Cargo

On 17th January, 2014, the day before the accident, the pilot departed from his company base, Ogle International Airport (SYGO) with another aircraft, a Cessna 208B, Registration – 8R-GHT. He was tasked to do two days of shuttling; the first day between Olive Creek and Ekereku Bottom Airstrips, and the second day between Olive Creek and Imbaimadai Airstrips. The pilot was accompanied by a third crew/loader, whose duty was to ensure that the aircraft was properly loaded for each trip, and an aircraft engineer who was assigned to carry out minor maintenance duties and refuel the aircraft as required for the duration of the shuttle operations. It was reported that on the first day, during a landing at Ekereku Bottom, the aircraft encountered severe wind conditions that resulted in a hard landing. The pilot was very concerned about the hard landing and expressed this to several individuals. He was concerned enough to log the hard landing in the Aircraft Technical Log. After the hard landing the aircraft was visually inspected by the engineer who declared the aircraft fit for flight. However while taxying prior to takeoff the aircraft suffered a right brake seizure. The engineer freed and bled the brake line. Tests were done on the brakes and the aircraft was flown to Olive Creek. The hard landing and the brake failure were reported to base and an instruction was passed that this aircraft should be brought back to Ogle by another pilot. Another Cessna 208B aircraft, 8R-GHS, the accident aircraft, was left with the pilot for him to complete his shuttle schedule the next day. On the afternoon of the first day, the pilot flew this aircraft, 8R-GHS to Kamarang Airstrip, where he overnighted. On the second day, 18th January, 2014, he departed Kamarang at 10:30hrs UTC for Olive Creek with the engineer and the loader. The engineer was left at Olive Creek. The pilot, with the loader, did one shuttle from Olive Creek to Imbaimadai. He returned to Olive Creek where the aircraft was refueled and then did three shuttles between Olive Creek and Imbaimadai. After these three shuttles the aircraft was again refueled. He completed one shuttle, Olive Creek/Imbaimadai/Olive Creek and had just taken off on the second in this series of shuttles when the accident occurred during midmorning. Both the pilot and the third crew were killed in the crash.

The aircraft departed Managua on a cargo flight to Saltillo with an intermediate stop in Tapachula, carrying two passengers and two pilots on behalf of DHL. During a night approach to Saltillo Airport, the crew was cleared to land on runway 17. One minute later, he initiated a go-around and decided to divert to Monterrey Airport which was the alternate. Due to a poor flight preparation, the crew was unaware that Monterrey Airport was closed to traffic that night. So few minutes later, the crew returned to Saltillo and was again cleared to land on runway 17. At that time, weather conditions were marginal with a limited visibility due to fog. Following an ILS CAT I approach, the pilot-in-command descended below the MDA and continued the approach despite he did not establish any visual contact with the runway and its equipment. The aircraft landed hard to the right of the runway and on the last third of the runway. After landing, the aircraft rolled for few dozen metres, lost its nose gear and came to rest against an embankment. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The single engine aircraft departed Cayenne-Rochambeau-Félix Éboué Airport runway 08 at 1448LT on a cargo flight to Maripasoula, carrying one female passenger and one pilot. About three minutes into the flight, while cruising at an altitude of 1,500 feet, the plot encountered engine problems, declared an emergency and was cleared for an immediate return. The aircraft landed back at 1452LT. Some controls were performed on the engine and the aircraft took off again at 1507LT. Less than a minute later, the engine lost power. The pilot again declared an emergency and returned to the airport. On short final, the aircraft lost height and crashed in bushes some 800 metres short of runway 26. The passenger was seriously injured and the pilot was slightly injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The four engine aircraft departed Novosibirsk-Yeltsovka Airport on a cargo flight to Irkutsk, carrying three mechanics, six crew members and a load consisting of 1,5 tons of spare parts for the Irkut Group (Sukhoi, Beriev) based in Irkutsk. On approach to Irkust-2 Airport, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with mist and limited visibility due to the night. On short final, the aircraft deviated to the right and descended too low until it impacted military vehicles and crashed onto several barracks of the 109th Arsenal of the Russian Army, coming to rest 770 metres short of runway 14 and about 90 metres to the right of its extended centerline. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed. There were no victims on the ground.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Jeddah, the crew completed the approach and landing procedures on runway 04 at Abuja-Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport. During the landing roll, the aircraft overran the displaced threshold then veered to the right and veered off runway. While contacting a grassy area, the aircraft collided with several parked excavator equipment and trucks. The aircraft came to a halt and was severely damaged to both wings and engines. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The captain and first officer were conducting an international cargo flight in the twin-engine turboprop airplane. After about 40 minutes of flight during night visual meteorological conditions, an air traffic controller cleared the airplane for a descent to 7,000 ft and then another controller further cleared the airplane for a descent to 3,000 ft and told the flight crew to expect an ILS (instrument landing system) approach. During the descent, about 7,300 ft and about 290 kts, the airplane entered a shallow left turn, followed by a 45-degree right turn and a rapid, uncontrolled descent, during which the airplane broke up about 1,500 ft over uneven terrain. The moderately loaded cargo airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder (CVR) (although it previously had a CVR in its passenger configuration) nor was it required by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. There were also no avionics on board with downloadable or nonvolatile memory. As a result, there was limited information available to determine what led to the uncontrolled descent or what occurred as the flight crew attempted to regain control of the airplane. Also, although the first officer was identified in FAA-recorded radio transmissions several minutes before the loss of control and it was company policy that the pilot not flying make those transmissions, it could not be determined who was at the controls when either the loss of control occurred or when the airplane broke up. There was no evidence of any in-flight mechanical failures that would have resulted in the loss of control, and the airplane was loaded within limits. Evidence of all flight control surfaces was confirmed, and, to the extent possible, flight control continuity was also confirmed. Evidence also indicated that both engines were operating at the time of the accident, and, although one of the four propeller blades from the right propeller was not located after separating from the fractured hub, there was no evidence of any preexisting propeller anomalies. The electrically controlled pitch trim actuator did not exhibit any evidence of runaway pitch, and measurements of the actuator rods indicated that the airplane was trimmed slightly nose low, consistent for the phase of flight. Due to the separation of the wings and tail, the in-flight positions of the manually operated aileron and rudder trim wheels could not be determined. Other similarly documented accidents and incidents generally involved unequal fuel burns, which resulted in wing drops or airplane rolls. In one case, the flight crew intentionally induced an excessive slide slip to balance fuel between the wings, which resulted in an uncontrolled roll. However, in the current investigation, the fuel cross feed valve was found in the closed position, indicating that a fuel imbalance was likely not a concern of the flight crew. In at least two other events, unequal fuel loads also involved autopilots that reached their maximum hold limits, snapped off, and rolled the airplane. Although the airplane in this accident did not have an autopilot, historical examples indicate that a sudden yawing or rolling motion, regardless of the source, could result in a roll, nose tuck, and loss of control. The roll may have been recoverable, and in one documented case, a pilot was able to recover the airplane, but after it lost almost 11,000 ft of altitude. During this accident flight, it was likely that, during the descent, the flight crew did regain control of the airplane to the extent that the flight control surfaces were effective. With darkness and the rapid descent at a relatively low altitude, one or both crewmembers likely pulled hard on the yoke to arrest the downward trajectory, and, in doing so, placed the wings broadside against the force of the relative wind, which resulted in both wings failing upward. As the wings failed, the propellers simultaneously chopped through the fuselage behind the cockpit. At the same time, the horizontal stabilizers were also positioned broadside against the relative wind, and they also failed upward. Evidence also revealed that, at some point, the flight crew lowered the landing gear. Although it could not be determined when they lowered the gear, it could have been in an attempt to slow or regain control of the airplane during the descent. Although reasons for the loss of control could not be definitively determined, the lack of any preexisting mechanical anomalies indicates a likelihood of flight crew involvement. Then, during the recovery attempt, the flight crew's actions, while operating under the difficult circumstances of darkness and rapidly decreasing altitude, resulted in the overstress of the airplane.

On 19 October 2013, an Avions de Transport Régional ATR42-320 freighter, registered P2-PXY (PXY) and operated by Air Niugini, was scheduled to fly from Madang to Tabubil, Western Province, as flight PX2900 carrying a load tobacco for a client company. There were three persons on board; the pilot in command (PIC), a copilot, and a PNG experienced DHC-8 captain whose function was to provide guidance during the approach into Tabubil. The PIC was the handling pilot and the copilot was the support monitoring pilot. The flight crew taxied to the threshold end of runway 25 intending to use the full length of the runway. The take-off roll was normal until the PIC tried to rotate at VR (speed for rotation, which the flight crew had calculated to be 102 knots). He subsequently reported that the controls felt very heavy in pitch and he could not pull the control column back in the normal manner. Flight data recorder (FDR) information indicated that approximately 2 sec later the PIC aborted the takeoff and selected full reverse thrust. He reported later that he had applied full braking. It was not possible to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway and it continued over the embankment at the end of the runway and the right wing struck the perimeter fence. The aircraft was substantially damaged during the accident by the impact, the post-impact fire and partial immersion in salt water. The right outboard wing section was completely burned, and the extensively damaged and burnt right engine fell off the wing into the water. Both propellers were torn from the engine shafts and destroyed by the impact forces.

The commercial, instrument-rated pilot of the multiengine airplane was conducting a newspaper delivery flight in night visual meteorological conditions. After two uneventful legs, the pilot departed on the third leg without incident. Radar data indicated that, after takeoff, the airplane flew over open water at an altitude of about 100 to 200 ft toward the destination airport and then climbed to 2,400 ft. Shortly thereafter, the pilot performed a 360-degree left turn, followed by a 360-degree right turn while the airplane maintained an altitude of about 2,400 ft, before continuing toward the destination airport. Less than 2 minutes later, the airplane began a rapid descending left turn and then collided with water. The wreckage was subsequently located on the sea floor near the airplane's last radar target. Both wings, the cabin, cockpit, and nose section were destroyed by impact forces. The wreckage was not recovered, which precluded its examination for preimpact malfunctions. The airplane had been operated for about 25 hours since its most recent inspection, which was performed about 3 weeks before the accident. The pilot had accumulated about 1,650 hours of total flight experience, which included about 1,100 hours in the accident airplane make and model. Although the pilot conducted most of his flights during the day, he regularly operated flights in night conditions. The pilot's autopsy did not identify any findings of natural disease significant enough to have contributed to the accident. In addition, although toxicological testing detected ethanol in the pilot's cavity blood, it likely resulted from postmortem production.

On August 14, 2013, about 0447 central daylight time (CDT), UPS flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, N155UP, crashed short of runway 18 during a localizer non precision approach to runway 18 at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (BHM), Birmingham, Alabama. The captain and first officer were fatally injured, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The scheduled cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, and dark night visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the airport; variable instrument meteorological conditions with a variable ceiling were present north of the airport on the approach course at the time of the accident. The flight originated from Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field, Louisville, Kentucky, about 0503 eastern daylight time. A notice to airmen in effect at the time of the accident indicated that runway 06/24, the longest runway available at the airport and the one with a precision approach, would be closed from 0400 to 0500 CDT. Because the flight's scheduled arrival time was 0451, only the shorter runway 18 with a non precision approach was available to the crew. Forecasted weather at BHM indicated that the low ceilings upon arrival required an alternate airport, but the dispatcher did not discuss the low ceilings, the single-approach option to the airport, or the reopening of runway 06/24 about 0500 with the flight crew. Further, during the flight, information about variable ceilings at the airport was not provided to the flight crew.

On 8 August 2013 at 1914 hrs the airplane, arriving from Stockholm, Sweden, landed at Leipzig/Halle Airport. After the landing it taxied to apron 2 to stand 207. On board the airplane were the Pilot in Command (PIC), the co-pilot, one flight engineer, one navigator, one radio operator, and two flight mechanics. The driver of the fueling vehicle stated that the airplane was refuelled between 0058 and 0121 hrs with 22,809 l fuel. The flight engineer stated that approximately at the same time the loading had occurred and was completed at about 0140 hrs. Between 2330 and 0100 hrs the airplane was loaded with 48,960 one-day-old chickens. They had a total mass of 3,061 kg. Take-off for the flight to Mineralye Vody, Russia, was planned for 0215 hrs. At 0201 hrs the engine start-up clearance was issued and the APU started. After the APU was running, engine No 1, outer left, was started. Once engine No 1 had reached idle speed the start-up for engine No 4, outer right, was begun. During engine start-up of engine No 4 the crew noticed a dull bang and the airplane jerked. The co-pilot, who monitored the APU instruments during engine start-up, had observed rotary speed oscillations and a temperature rise. A short time later the APU fire warning indication illuminated. The crew shut off the two already running engines and triggered the APU fire extinguisher system. One photo (see Appendix) shows a glaring light on the left fuselage side. At this time propellers 1 and 4 were turning; propellers 2 and 3 stood still. Video recordings show fire in the area of the left main landing gear. The co-pilot stated that the PIC had then opened the cockpit door. Flames were already visible in the cargo compartment. The PIC stated that he sent one of the flight mechanics outside for a check. He left the aircraft through the emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. After he had left the airplane, he immediately reported that the APU was burning. Subsequently, the three fire extinguishers located in the cockpit were handed down. In addition, the flight engineer and the second flight mechanic left the airplane; they confirmed the fire. Together the three men tried to extinguish the fire with on-board fire extinguishers. The PIC instructed the radio operator to report the situation to the tower. At 0207:45 hrs the radio operator reported the fire and requested the fire brigade. Around 0208 hrs the fire was noticed by other witnesses. They stated that the area of the left main landing gear was burning and that in this area on the left side below the fuselage some liquid leaked on to the ground. At 0208:01 hrs the tower alerted the fire station east. Half a minute later the fire station west was alerted. At 0209:00 hrs the tower announced the location of the fire. At 0212:06 hrs the first fire truck reached the airplane and undertook the first extinguishing attempt with foaming agent. The crew members evacuated the airplane through the front emergency exit located in the floor of the cockpit. Then they left the danger zone and retreated to a grassy area about 50 m in front of the airplane.