Training

The aircraft took off from Arusha Airport (ARK) at 12:35 hours for a circuit training. It was carrying one instructor, a pilot trainee and three passengers. The aircraft was flying VFR. The instructor said that he intended to execute nine touch and go circuit operations, three of which were to be performed with 42° flaps, another three with 18° flaps and the rest with zero degree flaps. The first six circuits were performed uneventfully. Before initiating the first flapless landing the instructor ordered the trainee to extend his approach and establish a six-mile final to runway 09. When the aircraft was established on the final for runway 09 the instructor saw that the aircraft was a bit too low and ordered the trainee to adjust his approach. After 5H-PAB was established on the approach slope the instructor advised the trainee to call when he needed props fully forward (setting propellers into full coarse pitch). This he subsequently did and the instructor, aware of the relatively high aircraft speed for the configuration advised the trainee to be careful on the flare in order to avoid the possibility of the tail skid hitting the ground. When the aircraft was flared, the tail skid hit and scraped the ground followed by the belly and the nose underside section. After sliding for 164 metres the aircraft came to rest on the runway with the engines still running. The instructor carried out the emergency shut down checks and evacuated the aircraft. It was only after touchdown that the crew realised that they had belly landed. The commander then proceeded to select reverse thrust. There was no fire and none of the occupants was injured. The instructor said that he had forgotten to lower the landing gear because of his preoccupation with the rate of descent and the execution of the flapless flare. The pilot under instruction testified that he had concentrated too much an the technical side of flying to the point of forgetting to call for the gear down selection. There was only one checklist in use in the cockpit which was contained in a book and this was being used by the instructor. The instructor testified to have used the checklist for the first six landings. The checklist was not used for the accident landing. None pilot of the pilots reported to have heard the landing gear horn.

The crew was completing a local training flight at RAF Middle Wallop. After landing, the twin engine failed to stopped, overran and came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Kuching Airport. On final approach, one of the engine failed. The aircraft lost height and crashed in a swampy area near the airport. All five occupants were killed.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Loma Bonita Airport which has a 1,400 metres long 18/36 runway. After touchdown, the crew initiated the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, rolled for about 100 metres then came to rest. All six occupants escaped uninjured. A fire erupted and destroyed the aircraft in few minutes as local firebombers were not sufficiently trained and well equipped.

The aircraft departed São Paulo-Congonhas on a training flight to Ribeirão Preto-Leite Lopes Airport, carrying five crew members, instructor and pilots. On final approach to runway 18, during the last segment, just prior to touchdown, the aircraft rolled to the right, causing the right wing tip to struck the runway surface. The pilot-in-command overcorrected, the aircraft went out of control and crashed 420 metres past the first impact, bursting into flames. All five occupants were killed.

The pilot was receiving a competency flight in the seaplane from an FAA inspector. The pilot was returning to their initial departure airport, descended to 1,000 feet, contacted the control tower for landing instructions, and was instructed to enter on a right base. Before he could acknowledge the landing instructions the engines started to make loud, rough, and unusual noises. The pilot informed the control tower that he was 2 miles south , declared an emergency, and stated he had a bad engine on the left side. The FAA inspector stated the pilot started the emergency procedure, the manifold pressure and rpm was fluctuating. The inspector could not determine the dead engine by the dead foot, dead engine method, because her rudder pedals were stowed. She pointed out a pasture and the pilot stated they were going to the water. She did not recall the pilot shutting down the engine or feathering the propeller. She could not recall the final seconds of the flight. The airplane collided with a tree, canal bank, and came to rest inverted in the canal. Examination of the airframe and flight control systems revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the left propeller revealed it was not feathered. The No. 6 front forward spark plug ignition lead was disconnected from the spark plug. The ignition lead shroud threaded coupling on the No. 4 front forward spark plug was unscrewed and the carbon wire was exposed. The left and right engines were removed from the airplane and transported to an authorized FAA approved repair station. The left engine was placed in an engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. The spark plug lead was removed from the No.6 forward cylinder. The left magneto had a 125 rpm drop during the magneto check. The right magneto had a 75 rpm drop. The magneto drop exceeded the allowable drop indicated by the engine overhaul manual. The right engine was placed in a engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. Review of the FAA inspectors FAA Form 4040.6 revealed she was not Event Based Current (EBC) for the 4th quarter of the Flight Standards EBC program, and she did not meet the EBC quarterly events required by the end of the 14-day grace period. FAA Order 4040.9 states for an FAA inspector to be eligible / assigned to perform flight certification job function they must be EBC current., and inspectors should not accept assignments without being in compliance with the FAA Order. Managers and supervisors should not assign inspectors who are not current. The FAA inspector's supervisor was aware that the inspector was not current. He contacted the FAA Safety Regulation Branch, FAA Southern Region Headquarters, and stated that FAA Southern Region indicated that the inspector could administer the checkride. FAA Southern Region stated at no time did they approve or agree to an operation outside the parameters of the FAR's, Inspector Handbook or FAA Order.

The flight departed Fort Lauderdale's Executive Airport (FXE) at about 1833 on a northwesterly heading for the co-located Pahokee VOR/airport (PHK) on the second training session of the day for the 2 front seat occupants. This particular flight had a dual purpose, in that the left seat occupant/new-hire was getting a 'pre-check ride' by the right seat occupant/instructor/PIC, and the instructor was being observed by the air taxi's director of operations in anticipation of an endorsement for an FAA designation as a company check airman. The flight was not in contact with any ATC facility and was squawking a transponder code consistent with non-controlled, VMC flight. At 1902, the Miami ARTCC lost radar contact at the 334 degree radial/12 nmi from the PHK VOR at 1,300 feet agl. Eight days later, the wreckage with its 3 occupants still inside, was located and recovered from the lake bottom. The location roughly corresponds with the radial of the PHK VOR that would have to be tracked while performing the VOR Runway 17 approach. The wreckage was intact except for 2 nacelle doors, the nose cone, and the left propeller, and revealed no engine, airframe, or component failure or malfunction. There was no evidence of a bird strike. Evidence revealed that both engines were developing power and the airplane was wings level in the approach configuration and attitude at water contact.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Antofagasta-Cerro Moreno Airport (Andrés Sabella Gálvez Intl Airport). At liftoff, the pilot-in-command initiated a sharp turn to the right, causing the left wing tip to struck the ground. Out of control, the aircraft crashed by the runway. All three occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was reported that the pilot-in-command was a Mirage fighter jet captain. When ATC requested the crew to expedite the takeoff, the pilot-in-command made a sharp turn at low height, apparently not aware about the aircraft wingspan.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Aguadilla-Rafael Hernández Airport. Following several touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew was approaching the airport when he inadvertently raised the landing gear prior to landing. The aircraft belly landed and came to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The flight was on a practice nondirectional beacon (NDB) approach to Great Falls runway 34 in visual conditions. Abeam the final approach fix, the aircraft was 4 miles right of course. Upon being advised of this by ATC, the pilot corrected back to final with a 60-degree intercept angle, rolling out on course 3 miles from the runway. When the pilot called missed approach, the local controller (a trainee) instructed the pilot to make a 360-degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 3, and the pilot acknowledged. The controller trainee then amended this instruction to a 180-degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 21, then to a 180- degree right turn to enter right downwind for runway 3. The crew did not acknowledge the amended instruction. Controllers then observed the airplane had crashed. Witnesses reported the airplane entered a steep descent from a right turn and impacted the ground at a steep angle. The flight was described as recurrent training required by the owner's insurance; however, the second aircraft occupant's airline transport pilot and flight instructor certificates had been revoked, and he held only a private pilot certificate. Investigators found no evidence of aircraft malfunctions.