Cargo

While descending to Bukavu-Kavumu Airport on a flight from Kalima, the crew encountered poor visibility due to fog. Seven minutes prior to ETA, the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a wooded and mountainous area located in the Kahuzi-Miega National Park. The wreckage was found about 15 km south of the airport. All four occupants were killed.

Parked at position 306 at Shanghai-Pudong Airport, the aircraft was prepared for a cargo service to Santiago de Chile with intermediate stops in Addis Ababa and São Paulo, when a fire erupted in the cargo compartment. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire and damaged beyond repair. No one was injured.

After landing at Beledweyne-Haji-Sheikh Mahmud Hasan (Ugas Khalif) Airport, the aircraft went out of control and came to rest against several earth mounds, bursting into flames. All three crew members managed to escape while the aircraft was destroyed by fire. The crew was completing a cargo flight from Djibouti City on behalf of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and it is believed that the aircraft was carrying food supplies.

The pilot departed on a cross country flight in a turbine-powered, multiengine airplane at night and in visual meteorological conditions. Recovered GPS data revealed that as the airplane accelerated down the runway, it drifted to the right of the runway centerline. A video recording showed that shortly after takeoff, the airplane rolled right, the nose dropped, and the airplane impacted the ground. It came to rest on its left side with both wings separated and the fuselage was highly fragmented forward of the main landing gear. A post-accident examination of the airframe and engines found no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. A witness that spoke to the pilot shortly before the accident flight stated that the pilot exhibited difficulty in completing some paperwork; however, no medical reasoning for this difficulty could be determined based upon the available evidence. The investigation determined that at the time of the accident the pilot had been on duty for about 19 hours and 20 minutes, which was contrary to duty and rest regulations. At his estimated arrival time into the destination, the pilot would have accumulated about 20 hours and 54 minutes of duty time. The investigation was unable to determine if the pilot took advantage of the opportunity for rest that existed during the day, and therefore could not determine if fatigue contributed to the accident. Investigators were unable to determine the reason for the loss of control on takeoff with the available information.

On 12 May 2020, a Quest Kodiak 100 aircraft, registration PK-MEC, was being operated by Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) as a cargo flight from Sentani Airport (WAJJ), Jayapura, Papua with intended destination of Mamit Airstrip (WAVS) Tolikara, Papua. The pilot was the only person on board for this flight and the aircraft carried 694 kgs of cargo goods. At 0622 LT (2122 UTC), the pilot of PK-MEC aircraft requested clearance to the Sentani Tower controller to start aircraft engine and flying to Mamit at radial 241° with intended cruising altitude 10,000 feet. The Sentani Tower controller approved the request. At 0627 LT, on daylight condition, the aircraft took off from runway 12 of Sentani Airport, thereafter, the Sentani Tower controller advised to the pilot of PK-MEC to contact Jayapura Radar controller. At 0628LT, the pilot of PK-MEC declared “MAYDAY” on Jayapura Radar radio frequency. The Jayapura Radar controller tried to contact pilot of PK-MEC four times but no answer. At 0630 LT, the Jayapura Radar Controller requested the pilot of PK-RCE that was just took off from Sentani to visually observe the position of PK-MEC aircraft. Few minutes later, the pilot of PK-RCE reported to Jayapura Radar controller that some debris were seen on Sentani Lake and some boats were moving toward the debris location. The pilot of PK-RCE assumed that PK-MEC aircraft had crashed to the lake. The pilot fatally injured. The wreckages have been recovered including the Global Positioning System (GPS) data card.

On approach to Bardale Airstrip, the twin engine aircraft struck the ground and crashed 5 km from the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all five occupants were killed. The crew was enroute from Mogadiscio to Bardale with an en route stop in Baidao, carrying medical supplies and mosquito nets.

The pilot was conducting a Part 135 on-demand cargo flight in instrument meteorological conditions. After executing a second missed approach, he informed air traffic control (ATC) of his intentions to divert to an airport located about 36 miles to the southeast. About 7 minutes after executing the second missed approach, the pilot began making unintelligible radio communications that ATC characterized as very garbled and difficult to understand, “almost hypoxic.” ATC then instructed the pilot to utilize oxygen. About 19 minutes after the second missed approach, ATC informed the pilot that the airplane had descended 1,600 ft, not following assigned course vectors or instructions and asked if everything was alright, to which no response was received. After attempting to relay communications through other airplanes in the area, an unintelligible response was received from the accident airplane. ATC then made numerous transmissions to the accident pilot urging him to utilize oxygen and open a window. No further communications were received from the accident airplane. A witness reported that he saw the airplane descend out of a low overcast cloud layer at a high rate of descent. The airplane then abruptly transitioned into a steep climb before re-entering the clouds. A few seconds later, he heard the airplane impact terrain and responded to the accident site. The sudden change in communications from the pilot indicates a possible impairment. When combined with the ATC data, the witness account, and the lack of any mechanical irregularities or malfunctions with the airplane, it is likely the pilot experienced difficulty controlling the airplane due to impairment. While the pilot was at an increased risk for an acute cardiovascular event, the extremely limited available medical evidence leaves no way to quantify that risk and no evidence regarding whether such an event occurred. As a result, whether the pilot was incapacitated by an acute medical event cannot be determined from the available medical information.

The pilot reported that, upon reaching the decision altitude on a GPS instrument approach, he saw the runway end identifier lights and continued the approach. Shortly after, the lights disappeared and then reappeared. He continued the approach and landing thinking the airplane was lined up with the runway by using the runway edge lights for reference. Upon touching down about 225 ft left of the runway, the airplane dug into snow and flipped over, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and tail. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

While the pilot was on a visual approach to the airport and descending over water on the left base leg, about 100 ft above the water's surface, the airplane entered instrument meteorological conditions with no forward visibility. The pilot looked outside his left window to gauge the airplane's altitude and saw "black waves of water approaching extremely rapidly." He tried to pull back on the yoke to initiate a climb, but the nosewheel contacted the water. Subsequently, the airplane nosed over and came to rest inverted in the water. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The airline transport pilot departed on a night cargo flight into conditions that included an overcast cloud ceiling and “hazy” visibility, as reported by another pilot. About one minute after takeoff, the pilot made a series of course changes and large altitude and airspeed deviations. Following several queries from the air traffic controller concerning the airplane’s erratic flight path, the pilot responded that he had “some instrument problems.” The pilot attempted to return to land at the departure airport, but the airplane impacted terrain after entering a near-vertical dive. The airplane was one of two in the operator’s fleet equipped with an inverter system that electrically powered the pilot’s (left side) flight instruments. Examination of the annunciator panel lighting filaments revealed that the inverter system was not powered when the airplane impacted the ground. Without electrical power from an inverter, the pilot’s side attitude indicator and horizontal situation indicator (HSI) would have been inoperative and warning flags would have been displayed over the respective instruments. The pilot had a history of poor procedural knowledge and weak flying skills. It is possible that he either failed to turn on an inverter during ground operations and did not respond to the accompanying warning flags, or he did not switch to the other inverter in the event that an inverter failed inflight. Due to impact damage, the operational status of the two inverters installed in the airplane could not be confirmed. However, the vacuum-powered flight instruments on the copilot’s (right side) were operational, and the pilot could have referenced these instruments to maintain orientation. Based on the available information, the pilot likely lost control of the airplane after experiencing spatial disorientation. The night marginal visual flight rules conditions and instrumentation problems would have been conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the airplane’s extensive fragmentation indicative of a high-energy impact was consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation. Ethanol identified during toxicology testing may have come from postmortem production and based on the low levels recorded, was unlikely to have contributed to this accident. Morphine identified in the pilot’s liver could not be used to extrapolate to antemortem blood levels; therefore, whether or to what extent the pilot’s use of morphine contributed to the accident could not be determined.