Training

The crew departed Madrid-Torrejón AFB on a training flight to Valladolid-Villanubla Airport. While descending to Valladolid Airport, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a hill located near La Cistérniga, about 20 km southeast of Villanubla Airport. All three crew members were killed.

On March 4, 1998, at 1350 hours Pacific standard time, a Learjet 23, N37BL, was substantially damaged when it landed gear up at the Oakdale, California, airport. The airline transport pilot and check pilot, the sole occupants, were not injured and no property damage occurred. The flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 on a familiarization and training flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The pilot stated in his report "the landing gear was never extended and the aircraft was landed with the gear retracted."

The Boeing 737 completed a flight from Lagos (LOS) through Abuja (ABV) to Kaduna (KAD) and was parked for over an hour. At 14:45 UTC, the Chief Pilot of Chanchangi Airline approached the Air Traffic Controller stating that he would like to fly around the circuit for a training flight. He was told that the visibility was 600 meters which was below the landing minima and was then advised against it. The pilot then suggested that he would carry out a "Rejected Takeoff" training. Additional persons boarded the flight to witness the exercise. At 15:37 UTC the pilot requested a take off clearance which was granted, and was directed to proceed to the holding point of runway 05. The prevailing visibility was 600 meters and the wind was 090 at 10 knots. Four rejected take off training runs were carried out within an interval of twelve minutes. In the conditions at Kaduna, a single exercise of a rejected take off would have required a cooling period of at least ten minutes. At the end of the fourth run, the left main landing gear number 2 brake unit had started to burn. The pilot steered the airplane off the runway into the last taxiway. Fifty meters from the runway 05 threshold the left inner wheel failed and leaving a molten rubber footprint on the taxiway and at the same time the hydraulic fluid of the brake units started to spill tracing an oily track along. Pieces of broken wheel rim were randomly shed for a distance of 150 meters when the rims appeared to undergo a major collapse. The footprint of the two left wheels became more pronounced for a distance of 120 meters when there was a positive turn to the left indicating a total failure in roll from the left wheel assembly. The zigzag motion continued for about 699 meters until the aircraft could no longer be easily moved and the pilot called for the fire trucks. The aircraft burnt to ashes on the spot.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) was administering a proficiency check flight to the first officer (FO) in a regional jet. One of the required check items was the loss of an engine at "V1" speed. While on takeoff roll with the FO at the controls, the PIC retarded the left engine throttle to idle when "V1" speed was attained. The FO called, "check max thrust," and then called, "positive rate gear up." As the PIC reached for the gear lever, he noticed the airplane roll to the left at a rate which he felt was "excessive and dangerous." He then reached for the flight controls and felt the left rudder "go all the way to the floor." As the PIC took control of the airplane, he applied full right rudder and right aileron. The airplane began recovering from the bank and impacted the ground. Flight recorder data revealed that the time interval between the throttle retarded to idle and ground impact was about 8 seconds. The data showed that the airplane became airborne about 2 seconds after the throttle was retarded, and that the airplane had rolled to a 71 degree left bank within 6 seconds from the throttle reduction. Ground scars and wreckage distribution revealed that the left wing had contacted the ground first and then the right wing prior to the airplane coming to rest. The FO had a total of 15 hours in the type aircraft in the last 90 days. Examinations of the airframe, engines, and flight control system did not reveal any anomalies that could have contributed to the accident. Company flight training policy stated that all check airmen should be ready to take control of the airplane while practicing these types of training maneuvers.

While completing a training flight, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a snow covered and wooded area located in the Los Hoyos Mountain Range. The wreckage was found near Navafría and all five occupants were killed.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in the sea off Lubang Island while completing a training flight. Crew fate unknown. The exact date of the accident remains unknown, somewhere in 1997.

The airplane departed runway 1L and radar data indicated the airplane maintained about a 110 knot ground speed for 37 seconds as it climbed to 1,400 feet msl (642 feet agl) with a 008 degree heading. The last radar 14 seconds later indicated the airplane's heading was 342 degrees and had a 130 knot ground speed. The winds were 290/11. Witnesses reported seeing the airplane flying low and slow, and then it made a turn like a "barrel roll" to the left before impacting the ground. Examination of the engines and airframe revealed no pre-existent anomalies. The left and right propellers exhibited leading edge damage and chordwise abrasions. The pilot had a total of about 1,175 flight hours with about 250 hours in the type and model aircraft. The copilot had 4,094 total hours, but had 10 hours of turbine time and no flight time in the type and model of aircraft. The pilot had indicated he was practicing simulated single engine failures. The gear was fully retracted. The trim settings were set for a right engine out situation. The flap selector was set to "UP" flaps, but the flaps were found in transit at approximately 2 degrees of flaps. The Airplane Flight Manual indicated that during "Engine Failure in Takeoff-Gear Fully Retracted" stated that the required airspeed before selecting flaps to 5 degrees was 140 KCAS. The Pilot's Operating Handbook stated the flaps take approximately 31 seconds to retract from 20 to 0 flaps, or 21 seconds to retract from 5 to 0 flaps.

The crew departed Marseille-Marignane Airport with three other similar aircraft to conduct a training mission in the bay of La Ciotat. Following several scooping manoeuvres, the crew simulated an engine failure and then performed a complete landing when the aircraft suffered severe vibrations. The crew increased engine power in an attempt to take off when the seaplane overturned and came to rest upside down. The copilot was seriously injured while the captain was killed.

The flight was one of a series being conducted by No. 173 Surveillance Squadron, 1st Aviation Regiment operating a de Havilland Canada DHC-6 (Twin Otter) aircraft as Exercise Highland Pursuit 2/97. The purpose of the exercise was to provide training for three No. 173 Squadron pilots in tropical mountainous operations in Papua New Guinea (PNG). All trainees were qualified on the aircraft type. The training pilot was the pilot in command. He had extensive experience in flying Twin Otter and other aircraft types in PNG as a civilian pilot and had also flown de Havilland Canada DHC-4 (Caribou) aircraft in PNG as a military pilot. Passengers were not carried on the flight. The plan for 9 November 1997 was to fly from Madang and return via a number of airstrips where landing and take-off exercises would be conducted. A flight plan was submitted to Madang Flight Service. At 0915 PNG time, the aircraft arrived at Koinambe where each trainee conducted landing and take-off practice. During this time, the training pilot occupied the right cockpit seat while the trainees, in turn, flew the aircraft from the left cockpit seat. The crew had flight-planned to track direct from Koinambe to Simbai. However, before departing Koinambe, they assessed that this would not be possible because of haze and cloud on track. The training pilot, who was still occupying the right control position, suggested that they could follow the Jimi River north-west from Koinambe and then one of its tributaries towards Simbai. This involved a right turn off the Jimi River about 37 km from Koinambe to follow the valley that passed about 2 km south of Dusin airstrip and then tracked south-east towards Simbai. The navigating pilot, in the left cockpit seat, suggested that, instead of following the tributary off the Jimi River as suggested by the training pilot, they should follow the valley which extended north-east off the Jimi River from a position about 17 km north-west of Koinambe. This was a shorter route than that suggested by the training pilot. The training pilot agreed that the route could be attempted. Neither during this discussion, nor at any earlier time, was there any reference to the elevation of the Bismarck Range. (The increase in ground elevation from the Jimi River to the Bismarck Range, a straight-line distance of about 17 km, is approximately 7,400 ft.) The crew was using an Operational Navigation Chart (ONC) 1:1,000,000-scale chart for in-flight navigation. After departing Koinambe, the crew began following the Jimi River, flying at about 1,000 ft above ground level (AGL). The training pilot had intended to remain in the right cockpit seat for the short flight to Simbai. However, to gain the maximum benefit from flying time during the exercise, he had adopted the practice of having trainees occupy both cockpit seats during the en-route sectors of the exercise. He would then monitor the progress of the flight from either between the cockpit seats or the aircraft cabin. In this instance, he vacated the right seat for a trainee who then became the flying pilot for the sector. The navigating pilot then made the required radio calls, one on VHF radio and the other (which was unsuccessful at the first attempt) on HF radio to Madang Flight Service to report the departure of the aircraft from Koinambe. A short time later, the navigating pilot became unsure of the aircraft's position. The flying pilot then conducted several left orbits while the navigating pilot obtained a Global Positioning System (GPS) fix and plotted the position on the ONC chart. He indicated on the chart, and received agreement from the training pilot, that he had identified the aircraft's position. The flying pilot then resumed tracking along the river. During this time the training pilot was in the cabin of the aircraft. He was wearing a headset which was equipped with an extension lead to enable him to communicate with the cockpit crew. He was frequently checking the aircraft's position through the cabin side windows. A short time later, the navigating pilot indicated what he believed to be the valley where the aircraft was to turn towards Simbai. The flying pilot turned the aircraft into this valley. He estimated that the aircraft was flying about 500 ft above the treetops at this time. The crew did not conduct a heading check to confirm that they were in the correct valley. When the aircraft was well into the valley, the training pilot heard over the intercom the flying and navigating pilots discussing the progress of the flight. He sensed some unease in their voices and moved forward from the aircraft cabin to a position between the cockpit seats. He immediately realised that the aircraft was at an excessive nose-high pitch angle and in a position from where it could not outclimb the terrain ahead or turn and fly out of the valley. The flying and navigating pilots ensured that the engine and propeller controls were set to full power and maximum RPM and selected 10 degrees flap. However, the training pilot assessed that impact with the trees was imminent. He ensured that the trainee seated in the cabin was strapped into his seat and then positioned himself on the floor aft of, and against, the cabin bulkhead. The stall warning activated at that time and, almost immediately, the aircraft crashed through the trees to the ground. When the crew had not reported to flight service by 1004, communication checks were initiated. An uncertainty phase was declared at 1023 when there was no contact with the crew. At 1045, this was upgraded to a distress phase after the pilot of a helicopter operating in the area reported that the aircraft was not on the ground at Simbai airstrip. The pilot of the helicopter was tasked with tracking from Simbai to Koinambe in an attempt to locate the aircraft. At 1127, the helicopter pilot reported receiving a strong emergency locator transmitter signal and, shortly after, located the accident site in a valley about 9 km south of Simbai.

The crew was completing a local training mission at Taipei-Songshan Airport. On approach, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls. The captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure when control was lost. The aircraft crashed few km short of runway and was destroyed. All eight occupants were killed.