Scheduled Revenue Flight

Shortly after takeoff from Kilindoni Airport, the single engine airplane crashed in flames. All nine occupants were able to evacuate the cabin and six of them were injured and transported to local hospital. The aircraft was completely destroyed by fire.

Following an uneventful flight from Port Harcourt, the crew initiated the approach to Lagos-Murtala Muhammed Airport in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls due to CB's at 1,900 feet. On final, he was cleared to land on runway 18R and informed about a wet runway surface. Both main landing gears touched down normally and when the nose gear landed as well, both wheels apparently separated. The nose gear leg ripped the ground and the airplane rolled for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 139 occupants evacuated safely and the airplane was later considered as damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful flight from Islamabad, the crew was cleared to land on runway 25 at Gilgit Airport. After touchdown, the crew initiated the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its right main gear and came to rest 12 metres further in a grassy area. All 53 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from Moroni-Prince Saïd Ibrahim-Hahaya Airport, while climbing, the pilot encountered an unexpected situation and apparently attempted an emergency landing when the twin engine airplane struck the ground past the runway end and came to rest inverted. All 11 occupants were evacuated, a passenger and the pilot were injured. The aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.

The commercial pilot was conducting a visual flight rules scheduled passenger flight with five passengers. During the return leg to the company’s base airport, the pilot requested, and was given clearance to, a short gravel runway of 1,858 ft that terminated at parallel cross-runways and had inbound airplanes. The wind was reported as variable at 3 knots, and the outside air temperature was 88°F which was 25° warmer than usual. The pilot stated that he conducted a steeper than normal approach and performed a normal 30° flap landing flare; however, the airplane floated halfway down the runway. He initiated a go-around by advancing the throttle to takeoff power and retracting the flaps to 20° as the main landing gear briefly touched down. Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data indicated that the airplane arrived 0.1 mile from the runway threshold at 149 ft above ground level (agl) and 110 knots of ground speed, which was 32 knots faster than the short field landing approach speed listed in the pilot operating handbook. A witness in the air traffic control tower (the ground controller) stated that the airplane “bled off a lot of airspeed,” during the landing attempt and climbed out in a very flat profile. The tower local controller stated that after liftoff, the airplane’s right wing dropped and the airplane appeared to be turning right into conflicting landing traffic, so he twice instructed the airplane to “left turn out immediately.” The pilot stated that he attempted to comply with the tower controller’s instruction, but when he applied left aileron, the airplane appeared to stall, rolled rapidly right, and descended in a right-wing-low attitude. It subsequently impacted the surface between runways. A postimpact fire ensued, and the pilot helped the passengers egress. The airplane was destroyed by postimpact fire. Given the evidence, it is likely that the pilot decided to land on the short runway to expedite the arrival and did not perform an appropriate short field landing approach, which resulted in excessive airspeed and altitude over the runway threshold, a long landing flare, rapid deceleration, and a self-initiated go-around from a slow airspeed. Had the pilot initiated the go-around as he approached the runway with indications of an unstable visual approach, the airspeed would have been well above stall speed, which would have allowed for the desired positive climb out on runway heading. The pilot likely attempted to comply with the tower local controller’s urgent commands to turn while the airplane was near the limit of performance (the temperature was about 25 degrees warmer than average, which would have resulted in a higher density altitude than the pilot was accustomed to and degraded aircraft and engine performance). The pilot’s maneuvering resulted in the exceedance of the critical angle-of-attack of the high wing (right wing) during the left turn, and an aerodynamic stall.

On 01.07.2019, B737-800 aircraft was involved in an accident (runway excursion) at Mumbai airport while landing in moderate to heavy rain. The aircraft was under the command of an ATPL holder (PF) with a CPL holder as First Officer (PM). There were 160 passengers and 7 crew members on board. There was no injury to any of the passengers or crew members. The aircraft suffered substantial damage. The subject flight was fifth of the day for the aircraft and second for the flight crew. The flight crew had earlier operated Mumbai-Jaipur sector and the incident flight was from Jaipur to Mumbai. There were no technical issues reported by the flight crew either during Mumbai Jaipur sector or on the return leg (Jaipur- Mumbai) till descent into Mumbai. The pilots had carried out briefing amongst themselves for the approach including the weather and Go Around actions, if required. The aircraft commenced descent into Mumbai in the late evening hours. As per the reported weather at the time of approach visibility was 2100 metres in rain making it dark. Reported winds were 090/12 Knots. Runway was wet and the trend provided was ³temporary reduction in visibility to 1500 metres with thunder/ showers of rain´. During descend at approximately 7000' Pressure Altitude, the crew observed an indication for IAS disagree, indicating a discrepancy of airspeed between the instrument sources for the flight crew. Although this indication was momentary, the 'Non-Normal Checklist' was carried out. The indication discrepancy did not recur for the remainder of the flight. The aircraft was radar vectored for an ILS approach for Runway 27 at Mumbai. The approach was stabilized by 3800' Pressure Altitude with landing gear down, flaps 30 and auto brake selected at 3. The autopilot was engaged throughout the descent phase and during approach, the second autopilot was also coupled for the ILS approach. At 100', the autopilot and the auto-throttle were disengaged by the PF. The flare manoeuvre consumed approximately 5807' of the runway length prior to the aircraft touchdown with 3881' of runway remaining. After touchdown, the speed brakes deployed automatically and maximum reverse thrust and wheel brakes were applied. The aircraft exited the paved surface at 65 Knots and came to rest at a distance of 615' beyond the end of the runway. Once the aircraft came to rest, the flight crew advised cabin crew to be at their stations. The pilots were unable to contact ATC through VHF communication. The PF contacted his airline personnel using mobile phone and informed that the aircraft had overrun the runway and requested for step ladders. The ATC activated fire services and the runway was closed for operation. The Cabin crew carried out check on the passengers in the cabin. The fire services reached the aircraft location and verbal communication was established with the flight crew once the cockpit window was opened. Two Fire Services personnel boarded the aircraft from the L1 door using a fire ladder. An assessment of the aircraft structure and occupants was made and the fire services personnel informed the cabin crew that deplaning was to be carried out using fire ladders. There were no injuries during evacuation or otherwise.

On a flight from Ulan-Ude to Nizhneangarsk, while descending to an altitude of 3,050 metres about 30 km from the destination airport, the crew contacted ATC and reported the failure of the left engine. The approach was continued to runway 22. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure when the airplane deviated to the right then veered off runway. It rolled in a grassy area, cwent through the perimeter fence and eventually impacted the building of a sewage treatment plant located 380 metres to the right of the runway centerline. The captain and the flight engineer were killed and the copilot was seriously injured. 10 other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

The commercial pilot was conducting his first scheduled commuter flight from the company’s seaplane base to a nearby island seaplane base with one passenger and cargo onboard. According to company pilots, the destination harbor was prone to challenging downdrafts and changing wind conditions due to surrounding terrain. Multiple witnesses at the destination stated that the airplane made a westerly approach, and the wind was from the southeast with light chop on the water. Two witnesses reported the wings rocking left and right before touchdown. One witness stated that a wind gust pushed the tail up before the airplane landed. A different witness reported that the airplane was drifting right during the touchdown, and another witness saw the right (downwind) float submerge under water after touchdown, and the airplane nosed over as it pivoted around the right wingtip, which impacted the water. Flight track and performance data from the cockpit display units revealed that, as the airplane descended on the final approach, the wind changed from a right headwind of 6 knots to a left quartering tailwind of 8 knots before touchdown. The crosswind and tailwind components were within the airplane’s operational limitations. Examination of the airframe, engine, and associated systems revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation or egress. During the final approach and descent, the pilot had various wind information available to him; the sea surface wind waves and signatures, the nearest airport observation winds, the cockpit display calculated wind, and the visual relative ground speed. Had the pilot recognized that the winds had shifted to a quartering tailwind and the airplane’s ground speed was faster than normal, he could have aborted the landing and performed another approach into the wind. Although crosswind landings were practiced during flight training, tailwind landings were not because new pilots were not expected to perform them. Although the crosswind component was well within the airplane’s limits, it is possible that combined with the higher ground speed, the inexperienced pilot was unable to counteract the lateral drift during touchdown in a rapidly shifting wind. The pilot was hired the previous month with 5 hours of seaplane experience, and he completed company-required training and competency checks less than 2 weeks before the accident. According to the chief pilot (CP), company policy was to assign newly hired pilots to tour flights while they gained experience before assigning them to commuter flights later in the season. The previous year, the CP distributed a list of each pilot’s clearances for specific types of flights and destinations; however, an updated list had not been generated for the season at the time of the accident, and the flight coordinators, who were delegated operational control for assigning pilots to flights, and station manager were unaware of the pilot’s assignment limitations. Before the flight, the flight coordinator on duty completed a company flight risk assessment that included numerical values based on flight experience levels. The total risk value for the flight was in the caution area, which required management notification before releasing the flight, due to the pilot’s lack of experience in the accident airplane make and model and with the company, and his unfamiliarity with the geographical area; however, the flight coordinator did not notify management before release because the CP had approved a tour flight with the same risk value earlier in the day. Had the CP been notified, he may not have approved of the pilot's assignment to the accident flight. The pilot's minimal operational experience in seaplane operations likely affected his situational awareness in rapidly changing wind conditions and his ability to compensate adequately for a quartering tailwind at a higher-than-normal ground speed, which resulted in a loss of control during the water landing and a subsequent nose-over.

The route of the aircraft on that day was DAC-RGN-DAC. At (18:03) the Bombardier DHC-8-402 aircraft, registered (S2-AGQ) contacted Yangon control tower and at (18:16) had ILS established and reported to the Yangon control tower. Due to adverse weather, Yangon control tower asked them to execute a go-around and the aerodrome operations was closed for the aviation safety for 2 hours. When the weather condition got better, the aerodrome operations was opened. And then the DHC-8-402 aircraft, registered S2-AGQ made RNP approach because only localizer was available at that moment. While the Bombardier DHC-8-402 aircraft was and making approach to runway 21, it was a bit higher than on slope 3 degree and landed on runway 21, remaining on the ground for upwards of 7 seconds, but the aircraft ran parallel to the runway, and then it flew up in the air up to 44 ft above the ground and sank again and collided with runway 03 and slid forward out of the runway and came to a complete stop on the over-run of the runway 03. There was no fire. All gears were collapsed and fuselage was broken into three sections. All 33 occupants were evacuated, among them 20 were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft departed runway 24C at Moscow-Sheremetyevo Airport at 1803LT on a schedule service to Murmansk. Few minutes after takeoff, while climbing to an altitude of 10,000 feet, the crew encountered problems with the electrical system and informed ATC about an emergency situation via the transponder codes 7700 because communication systems were unserviceable. The crew initiated a circuit to return to the airport, continued the approach to runway 24L. On approach at an altitude between 900 and 1,100 feet, the windshear warning system sounded five times 'Go around. Windshear ahead'. From a height of 80 m (260 ft) above ground level, the aircraft descended below the glide path and at a height of 55 m (180 ft) the TAWS warning sounded: "Glide Slope." From that moment on the airspeed increased to 170 knots. At 18:30 the aircraft overflew the runway threshold and touched down at a distance of 900 m past the threshold at a speed of 158 knots. Touchdown occurred at a g-force of at least 2.55g with a subsequent bounce to a height of about 2 m. After two seconds the aircraft landed again on the nose landing gear with a vertical load 5.85g, and bounced to a height of 6 m. The third landing of the aircraft occurred at a speed of 140 knots with a vertical overload of at least 5g. This caused a rupture of the wing structure and fuel lines. The aircraft caught fire, went out of control, veered off runway to the right and came to rest in a grassy area, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by fire. 37 occupants were evacuated while 41 people, among them a crew member, were killed.