Private

The pilot departed in the twin-engine airplane with an unknown quantity of fuel and a fuel quantity indicating system that was known to be inaccurate. Immediately after takeoff, approximately 1/2 mile beyond the departure end of the runway, witnesses reported the engine noise from the accident airplane as "surging" as the airplane passed overhead, and one witness described a "radical" turn back to the airport. Two witnesses stated that only one engine was running, and added that it was "revving," and would then stop before revving up again. During the descent to the airport, radar data showed the airplane at 93 knots 700 feet and 1 mile from the runway, and at 90 knots at 500 feet and 1/2 mile from the runway, but the airplane crashed prior to the approach end of the runway. Post accident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a pre accident mechanical malfunction. The fuel system had a capacity of 226 gallons, was serviced through a single port on top of the left wing, and the tanks were interconnected to a center fuel sump that fed both engines. The fuel cells were opened through access panels and each was intact and contained only trace amounts of fuel. The airplane was leveled, the drain petcock was opened at the center fuel cell sump, and 1 quart of fuel was drained.

The twin engine aircraft departed São Paulo-Congonhas Airport at 1831LT on a private flight to Porto Seguro, carrying 12 passengers and two pilots, among them the Brazilian Businessman Roger Wright, his wife, children and grandchildren. On approach to Porto Seguro-Terravista Golf Club Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and the visibility was low due to the night. On final approach to runway 15, the aircraft impacted trees located 900 metres from the runway threshold. The aircraft continued for about 700 metres then struck others trees and crashed 200 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 14 occupants were killed.

The single engine aircraft departed Astoria Airport at 1637LT on a private flight to Seattle-Boeing Field, carrying one passenger (a female passenger aged 84) and one pilot. During a climb to en route cruise, the airplane's engine lost almost all power, and the pilot elected to ditch the airplane into the Columbia River off Astoria. The airplane crash landed eight minutes later, nosed down in water and came to rest partially submerged. Both occupants were quickly rescued and were uninjured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing at Gaborone-Seretse Khama Airport, the twin engine aircraft went out of control, flipped over and crashed, coming to rest upside down on the runway edge. All five occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed. The aircraft type is not confirmed.

On March 22, 2009, about 1432 mountain daylight time, a Pilatus PC-12/45, N128CM, was diverting to Bert Mooney Airport (BTM), Butte, Montana, when it crashed about 2,100 feet west of runway 33 at BTM. The pilot and the 13 airplane passengers were fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged by impact forces and a post crash fire. The airplane was owned by Eagle Cap Leasing of Enterprise, Oregon, and was operating as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight departed Oroville Municipal Airport, Oroville, California, on an instrument flight rules flight plan with a destination of Gallatin Field, Bozeman, Montana. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

On 12 February 2009, the Marcel Dassault/Bréguet Aviation Falcon 10 aircraft, registration VP-BAF, took off at 14:06 UTC from Vienna (LOWW) on a private flight under instrument flight rules (IFR) and an ATC flight plan Y, to Samedan (LSZS). Two crew members and one passenger were on board. After an uneventful flight, the IFR flight plan was cancelled at 14:56:32 UTC and the flight continued under visual flight rules (VFR). Over Samedan the crew were informed by the Samedan airport flight information service officer (FISO) that snow clearance work would be taking place on the runway and that they should expect a ten-minute delay. After approximately 15 minutes the crew initiated the approach. On landing, the aircraft made first contact with the ground by scraping the right wing on the left half of the runway and subsequently touched down with the right, and then the left main landing gear. It then drifted to the left and the left wing tip scraped a bank of snow running parallel to the runway. As a result it rotated anti-clockwise around its vertical axis and crashed into a frozen bank of snow about four metres high. The aircraft broke into two pieces as a result of the force of the impact. The two pilots suffered fatal injuries on the impact. The passenger was seriously injured. The aircraft was destroyed. Fire did not break out.

The pilot had filed an instrument flight rules flight plan with a planned departure time of 0700 in order to arrive at his intended destination in time for a planned engagement. He and his passenger arrived at the airport approximately 0800 and requested that the airplane be fueled. The airplane was pulled from its heated hangar into heavy snowfall and fueled at 0917. As the airplane sat outside in the heavy snowfall, a measurable amount of wet slushy snow accumulated on the airplane. The Fixed Base Operator manager suggested to the pilot that the airplane be deiced, but he declined. The airplane was then pulled out to the taxiway in an effort to prevent it from becoming stuck in the snow. At 0939, approximately 22 minutes after the airplane was pulled out if its hangar, the pilot departed with a visibility of 3/4 of a mile in snow and with a 4-knot direct tailwind. The pilot then made a right turn and announced that he was heading to his first waypoint. The airplane continued into an ever tightening right turn until it impacted the ground while in an inverted position about one mile north-northwest of the runway. An examination of the airplane’s wreckage revealed no anomalies with either the engine or airframe that would have contributed to the loss of control. The airplane’s Pilot Operating Handbook and Airplane Flight Manual contained the following limitation: "The aircraft must be clear of all deposits of snow, ice and frost adhering to the lifting surfaces immediately prior to takeoff."

Prior to departure, the pilot was informed that it had been raining; the roads were wet, but no mention of ice at his destination. During the approach to the destination airport, the runway appeared "wet", and a normal approach and landing was attempted. The airplane touched down at 110 knots, the pilot "then deployed lift dump and [then applied the] brakes". Unable to get braking action, the pilot tried to slide the airplane "left and right" to get traction, but could not. The airplane departed the south end of the 4,370-foot-long runway, went over the edge of an embankment and stopped next to a levee. There were no reported pre-impact malfunctions with the airplane. The Manufacturer Approved Airplane Flight Manual Supplement for Airplanes Operating on Wet and contaminated Runways; General Information Section, states operations on runways contaminated with ice or wet ice are not recommended and no operational information is provided. Using the supplement, the anticipated landing distance on a wet runway was calculated to be about 3,400 feet, the anticipated landing distance on an uncontaminated runway was calculated to be approximately 2,800 feet, and the prescribed landing speed (Vref) was determined to be about 111 knots. A braking action (runway condition) report for the private airfield's runway did not exist, nor was one required.

Radar data showed the airplane proceeding outbound for the procedure turn. The pilot reported that they were having trouble extending the landing gear and stated, " ... we’re trying to turn back in and do our gear here all at the same time." Shortly thereafter, the other pilot reported that they had extended the gear and had "three good, three green lights, so we’re hoping the gear is down." The pilot also said, "we are now turned inbound." She was told to contact Unicom. This was the last recorded radio transmission from the flight. The Unicom operator said that she heard the pilot say that they were "coming in." Radar data indicated the airplane crossed the localizer at almost a 90-degree angle and continued turning right until it started to intercept the localizer. The data then indicated that the airplane made a left turn away from the localizer that continued and terminated near the accident site. The turn was captured by six plots. The first plot showed the airplane had descended from 9,400 feet to 9,200 feet and its ground speed had increased from 85 knots to 152 knots. The second plot showed the altitude had increased to 9,700 feet and ground speed had decreased to 132 knots. The third plot showed the altitude had increased further to 10,200 feet and ground speed had dropped to 76 knots. The fourth plot showed the airplane had made almost a 180-degree turn and was at 8,900 feet and at a ground speed of 120 knots. The fifth plot showed the airplane was at 8,700 feet and 20 knots. The sixth and final plot showed the airplane at 8,400 feet and 38 knots. An examination of the airplane showed both wing flap jackscrews retracted and the landing gear actuators extended. The landing gear control switch was in the down position and the emergency gear extension knob was pulled out to full travel. Reduced visibility and clouds were in the vicinity of the airport at the time of the accident.

Shortly after a night takeoff from runway 05 at Buenos Aires-San Fernando Airport, the pilot initiated a left turn at low altitude when the twin engine aircraft collided with two poles and two parked trucks then crashed on the ground, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.