Private

During the landing approach, a witness saw the twin-engine airplane slow and stall. The airplane crashed short of the runway, in a residential backyard. An airport manager flew with the pilot 8 days before the accident. The manager reported that during his flight the pilot flew the approach and landing with the aural stall warning horn activated. The manager advised the pilot of the aural warning, however no corrective action was taken by the pilot during that flight. An on-scene investigation revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies. The pilot had about 12.6 hours of flight time in the accident airplane, of which 7.7 hours were dual instruction. Due to the lack of any mechanical problems with the airplane, the pilot's minimal experience in twin-engine airplanes, and his history of flying the airplane too slow, it is probable that he allowed the airspeed to decay below a safe speed, and inadvertently stalled it.

While descending to La Romana Airport following a flight from Caracas, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and ditched the aircraft about 64 km off Saona Island, southeast of La Romana. One passenger was killed while six other occupants were rescued by Porto Rico Coast Guards.

According to a witness, prior to arriving in the run-up area the pilot lowered the airplane's flaps. After the right flap fully extended, the flap key on the drive shaft inside the 90-degree drive assembly adapter fractured, in overload, in the direction of flap extension. Before takeoff, the pilot raised the flaps; however, with the fractured key, the right flap would have remained fully extended. The pilot could have identified this condition prior to takeoff, either visually or by means of the flap indicator, which received its input from the right flap actuator. The pilot subsequently took off, and the airplane turned left, but it is unknown at what point the pilot would have noted a control problem. The pilot climbed the airplane to 250 to 300 feet and allowed the airspeed to bleed off to where the airplane stalled and subsequently spun into the ground. Airplane manufacturer calculations revealed that the pilot should have been able to maintain control of the airplane at airspeeds over 70 knots. According to the pilot's operating handbook, the best two-engine angle of climb airspeed was 99 knots and the best two-engine rate of climb airspeed was 120 knots.

The accident flight was the pilot's first 700 nm cross-country flight in the newly purchased airplane. Prior to departing he had the airplane refueled with the airplane on a slope. The individual who refueled the airplane estimated that the left wing tip was 12 to 14 inches lower than the right wing tip. He stated that the pilot was very concerned about getting as much fuel in the airplane as possible because of his up-coming flight. After climbing to his assigned cruising altitude of 21,000 feet and about two hours into the flight the pilot reported to ATC that he needed to divert. During the descent the pilot reported that he was experiencing a fuel problem and that one engine was sputtering. Two minutes later the pilot declared an emergency and reported that both engines were sputtering. The pilot reported at that time that he had 15 total gallons of fuel remaining A witness to the accident reported that he saw the airplane flying southbound and that the wings were rocking side-to-side. The airplane then rolled to the right before crashing into the citrus grove. Examination of the airframe revealed no pre-impact failure to any flight control surface or control system component. The power plant investigation did not disclose any pre-impact mechanical failure of any rotating or reciprocating component of the engine. Interviews with pilots who had flown with the accident pilot indicated that this was his first flight above 13,000 feet in the accident airplane, and was probably his longest distance attempted flight since he had purchased the airplane. According to information contained within the Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual (VB-1190), "The full amount of usable fuel is based on the airplane sitting on a level ramp, laterally level, and longitudinally (approximately 1 1/2 degree nose up) with each tank fueled to 0.6 inches below filler neck. The wing tanks are extremely sensitive to attitude and if not level, they cannot be fueled to the full usable capacity." This information is also included in the FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet No. A17WE under the section Data Pertinent to All Models, Note 1.

The private pilot was continuing a cross-country flight after having stopped for fuel. About 20 minutes into the flight, the pilot said both engines started running rough, and he turned the airplane toward the nearest airport and descended. The pilot reported that he did not think the airplane would make it to the airport, and that due to the rugged terrain, he felt it was better to ditch the airplane in a large lake he was flying over. The pilot reported there were no mechanical anomalies prior to the loss of engine power. He said he felt that fuel contamination was the cause of the engine problem, and that not fueling during heavy rain might have prevented the problem. Fuel samples were taken from the fuel supply where he added fuel, and the equipment used to fuel the airplane. No other instances of fuel contamination were reported, and according to the FAA inspector the fuel samples were tested, and found to be clean. The airplane was not recovered from the lake, and has not been examined by the NTSB.

The first officer was flying the Area Navigation, Global Positioning System, approach to runway 22. During the approach, the airplane was initially fast as the first officer had increased engine power to compensate for wind conditions. Descending below the minimum descent altitude (MDA), the first officer momentarily deployed the speed brakes, but stowed them about 200 feet above ground level (agl), and reduced the engine power to flight idle. The airplane became low and slow, and developed an excessive sink rate. The airplane subsequently landed hard on runway 22, which drove the right main landing gear into the right wing, resulting in substantial damage to the right wing spar. The first officer reported intermittent airspeed fluctuations between his airspeed indicator and the captain's airspeed indicator; however, a subsequent check of the pitot-static system did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airspeed indicators. About the time of the accident, the recorded wind was from 190 degrees at 11 knots, gusting to 24 knots; and the captain believed that the airplane had encountered windshear near the MDA, with the flaps fully extended. Review of air traffic control data revealed that no windshear advisories were contained in the automated terminal information system broadcasts. Although the local controller provided windshear advisories to prior landing aircraft, he did not provide one to the accident aircraft. Review of the airplane flight manual (AFM) revealed that deploying the speed brakes below 500 feet agl, with the flaps in any position other than the retracted position, was prohibited.

The privately operated Piper Malibu PA-46-310P was en route from Salem, Oregon, to Springbank, Alberta, on an instrument flight rules flight plan. During the descent through 17 000 feet at approximately 55 nautical miles (nm) southwest of Calgary, the pilot declared an emergency with the Edmonton Area Control Centre, indicating that the engine had failed. The pilot attempted an emergency landing at the Fairmont Hot Springs airport in British Columbia, but crashed at night at about 1912 mountain daylight time 11 nm east of Invermere, British Columbia, in wooded terrain. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured.

The airplane was loaded to within a few hundred pounds of its maximum gross takeoff weight, and departed from an airport located in a valley, surrounded by rising terrain. Although visual conditions prevailed at the accident airport, fog was present in the adjacent valleys. During the initial climb after takeoff, the right engine lost partial power due to a failure of the number one cylinder exhaust valve. The pilot secured the right engine; however, he was unable to maintain a climb with only the left engine producing power. The airplane was manufactured in 1964. Review of weight and performance data published at the time of manufacture, revealed that the airplane should have been able to climb about 400 feet-per-minute with a single engine producing power. No current weight and balance data was recovered, and due to impact and fire damage, the preimpact power output of the left engine could not be determined. Both engines were last overhauled slightly more than 12 years prior to the accident, and flown about 310 hours during that time. For the make and model engine, the manufacturer recommended overhaul at 1,200 hours of operation, or during the twelfth year.

Following an uneventful flight from Kralendijk, Bonaire Island, the crew started a night approach to Santo Domingo-Mayor Buenaventura Vivas Airport, Venezuela. On final, the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a wooded area located 9 km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

On approach to Madison-Dane County-Truax Field, the pilot encountered technical problems with the right main gear that remained stuck in its wheel well. He decided to retract the gear and to complete a wheels-up landing. The twin engine aircraft belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.