Landing (descent or approach)

En route from Moscow-Domodedovo to Luton, while cruising over Germany, the crew declared an emergency following smoke spreading in the cabin and the cockpit. The crew was cleared to divert to Kiel-Holtenau Airport. After landing by night on runway 26 which is 1,265 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest in a ravine. All 6 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After landing at Aweil Airport, both tyres on the nose gear burst. The aircraft went out of control, veered off runway and collided with a building, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all 7 crew and 13 passengers (Sudanese soldiers) were killed.

On February 7, 2006, about 2359 eastern standard time, United Parcel Service Company flight 1307, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F, N748UP, landed at its destination airport, Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, after a cargo smoke indication in the cockpit. The captain, first officer, and flight engineer evacuated the airplane after landing. The flight crewmembers sustained minor injuries, and the airplane and most of the cargo were destroyed by fire after landing. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Night visual conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The multi-engine airplane rolled inverted and dove into the ground on a landing approach. According to witnesses, the airplane made two approaches to runway 23. During the first approach the airplane was observed, "fish tailing" while about 30' feet over the runway. The airplane appeared to regain control and continued flying over the runway until passing the air traffic control tower, at which time the airplane began a climbing left turn. The witnesses stated that they heard the pilot tell the air traffic controller that he was doing a go-around. The controller asked the pilot if he had problems with the sea fog. The pilot responded back to the controller "no that his left engine kept power up a little too much and would not come back." The witnesses observed the airplane circle the airport to the left, and watched it line up on runway 23 for the second time. The witnesses stated that as the airplane descended to the runway and without any indication of trouble, the airplane "climbed and rolled left, went inverted and nosed down into the grass to the left of the runway and burst into flames." Examination of the airplane, airplane systems, engines, and propellers found no abnormal preimpact conditions that would have interfered with the normal operation of the airplane. No recorded radar data for the flight was located that captured the airplane's two attempted landings. Information contained in the Super King Air 200 Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) and FAA Approved Flight Manual (AFM) showed the stall speed with gear extended, 40-degrees flaps, and zero bank angle as 84 knots Indicated Air Speed.

The aircraft was performing a private tour when enroute, the crew decided to divert to Ohakea AFB due to the deterioration of the weather conditions. On final approach, when full flaps was selected, the aircraft rolled left and right. The pilots could not control the aircraft that struck the runway surface and came to rest. While all occupants were uninjured, the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

The right main landing gear collapsed on landing. According to the flight crew, after departure they preceded to Mountain Air Airport, where they performed a "touch-and-go" landing. Upon raising the landing gear following the touch-and-go landing, they got an "unsafe gear" light. The crew stated they cycled the gear back down and got a "three green" normal indication. They cycled the gear back up and again got the "gear unsafe" light. They diverted to Greensboro, North Carolina, and upon landing in Greensboro the airplane's right main landing gear collapsed. After the accident, gear parts from the accident airplane were discovered on the runway at Mountain Air Airport. Metallurgical examination of the landing gear components revealed fractures consistent with overstress separation and there was no evidence of fatigue. Examination of the runway at Mountain Air Airport by an FAA Inspector showed evidence the accident airplane had touched down short of the runway.

The airplane was destroyed and the occupants fatally injured when it impacted the ground during approach to landing. Examination of the airplane, its engines and propellers, revealed no anomalies that were determined to have existed prior to impact. The propellers were found to have been in their normal operating range and neither propeller was in a feathered position. The quill shafts of both engines showed evidence of damage due to the production of torque. A sound spectrum examination of audio transmissions showed signatures that both engines were operating during the last two radio transmissions from the airplane. Based on radar data, communications and meteorological information obtained during the investigation, the airplane was operating in visual meteorological conditions below an overcast layer of clouds. The radar data showed the airplane as it approached the airport and as it entered a left hand traffic pattern for runway 34. Radio communications confirmed that the airplane had been cleared for a left hand traffic pattern to runway 34. The radar data showed the airplane as it made a turn to the left while its speed decreased to about 82 knots calibrated airspeed as of the last received radar return. This radar return was about 0.1 nautical miles from the accident site and 0.8 nautical miles and 216 degrees from the approach end of runway 34. The airplane owner's manual listed stall speeds ranging from 81 to 94 knots calibrated airspeed for airplane configurations including gear and flaps up to gear down and flaps 15 degrees, and bank angles from 0 to 40 degrees. Flap position could not be determined because the flap chain had separated from the flap drive motor. The owner's manual also listed an approach speed of 103 knots.

During a cross country flight, the pilot was informed by air traffic control that adverse weather was along his route of flight for terrain obscurement in clouds, precipitation, fog or mist. Turbulence was reported below 12,000 feet and occasional moderate rime or mixed icing was reported from the freezing level to 14,000 feet. Further along the route, the pilot reported to another controller that he was at 13,000 feet and descending. The controller inquired if the pilot was aware of the center weather advisory and the reports of severe rime ice in the direction that he was heading. The pilot acknowledged the controller by reporting that he was aware of the weather and that the aircraft was "equipped." The controller continued to inform the pilot of pilot reports from commercial aircraft flight crews of the reports of icing conditions, however, the pilot continued on his routing and again reported that the aircraft was "equipped." During the last transmissions from the pilot, he reported that he was "turning on (de-ice) equipment now." The controller recommended to the pilot to stay clear of the clouds. The pilot responded, "roger." The controller then asked the pilot if he was "going to orbit there for awhile." The pilot responded, "yes," followed by a partially unintelligible transmission of "getting some weather here." The pilot's last transmissions were "Ah, I'm in a little trouble," followed by "Ah, standby 9KM." Radar tracking indicated that the aircraft had been cruising at 16,500 feet before starting a gradual descent. The aircraft descended to 12,700 feet and it began a turn to the right. During this turn, the aircraft's altitude changed rapidly beginning with an increase, followed by a rapid loss of altitude from 8,000 feet per minute descent to 10,600 feet per minute descent before radar contact was lost. The aircraft was found 6 months later in an area of mountainous terrain. On site evidence indicated that the aircraft collided with trees and terrain in a nose low attitude with the majority of the wreckage contained in a large deep crater.

The aircraft was performing a cargo flight from Goma to Mbuji-Mayi with a crew of 4 and a cargo consisting of fuel drums. The aircraft landed hard, causing both wings to break down. The undercarriage partially collapsed then the aircraft skidded for about 500 metres before coming to rest on the left side of the runway. A fire erupted in the rear of the cabin and the aircraft was destroyed.

Air traffic control cleared the flightcrew for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 24, which was 4,897 feet long. The flightcrew then reported that they had the runway in sight, cancelled their instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance, and executed a visual flight rules (VFR) approach in VFR conditions to the airport. The reported winds favored a landing toward the east, onto the opposite runway (runway 6). During the approach, after a query from the first officer, the captain indicated to the first officer that he was going to "...land to the east," consistent with the reported winds. However, the final approach and subsequent landing were made to runway 24, which produced a six-knot tailwind. During the approach sequence the captain maintained an airspeed that was approximately 30 knots higher than the correct airspeed for the aircraft's weight, resulting in the aircraft touching down about 1,500 feet further down the runway than normal, and much faster than normal. The captain then delayed the initiation of a go-around until the first officer asked if they were going around. Although the aircraft lifted off the runway surface prior to departing the paved overrun during the delayed go-around it impacted a localizer antenna platform, whose highest non-frangible structure was located approximately 304 feet past the end of the runway, and approximately two feet lower than the terrain at the departure end of the runway. The aircraft continued airborne as it flew over downsloping terrain for about 400 more feet before colliding with the terrain and a commercial storage building that was located at an elevation approximately 80 feet lower than the terrain at the end of the runway. The localizer antenna platform was located outside of the designated runway safety area, and met all applicable FAA siting requirements. The captain had type 2 diabetes, for which he took oral medication and monitored blood sugar levels. He did not reveal his history of diabetes to the FAA. The captain's post-accident toxicology testing was consistent with an elevated average blood sugar level over the previous several months; however, no medical records of the captain's treatment were available, and the investigation could not determine if the captain's diabetes or treatment were potentially factors in the accident. The captain of the accident flight was the sole owner of a corporation that was asked by the two owners of the accident airplane to manage the airplane for them under a Part 91 business flight operation. The two owners were not pilots and had no professional aviation experience, but they desired to be flown to major domestic airports so that they could transfer and travel internationally via commercial airlines. One of the two owners stated that the purpose of the accident flight was to fly a businessman to a meeting, and to also transport one of the owner's wives to visit family at the same destination. According to one of the owners, the businessman was interested in being a third owner in the accident airplane, so the owner permitted the businessman to fly. The owner also stated that the accident pilot told him that the passenger would pay for expenses directly related to the operation of the airplane for the flight (permitted under FAA Part 91 rules), and an "hourly fee" (prohibited under FAA Part 91 rules); however, no documentation was found to corroborate this statement for the accident flight or previous flights.