Crash of a Boeing 737-204C in Buenos Aires: 65 killed

Date & Time: Aug 31, 1999 at 2054 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LV-WRZ
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Buenos Aires – Córdoba
MSN:
20389
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
MJ3142
Country:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
95
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
65
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
1710.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4085
Copilot / Total hours on type:
560
Aircraft flight hours:
67864
Aircraft flight cycles:
41851
Circumstances:
LAPA flight 3142 was scheduled to depart from Buenos Aires-Jorge Newbery Airport at 20:36 for a 1 hour and 15 minute flight to Córdoba, Argentina. The first officer and cabin crew were the first to arrive at the Boeing 737-200. The first officer notified one of the mechanics that the total fuel requirement was 8,500 kg, all to be stored in the wing tanks. The mechanic noticed there was still some fuel in the central tank and commenced transferring the fuel from the central to the wing tanks. At that moment the captain boarded the flight. He threw his paperwork on the ground, showing annoyance, confirming that attitude by later shutting off the fuel transfer between the main tank and the wing tanks. During their first four minutes on board, the captain, the co-pilot and the purser talked about trivial matters in good spirits, focusing on the purser's personal issues. When the purser left the cockpit, the conversation changed tone as they discussed a controversial situation about the family problems of the captain. The captain said that he was "going through bad times", to which the copilot replied that he was also having a bad day. Without interrupting the conversation, the crew began working the checklists, mixed with the personal issues that worried them and that led them to misread the checklist. In the process they omitted to select the flaps to the appropriate takeoff position. This confusing situation, in which the checklist procedure was mixed with conversation irrelevant to the crew's task, persisted during push back, engine start and taxiing, up to the moment of take-off, which was delayed by other aircraft waiting ahead of the LAPA flight and heavy arriving traffic. During this final wait, the crew members were smoking in the cockpit and continued their conversation. Take-off was started on runway 13 at 20:53 hours. During the takeoff roll the Take-off warning system sounded because the flaps had not been selected. The crew ignored the warning and continued the takeoff. After passing Vr, the pilot attempted to rotate the aircraft. The stick shaker activated as the aircraft entered a stall. It successively impacted the ILS antenna, the perimeter fence, a waiting shelter for buses, two automobiles, two excavators and an embankment where it stopped. Immediately a fire erupted. Three flight crew members, 60 passengers and two persons inside an automobile were killed.
Probable cause:
The JIAAC considers as an immediate cause of the accident that the flight crew of the LAPA 3142 forgot to extend the flaps for takeoff and dismissed the alarm sound that warned about the lack of configuration for that maneuver.
The contributing factors were:
- Lack of discipline of the crew that did not execute the logical reaction of aborting the takeoff and verification of the failure when the alarm began to sound when adding engine power and continued sounding until the rotation attempt.
- Excess of conversations foreign to the flight and for moments of important emotional intensity between the pilots, that were mixed with the execution of the check lists, arriving at omitting the part of these last ones where the extension of flaps for takeoff had to be completed.
- Personal and/or family and/or economic and/or other problems of both pilots, which affected their operational behavior.
- Insufficiency of the psychic control system, which did not allow to detect when the pilots were suffering personal and/or family problems and/or of another type that influenced their operational capacity when diminishing their psychic stability.
- Knowledge and treatment of very personal and extra-occupational issues among the pilots and even with the onboard commissioner, who facilitated the atmosphere of scarce seriousness and concentration in the operational tasks.
- Background of negative flight characteristics of the commander that surfaced before his personal situation and relationship in the cockpit before and during the emergency.
- Background of flight characteristics of the co-pilot, which manifested themselves during compliance with the procedural checklists in a cockpit where its components participated with a completely dispersed attention to particular interests outside the flight.
- No immediate recognition or verification of both pilots, of the relationship between the type of intermittent audible alarm that indicated failure in the configuration for takeoff, with the absence of flaps in the position for this maneuver.
- Design of the take-off configuration alarm system that does not allow, in this type of aircraft, a simple check by the crews to ensure periodic listening to this type of intermittent alarm.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain in Princess Harbor

Date & Time: Aug 29, 1999 at 1532 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GHMK
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Saint Andrews - Berens River
MSN:
31-7952120
YOM:
1979
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The Piper PA-31-350 Navajo, C-GHMK, departed from St. Andrews, Manitoba, on a visual flight rules charter flight to Berens River. One pilot and ten passengers, including one infant, were on board, and a dog was stowed in the baggage compartment behind the right, rear seat. At approximately 1530 central daylight saving time (CDT), while the aircraft was at an altitude of about 2 500 feet and about 30 nautical miles south of Berens River, the pilot heard a loud sound from the left engine. He saw deformation of the left engine cowling and smoke coming from the engine, and the aircraft yawed to the left. Part of the engine cowling departed in flight. The pilot could not pull the left propeller lever beyond half of its normal travel, nor could he move it into the feather position. He set maximum power on the right engine, but the aircraft did not maintain altitude. The pilot advised company dispatch over the radio that he would attempt a forced landing, then force landed in a mossy marsh area. Everyone on board, including the dog, deplaned. Five of the passengers sustained minor injuries during the evacuation. A fire ensued, completely destroying the aircraft except for the empennage aft of the horizontal stabilizers.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The number three cylinder lower forward through stud was missing its base nut, which allowed the lower rear base nut of the number two cylinder to loosen.
2. The missing base nut of the through stud indicates that the base nut did not have sufficient clamping force; however, it could not be determined if the base nut did not receive the required torque during installation or if the base nut lost its clamping force during engine operation.
3. The d-inch studs and the 2-inch through studs of the number two cylinder failed in fatigue, and the number two cylinder of the left engine separated from the crankcase.
4. The left propeller could not be feathered because of interference between the propeller governor control and the separated number two cylinder.
5. The drag from the unfeathered left propeller and the deformed left engine cowling resulted in the aircraft being incapable of maintaining its altitude.
Other Findings:
1. The pilot was certified and qualified for the accident flight.
2. The aircraft's weight and balance were within the specified limits at the time of the accident.
3. The ELT was not readily accessible without tools.
Final Report:

Crash of a Yakovlev Yak-40 in Turtkul: 2 killed

Date & Time: Aug 26, 1999 at 1051 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UK-87848
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tashkent - Turtkul
MSN:
9 33 17 30
YOM:
1973
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
29
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
On approach to Turtkul Airport, the aircraft was not properly aligned on the glide and the captain initiated a go-around procedure. During a second attempt to land, the aircraft position was wrong so the pilot passed over the runway 20 at a height of about 4-7 metres then initiated a second go-around procedure. The aircraft passed over the runway end at a height of 10 metres when the landing gear were retracted. At a distance of 2 km past the runway end, the aircraft collided with trees and power cables, crash landed, slid for about 130 metres and came to rest against an embankment. Two passengers were killed while four others were injured.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the crew. The following findings were identified:
- Poor approach planning,
- Poor crew coordination and lack of crew interaction during the approach and go-around procedure,
- Lack of ATC assistance,
- The go-around procedure was poorly negotiated.

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-90-30 in Hualien

Date & Time: Aug 24, 1999 at 1236 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-17912
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Taipei - Hualien
MSN:
53536
YOM:
1996
Flight number:
UNI873
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
90
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6532
Captain / Total hours on type:
1205.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5167
Copilot / Total hours on type:
96
Aircraft flight hours:
4929
Aircraft flight cycles:
7736
Circumstances:
As the MD-90 touched down following a 25-minute flight from Taipei, there was a loud noise from the front of the cabin and thick black smoke poured from one of the overhead luggage compartments on the right hand side of the plane. Insulation and charred luggage littered the runway. Passengers were swiftly evacuated, but it took firefighters more than half an hour to control the fire. Twenty-eight people were injured. Preliminary investigation reports in 1999 indicated that the blast was caused by two bottles of household bleach. However, the Hualien District Court judges decided the bottles contained gasoline. According to the judges, Ku Chin-shui had put the gasoline into two plastic bleach bottles and gave them to his nephew. The gasoline leaked during the flight and exploded when it caused a short-circuit in a motorbike battery in a nearby overhead luggage compartment. In July 2003 Ku appealed a seven-and-a-half-year prison term. Considering the prosecutor's case against Ku to be full of holes, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial.
Probable cause:
A flammable liquid (gasoline) inside bleach and softener bottles and sealed with silicone was carried on board the aircraft. A combustible vapor formed as the leaking gasoline filled the stowage bin, and the impact of the landing aircraft created a short in a battery. The short ignited the gasoline vapor and created the explosion. Contributing factors to the accident were:
- The Civil Aeronautical Administration Organic Regulations and its operational bylaws fail to designate any entity as responsible for hazardous materials;
- The Aviation Police fail to properly recruit and train personnel, to include preparing training materials and evaluating training performance. Some new recruits were found to have not received any formal security check training, but instead were following instructions from senior inspectors. Consequently, new inspectors cannot be relied upon to identify hazardous materials;
- The detectors and inspectors failed to detect the hazardous materials. The detectors used by the Aviation Police did not detect the banned motorcycle batteries, nor did security inspectors detect the liquid bleach, a banned corrosive substance.
Final Report:

Crash of a McDonnell Douglas MD-11 in Hong Kong: 3 killed

Date & Time: Aug 22, 1999 at 1843 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-150
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bangkok - Hong Kong - Taipei
MSN:
48468
YOM:
1992
Flight number:
CI642
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
15
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
300
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
17900
Captain / Total hours on type:
3260.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4630
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2780
Aircraft flight hours:
30700
Aircraft flight cycles:
5800
Circumstances:
China Airline’s flight CI642 was scheduled to operate from Bangkok to Taipei with an intermediate stop in Hong Kong. The crew had carried out the sector from Taipei to Bangkok, passing through Hong Kong on the previous day. On that flight, the crew were aware of the Severe Tropical Storm (STS) ‘Sam’ approaching Hong Kong and the possibility that it would be in the vicinity of Hong Kong at about the scheduled time of arrival on the following evening. Weather information provided at the preflight briefing for the return flight indicated the continuing presence of STS ‘Sam’ with its associated strong winds and heavy precipitation. The flight departed from Bangkok on schedule with 300 passengers and 15 crew on board, with an estimated time of arrival (ETA) of 1038 hour (hr) in Hong Kong. The commander had elected to carry sufficient fuel to permit a variety of options on arrival – to hold, to make an approach, or to divert. If an immediate approach was attempted, the aircraft would be close to its Maximum Landing Weight (MLW) involving, in consequence, a relatively high speed for the approach and landing. Throughout the initial stages of the flight and during the cruise, the commander was aware of the crosswind component to be expected in Hong Kong and reviewed the values of wind direction and speed which would bring it within the company’s crosswind limit as applicable to wet runways of 24 kt. In the latter stage of the cruise, the crew obtained information ‘Whisky’ from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) timed at 0940 hr, which gave a mean surface wind of 320 degrees (º) / 30 knots (kt) maximum 45 kt in heavy rain, and a warning to expect significant windshear and severe turbulence on the approach. Although this gave a crosswind component of 26 kt which was in excess of the company’s wet runway limit of 24 kt, the commander was monitoring the gradual change in wind direction as the storm progressed, which indicated that the wind direction would possibly shift sufficiently to reduce the component and thus permit a landing. Hong Kong Area Radar Control issued a descent clearance to the aircraft at 1014 hr and, following receipt of ATIS information ‘X-ray’ one minute later, which included a mean surface wind of 300º at 35 kt, descent was commenced at 1017 hr. Copies of the information sheets used by Air Traffic Control (ATC) as the basis for ATIS broadcasts ‘Whisky’ and ‘X-ray’ are at Appendix 1. The approach briefing was initiated by the commander just after commencing descent. The briefing was given for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to Runway 25 Right (RW 25R) at HKIA. However, the active runway, as confirmed by the ATIS was RW 25L. Despite the inclusion in the ATIS broadcasts of severe turbulence and possible windshear warnings, no mention was made in the briefing of the commander’s intentions relating to these weather phenomena nor for any course of action in the event that a landing could not be made, other than a cursory reference to the published missed approach procedure. The descent otherwise continued uneventfully and a routine handover was made at 1025 hr to Hong Kong Approach Control which instituted radar vectoring for an ILS approach to what the crew still believed was RW 25R. At 1036 hr, after having been vectored through the RW 25L localizer for spacing, CI642 was given a heading of 230º to intercept the localizer from the right and cleared for ILS to RW 25L. The co-pilot acknowledged the clearance for ILS 25L but queried the RVR (runway visual ranges); these were passed by the controller, the lowest being 1300 m at the touchdown point. The commander then quickly re-briefed the minimums and go-around procedure for RW 25L. At 1038 hr, about 14 nautical miles (nm) to touchdown, the aircraft was transferred to Hong Kong Tower and told to continue the approach. At 1041 hr, the crew were given a visibility at touchdown of 1600 metres (m) and touchdown wind of 320º at 25 kt gusting 33 kt, and cleared to land. The crew of flight CI642 followed China Airline’s standard procedures during the approach. Using the autoflight modes of the aircraft, involving full use of autopilot and autothrottle systems, the flight progressed along the ILS approach until 700 ft where the crew became visual with the runway and approach lights of RW 25L. Shortly after this point the commander disconnected the autopilot and flew the aircraft manually, leaving the autothrottle system engaged to control the aircraft’s speed. After autopilot disconnect, the aircraft continued to track the runway centreline but descended and stabilized slightly low (one dot) on the glideslope. Despite the gustiness of the wind, the flight continued relatively normally for the conditions until approximately 250 ft above the ground at which point the co-pilot noticed a significant decrease in indicated airspeed. Thrust was applied as the co-pilot called ‘Speed’ and, as a consequence, the indicated airspeed rose to a peak of 175 kt. In response to this speed in excess of the target approach speed, thrust was reduced and, in the process of accomplishing this, the aircraft passed the point (50 ft RA) at which the autothrottle system commands the thrust to idle for landing. Coincidentally with this, the speed decreased from 175 kt and the rate of descent began to increase in excess of the previous 750-800 feet per minute (fpm). Although an attempt was made to flare the aircraft, the high rate of descent was not arrested, resulting in an extremely hard impact with the runway in a slightly right wing down attitude (less than 4º), prior to the normal touchdown zone. The right mainwheels contacted the runway first, followed by the underside of the right engine cowling. The right main landing gear collapsed outward, causing damage to the right wing assembly, resulting in its failure. As the right wing separated, spilled fuel was ignited and the aircraft rolled inverted and came to rest upside-down alongside the runway facing in the direction of the approach. The cockpit crew were disorientated by the inverted position of the aircraft and found difficulty in locating the engine controls to carry out engine shut down drills. After extricating themselves, they went through the cockpit door into the cabin and exited the aircraft through L1 door and began helping passengers from the aircraft through a hole in the fuselage. Airport fire and rescue services were quickly on the scene, extinguishing the fuel fire and evacuating the passengers through the available aircraft exits and ruptures in the fuselage. As a result of the accident, two passengers were found dead on arrival at hospital, and six crew members and 45 passengers were seriously injured. One of the seriously injured passengers died five days later in hospital.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was the commander’s inability to arrest the high rate of descent existing at 50 feet RA. Probable contributory causes to the high rate of descent were:
- The commander’s failure to appreciate the combination of a reducing airspeed, increasing rate of descent, and with the thrust decreasing to flight idle.
- The commander’s failure to apply power to counteract the high rate of descent prior to touchdown.
- Probable variations in wind direction and speed below 50 feet RA may have resulted in a momentary loss of headwind component and, in combination with the early retardation of the thrust levers, and at a weight only just below the maximum landing weight, led to a 20 kt loss in indicated airspeed just prior to touchdown. A possible contributory cause may have been a reduction in peripheral vision as the aircraft entered the area of the landing flare, resulting in the commander not appreciating the high rate of descent prior to touchdown.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900D in Seven Islands: 1 killed

Date & Time: Aug 12, 1999 at 2357 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FLIH
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Port-Menier - Seven Islands
MSN:
UE-347
YOM:
1999
Flight number:
RH347
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
7065
Captain / Total hours on type:
606.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2600
Copilot / Total hours on type:
179
Aircraft flight hours:
373
Circumstances:
The RégionnAir flight took off from Port-Menier at 23:34 for an IFR flight to Seven Islands. The crew decided to carry out a straight-in GPS approach to runway 31. However, there is no published GPS approach for that runway. The descent from cruise flight into the airport was started late, and the aircraft was high and fast during the approach phase to the NDB. From an altitude of 10 000 feet at 9 nm from the NDB, the rate of descent generally exceeded 3000 fpm. The aircraft crossed the beacon at 600 feet asl. For the last 30 seconds of flight and from approximately 3 nm from the threshold, the aircraft descended steadily at approximately 850 fpm, at 140 to 150 knots indicated airspeed, with full flaps extended. The captain coached the first officer throughout the descent and called out altitudes and distances. The GPWS "Minimums" activation sounded, consistent with the decision height selection of 100 feet, to which the captain responded with directions to continue a slow descent. The last call was at 30 feet, 1.2 seconds before impact. Eight seconds before impact, the GPWS voice message "Minimums, Minimums" activated. The aircraft continued to descend and struck trees in a near-level attitude, in an area of rising terrain. A post-crash fire destroyed the wings, the right engine, and the right midside of the fuselage. The cabin area remained relatively intact, but the cockpit area separated and was crushed during the impact sequence. The Beechcraft in question was a brand new aircraft, registered just 2 months earlier. This accident was RégionnAir's second Beech 1900 loss in 1999; on January 4 an accident happened on approach to St. Augustin River. No one received fatal injuries in that accident however.
Probable cause:
Findings as to causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot flying did not establish a maximum performance climb profile, although required by the company's standard operating procedures (SOPs), when the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) "Terrain, Terrain" warning sounded during the descent, in cloud, to the non-directional beacon (NDB).
2. The pilot flying did not fly a stabilized approach, although required by the company's SOPs. The crew did not carry out a go-around when it was clear that the approach was not stabilized.
3. The crew descended the aircraft well below safe minimum altitude while in instrument meteorological conditions.
4. Throughout the approach, even at 100 feet above ground level (agl), the captain asked the pilot flying to continue the descent without having established any visual contact with the runway environment.
5. After the GPWS "Minimums, Minimums" voice activation at 100 feet agl, the aircraft's rate of descent continued at 850 feet per minute until impact.
6. The crew planned and conducted, in cloud and low visibility, a user-defined global positioning system approach to Runway 31, contrary to regulations and safe practices.
Findings as to risk:
1. At the time of the approach, the reported ceiling and visibility were well below the minima published on the approach chart.
2. Because the runway was not equipped with a reporting runway visual range system, flying the NDB approach was allowable under the existing regulations.
3. The crew did not follow company SOPs for the approach and missed-approach briefings.
4. Both crew members had surpassed their maximum monthly and quarterly flight times and maximum daily flight duty times. They were thus at increased risk of fatigue, which leads to judgement and performance errors.
5. The first officer likely suffered from chronic fatigue, having worked an average of 14 hours a day for the last 30 days, with only 1 day of rest.
6. Transport Canada was not aware that the company's pilots were exceeding the flight and duty times.
7. The company operations manager did not effectively supervise the flight and duty times of company pilots.
8. The captain had not received the mandatory training in pilot decision making or crew resource management.
Other findings:
1. The emergency locator transmitter activated on initial impact but ceased to transmit shortly thereafter when its antenna cable was severed.
Final Report:

Crash of a Dornier DO228-201 on Santo Antão Island: 18 killed

Date & Time: Aug 7, 1999 at 1202 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
D4-CBC
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
São Pedro – Ponta do Sol
MSN:
8091
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
VR5002
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
16
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
18
Circumstances:
The schedule service from São Pedro to Ponta do Sol was normally operated by a Twin Otter from TACV - Transportes Aéreos de Cabo Verde. As the aircraft was unserviceable due to technical problems, TACV leased the Dornier DO228 from the Cabo Verde Coast Guards (Guarda Costeira de Cabo Verde). The aircraft departed São Pedro Airport on a 13 minutes flight to Ponta do Sol-Agostinho Neto Airport located on the north coast of the Santo Antão Island. While approaching the destination, the crew was informed about the poor weather conditions. Because the visibility was below minimums, the crew decided to return to São Pedro Airport. Few minutes later, while cruising in limited visibility due to rain falls, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located in the center of the Santo Antão Island. The aircraft was destroyed and all 18 occupants were killed, among them three Austrian and two French citizens.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew descended below the minimum safe altitude in IMC conditions.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante near Nasirotu: 17 killed

Date & Time: Jul 24, 1999 at 0533 LT
Operator:
Registration:
DQ-AFN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Nausori - Nadi
MSN:
110-416
YOM:
1983
Flight number:
PC121
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Aircraft flight hours:
13563
Aircraft flight cycles:
22411
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Suva-Nausori Airport at 0525LT on a regular schedule service (flight PC121) to Nadi, carrying 15 passengers and two pilots. The crew continued to climb via route 28 Golf in relative good weather conditions. At 0532LT, the pilot reported 5,500 feet 22,4 km from the airport. One minute later, he reported at 6,000 feet when the aircraft disappeared from radar screens, eight minutes after takeoff. The wreckage was found at an altitude of 540 metres in a wooded an mountainous area located in the Mataicicia Mountain Range, 35,2 km west of Nausori Airport, south of the village of Nasirotu. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and all 17 occupants were killed, among them nine Fidjians, five Australians, one New Zealander, one Chinese and one Japanese.
Probable cause:
The following findings were identified:
- The wreckage was found 3 km south of the intended route,
- The aircraft struck a tall tree with its right wing 390 metres above ground, flew for another 1,300 metres then crashed,
- The minimum safe altitude for the area is 5,400 feet,
- No technical anomalies were found on the aircraft,
- Investigations were unable to determine the exact cause why the crew failed to comply with the minimum safe altitude,
- The captain had insufficient rest time prior to the flight and consumed an above-therapeutic level of antihistamine prior to the flight, which may have affected his capabilities to fly,
- The operator's published standard operating procedures for the Embraer Bandeirante aircraft were inadequate,
- Weather conditions were considered as good with a 40 km visibility, scattered clouds at 2,200 feet and no wind,
- The total weight of the aircraft was just below the MTOW.

Crash of a Cessna 208B Grand Caravan on Mt Silva: 16 killed

Date & Time: Jul 20, 1999 at 0945 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YN-CED
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Managua – Bluefields
MSN:
208B-0341
YOM:
1993
Flight number:
NIS046
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
14
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
16
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Managua-Augusto C. Sandino Airport in the morning on a flight to Bluefields, carrying two pilots and 14 passengers, most of them members of a development aid organization. While approaching the destination, the crew initiated a VFR descent to Bluefields in marginal weather conditions. At an altitude of 2,000 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Silva located in the Zelaya Central Mountain Range. The wreckage was found about 50 km west of Bluefields and all 16 occupants were killed, among them a Swiss citizen.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew initiated the descent under VFR mode in IMC conditions. The following contributing factors were identified:
- Poor weather conditions with low clouds,
- The crew started the descent prematurely, causing the aircraft to descent at 2,000 feet while the minimum safe altitude was 2,700 feet over the area of the accident.

Crash of an Embraer EMB-110P2 Bandeirante in Goroka: 17 killed

Date & Time: Jun 17, 1999 at 0852 LT
Operator:
Registration:
P2-ALX
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Lae - Goroka
MSN:
110-210
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
ND120
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
15
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
17
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Lae-Nadzab Airport at 0820LT on a flight to Goroka, carrying 15 passengers and two pilots. While descending in marginal weather conditions at an altitude of 8,500 feet, the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 20 km east-southeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all 17 occupants were killed, among them two Dutch citizens.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain after the crew continued the descent to Goroka under VFR mode in IMC conditions. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was one km off course and at an insufficient altitude (minimum altitude is fixed at 14,000 feet).