Crash of a BAe ATP-F in Wamena

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2015 at 1515 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
PK-DGB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Jayapura – Wamena
MSN:
2029
YOM:
1990
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3912
Captain / Total hours on type:
833.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
415
Copilot / Total hours on type:
45
Aircraft flight hours:
200845
Aircraft flight cycles:
27921
Circumstances:
On 4 March 2015 a BAe-ATP registration PK-DGB operated by PT. Deraya Air as scheduled cargo flight from Sentani to Wamena Airport. On board of this flight was two pilots while the Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as pilot flying and First Officer (FO) acted as pilot monitoring. The aircraft departed Sentani at 0524 UTC to Wamena airport. The pilot contacted Wamena Tower controller while position on Jiwika way point at altitude 10,000 feet. Wamena Tower controller instructed to use runway 33 and to proceed to left runway 33. At 0602 UTC the pilot requested to proceed to Pyramid waypoint and to descend to 8,000 feet and made holding due to weather. At 0613, a C-130 pilot that was on approach reported making go around runway 33 and ATC instructed to C-130 pilot to proceed to Pyramid waypoint and hold. At 0619 UTC, Wamena Tower controller informed that the weather reported continuous heavy rain, visibility was reported 2 up to 3 km and wind was from 060° with velocity of 6 knots. The PK-DGB aircraft left Pyramid waypoint for approach runway 33. The aircraft proceed to left downwind and descent to 6,500 feet. During turning base leg, the pilot observed runway insight and continued the approach. At 0620 UTC, the aircraft touched down, thereafter veered off to the right of the runway and skid. The aircraft re-entered the runway at approximately 400 meters from beginning runway 33 and stopped near taxiway Delta at approximately 800 meters from beginning runway 33.

Crash of a Boeing 737-43Q in Accra

Date & Time: Jan 10, 2015 at 1105 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ET-AQV
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lomé – Accra
MSN:
28493/2838
YOM:
1996
Flight number:
KP4030
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful cargo flight from Lomé, the crew initiated the approach to Accra-Kotoka Airport. The visibility was reduced due to foggy conditions. After touchdown on runway 03, the aircraft became uncontrollable and veered off runway to the right. While contacting soft ground, it lost its undercarriage and its right engine before coming to rest in a grassy area. All three crew crew members escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was destroyed.

Crash of a Fokker 50 in Nairobi

Date & Time: Jan 4, 2015 at 1102 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5Y-SIB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Wajir – Nairobi
MSN:
20167
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
17000
Captain / Total hours on type:
1200.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4143
Copilot / Total hours on type:
200
Circumstances:
On 4 January 2015, about 0840 local time, a Fokker 27-50 a cargo flight, registration 5Y-SIB, operated by Skyward Express Ltd, experienced a gear-up landing at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK). The flight had diverted to HKJK due to a mechanical malfunction of the landing gear. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and the airplane was on an IFR flight plan. None of the ten persons on board were injured. The airplane was substantially damaged and there was no fire. The flight originated at Wajir (HKWJ) and the original destination was Nairobi-Wilson Airport (HKNW). During the departure from HKWJ, the flight sustained a bird-strike. After taking steps to confirm any aircraft system malfunction the aircraft systems were still operable and the flight crew elected to continue the flight. The flight en route was without any incident. While in the traffic pattern at Wilson, the landing gear was activated to extend and it resulted in an unsafe indication for the left main gear. During the period of about an hour while circling overhead the airport, the flight crew attempted to resolve the anomaly but they were unsuccessful. It prompted the crew to declare an emergency after they had confirmed that the left main landing gear was locked up in the air position and was not lowering. After declaring an emergency, the crew carried out an extensive consultation with the air traffic services and the company ground personnel and elected to divert the flight to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK). The crew made a successful gear-up landing at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK) runway 06 with no injury to those onboard the flight however the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The aircraft got disabled after landing and blocked both runways for more than four hours as the airport authorities struggled to remove it to pave way for other operations. According to the report obtained from post-accident interview with the flight crew at 0540 the aircraft took-off at Wajir (HKWJ) on runway 15 and immediately after take-off on passing 200ft at a speed of Vref +10 Knots the crew noticed a flock of birds and tried to evade them. While increasing the aircraft rate of climb they felt like a thud (hitting something). After clearing the flock they inspected the instruments and confirmed all aircraft systems were functioning satisfactorily. They then proceeded with their flight as intended. According to the air traffic control (ATC) transcript obtained from Wilson control tower upon entering Wilson aerodrome traffic circuit at 0641:41 the crew requested ATC to join downwind runway 07 and was immediately cleared. After five minutes (0646:50) the crew requested ATC to extend downwind and at 0648:03 the crew confirms to the ATC that they are checking the undercarriage. At 0654:08 the crew confirms to the ATC that they have an emergency on the left main landing gear and they have checked it is locked up in the air position. The crew requested for more time to trouble-shoot the problem and requested ATC to brief their company about the problem. At 0731:07 the crew confirmed to HKNW air traffic service unit that they are ready to do gear-up landing and they would prefer HKJK instead of HKNW. They are then cleared for HKJK to join left base runway 06. 30 seconds later the crew changes their intention to go to HKJK and confirms to HKNW ATC that they would do a gear-up landing at HKNW and requests for more time. At 0749:31 the crew consults with their company through HKNW ATC and agrees to carry out the gear-up landing at HKJK and the flight was cleared to proceed to HKJK. At 0802 the crew made a successful gear-up landing on runway 06 at HKJK.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was the failure of the left Main Landing Gear, MLG to extend during landing due to a bird strike which disabled proper functioning of the mechanical system that controls the opening and closing the door to the left MLG.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26B in Magadan

Date & Time: Jan 3, 2015 at 1119 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-26082
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky – Magadan – Mirny – Nizhnevartovsk
MSN:
117 05
YOM:
1981
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3783
Captain / Total hours on type:
2240.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
11986
Copilot / Total hours on type:
94
Aircraft flight hours:
13698
Aircraft flight cycles:
6810
Circumstances:
During the take off run, at a speed of 250 km/h, the crew initiated the rotation when the aircraft failed to lift off. The captain decided to abandon the take off and started an emergency braking. The aircraft veered off runway to the right, went through a snow covered terrain, lost its nose and right main gear before coming to rest 490 meters further, with the right wing bent. The aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair while all eight occupants were unhurt.
Probable cause:
The accident occurred as result of the aircraft departing the side of the runway after the commander rejected takeoff after having been unable to use the elevator because of the yoke's locked position. The roll beyond the edge of the runway was likely caused by the flight engineer while attempting to operate the handle to release the flight controls lock while the aircraft was already accelerating for takeoff. The accident was thus caused by this combination of factors:
- violation of requirements by FCOM to ascertain the flight controls were free and usable before engine start,
- failure by the crew to execute the checklists to check elevator, rudder and ailerons were free to move before takeoff,
- flight crew receives insufficient practice in real flight to maintain skills acquired during simulator training in the management of the aircraft and its systems resulting in negative impact during emergency situations.
Final Report:

Crash of a Britten Norman BN-2A-6 Islander near Mahdia: 2

Date & Time: Dec 28, 2014 at 1145 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
8R-GHE
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mahdia – Karisparu
MSN:
269
YOM:
1971
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
8000
Aircraft flight hours:
25818
Circumstances:
The crew (a pilot and a load master) was performing a regular cargo service to Karisparu and departed Mahdia Airport at 1142LT. The duration of the flight should be less than 20 minutes as the aircraft was scheduled to arrive at Karisparu Airfield at 1200LT. Less than three minutes after departure, the radio contact was lost with the pilot. SAR operations were initiated but after four days, no trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found. The Director General of the Guyana Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA), Zulfikar Mohamed, said that the crucial 72-hour window period since the aircraft vanished in the thick jungle in Region Eight expired on Tuesday December 30. On January 4, 2015, all SAR operations were suspended as no trace of the aircraft was found.
Probable cause:
Due to lack of evidences, the cause of the accident could not be determined.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-26 near Uvira: 6 killed

Date & Time: Dec 28, 2014 at 0300 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
4L-AFS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Entebbe – Bujumbura – Pointe-Noire
MSN:
86 08
YOM:
1979
Flight number:
AGS902
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
6
Circumstances:
The aircraft was performing a cargo flight from Entebbe to Pointe-Noire with an intermediate stop in Bujumbura, Burundi, to refuel. After takeoff, while proceeding to the west by night, the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Kafinda (3,100 metres high), about 25 km south of Uvira. The wreckage was found on hilly and wooded terrain. All six occupants were killed.

Crash of a an Antonov AN-26B in Obo

Date & Time: Dec 12, 2014 at 1500 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UP-AN608
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Entebbe – Obo
MSN:
135 04
YOM:
1984
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
After touchdown at Obo Airfield, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance, overran and came to rest in a wooded area. All seven occupants escaped uninjured, the cargo equipment was recovered and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Entebbe to Obo, with a possible intermediate stop in Sudan, carrying an aircraft engine, some fuel drums (Jet A-1) and other logistics intended to the UPDF military offensive, code-named 'Operation Lightning Thunder' that has been hunting Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and its rebel leader Joseph Kony. About 100 members of the US special forces were based at the Obo Airstrip at the time of the accident. The runway 04/22 is about 2,050 feet long (625 meters).

Crash of a Rockwell Aero Commander 500B in Chicago: 1 killed

Date & Time: Nov 18, 2014 at 0245 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N30MB
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Chicago - Columbus
MSN:
500-1453-160
YOM:
1964
Flight number:
CTL62
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1339
Captain / Total hours on type:
34.00
Aircraft flight hours:
26280
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand cargo charter flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot informed the tower controller that he wanted to "come back and land" because he was "having trouble with the left engine." The pilot chose to fly a left traffic pattern and return for landing. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The accident site was located about 0.50 mile southeast of the runway's displaced threshold. GPS data revealed that, after takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn to a southeasterly course and reached a maximum GPS altitude of 959 ft (about 342 ft above ground level [agl]). The airplane then entered another left turn that appeared to continue until the final data point. The altitude associated with the final data point was 890 ft (about 273 ft agl). The final GPS data point was located about 135 ft northeast of the accident site. Based on GPS data and the prevailing surface winds, the airspeed was about 45 knots during the turn. According to the airplane flight manual, the stall speed in level flight with the wing flaps extended was 59 knots. Postaccident examination and testing of the airframe, engines, and related components did not reveal any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the nature of any issue related to the left engine could not be determined. Based on the evidence, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed while turning the airplane back toward the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain airspeed while attempting to return to the airport after a reported engine problem, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.
Final Report:

Crash of a Short 360-200 off Sint Maarten: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 29, 2014 at 1840 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N380MQ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sint Maarten - San Juan
MSN:
3702
YOM:
1986
Flight number:
SKZ7101
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5318
Captain / Total hours on type:
361.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1040
Copilot / Total hours on type:
510
Aircraft flight hours:
25061
Aircraft flight cycles:
32824
Circumstances:
On October 29, 2014, at about 1840 Atlantic Standard Time, a Shorts SD3-60, United States registered N380MQ was destroyed when it crashed into the sea shortly after takeoff from Runway 28 at Princess Juliana International Airport, Sint Maarten, Dutch Antilles, Kingdom of the Netherlands. The two crewmembers on board sustained fatal injuries. The aircraft was operated by SkyWay Enterprises Inc. on a scheduled FedEx contract cargo flight to Luis Munoz Marin International Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico. At 1839 local, Juliana Tower cleared the aircraft for takeoff Runway 28 - maintain heading 230 until passing 4000 feet. At 1840 local, Tower observed the aircraft descending visually and the radar target and data block disappeared. There were no distress calls. Night conditions and rain prevailed at the time of the accident. Coast Guard search crews discovered aircraft debris close to the shoreline about 1 ½ hours later. The Sint Maarten Civil Aviation Authority initiated an investigation in accordance with ICAO Annex 13. Local investigation authority personnel were joined by Accredited Representatives and advisors from the following states: the USA (NTSB/FAA), United Kingdom (AAIB and Shorts Brothers PLC), and Canada (TSB, TC, PWC). Organization of the investigation included the following groups: Operations, Accident Site and Wreckage, Powerplants, Aircraft Maintenance, Air Traffic Services, Meteorology, and GPS Study. The operator made available personnel for interviews but deferred to participate in the groups. Flight recorders were not installed nor required on this cargo configured aircraft. The original FDR and CVR were removed following conversion to cargo only operations. A handheld GPS recovered from submerged wreckage was successfully downloaded. Data revealed the aircraft past the departure runway threshold on takeoff and attained a maximum GPS recorded altitude of 433 feet at 119 knots groundspeed at 18:39:30. The two remaining data points were over the sea and recorded decreasing altitude and increasing airspeed. The wreckage was recovered from the sea and examined by technical experts. Assessment of the evidence concluded there were no airframe or engine malfunctions that would have affected the airworthiness of the aircraft. The experts concluded that the aircraft struck the sea while under normal engine operation. Operations and human performance investigators evaluated the evidence and analyzed extensive interviews. The investigation concluded that the aircraft departed from the expected flight path in an unusual attitude. The pilot flying most likely experienced a somatographic illusion as a result of a stressful takeoff and acceleration from flap retraction. The pilot’s reaction to pitch down while initiating a required heading change led to an extreme unusual attitude. Circumstances indicate the pilot monitoring did not perceive/respond/intervene to correct the flight path and recover from the unusual attitude. The aircraft exceeded the normal maneuvering parameters, the crew experienced a loss of control, and lacking adequate altitude for recovery, the aircraft crashed into the sea.
Probable cause:
The investigation believes the PF experienced a loss of control while initiating a turn to the required departure heading after take-off. Flap retraction and its associated acceleration combined to set in motion a somatogravic illusion for the PF. The PF’s reaction to pitch down while initiating a turn most likely led to an extreme unusual attitude and the subsequent crash. PM awareness to the imminent loss of control and any attempt to intervene could not be determined. Evidence show that Crew resource management (CRM) performance was insufficient to avoid the crash. Contributing factors to the loss of control were environmental conditions including departure from an unfamiliar runway with loss of visual references (black hole), night and rain with gusting winds.
Final Report:

Crash of a Let L-410UVP in Shabunda

Date & Time: Oct 25, 2014 at 1416 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
9Q-COT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Bukavu – Shabunda
MSN:
83 10 23
YOM:
1983
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14000
Captain / Total hours on type:
7325.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3300
Aircraft flight hours:
7187
Aircraft flight cycles:
8265
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Bukavu-Kavumu Airport at 1341LT on a 40-minute cargo flight to Shabunda, carrying two pilots and a load of 1,500 kilos of various goods. On final approach to Shabunda Airport, at a height of 300 feet, the right engine lost power. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft stalled and crashed in palm trees located 3,7 km short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and both pilots were seriously injured.
Probable cause:
On final approach, the right engine lost power, causing the aircraft to stall because the speed dropped. Investigations were unable to determine the exact cause of the loss of power because the aircraft was totally destroyed. Nevertheless, the crew was unable to expect a stall recovery because the stall occurred at an insufficient height.
Final Report: