Training

The accident aircraft had recently had maintenance work performed on its autofeather system pressure sensing switches, due to reports of the left engine not autofeathering properly in flight. The purpose of the accident flight was to verify proper inflight operation of the autofeather system following the maintenance work on the autofeather pressure sensing switches and a successful ground check of the autofeather system. Air traffic control (ATC) communications recordings disclosed that the pilot called ready for takeoff from runway 2 approximately 1207, and requested to orbit above the airport at 8,000 feet (note: the airport elevation is 4,740 feet.) The pilot subsequently reported established in a hold above the airport at 8,000 feet approximately 1213, and was instructed by ATC to report leaving the hold. Approximately 1215, an abbreviated radio transmission, "zero five four," was recorded. The Idaho Falls tower controller responded to this call but never got a response in return from the accident aircraft, despite repeated efforts to contact the aircraft. Witnesses reported that the aircraft banked to the left, or to the west, and that it entered a spiral from this bank and crashed (one witness reported the aircraft was flying at 200 to 300 feet above ground level when it entered this bank, and that it performed a "skidding" or "sliding" motion part way through the bank, about 1 second before entering the spiral.) The aircraft crashed about 2 miles north of the airport. On-site examination disclosed wreckage and impact signatures consistent with an uncontrolled, relatively low-speed, moderate to steep (i.e. greater than 22 degrees) angle, left-wing-low impact on an easterly flight path. No evidence of flight control system malfunction was found, and a large quantity of jet fuel was noted to be aboard the aircraft. Post-accident examination of the aircraft's engines indicated that the left engine was most likely operating in a low power range and the right engine was most likely operating in a mid to high power range at impact, but no indications of any anomalies or distress that would have precluded normal operation of the engines prior to impact was found. Post-accident examination of the aircraft's propellers disclosed indications that 1) both propellers were rotating at impact, 2) neither propeller was at or near the feather position at impact, 3) both propellers were being operated with power at impact (exact amount unknown), 4) both propellers were operating at approximately 14º to 20º blade angle at impact, and 5) there were no propeller failures prior to impact. Post-accident examination of the autofeather pressure sensing switches disclosed evidence of alterations, tampering, or modifications made in the field on all but one switch (a replacement switch, which had been installed just before the accident flight during maintenance) installed on the aircraft at the time of the accident. All switches except for the replacement switch operated outside their design pressure specifications; the replacement switch operated within design pressure specifications. Examination of the switches indicated that all switches were installed in the correct positions relative to high- or low-pressure switch installations. Engineering analyses of expected autofeather system performance with the switches operating at their "as-found" pressure settings (vice at design pressure specifications) did not indicate a likelihood of any anomalous or abnormal autofeather system operation with the autofeather switches at their "as-found" pressure settings. Also, cockpit light and switch evidence indicated that the autofeather system was not activated at the time of impact. The combination of probable engine power and propeller pitch on the left engine (as per the post-accident engine and propeller teardown results) was noted to be generally consistent with the "zero-thrust" engine torque and propeller RPM settings specified for simulated single-engine practice in the aircraft Information Manual.

The four engine aircraft was dispatched at King Hussein AFB for a local training mission on behalf of the Jordan Special Forces. While flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet in the vicinity of the airbase, the crew encountered an unexpected situation when the aircraft that entered an uncontrolled descent. At low height, the crew attempted a last correction manoeuvre to avoid power cables when the aircraft crashed in a huge explosion. All 13 occupants were killed. It was reported that the crew encountered unknown technical problems.

The purpose of the flight was for the instructor pilot to administer second-in-command (SIC) flight training to the commercial pilot in the twin-engine aircraft. According to the training manual, SIC training encompassed 4 hours of normal and emergency flight maneuvers to include stalls in the landing and takeoff configuration and while turning at a 15-30 degree bank. A witness heard the airplane's engines and observed the airplane from her driveway. The witness stated that as "the [engine] noise was getting louder and louder, I spotted it spiraling downward." The witness thought that the airplane was performing aerobatics; however, the airplane was getting too close to the ground. The witness heard a loud thud, and approximately 3 seconds later, she heard a loud boom and saw black smoke billow up. Another witness stated that she observed the airplane "going nose first straight down and spinning...counterclockwise." She thought the airplane was performing aerobatic maneuvers; however, the airplane did not stop descending. The airplane disappeared behind trees and the witness heard a loud explosion and saw smoke. She added that she did not observe what the airplane was doing prior to seeing it in a "downward spiral." Radar data depicted the airplane at 8,400 feet msl for the last 2 minutes and 26 seconds of the flight. The recorded aircraft ground speed during that time period fluctuated between 75 and 59 knots. The final radar returns depicted the airplane as making a 180 degree turn before radar contact was lost. No mayday calls were received from the airplane. The airplane impacted the ground in a near wings level attitude and was consumed by a post-crash fire. No anomalies were noted with the airplane or its engines during a post-accident examination. It is unknown which of the pilots was flying the airplane at the time of the accident.

On June 2, 2000, about 1240 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 401, Dominican Republic registration HI-696CT, registered to and operated by Air Century, crashed shortly after takeoff from La Romana International Airport, La Romana, Dominican Republic, while on an instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft was destroyed. The commercial-rated pilot received fatal injuries. The commercial-rated second pilot received serious injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. Civil aviation authorities stated that the flight was an instructional flight. Shortly after takeoff on runway 12, the pilot simulated the failure of the left engine. Control of the aircraft was lost and the aircraft crashed 350 meters from the runway. Examination of the aircraft and engines showed no mechanical anomalies.

The twin engine aircraft departed Aschaffenburg Airport on a training flight to Hahn with two pilots on board, one instructor and one pilot under supervision who was completing his type rating qualification. On approach to Hahn Airport runway 03 in marginal weather conditions, at an altitude of 4,350 feet and at a speed of 150 knots, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent. The rate of descent was up to 2,800 feet during the last four seconds before the aircraft crashed in an almost vertical position in a wooded area located about 9 km short of runway. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and both occupants were killed. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were as follow: overcast with few clouds at 200 feet, light rain possible on approach, moderate icing conditions possible in clouds, visibility one km and RVR runway 03 1,300 metres.

The pilot canceled the IFR flight plan as the aircraft crossed the VOR and reported the airport in site. The last radio contact with Air Traffic Control was at 0935:16. The crew did not report any problems before or during the accident flight. The distance from the VOR to the airport was 4 nautical miles. Witnesses saw the airplane enter right traffic at a low altitude, for a landing on runway 36, then turn right from base leg to final, less than a 1/2-mile from the approach end of the runway. Witnesses saw the airplane pitch up nose high, and the right wing dropped. The airplane than struck trees west of the runway, struck wires, caught fire, and impacted on a hard surface road. This was a training flight for the left seat pilot to retake a Learjet type rating check ride he had failed on March 24, 2000. He failed the check ride, because while performing an ILS approach in which he was given a simulated engine failure, and he was transitioning from instruments to VFR, he allowed the airspeed to decrease to a point below Vref [landing approach speed]. According to the company's training manual, "...if a crewmember fails to meet any of the qualification requirements because of a lack in flight proficiency, the crewmember must be returned to training status. After additional or retraining, an instructor recommendation is required for reaccomplishing the unsatisfactory qualification requirements." The accident flight was dispatched by the company as a training flight. On the accident flight a company check airman was in the right seat, and the check ride was set up for 0800, April 5,2000. The flight arrived an hour and a half late. The left seat pilot's, and the company's flight records did not indicate any training flights, or any other type of flights, for the pilot from March 24, 2000, the date of the failed check flight, and the accident flight on April 5, 2000. The accident flight was the first flight that the left seat pilot was to receive retraining, and was the only opportunity for him to demonstrate the phase of flight that he was unsuccessful at during the check flight on March 24th. Examination of the
airframe and engine did not reveal any discrepancies.

The crew (one instructor and one pilot under training) departed Dortmund-Wickede Airport for a training mission. At an altitude of 3,200 feet, while completing stall exercises, the crew lost control of the airplane that crashed in a flat attitude in a sandy field located near Ascheberg, bursting into flames. Both occupants were killed.

The four engine aircraft departed Tehran-Mehrabad Airport on a training flight to Hamadan, carrying six crew members. At liftoff from runway 29R, the aircraft deviated to the right and crashed on an Iran Air Airbus A300B2-203 that was towed. Both aircraft exploded instantly and were totally destroyed by a post crash fire. All six crew members on board the Hercules were killed as well as three people who were on board the Airbus.

The four engine aircraft departed Santa Lucía AFB on a local training flight. While flying in clouds, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt La Paila (2,865 metres high) located about 57 km northeast of the airbase. All five crew members were killed.

The airplane landed wheels up after the instructor pilot failed to lower the landing gear. The instructor told the student to execute 'a no flap landing due to a simulated hydraulic pump failure.' The student established the airplane on the approach and called for the 'Emergency Gear Extension Checklist.' The instructor delayed extending the gear in accordance with the operator's flight standards manual, which stated that the landing gear should not be extended until the landing was assured. Later in the approach, when the gear warning horn stopped sounding, due to the student's movement of the power levers forward, the instructor removed his hand from the gear handle without extending the gear. The instructor stated that 'because [the student] had already called for the [Emergency Gear Extension] checklist once before, in a split second thought process, [he] mistakenly thought it had been completed.' Following the accident, the landing gear system was tested and found to operate normally. Review of the maintenance records revealed no uncorrected discrepancies. At the time of the accident, the instructor pilot was completing a 9-hour work day, and did not have a lunch break.