Positioning

The disintegration and subsequent fire in the No.3 engine when it ingested a large number of seagulls. Following the disintegration of the engine, the aircraft failed to decelerate effectively because:
- The n°3 hydraulic system was inoperative, which caused the loss of the n°2 brake system and braking torque to be reduced 50%,
- The n°3 engine thrust reversers were inoperative,
- At least three tyres disintegrated,
- The n°3 system spoiler panels on each wing could not deploy,
- The runway surface was wet.
The following factors contributed to the accident:
- The bird-control program at John F. Kennedy airport did not effectively control the bird hazard on the airport,
- The FAA and the General Electric Company failed to consider the effects of rotor imbalance on the abradable epoxy shroud material when the engine was tested for certification.

The accident was caused by the aircraft descending into fog covered ground. No reason for this loss of height could be positively established but there is a strong possibility that the pilot's ability to fly the aircraft became impaired by the onset of symptoms associated with coronary artery disease.

Complete failure of both engines due to fuel exhaustion. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Inadequate preflight preparation,
- Mismanagement of fuel,
- Fuel exhaustion,
- Failure of both engines,
- Improper operations of flight controls,
- Fuel drained total less than two gallons from each wing,
- Right wing hit first and aircraft cartwheeled.

The cause of the accident could not be determined.

Failure of the lower lug of the oleo strut due to corrosion.

Double engine failure caused by a fuel exhaustion. It is believed that the fuel quantity was insufficient to cover the distance or that the crew encountered strong headwinds, increasing the fuel consumption.

Loss of control following an engine failure.

Investigations determined that after departure, the pilots were confronted with various technical issues on several instruments. Indeed, the crew had started the flight under instrument flight rules but was forced to continue under VFR mode, which was impossible due to the lack of visibility caused by the presence of fog. The aircraft maintenance did not comply with the published requirements due to corrosion detected on the bearings of the electrical turn indicator that led to the assumption that this instrument was not working at takeoff, and probably for a long time. In addition, the artificial horizon was blocked at the time of impact and investigators believe that this instrument was partially deficient at the time of departure. The pilot-in-command accumulated 3,381 flight hours in total but had only 45 minutes of experience on this type of aircraft. The copilot had a total of 2,990 flying hours including 1,400 on type. Given the presence of fog, the pilot's lack of experience and the malfunctioning of two vital instruments, the crew should not have started the flight, especially since neither pilot had a valid license under IFR mode.

Inadequate preflight preparation on part of the crew. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Collision with wires,
- Lack of familiarity with aircraft,
- Failed to abort takeoff,
- Gust locks engaged,
- Operational supervisory personnel: inadequate supervision of flight crew,
- Unqualified person operated aircraft,
- Airport conditions,
- Checklist: failed to use,
- Downwind,
- Mechanic acting as copilot,
- 3,060 feet soft dirt strip.

The loss of control of the aircraft because the flight crew failed to recognize and correct the aircraft's high-angle-of-attack, low-speed stall and its descending spiral. The stall was precipitated by the flight crew's improper reaction to erroneous airspeed and Mach indications which had resulted from a blockage of the pitot heads by atmospheric icing. Contrary to standard operational procedures, the flight crew had not activated the pitot head heaters.