Ferry

The crew was completing a ferry flight from California to Hawaii. While cruising by night, the pilot lost his orientation and was unable to locate his position with certainty. While cruising, both engines stopped simultaneously. The pilot reduced his altitude and ditched the aircraft. USCG personnel was able to rescue both occupants who were evacuated. The aircraft sank and was lost.

Shortly after takeoff from Middletown-Summit Airpark, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft banked left and crashed in a huge explosion. Both occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.

While in cruising altitude, the twin engine airplane went into a dive and eventually crashed in a prairie. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a ferry flight from Nice to London-Gatwick. While descending to Gatwick Airport in VFR mode, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with rain falls and turbulences. While flying in clouds, he lost control of the airplane that plunges into the earth and crashed in a field. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

While in cruising altitude, one of the engine failed while the second lost power. The crew decided to reduce his altitude and attempted an emergency landing on a beach located in Dorchester. The aircraft completed a wheels-up landing and came to rest into the sea. Both pilots were uninjured while the aircraft was lost.

The prototype aircraft, after having carried out several demonstration flights in Germany, was on its way back to England. It took off from Emden, Germany, at 1137 hrs local time on a non-scheduled international VFR flight to Southampton, England, with the pilot and one passenger. Two minutes after take-off the aircraft made radio contact with Eelde and at 1150 hrs informed Eelde that it was "abeam Eelde VOR" and flying at 1 500 ft VMC on top of cloud. At this position the aircraft could not have had any visual ground contact. At 1156 hrs the aircraft asked Amsterdam Flight Information Service for radar assistance in order to pass through Schiphol Control Zone but was informed it was not possible because positive radar contact could not be established. At 1209 hrs the aircraft was advised to divert to Eelde because weather conditions in the Schiphol Control Zone precluded VFR flight through the zone at 1500 ft. On receipt of this information the pilot informed Amsterdam that he would proceed according to his flight plan. At 1220 hrs when flying at 1 500 ft the pilot informed Schiphol that he would clear Schiphol Control Zone to the west. This was after the controller had positively instructed him to remain clear of the Control Zone and that it was impossible to pass through the zone at 1 500 ft under VFR. Reconstruction of the aircraft's flight path showed that at about 1225 hrs it deviated from its route and cleared the Schiphol area on a heading of about 040°. Shortly afterwards, at 1234 hrs the pilot reported he vas experiencing "serious compass trouble1' and asked for a "steer" but Amsterdam still had no radar contact with the aircraft. According to eyewitnesses, the aircraft was, at about this time, flying at a very low height around the vicinity of the village of Rijs, returning to or passing over the same area several times. It was also established from these witnesses that the weather conditions were such i.e. fog and rain, that the pilot would not have had adequate visual reference. At 1240 hrs the pilot reported "some compass trouble" and again requested radar guidance but radar contact had still not been established. Flight at low altitude was apparently discontinued at about 1247 hrs and at 1249 hrs the pilot reported at 3 000 ft in IMC and that he had a serious instrument failure. Schiphol Control instructed him to maintain FL 30 (3 000 ft) and a heading of 200'. Contrary to this instruction, the pilot reported at 1251 hrs as being at FL 50 and at 1254 hrs at 6 000 ft. At 1255 hrs the controller asked if the aircraft was circling, the pilot replied in the affirmative and said "I think I am going around it". The controller acknowledged this transmission and remarked that he thought the aircraft should be heading 200°; the pilot then replied "I cannot maintain a heading". At that moment the aircraft was positively identified on the radar screen. Replying to the radar controller's instruction to fly specific headings and to make a left-hand turn the pilot said he could not maintain a heading and that right hand turns were easier to mase. At 1258 hrs the pilot requested the height of cloud tops and inquired if there were any clear layers in which he could find visual flight conditions. At his request he was cleared to climb to FL 80; however, a German military aircraft which had recently flown over Spijkerboor at PL 100 reported that it had been "fully IMC" there. At 1301 hrs the pilot reported at 8 700 ft and "climbing as fast as I can, I want to pet out on top"; this was the last recognizable transmission heard by Schiphol. The aircraft was observed on the radar screen until about 1309 hrs at which time radar contact was lost. According to the radar controller the indications observed on the screen for the last 10 to 12 minutes indicated that the aircraft made a series of random small radius right and left-hand turns. At 1310 hrs witnesses near Ringwiel lake saw parts of an aircraft falling, most of it into the lake; these were later identified as parts of the subject aircraft. Calculations and evidence suggested that the aircraft climbed to an altitude above 10 000 ft where it would have encountered severe icing and would have reached a region of moderate to severe turbulence. The time of impact was estimated to be approximately 1310 hrs. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both occupants were killed.

The aircraft was on a ferry flight from Minsk, Belarus, to Bamako, Mali, with intermediate stops in Zagreb, Marseille, Oran and Tamanrasset. It was returning to its country following maintenance in Minsk factory. While cruising by night in poor weather conditions, the crew failed to realize that the airplane deviated from the prescribed flight path. Due to opposite traffic, the crew was instructed to make a 360° right turn but apparently did not understand this message. At an altitude of 10,000 feet, the airplane struck the slope of Mt L'Avalanche located about 1,500 meters west of Estenc, Alpes-Maritimes. The wreckage was found few hours later. The airplane was totally destroyed upon impact and all seven occupants, five crew members and two passengers (two mechanics) were killed. At the time of the accident, the airplane equipment was compliant but due to stormy weather and strong winds, a precise navigation was impossible due to the lack of a VOR receptor. On the route Genoa - Albenga - Nice, the airplane failed to follow the G7 Airway due to stormy weather and in accordance with ATC. The Russian pilot-in-command, speaking neither English nor French, could not converse directly with ground control. The co-pilot, speaking French but not Russian, could not converse directly with the captain or translate his orders from the ground. The navigator, in charge of the route in particular difficult conditions, could not correspond more with the pilot, if not by means of the radio. Only the radio could translate into Russian to the captain the indications provided in French by the ground control, which could ipso facto introduce a source of error of interpretation, and required a certain time of translation. The ICAO recommendation suggesting to the pilot-in-command the use of English or the language used by the ground station was not applied. The investigation established that the crew was unaware of wind and drift. Under the influence of a wind blowing from sector 210 to 100 km/h, the aircraft suffered a drift of about 20° towards the north, thus towards the mountain. Vertical to Nice, the airplane was already 25 kilometers north of the station and north of the G7 Airway. The diversion order did not have to be understood the first time since the crew requested repetition. The superposition of the orders of two simultaneous maneuvers, turn and descent, probably made the interpretation tricky and ambiguous. The order to make a 360° right turn, which means a circular turn, was erroneously understood as the order to take heading 360. Indeed, at least five kilometers prior to impact, the aircraft was following a straight path, in this case a heading oriented almost to magnetic north. Under the influence of one or more stormy areas northwest of Nice, the unstable indications of the radiocompas did not allow position's control and turbulences could create an additional difficulty. The aircraft approached the terrain as fast as it did to the north and the speed of the aircraft at that heading increased by about 100 km/h, representing the wind speed south-southeast. The point of impact was 2,440 meters, the level 80 towards which the aircraft was normally descending corresponding to an altitude of 2'380 meters.

The pilot was conducting a ferry flight out from Memphis-Metropolitan Airport. While in cruising altitude, the airplane entered an uncontrolled descent. Due to overload failure, several parts of the airplane separated and it eventually crashed in an open field located near South Haven. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The crew obtained a special ferry permit and departed Goodyear-Litchfield Airport (five miles away) bound for Litchfield Park. On approach, smoke spread in the cockpit and after a normal touchdown, the crew vacated the runway via a taxiway and stopped the aircraft. While the crew evacuated safely, the airplane was totally destroyed by fire.

While rolling on a taxiway, the nose gear collapsed and the airplane sank on its belly and came to rest. All three technicians on board were uninjured while the aircraft christened 'Star of Chillon' was considered as damaged beyond repair.