Daytona Beach

A total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion as a result of the pilot’s inadequate preflight inspection.

The chafed and shorted electrical wiring between bus bars, which caused a partial electrical failure, resulted in a false fire warning indication, and prevented the restart of the right engine.

Occurrence #1: in flight collision with terrain/water
Phase of operation: takeoff - initial climb
Findings
1. Touch-and-go - performed - copilot/second pilot
2. (f) weather condition - haze/smoke
3. (c) proper climb rate - not maintained - copilot/second pilot
4. (c) diverted attention - copilot/second pilot
5. (c) supervision - inadequate - pilot in command
6. (f) complacency - pilot in command
7. (f) terrain condition - water, rough

Upon the basis of the foregoing findings and of the entire record available, investigators find that the probable cause of the accident was loss of control of the airplane while being operated on instruments and while encountering severe turbulence in a line squall, the existence of which the carrier's ground personnel had failed to make known to the captain.
The following contributing factors were identified:
1. Failure of carrier to provide an adequate dispatching system with a number of trained dispatchers on Route 6 to keep in constant contact with flights in order to provide them with current and accurate flight information.
2. Failure of carrier's West Palm Beach ground station to transmit to Trip 14 the full text of the message received from Trip 10 at 8:32 A.M.
3. Failure of carrier's meteorologist to make a more thorough analysis of weather conditions and issue a supplementary forecast to that originally issued for the operation of trip 14.
4. Although as we have previously stated it is impossible to reach a definite conclusion as to the degree of severity of the problem presented to the pilot it appears very possible that the handicap of the captain's limited experience in flying transport aircraft under conditions of severe turbulence was a factor contributing to the occurrence of the accident.

With respect to the erection of the poles in question, it does not appear that the Power and Light Company gave formal or informal notification of the fact of their erection prior to, during the course of, or at the completion of their erection, to the operators of the aircraft, the airport authorizations, or to any other governmental authority concerned with the safety of operation of aircraft at the airport, Furthermore, it was established the these poles were not lighted or marked in any manner which would serve to warn the crew of aircraft NC13739 of their presence.
To establish the element of notice, the company claimed that one of its employees, who had investigation the failure in the underground circuit, used the public telephone in the Administration Building of the airport to call his office and report the trouble to his superior and to advise the erection of an overhead line. This call was reported to have been made between 7:30 and 9:30 p.m., August 9, that later, during the installation of the poles and wires, another of its employees used the same telephone, that the men on duty in the airport office should have observed the men at work along the road with their equipment and lights, setting up the poles and stringing the wire, and also that the air lines using the airport know from previous occasions that, as a temporary measure, such poles had been set up to give service to customers. It appears from the Board investigation that the condition and functioning of the aircraft and its power plant were normal, and that the take-off likewise was normal. Its is the opinion of the Board that the probable cause of this accident was the absence of reasonable notice to those operating and navigating the aircraft that an object had been erected which constituted a hazard to the aircraft taking off.