Positioning

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Kiev to Khartoum with an intermediate stop in El Alamein, Egypt. While cruising by night, the crew informed ATC that he was short of fuel and attempted an emergency landing in a desert area located about 50 km east of El Alamein Airport. The aircraft belly landed, slid for few dozen metres and came to rest, broken in two. There was no fire. All six crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It is reported that the crew was forced to make an emergency landing due to fuel shortage, probably caused by strong headwinds all along the flight.

The aircraft departed Figari-Sud-Corse Airport on a positioning flight to Saint-Tropez-La Môle, carrying one passenger and one pilot. Weather conditions at destination were poor with ceiling at 1,800 feet and rain. The pilot contacted Nice Approach and was cleared to descend to 6,000 feet and to report over EM for an approach to La Môle Airport Runway 24. On final approach, the pilot was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, he completed a second approach and landed the airplane 200 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 136 knots. Spoilers were deployed but the airplane was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It veered slightly to the left, departed the end of the runway, crossed a river and came to rest against an embankment located about 100 metres past the runway end. The pilot escaped unhurt while the passenger was slighlty injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot departed Manaus-Eduardo Gomes International Airport at 0940LT on a short positionning flight to Manaus-Aeroclub de Flores. On final approach to runway 11, the engine lost power and suffered power variations. The pilot attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed 350 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. The pilot escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the single engine aircraft stalled and crashed in a prairie, bursting into flames. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The pilot reported that, during the approach following a positioning flight, he saw that the runway had a light dusting of snow on it and that the airplane touched down on speed in the first 1,000 ft of the 4,100- ft-long runway. The copilot, who was the pilot flying, applied heavy braking, but there appeared to be no braking effectiveness, and the airplane did not slow down as expected. The pilot added that, when the airplane reached about two-thirds of the way down the runway, he knew that it was going to overrun the runway due to the loss of only half of its airspeed. He thought that if he aborted the landing, there was a small chance the airplane could become airborne within the remaining runway. The copilot added engine power to abort the landing, and the nose landing gear lifted off, but insufficient runway was remaining to take off. The copilot reduced the engine power to idle, and the airplane overran the runway and went through the airport fence and a guardrail, across a highway, and into a field. Postaccident examination revealed no flat spots or evidence of skidding on the landing gear tires. The flaps were found in the “ground flaps” position, which is not allowed for takeoff. No evidence of any pre-accident mechanical malfunctions or failures were found with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Based on an airplane weight of 11,000 lbs, the airplane’s stopping distance would have been about 4,400
ft. The flight crew’s improper decision to land on a snow-covered runway that was too short to accommodate the landing in such conditions led to a runway overrun and impact with obstacles.

On 02 November 2017, a Perimeter Aviation LP Fairchild SA227-AC Metro III (serial number AC-756B, registration C-FLRY) was operating as flight 959 (PAG959) from Gods River Airport, Manitoba, to Thompson Airport, Manitoba, with 2 flight crew members on board. When the aircraft was approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of Thompson Airport, the crew informed air traffic control that they had received a low oil pressure indication on the left engine that might require the engine to be shut down. The crew did not declare an emergency, but aircraft rescue and firefighting services were put on standby. After touchdown on Runway 24 with both engines operating, the aircraft suddenly veered to the right and exited the runway. The aircraft came to rest in snow north of the runway. The captain and first officer exited the aircraft through the left side over-wing emergency exit and were taken to hospital with minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged. The 406-MHz emergency locator transmitter did not activate. The occurrence took place during the hours of darkness, at 1920 Central Daylight Time.

On 29th July, 2017 at about 0905hrs, an Antonov aircraft Model AN-74TK-100, flight CVK7087, registration UR-CKC, owned by SWIFT SOLUTION FZC and operated by CAVOK Airlines LLC was departing Sao Tome International Airport to Kotoka International Airport, Accra, for positioning with six crew on board. The flight was on an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) flight plan and Visual Meteorological Conditions prevailed. The aircraft exited runway 29 during a rejected take off. The Flight Navigator sustained an injury and the aircraft was destroyed. On 28th July, 2017 at 0225hrs the aircraft arrived Sao Tome International Airport from Stavanger (Norway), via Luxemburg and Ghardaia (Algeria) as a Cargo flight. On 29th July, 2017 at about 0800hrs, the crew of CVK 7087 comprising the Captain, the First Officer, the Flight Engineer, the Flight Navigator and 2 Maintenance Engineers arrived the airport and commenced the flight preparation; pre-flight inspection, determination of weight and balance, computation of performance and take-off speeds. The crew received flight briefing/weather information and refuelled the aircraft with an uplift of 5,700kg. At 0850hrs, the crew requested engine start-up clearance from Sao Tome Tower and it was approved. After completing the engine start procedures, engine parameter indications on both engines were normal. Appropriate checklist was completed and taxi clearance was requested by the crew. Sao Tome Tower initially cleared CVK 7087 to taxi on runway (RWY) 11 as favoured by the prevailing wind. However, the crew requested RWY 29 for departure. This request was approved by the Tower and the aircraft re-cleared to taxi to RWY 29 for departure. Sao Tome Tower did not provide the flight crew with the information about possible presence of birds at the aerodrome, in particular, on the runway. At 0905hrs, the aircraft began the take-off roll. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying (PF) while the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The engines and systems parameters were reported to be normal. According to the Captain, "In the first half of the take-off run from the runway, from five to six eagles got off the ground of the runway and flew dangerously close to the aircraft". He then requested the Flight Engineer to check if the flood lights were ON and to monitor the engine parameters. The crew asserted that they observed a rising and narrowing runway as the aircarft accelerated to a speed of 180 km/hr. They stated further: "At a speed of 180 km/hr, ahead, a flock of eagles, which were not seen before this moment began to get off the ground from the runway." The Captain took control of the aircraft and decided, after assessing the situation within 4 seconds that the best option for the crew was to discontinue the take-off. At that moment, the crew heard a bang, which they suggested could be a bird strike. This was followed by aural and visual indications on the annunciator panel such as “Left Engine Failure”, “Dangerous Vibration”, and “Take-off is prohibited” and the Captain immediately initiated a rejected take-off and instructed the Flight Engineer to deploy thrust reversers. The rejected takeoff was initiated about 5 seconds after sighting the birds, at a speed of 220km/h. According to the Captain, his decision was necessitated by the consideration of losing multiple engines due to bird strike if the take-off continued. The Captain said he pressed the brake pedals completely immediately after initiating the rejected take-off, subsequently he assessed the braking action as not effective and he used the emergency braking at a speed of about 130 km/h. On realizing that the aircraft would not stop within the remaining available runway length (about 272.3m) coupled with the presence of a ravine at the end, the captain intentionally veered to the right in order to extend the runway stopping distance and also avoid the ravine. The aircraft exited the runway at a speed of approximately 76 km/h. As the aircraft’s speed decayed to 60 km/h and just before the aircraft exited the runway, the Captain instructed the Flight Engineer to close the fuel emergency shutoff cock. The aircraft travelled a distance of about 95m from the exit point before plunging into the ravine. In the process, the forward fuselage separated from the bulkhead located immediately after the cockpit section. The aircraft came to rest at a location with coordinates: N002° 2' 51'' and E006° 42' 07''. The accident occurred in daylight at about 0905hrs.

Following an unventful flight from Entebbe, the twin engine airplane made a belly landing at Mogadishu-Aden Abdulle Airport. After touchdown, it slid for few hundre metres before coming to rest. All four crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll on runway 15 at Toluca-Licendiado Adolfo López Mateos, after the airplane passed the V1 speed, the warning light came on in the cockpit panel, informing the crew about the deployment of the reverse on the left engine. According to published procedures, the crew continued the takeoff and shortly after rotation, during initiale climb, the aircraft rolled to the left and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 200 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

On May 15, 2017, about 1529 eastern daylight time, a Learjet 35A, N452DA, departed controlled flight while on a circling approach to runway 1 at Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, and impacted a commercial building and parking lot. The pilot-in-command (PIC) and the second-in-command (SIC) died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The airplane was registered to A&C Big Sky Aviation, LLC, and was operated by Trans-Pacific Air Charter, LLC, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a positioning flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, about 1504 and was destined for TEB. The accident occurred on the flight crew’s third and final scheduled flight of the day; the crew had previously flown from TEB to Laurence G. Hanscom Field (BED), Bedford, Massachusetts, and then from BED to PHL. The PIC checked the weather before departing TEB about 0732; however, he did not check the weather again before the flight from PHL to TEB despite a company policy requiring that weather information be obtained within 3 hours of departure. Further, the crew filed a flight plan for the accident flight that included altitude (27,000 ft) and time en route (28 minutes) entries that were incompatible with each other, which suggests that the crew devoted little attention to preflight planning. The crew also had limited time in flight to plan and brief the approach, as required by company policy, and did not conduct an approach briefing before attempting to land at TEB. Cockpit voice recorder data indicated that the SIC was the pilot flying (PF) from PHL to TEB, despite a company policy prohibiting the SIC from acting as PF based on his level of experience. Although the accident flight waslikely not the first time that the SIC acted as PF (based on comments made during the flight), the PIC regularly coached the SIC (primarily on checklist initiation and airplane control) from before takeoff to the final seconds of the flight. The extensive coaching likely distracted the PIC from his duties as PIC and pilot monitoring, such as executing checklists and entering approach waypoints into the flight management system. Collectively, procedural deviations and errors resulted in the flight crew’s lack of situational awareness throughout the flight and approach to TEB. Because neither pilot realized that the airplane’s navigation equipment had not been properly set for the instrument approach clearance that the flight crew received, the crew improperly executed the vertical profile of the approach, crossing an intermediate fix and the final approach fix hundreds of feet above the altitudes specified by the approach procedure. The controller had vectored the flight for the instrument landing system runway 6 approach, circle to runway 1. When the crew initiated the circle-to-land maneuver, the airplane was 2.8 nautical miles (nm) beyond the final approach fix (about 1 mile from the runway 6 threshold) and could not be maneuvered to line up with the landing runway, which should have prompted the crew to execute a go-around because the flight did not meet the company’s stabilized approach criteria. However, neither pilot called for a go-around, and the PIC (who had assumed control of the airplane at this point in the flight) continued the approach by initiating a turn to align with the landing runway. Radar data indicated that the airplane’s airspeed was below the approach speed required by company standard operating procedures (SOPs). During the turn, the airplane stalled and crashed about 1/2 nm south of the runway 1 threshold.