot, the pilot stated that the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command nor did it diminish his command authority. Neither the pilot nor copilot called for a go-around before landing despite awareness that the approach was unstabilized. As the airplane touched down, the pilot failed to follow the AFM guidance and used the thrust reversers before the speedbrakes. According to the airplane manufacturer's calculations, the airplane could have stopped within the length of runway available if the airplane had not bounced and the speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the point of the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, when the airplane became airborne again, the pilot attempted a go-around; the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after the thrust reversers are deployed. It is critical for pilots to know the point at which they should not attempt a go-around; a committed-to-stop (CTS) point is the point at which a go-around or rejected landing procedure will not be initiated and the only option will be bringing the aircraft to a stop. Establishing a CTS point eliminates the ambiguity for pilots making decisions during time-critical events. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009, "Committed-toStop Point on Landings," to inform operators and pilots about the importance of establishing a CTS point; however, the director of operations was not aware of the concept of a CTS point during landing.

On final approach to Los Ángeles-María Dolores Airport, the airplane crashed in a wooded area located about 412 metres short of runway 18, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. The accident occurred 19 minutes after sunset.

The accident occurred during an IFR air taxi flight from Oslo (ENGM) to Aarhus (EKAH). The flight was uneventful until the landing phase. The commander was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. En route, the flight crew set the Vapp 15° to 123 knots (kt) and the Vref 35° to 116 kt and agreed upon, if foggy at EKAH, to pull the curtains between the cockpit and the passenger cabin in order to avoid blinding from lights in the passenger cabin. During the descent, the flight crew decided not to descend below Flight Level (FL) 170, if the weather did not allow an approach and landing in EKAH. Instead they would continue to a pre-planned destination alternate. The pre-planned and nearest useable destination alternate was Billund (EKBI) at a great circle distance of 60 nautical miles southwest of EKAH. At 22:09 hrs, the first officer established preliminary radio contact with Aarhus Tower (118.525 MegaHertz (MHz)) in order to obtain the latest weather report for EKAH. The air traffic controller at Aarhus Tower communicated the following landing details:
- Expected landing on runway 10R.
- Wind conditions to be 140° 2 kt.
- Meteorological visibility to be 250 meters (m).
- Runway Visual Range (RVR) at landing to be 900 m, 750 m, and 400 m in fog patches.
- Few clouds at 200 feet (ft), few clouds at 6500 ft.
- Temperature 16° Celcius (C) and Dewpoint 15° C.
- QNH 1008 Hectopascal (hPa).
The first officer read back a meteorological visibility of 2500 m to the commander. The flight crew discussed the reported RVR values and agreed that runway 10R would be the preferable landing runway. The commander made an approach briefing for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for runway 10R including a summary of SOP in case of a missed approach. The first officer pulled the curtain between the cockpit and the passenger cabin. At established radio contact with Aarhus Approach (119.275 MHz) at 22:20 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to descend to altitude 3000 feet on QNH 1008 hPa and to expect radar vectors for an ILS approach to runway 10R. The flight crew performed the approach checklist. The flight crew discussed the weather situation at EKAH with expected shallow fog and fog patches at landing. At 22:28 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to turn right by 10°, descend to 2000 ft on QNH 1008 hPa, and informed that Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) were in operation at EKAH. Due the weather conditions, the air traffic controller radar vectored the aircraft for a long final allowing the flight crew to be properly established before the final approach. The commander called out the instrument presentation of an operative radio altimeter. At 22:31 hrs, the air traffic controller instructed the flight crew to turn left on heading 130° and cleared the flight crew to perform an ILS approach to runway 10R. The commander armed the approach mode of the aircraft Automatic Flight Control System and ordered a flap setting of 15°. When established on the LLZ for runway 10R and shortly before leaving 2000 ft on the GS, the commander through shallow fog obtained and called visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system. At that point, the first officer as well noted the approach and runway lighting system including the position of the green threshold identification lights. The commander ordered a landing gear down selection. The flight crew observed that a fog layer was situated above the middle of the runway. Though visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system, the commander requested altitude call-outs on approach. The commander ordered a flap setting of 35°. The aircraft was established on the ILS (LLZ and GS) for runway 10R in landing configuration. At 22:32 hrs, the first officer reported to Aarhus Approach that the aircraft was established on the ILS for runway 10R. The air traffic controller reported the wind conditions to be 150° 2 kt and cleared the aircraft to land on runway 10R. The flight crew initiated the final checklist. The landing lights were on. The first officer noted two white and two red lights of the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) to the left of runway 10R. Passing approximately 1500 ft Radio Height (RH), the first officer reported to the commander visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system, fog above the middle of the runway, and that the touchdown zone and the runway end were both visible. The commander confirmed. At approximately 900 ft RH, the commander disengaged the autopilot, and the flight crew completed the final checklist. The aircraft was established on the ILS (LLZ and GS) for runway 10R in landing configuration at a recorded computed airspeed of approximately 128 kt. The first officer called: 500 to minimum (passing approximately 800 ft RH), and the commander called: Runway in sight. The commander confirmed that the intensity of the approach and runway lighting system was okay. The commander informed the first officer that the intention was to touch down at the beginning of the runway. In order to avoid entering fog patches during the landing roll, the commander planned flying one dot below the GS, performing a towed approach, and touching down on the threshold. However, the commander did not communicate this plan of action to the first officer. The aircraft started descending below the GS for runway 10R. The first officer asked the commander whether to cancel potential Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) GS warnings. The commander confirmed. At approximately 500 ft RH, the Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) recorded cancellation of potential EGPWS GS warnings. The aircraft aural alert warning system announced passing 500 feet RH. The recorded computed airspeed was 125 kt, the recorded vertical speed was approximately 700 ft/minute, and the GS deviation approached one dot below the GS. The commander noted the PAPI indicating the aircraft flying below the GS (one white and three red lights). The first officer called: Approaching minimum. Shortly after, the aircraft aural alert warning system announced: Minimums Minimums. The SSFDR recorded a beginning thrust reduction towards flight idle and a full scale GS deviation (flying below). The commander called: Continue. The commander had visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system. It was the perception of the first officer that the commander had sufficient visual cues to continue the approach and landing. The first officer as pilot monitoring neither made callouts on altitude nor deviation from GS. The commander noticed passing a white crossbar, a second white crossbar and then red lights. To the commander, the red lights indicated the beginning of runway 10R, and the commander initiated the flare. The aircraft collided with the antenna mast system of the LLZ for runway 28L, touched down in the grass RESA for runway 28L, and the nose landing gear collided with a near field antenna (LLZ for runway 28L) and collapsed. The aircraft ended up on runway 10R. Throughout the sequence of events and due to fog, the air traffic controller in the control tower (Aarhus Approach) had neither visual contact with the approach sector, the threshold for runway 10R nor the aircraft on ground, when it came to a full stop. Upon full stop on runway 10R, the first officer with a calm voice reported to Aarhus Approach: Aarhus Tower, Delta Whiskey Mike, we had a crash landing. The air traffic controller did not quite perceive the reporting and was uncertain on the content of the reporting and replied: Say again. The cabin crewmember without instructions from the flight crew initiated the evacuation of the passengers via the cabin entry door. The aircraft caught fire. Aarhus Approach and the Aerodrome Office in cooperation activated the aerodrome firefighting services and the area emergency dispatch centre. Upon completion of the on ground emergency procedure and the evacuation of the aircraft, the flight crew met the cabin crewmember and the passengers at a safe distance in front of the aircraft.

The crew was completing a local skydiving mission in the region of Fakhrabad, about 30 km southwest of Dushanbe. After eight skydivers departed the cabin, the crew was returning to Fakhrabad Airfield when, on final approach, the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances. The copilot was seriously injured and the captain was killed.

The flight crew was landing the transport-category airplane at a remote, gravel-covered runway. According to the captain, the terrain on the approach to the runway sloped down toward the approach end, which positioned the airplane close to terrain during the final stages of the approach. A video recorded by a bystander showed that while the airplane was on short final approach, it flew low on the glidepath and dragged its landing gear through vegetation near the approach end of the runway. The video showed that, just before the main landing gear wheels reached the runway threshold, the right main landing wheel impacted a dirt and rock berm. The captain said that to keep the airplane from veering to the right, he placed the No. 1 and No. 2 engine propellers in reverse pitch. The flight engineer applied asymmetric reverse thrust to help correct for the right turning tendency, and the airplane tracked straight for about 2,000 ft. The video then showed that the right main landing gear assembly separated, and the airplane continued straight down the runway before veering to the right, exiting the runway, and spinning about 180°, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. On-site examination of the runway revealed several 4-ft piles of rocks and dirt at the runway threshold, which is likely what the right main landing wheel impacted. Given that the airplane landing gear struck vegetation and rocks on the approach to the runway, it is likely that they were below the proper glidepath for the approach. The crew stated there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

Following an uneventful flight from Port Harcourt, the crew initiated the approach to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls due to CB's at 1,900 feet. On final, he was cleared to land on runway 18R and informed about a wet runway surface. Both main landing gears touched down normally and when the nose gear landed as well, both wheels apparently separated. The nose gear leg ripped the ground and the airplane rolled for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 139 occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was later considered as damaged beyond repair.