Aeroflot - Russian International Airlines

It was determined that the fire alarm that activated in the cockpit was false and not related to an engine fire. Analysis revealed that the temperature of the left engine compartment increased to 253° C due to the disconnection of a pipe coupled to the anti-icing system. The accident was the consequence of the combination of several wrong decisions on part of the flying crew and the following factors:
- The approach was completed by night and icing conditions in a single engine configuration,
- The total weight of the aircraft was 10,201 kg above the maximum weight allowed for landing,
- The approach was completed with a tailwind component,
- Excessive approach speed,
- Premature descent resulting in a collision with ground after passing MDA,
- Lack of crew interaction and coordination,
- The navigator failed to inform the captain about the decision height fixed at 120 meters,
- The approach was completed with the GPWS deactivated,
- The copilot failed to monitor the instruments properly, which contributed to the deviation of the airplane to the right during the last sequence until it lost altitude and impacted the ground.

Decision of the captain to continue the flight in below-minima weather conditions and his decision to return was too late. It was also reported that ATC failed to inform the crew about the minimum safe altitude in the area and the fact that weather conditions deteriorated en route. Finally, weather bulletin published by meteorologist were incomplete.

Engine failure for undetermined reasons.

The cause of the accident was the internal destruction of the engine due to fatigue peeling of the nitrided layer and subsequent destruction of the teeth of the fixed gear wheel.

Due to the extensive destruction of the aircraft, it was not possible to determine the exact cause of the accident. However, it is believed that the loss of control may have been caused by wrong informations provided by the horizons while on approach in poor weather conditions.

It was determined that the accident was the consequence of a premature deactivation of the deicing systems while completing an approach in icing conditions with flaps deployed at 38°. This caused the aircraft to be unstable on its longitudinal axis and to come uncontrollable. Various flight tests to determine the longitudinal stability and controllability characteristics during a flight in icing conditions had not been carried out.

Loss of control during initial climb after the airplane suffered windshear and low level turbulences.

It was determined that the loss of control was the consequence of several errors on part of the crew who failed to take appropriate actions to insure that the aircraft's speed was sufficient for a go-around procedure. The crew took too much time (about 10 seconds) to retract flaps and landing gears which prevented the aircraft to have sufficient speed. It was also reported that the training program did not include an engine shut down on approach and that the instructor completed such procedure for the first time, which was considered as a contributing factor.

It was determined that the stall and subsequent loss of control during initial climb was caused by the cargo shifting. Investigations revealed that the wooden copper coils were not properly installed and secured in the cabin but only fixed with the onboard winch cable. At liftoff, the wooden copper coils moved to the rear of the cabin, causing the CofG to be out of the enveloppe and the aircraft to be uncontrollable. Loadmasters failed to install and secure the wooden copper coils according to the published procedures and failed to use appropriate equipment such as nets or belts. The copilot exercised an unsatisfactory supervision of the loading while the captain decided to takeoff despite the load was improperly secured.