Blackbushe

The aircraft had positioned to Milan earlier in the day, flown by the same pilot, and was returning to Blackbushe with the pilot and three passengers on board. After descending through the London Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) it was handed over from London Control to Farnborough Approach. Its descent continued towards Blackbushe and, having reported that he had the airfield in sight, the pilot was instructed to descend at his own discretion. When the aircraft was approximately four miles south of its destination, he was instructed to contact Blackbushe Information. The weather at Blackbushe was fine with light and variable winds, visibility in excess of ten kilometres, and no low cloud. HZ-IBN entered the left-hand circuit for Runway 25 via the crosswind leg. Towards the end of the downwind leg, it overtook an Ikarus C42 microlight aircraft, climbing to pass ahead of and above that aircraft. As the climb began, at approximately 1,000 ft aal, the TCAS of HZ-IBN generated a ‘descend’ RA alert to resolve a conflict with the microlight. The TCAS RA changed to ‘maintain vertical speed’ and then ‘adjust vertical speed’, possibly to resolve a second conflict with a light aircraft which was above HZ-IBN and to the east of the aerodrome. Neither the microlight nor the light aircraft was equipped with TCAS. Following this climb, HZ-IBN then flew a curving base leg, descending at up to 3,000 feet per minute towards the threshold of Runway 25. The aircraft’s TCAS annunciated ‘clear of conflict’ when HZ-IBN was 1.1 nm from the runway threshold, at 1,200 ft aal, and at a speed of 146 KIAS, with the landing gear down and flap 3 selected. The aircraft continued its approach at approximately 150 KIAS. Between 1,200 and 500 ft aal the rate of descent averaged approximately 3,000 fpm, and at 500 ft aal the descent rate was 2,500 fpm. The aircraft’s TAWS generated six ‘pull up’ warnings on final approach. The aircraft crossed the Runway 25 threshold at approximately 50 ft aal at 151 KIAS. The aircraft manufacturer calculated that the appropriate target threshold speed for the aircraft’s mass and configuration was 108 KIAS. The AFISO initiated a full emergency as the aircraft touched down, because “it was clear at this time that the aircraft was not going to stop”. Tyre marks made by the aircraft at touchdown indicated that it landed 710 m beyond the Runway 25 threshold. The Runway 25 declared Landing Distance Available (LDA) was 1,059 m; therefore the aircraft touched down 349 m before the end of the declared LDA. The paved runway surface extended 89 m beyond the end of the LDA. The aircraft continued along the runway, decelerating, but departed the end of the paved surface at a groundspeed of 83 kt (84 KIAS airspeed) and struck an earth bank, which caused the aircraft to become airborne again. It then struck cars in a car park, part of a large commercial site adjacent to the aerodrome. The wing separated from the fuselage, and the fuselage rolled left through 350° before coming to rest on top of the detached wing, on a heading of 064°(M), 30° right side down and in an approximately level pitch attitude. A fire broke out in the underside of the aft fuselage and burned with increasing intensity. The aerodrome’s RFFS responded to the crash alarm but their path to the accident site was blocked by a locked gate between the aerodrome and commercial site. The first two RFFS vehicles arrived at the gate 1 minute and 34 seconds after the aircraft left the runway end. The third RFFS vehicle, which carried a key for the gate, arrived approximately one minute later, and the three RFFS vehicles proceeded through the gate 2 minutes and 46 seconds after the aircraft left the runway. As the aircraft was located in an area of the car park surrounded by a 2.4 m tall wire mesh fence, the RFFS vehicles had to drive approximately 400 m to gain access to the accident site. Despite applying all their available media, the RFFS was unable to bring the fire under control. The intensity of the fire meant that it was not possible to approach the aircraft to save life. All four occupants of the aircraft survived the impact and subsequently died from the effects of fire. Subsequently, local authority fire appliances arrived and the fire was extinguished.

After takeoff the pilot was unable to raise the landing gear and was presented with failure indications affecting both the lift dump and anti skid systems. Following a successful landing at Farnborough, and discussions with the aircraft's maintenance organisation, the aircraft was flown to Blackbushe for further technical investigation. After landing on Runway 26 the aircraft left the runway, struck a series of obstructions and was destroyed: there was no fire and the pilot was uninjured. The support bracket for the right main landing gear weight-on-wheels switch was found to have sustained a pre-impact failure which accounted for the indications reported by the pilot. Five recommendations have been made as a result of this investigation.

The aircraft, with the pilot and four passengers on board, departed Blackbushe from Runway 08 in fog with a visibility of less than 500 metres. As the aircraft reached the upwind end of the runway it was seen to bank to the left before disappearing from view. It crashed 13 seconds later into a factory complex where a major fire ensued. All on board were fatally injured. A substantial amount of the aircraft structure was consumed by fire. Engineering examination of that which remained showed that there was no malfunction found within the engines, propellers or controls that would have affected the flight. Analysis of the cockpit voice recorder however showed a reduction in one of the propellers rpm as the aircraft rotated that would have led to thrust asymmetry. Through a combination of lack of visual reference, confusion as to the cause of the power reduction and possible disorientation the pilot lost control of the aircraft and although he may have realised the situation seconds before impact with the ground there was insufficient height available to effect a safe recovery.

The accident occurred at Blackbushe airfield following a go-around from an approach to land on runway 26. The aircraft appeared to begin the go-around normally but was then seen to bank to the left and start turning left. The turn continued through 135° of heading, at a low height, with the bank angle increasing progressively, until the aircraft crashed into trees, semi-inverted, approximately 550 meters from the runway 26 threshold. The reason for the initiation of the go-around was an unsafe main landing gear indication caused by a defective microswitch. The reasons for the subsequent loss of control could not be determined.

The aircraft was en route from Blackbushe to Stansted when about three minutes after takeoff it descended to aerodrome level and flew into some trees which were obscured by fog and low cloud. The aircraft caught fire and the pilot, the sole occupant, was killed.

The aircraft was on a trooping flight from Blackbushe Airport to Idris in Tripoli and was carrying a crew of four, one supernumerary crew as passenger and thirty passengers. A few seconds after 2214LT the aircraft was observed to make its run and to take off. At 2216, it called the control tower and passed the following message, "I have got a port engine failure I am making a left-hand circuit to come in again". Having completed the downwind and base legs of this circuit, the aircraft crashed in a wood just as, or just after, it had turned onto the final approach and at a distance of about 1 200 yards from the threshold of the runway. Thirty-four of the thirty-five persons on board lost their lives.

The aircraft was flying under charter to the Air Ministry and had flown from Idris Airport, Tripoli with a crew of 6 and 74 passengers, nearly all members of servicemen's families. Shortly before midnight, on landing at Blackbushe in poor visibility, the aircraft undershot the runway, hit a beech tree 3,617 feet short of the threshold, swung sharply to port, came down among pine trees about 3,000 feet from the beech tree and caught fire. Three crew members were killed by the impact and four children lost their lives due to fire.

The aircraft took off from London Airport at 0755LT on a training flight, which was part of a routine base check being carried out by a training captain on a line captain. Having completed the first part of the check the aircraft landed at Blackbushe. At approximately 0850LT a takeoff was commenced from this airport for another exercise. On reaching the takeoff safety speed the training captain simulated a starboard outer engine failure. At this point the aircraft was just leaving the ground and as it did so the starboard inner propeller was seen to be stopping and the aircraft began turning to the right with an increasing amount of bank. It rose to about 30 feet and then descended and hit the ground at a point 250 yards from the runway in a steeply banked, nose-down attitude. It cartwheeled, slid along the ground backwards for 200 yards and came to rest just inside the northwest boundary of the aerodrome. The aircraft sustained major impact damage and fire broke out which almost completely destroyed it. The five occupants escaped with only slight injuries.

While overflying the Isle of Wight, enroute from Jersey to Blackbushe, the pilot encountered technical problems with both engines that lost power. He reduced his altitude and ditched the aircraft on the Solent, off Calshot. While the aircraft sank and was lost, all 11 occupants were quickly rescued by the crew of a yacht and then transferred to shore.

Ten minutes after takeoff from Blackbushe, at an altitude of 6,000 feet, an oil leak occurred on the right engine that was shot down and its propeller feathered. The crew received the permission to return to Blackbushe. On final approach, at a speed of 100 knots, the aircraft stalled and crashed in flames in a field located 135 yards short of runway 26 threshold. All 37 occupants evacuated the cabin and four of them were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.