Cargo

The aircraft departed Mwanza Airport at 1926LT on a cargo flight Nairobi. While passing FL169, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent. It passed FL146 at an excessive speed of 430 knots and eventually crashed in an open field located near Kogatende. The wreckage was found the following morning. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.

The four engine aircraft was performing a cargo flight from Glasgow-Prestwick to Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, with intermediate stops in Ghardaïa and Tamanrasset. On board were seven crew members and a load consisting of oil equipment. About three minutes after takeoff from Tamanrasset-Aguenar-Hadj Bey Akhamok Airport, radio contact was lost when the aircraft crashed in a mountainous terrain located some 15 km south of the airport. The wreckage was found few hours later. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all seven crew members (six Ukrainians and one Russian) were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Bukavu-Kavumu Airport at 1342LT on a cargo flight to Kama, carrying two pilots, two passengers and a load of 1,500 kilos of books. Some 10 minutes later, the crew changed his frequency and no further contact was established. As the aircraft failed to arrive in Kama, Maniema Province, SAR operations were initiated. The crew of two helicopters from the same operator spotted the burnt wreckage two days later, in the region of Mulume Munene, some 30 km southwest of Bukavu. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed.

On 2 July 2014, about 01.14 UTC, 5Y-CET, a Fokker F50, an international cargo flight, operated by Skyward International, crashed shortly after takeoff from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA), Nairobi, Kenya (JKIA). Instrument Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. The four crewmembers were fatally injured. The airplane was destroyed and consumed by post-crash fire. The destination of the flight was Aden Adee International Airport, Mogadishu, Somalia. The airplane was repositioned from its home base at Wilson Airport in Nairobi, the day before. The accident captain (CAPT) and another first officer conducted the repositioning flight. (see Aircraft Information). At JKIA, the airplane was loaded with cargo in preparation for the accident flight. The accident crew consisted of the Capt and FO in addition to a maintenance engineer and loadmaster. According to air traffic control (ATC), the flight plan was filed for duration of 2.5 hours at an altitude of 19,000 feet along with 5 hours of fuel aboard. Based on flight recorder data, the Capt was the pilot-flying and the FO was the pilot-monitoring. The accident flight was reconstructed using data from air traffic control and flight recorder information. According to FDR data, engine start occurred at at 01.50.20. At about 01.10.59 the flight made initial contact with JKIA air traffic control tower and after routine communication, including the confirmation of the number of person and fuel endurance, the flight was cleared for takeoff at 0112.30. At 01.11.58, both engines accelerated to a high power setting with engine no. 1 stabilizing at 78% torque, 100% propeller speed and engine 2 stabilizing at 80% torque, 99% propeller speed. About six seconds later, the Capt indicates “power is set”. About 2 seconds afterwards the Capt indicated “the auto-feather is off, left” and then 5 seconds later, the FO calls out “seven eighty” (?). About 16 seconds after initial engine acceleration was applied, the first of a series of three chimes audio alerts occurred, and continued at 1 second interval throughout the CVR recording. Immediately after the initial chimes, the Capt said “you see” and “how much is that?”. The FO responded “okay niner”. The Capt then asked “it has gotten to?” The FO replied “thirty four thirty ninety two” and shortly afterward “the left one is thirty”. About 24 seconds after initial engine acceleration, engine 1 torque climbs over a period of 2 seconds to a recorded value of 119.9%, the maximum value the recorder is capable of recording. Simultaneously Engine 1 propeller speed falls from 100% to 57%. Other engine shaft speeds remain at approximately their original high power values. Airspeed at the point this change occurs was less than 30 knots. During this period, the FO called out “one twenty two now [pause] torque”. The Capt responded “it is rising eh? The FO then noted “torque one twenty six now”. About 31 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the FO called out “okay speed alive sixty”. About a second later the Capt asked “do we reduce or”? The FO responded “we can just cut”. The Capt inquired “do we abort or continue?” The FO responded, “okay one one twelve and nine four point three” and then “okay one sixteen [pause] ninety four.” The Capt acknowledged “yeah okay” About 47 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the Capt said twice “did I reduce it?”and the FO responded sequentially “yeah” and “okay”] About 52 seconds after initial engine acceleration, the Capt asked “how is it now?” and the FO replied “yeah one oh two [pause] ninety four”. About 7 seconds later the FO called out “okay, one sixteen ninety four”. About 1 minute after initial engine acceleration, the Capt inquired “Is it really going?” The FO replied “one oh one, ninety five”. The Capt acknowledged and shortly afterward he queried “is it going really, is the aircraft really moving”. The FO responded “okay, one oh one, ninety five”. About 4 seconds later, the Capt indicated “it is not giving power” About 1 minute 9 seconds after the initial engine acceleration the FO called out “okay speed has now reached about hundred”. The Capt responded “oh yeah” and immediately afterward the FO called out “okay one eleven, ninety five”. About 1 minute 18 seconds after the initial engine acceleration, the FO indicated “hundred now”. The Capt acknowledged. About 1 minute 26 seconds after the initial engine acceleration, the FO called out “V one V R rotate” About 1 minute 33 seconds after the initial engine acceleration a transition of the airplane from ground to air mode is recorded and the pressure altitude begins to climb along with the Capt immediately afterward expressing two exclamations. Following the transition to air mode there were 51 seconds of flight recorder data before the recording ended. During this time and over a period of about 3 seconds, the FO calls out “positive rate of climb” and the Capt responded “gear up”. About 3 second later, the Capt expressed “it doesn’t have power [pause] it’s on one side.” About 6 seconds afterward, the FO said “we can also turn back”. About 3 seconds later the first of seven “don’t sink” (GPWS aural warning alerts) begins over a period of 23 seconds. After the second GPWS alert the Capt queried “ok, we’re ok?” After the third GPWS alert, the FO said “we can turn back” and the Capt immediately responded “let’s just go”. The FO replied “okay”. After the fifth GPWS alert, the Capt indicated “and this one is showing one fourteen” and then queried? “we can turn back?”. About 2 seconds later, the FO called out “okay speed is one hundred” and the Capt responded “but this one has nothing” About 1 second later and about the time of the sixth GPW alert, JKIA control tower radioed “five yankee charlie echo tango contact radar one two three decimal three. Good morning.” After the seventh GPWS alert the recording ended about 13 seconds later. During this time, the controller called the aircraft again. The Capt expressed “tell him [pause] tell him we have no power”. The last CVR data indicates the FO radioed, “ah tower charlie echo” and the transmission abruptly ended along with simultaneous sounds of distress. According to FDR data, about 15 seconds after the airplane transitioned from ground to air mode the recorded altitude peaked about 5060 feet and accompanied by a maximum airspeed of 100 knots. Along with a variation of airspeed between 90 knots and 100 knots for the remainder of the recording, during the following 20 seconds the altitude decreased to about 5000 feet and then increased to 5050 feet over the next 10 seconds where it remained until the recording ended at 1.14.27. Witness Accounts (Air Traffic Controller Civilians). The aircraft crashed during the hours of darkness at geographical coordinates of 01° 17’16”S, 36° 57’5”E.

The aircraft departed Villavicencio on a cargo flight to Florencia, carrying three passengers, two pilots and a load consisting of 2,540 kg of various goods. While cruising under VFR mode at an altitude of 6,500 feet, weather conditions worsened and the crew attempted to modify his route when the aircraft impacted ground and crashed in a wooded and mountainous area located some 45 km north of San Vincente del Caguán, near Uribe. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all five occupants were killed.

The aircraft was scheduled to operate three commercial air transport (cargo) sectors: from Athens to Bergamo, then to Paris Charles de Gaulle, and finally East Midlands. The aircraft’s flap load relief system was inoperative, which meant that the maximum flap position to be used in flight was 30, rather than 40º. This defect had been deferred in the aircraft’s technical log and it had no effect on the landing of the aircraft. Otherwise, the aircraft was fully serviceable. The co-pilot completed the pre-flight external inspection of the aircraft in good light, and found nothing amiss. The departure from Athens was uneventful, but a combination of factors affecting Bergamo (including poor weather, absence of precision approach aids, and work in progress affecting the available landing distance) led the crew to decide to route directly to Paris, where a normal landing was carried out. The aircraft departed Paris for East Midlands at 0040 hrs, loaded with 10 tonnes of freight, 8 tonnes of fuel (the minimum required was 5.6 tonnes), and with the co-pilot as Pilot Flying. Once established in the cruise, the flight crew obtained the latest ATIS information from East Midlands, which stated that Runway 27 was in use, although there was a slight tailwind, and Low Visibility Procedures (LVPs) were in force. They planned to exchange control at about FL100 in the descent, for the commander to carry out a Category III autoland. However, as they neared their destination, the weather improved, LVPs were cancelled, and the flight crew re-briefed for an autopilot approach, followed by a manual landing, to be carried out by the co-pilot. The landing was to be with Flap 30, Autobrake 2, and idle reverse thrust. The final ATIS transmission which the flight crew noted before landing stated that the wind was 130/05 kt, visibility was 3,000 metres in mist, and the cloud was broken at 600 ft aal. The commander of EI-STD established radio contact with the tower controller, and the aircraft was cleared to land; the surface wind was transmitted as 090/05 kt. The touchdown was unremarkable, and the autobrake functioned normally, while the co-pilot applied idle reverse thrust on the engines. As the aircraft’s speed reduced through approximately 60 kt, the co-pilot handed control to the commander, who then made a brake pedal application to disengage the autobrake system. However, the system remained engaged, so he made a second, more positive, brake application. The aircraft “shuddered” and rolled slightly left-wing-low as the lower part of the left main landing gear detached. The commander used the steering tiller to try to keep the aircraft tracking straight along the runway centreline, but it came to a halt slightly off the centreline, resting on its right main landing gear, the remains of the left main landing gear leg, and the left engine lower cowl. The co-pilot saw some smoke drift past the aircraft as it came to a halt. The co-pilot made a transmission to the tower controller, reporting that the aircraft was in difficulties, after which the co-pilot of another aircraft (which was taxiing from its parking position along the parallel taxiway) made a transmission referring to smoke from the 737’s landing gear. The commander of EI-STD had reached the conclusion that one of the main landing gear legs had failed, but as a result of the other pilot’s transmission, he was also concerned that the aircraft might be on fire. The commander immediately moved both engine start levers to the cut-off positions, shutting down the engines. Three RFFS vehicles had by now arrived at the adjacent taxiway intersection, and their presence there prompted the commander to consider that the aircraft was not on fire (he believed that if it were, the vehicles would have adopted positions closer by and begun to apply fire-fighting media). The RFFS vehicles then moved closer to the aircraft and fire-fighters placed a ladder against door L1, which the co-pilot had opened. Having spoken to fire-fighters while standing in the entrance vestibule, the commander returned to the flight deck and switched off the battery. The flight crew were assisted from the aircraft and fire-fighters applied foam around the landing gear and engine to make the area safe. The commander had taken the Notoc2 with him from the aircraft, and informed fire-fighters of the dangerous goods on board the aircraft.

The aircraft departed Nairobi-Wilson Airport on a cargo flight to Guriceel, carrying two pilots and a load of six tons of khat. After landing, the crew encountered difficulties to stop the airplane within the remaining distance. The aircraft overran and came to rest with its left wing partially torn off. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful flight from Brisbane, the crew completed the approach and landing at Honiara-Henderson Airport. After touchdown on runway 24, the right main gear collapsed and punctured the right wing. The aircraft veered slightly to the right and came to a halt on the runway. All three occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 17th January, 2014, the day before the accident, the pilot departed from his company base, Ogle International Airport (SYGO) with another aircraft, a Cessna 208B, Registration – 8R-GHT. He was tasked to do two days of shuttling; the first day between Olive Creek and Ekereku Bottom Airstrips, and the second day between Olive Creek and Imbaimadai Airstrips. The pilot was accompanied by a third crew/loader, whose duty was to ensure that the aircraft was properly loaded for each trip, and an aircraft engineer who was assigned to carry out minor maintenance duties and refuel the aircraft as required for the duration of the shuttle operations. It was reported that on the first day, during a landing at Ekereku Bottom, the aircraft encountered severe wind conditions that resulted in a hard landing. The pilot was very concerned about the hard landing and expressed this to several individuals. He was concerned enough to log the hard landing in the Aircraft Technical Log. After the hard landing the aircraft was visually inspected by the engineer who declared the aircraft fit for flight. However while taxying prior to takeoff the aircraft suffered a right brake seizure. The engineer freed and bled the brake line. Tests were done on the brakes and the aircraft was flown to Olive Creek. The hard landing and the brake failure were reported to base and an instruction was passed that this aircraft should be brought back to Ogle by another pilot. Another Cessna 208B aircraft, 8R-GHS, the accident aircraft, was left with the pilot for him to complete his shuttle schedule the next day. On the afternoon of the first day, the pilot flew this aircraft, 8R-GHS to Kamarang Airstrip, where he overnighted. On the second day, 18th January, 2014, he departed Kamarang at 10:30hrs UTC for Olive Creek with the engineer and the loader. The engineer was left at Olive Creek. The pilot, with the loader, did one shuttle from Olive Creek to Imbaimadai. He returned to Olive Creek where the aircraft was refueled and then did three shuttles between Olive Creek and Imbaimadai. After these three shuttles the aircraft was again refueled. He completed one shuttle, Olive Creek/Imbaimadai/Olive Creek and had just taken off on the second in this series of shuttles when the accident occurred during midmorning. Both the pilot and the third crew were killed in the crash.

The aircraft departed Managua on a cargo flight to Saltillo with an intermediate stop in Tapachula, carrying two passengers and two pilots on behalf of DHL. During a night approach to Saltillo Airport, the crew was cleared to land on runway 17. One minute later, he initiated a go-around and decided to divert to Monterrey Airport which was the alternate. Due to a poor flight preparation, the crew was unaware that Monterrey Airport was closed to traffic that night. So few minutes later, the crew returned to Saltillo and was again cleared to land on runway 17. At that time, weather conditions were marginal with a limited visibility due to fog. Following an ILS CAT I approach, the pilot-in-command descended below the MDA and continued the approach despite he did not establish any visual contact with the runway and its equipment. The aircraft landed hard to the right of the runway and on the last third of the runway. After landing, the aircraft rolled for few dozen metres, lost its nose gear and came to rest against an embankment. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.