Landing (descent or approach)

The pilot of the Part 135 cargo flight was executing the 'full' ILS runway 27 approach at Helena Regional Airport in a non-radar environment. Although the approach calls for the pilot to maintain 7,000 feet until intercepting the glideslope, the aircraft impacted the terrain at 5,300 about 1.5 miles prior to reaching the point where the pilot should have crossed the Hauser NDB at an altitude of 6,741 feet. According to the approach plate, the aircraft should not have descended to an altitude below 5,400 feet until reaching the outer marker, which is located about five and one-half miles west of the impact site.

The pilot, sole on board, departed Tangier on a delivery flight to Saint Peter-La Villiaze, Guernsey Island, where the aircraft should be taken over by another crew to be ferried to Iceland. While approaching the Channel Islands, the pilot informed ATC about technical problems and elected to divert to Jersey Airport. Shortly later, after both engines stopped due to a fuel exhaustion, the plane lost height and crashed in the sea about 3 nm northwest of Jersey Island. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

After a 4.7 hour flight, while turning onto final, the airplane landed short. The pilot did not mention engine problems during a police interview. He subsequently told an FAA Inspector that the left engine failed, then later, that the right engine failed. He told the Safety Board that both engines failed. Adequate fuel was confirmed. The previous day, the right engine failed approaching another airport. The pilot performed a single-engine go-around, with landing gear and flaps down. He refused assistance and performed his own maintenance. He cleaned the fuel filters of both engines. During a ground runup, the right engine was hard to start, and required a high fuel flow to remain running. After the pilot re-cleaned the right fuel filter the engine ran fine. The flight was uneventful until the accident. Post-flight examination revealed all propeller blades bent back 90 degrees, with significant chordwise scoring on one blade per engine. The left engine fuel filter was relatively clean, with some brown residue which contained ferrous material. The right engine fuel filter was heavily coated with a white residue which contained aluminum, and brown material which contained ferrous material. The pilot received his multi-engine rating on April 22, 1998.

While descending to Santa Fe-Sauce Viejo Airport by night, the crew was informed about poor weather conditions at destination. The visibility was estimated to be 30 metres in foggy conditions, well below minimums. As the crew elected to attempt an approach, he as cleared for and ILS approach to runway 03. On short final, the aircraft descended below the MDA and struck the ground 430 metres short of runway threshold. On impact, it lost its undercarriage and slid for another 180 metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Aguadilla-Rafael Hernández Airport. Following several touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew was approaching the airport when he inadvertently raised the landing gear prior to landing. The aircraft belly landed and came to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After takeoff from runway 28 at Brno-Tuřany Airport, the pilot reported on the tower frequency that she needs to land. She received instruction to continue a southern (left-hand) circuit and to report final for runway 28. At this time the first contact was made with the aeroplane by secondary radar at a height of about 520 feet AAL and 560 metres north from runway 28. The pilot did not confirm the instruction, did not turn for the southern (left-hand) circuit, but continued to turn for the northern (right-hand) one. Since she did not confirm repeated approval for the left-hand circuit and continued the right-hand one, she received information from tower that it is possible to continue the northern circuit, clearance to land to runway 28 ans was offered assistance after landing. Without any confirmation. At this time the height was approximately 930 feet AAL and position 2,8 km north from the aerodrome. The aeroplane started gradually to descend and to turn as the pilot probably intended to accomplish approach for runway 28. However it did not happen and the aeroplane hit the ground at 0615,28 approximately 600 metres north from the runway 28 threshold. The aeroplane was flying very low in the last phase of flight according to statements of witnesses. The last height recorded by the secondary radar was approximately 120 feet AAL 13 seconds prior to the impact onto ground. Witnesses described the attitude of the aeroplane prior to strike to ground as very unusual. Both occupants were killed.

The captain/operator, the first officer and one passenger, departed on a cross-country positioning flight. The airplane contained about 300 gallons of fuel. After 3.9 hours en route, the flight was cleared for a visual approach to the destination airport. During the approach, both engines lost power about 2,000 feet mean sea level. The pilot stated the right fuel tank was empty. He estimated that 50 to 60 gallons of fuel remained in the left fuel tank. While the airplane was descending toward an area of open water, he attempted to restart the engines without success. He then lowered the landing gear, and made a right turn toward a small airstrip, located about 5 miles northwest of the destination airport. The airplane touched down in an area of soft, marsh covered, terrain. During the landing roll, the airplane nosed down and received damage to the forward, lower portion of the fuselage. An inspection of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the left fuel tank contained about 1 inch of fuel. The right fuel selector was positioned on the right auxiliary fuel tank. The left fuel selector was positioned between the left main, and the left auxiliary fuel tanks.

During landing roll, the airplanes normal braking system failed as a result of hydraulic fluid leak(s). At the pilot's request, deployment of the drag chute and application of the emergency braking system was performed by the first officer. According to the first officer, application of the emergency brakes caused the airplane to yaw. The first officer then pulled up on the emergency brakes handle followed by re-application of braking pressure. This action took place several times during the landing roll. Gates' Learjet Flight Training Manual (Page 105) states, 'In using the emergency brake lever, slow steady downward pressure is required. Each time the lever is allowed to return upward to the normal position, nitrogen is evacuated overboard. Brace your hand so you will not allow the lever to move up and down inadvertently on a bumpy runway.' The airplane overran the end of the runway and collided with the Instrument Landing System back course antennae.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Salvador to Guanambi, carrying one passenger, two pilots and a load consisting of briefcases containing valuables. On final approach to Guanambi Airport, following a 1 hour and 42 minutes of flight, both engines lost power. The crew lost control of the airplane that crashed few hundred metres short of runway. All three occupants were killed.

The flight was on a practice nondirectional beacon (NDB) approach to Great Falls runway 34 in visual conditions. Abeam the final approach fix, the aircraft was 4 miles right of course. Upon being advised of this by ATC, the pilot corrected back to final with a 60-degree intercept angle, rolling out on course 3 miles from the runway. When the pilot called missed approach, the local controller (a trainee) instructed the pilot to make a 360-degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 3, and the pilot acknowledged. The controller trainee then amended this instruction to a 180-degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 21, then to a 180- degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 3. The crew did not acknowledge the amended instruction. Controllers then observed the airplane had crashed. Witnesses reported the airplane entered a steep descent from a right turn and impacted the ground at a steep angle. The flight was described as recurrent training required by the owner's insurance; however, the second aircraft occupant's airline transport pilot and flight instructor certificates had been revoked, and he held only a private pilot certificate. Investigators found no evidence of aircraft malfunctions.