United States of America

The pilot reported he was on a missed approach and was returning to Charleston "heading 360°..." the aircraft crashed about 1/4 mi south and 100 feet short of the departure end of runway 27. The wreckage scatter pattern was oriented on a heading of 155°. Missed approach procedures specify a climbing right turn via a 325° heading. The left engine prop drive gear shaft had evidence of both bending and torsional failure loads. There was no evidence of machining or rotational smearing. Two of the three propeller blade tips were bent aft about the blade face. The left turbocharger had a tension failure of the turbine wheel shaft. No smear marks were noted on the fracture face. Single turbine blade impact marks were noted on the housing. The n°1 tach needle indicated 900 rpm and the n°2 tach needle indicated 1,900 rpm. All four occupants were killed.

At 1236 the flight departed Ketchikan seaplane base with a special VFR clearance and at 1240 reported clear of the control zone. The next and last transmission by the pilot was made to the company via FM radio at about 1340. This report was issued in the vicinity of Happy Harbor (passing over Kasaan Island) and was the approximate mid-point of the flight to Craig. Witnesses reported seeing the aircraft flying southwest over Twelvemile arm toward Hollis. Upon reaching Hollis the flight would be expected to turn west and cross inland over Prince of Wales Island until reaching the west shoreline and thence directly to Craig. There was a fog bank about 2 miles prior to Hollis in Twelvemile arm and the aircraft was observed to reverse course as the weather was approached and proceed north. The aircraft was lost from sight due to trees and rapidly upsloping terrain. An increase in engine sound was heard prior to the crash. Witnesses described the clouds as essentially broken with bases at about 1,000 feet over the water and obstructing the tops of some of the higher islands. All eight occupants were killed in the crash.

Two minutes after takeoff the pilot reported a loss of the left engine. He was immediately cleared for a landing at Eglin AFB. While maneuvering for a landing the left engine and wing separated from the aircraft. The engine was separated from the wing and showed evidence of in flight fire. The most intense heat was in the engine accessory section in the area between the bendix fuel servo and the inboard turbocharger. There was extensive fire damage to the oil and fuel lines on the right side of the accessory section, the oil dipstick showed no oil and there was no evidence to show that the oil had spilled in the impact crater. About 25 min prior to takeoff the pilot telephoned the maintenance facility who had accomplished recent major repairs on the aircraft and related he was experiencing difficulty with the left throttle. The pilot was advised to have a mechanic check it out. All three occupants were killed.

At 1906 the flight was cleared to descend and maintain 7,500 feet, turn right to a heading 040 for an ASR approach to Pueblo Memorial Airport, and that the MDA is 5,200 feet. The flight read back "left to one forty five two zero zero." Approach control advised the flight that the heading was 040 and the flight acknowledged. There were no further communications with the flight. The aircraft was travelling in excess of an estimated 200 mph when it struck tundra in level flight on a heading of about 040. The copilot's autopsy revealed that the trachae, bronchi, and lungs contained aspirated gastric contents, including skeletal muscle fibers. Another company pilot reported that the copilot had vomited during a flight on November 14, 1982.

While rolling on a taxiway, the airplane went out of control and collided with a hangar. There were no injuries but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Following an uneventful training mission out from Castle AFB, the crew was returning to his base. After landing, the crew started the braking procedure when a fire erupted in the nose gear section. The aircraft was stopped and all six crew members escaped with no injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

The pilot reported that on the previous flight, the center fuel tank gauge was malfunctioning and indicated 800 lbs even when it was full with 1400 lbs. After landing at Charlotte, NC, it was still indicating 800 lbs. Before takeoff, the center tank was refilled. While en route about 40 miles west of Atlanta, GA, the pilot noted that the fuel gauge indicated 500 lbs and was dropping rapidly. A few minutes later, both engines flamed out. Vectors were obtained to fly to the nearest airport. During the descent, the engines were restarted. The pilot intercepted the ILS and remained high on the glide slope. The weather at the airport was reported as 100 feet overcast, visibility 1/4 mile with fog and rain. The aircraft broke out of the clouds approximately 2/3 of the way down the runway, then continued off the end of the runway and went thru ILS antenna array. An exam revealed the center fuel cap was missing, it was found in the grass near the parking ramp at Charlotte. The fuel cap was found to be worn and would not lock securely.

The pilot requested an instrument approach to the airport and advised approach control (a/c) that he did not have an approach plate for the airport. A/c cleared the aircraft for an NDB approach to runway 24 and read the approach information to the pilot. When the pilot reported procedure turn inbound a/c advised the pilot he was approx 4 miles south of the final approach course and gave him a new heading to correct back to the airport. Radar contact was then lost over the airport but reappeared approx 1/2 mile west of the airport and appeared to be making a turn back to the airport. The wreckage was found about 4 miles west of the airport. Both occupants were killed.

Aero Commander 560E, N3827C (27C) was returning from Blairstown where it had been flown for minor maintenance. The pilot was on an IFR flight plan, cleared by New York tracon to proceed at 2,000 feet msl on a radar vector of 170° for an ILS approach to the Teterboro Airport. The aircraft was equipped with an altitude encoding transponder that was being used. The pilot was advised of numerous targets at his 12 o'clock position. At approximately the same time, Cessna 182Q, N96402 (402), was on a flight from the Kupper Airport to Ramapo Airport. A direct route between these airports would have intersected the nw edge of the New York TCA where positive control began between 1,800 and 7,000 feet msl. The pilot was proceeding VFR with no flight plan and was not in radio communication with any ATC facility. 402 was equipped with a transponder that was operating, but had no altitude encoding capability. As the aircraft converged, 402 was on a northeasterly heading. The planes collided about 1 mile inside the TCA. Then impacted the ground approximately 1,500 feet apart. A map was found in 402 with a line drawn between the airports and intersecting the TCA. All three occupants in both aircraft were killed.

On November 17, 1982, the pilot called Vichy Flight Service Station (FSS) and filed a request for an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance for a flight from Mountain View Airport, Mountain View, Missouri, to Lambert - St. Louis International Airport, St. Louis, Missouri, for the following day. The pilot requested the IFR clearance for a 0930 departure. The flight was to be operated under 14 CFR Part 91, and the purpose of the flight was to transport the pilot, who was the president of the company which owned N2CA, and two passengers to St. Louis. Neither passenger was a pilot. Earlier on November 17, the pilot and the company's chief pilot had flown N2CA to Mountain View Airport from St. Louis. The chief pilot said that there were no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane, but that he believed that some of the avionics equipment was slow to warm up and become operationally usable. The Global Navigation System (GNS) 1 / required 4-5 minutes to become operationally usable from the time it was turned on. According to the chief pilot, the attitude director indicator (ADI) on the pilot's side also required more time to become operationally usable than some of the other avionic equipment. He stated that there had been occasions when "we've had to sit for 1- 1 1/2 minutes waiting for the artificial horizon to leave its caged position and go to the normal flight position." He also stated that in the last 10 flying hours, the pilot's heading indicator required more time "than normal to come on line." He said that the pilot had mentioned to him on the previous day that it was taking an increasingly longer time for the flag to disappear before the heading indicator was ready for use in flight. According to the chief pilot, the pilot stated that he (the pilot) occasionally would use the copilot's heading indicator during takeoff until the heading information on the pilot's side was operationally usable. After the flight to Mountain View Airport on November 17, the airplane was refueled with all tanks filled to capacity. A jet-A fuel supply recently had been installed at the airport; the airplane therefore could be "topped off" at Mountain View Airport instead of having to make an extra refueling stop. As a result, the airplane was about 3,400 lbs heavier for flight on the 18th than it had been in past takeoffs from Mountain View Airport. About 0730 2/ c.s.t., November 18, the pilot called a fixed-base operator at Lambert - St. Louis International Airport and inquired about the weather. The operator was neither a pilot nor a weather observer. He told the pilot that the visibility was at least 1 1/2 miles, and the ceiling was "fairly low." The operator called the Lambert - St. Louis Air Traffic Control (ATC) Tower and inquired about ATC delays. He then called the pilot back and relayed information about the ATC situation. There was no record of any other weather briefing. At 0909, the pilot called the Vichy FSS for the IFR clearance. The pilot told the FSS specialist that he would need 15 minutes to get to the airport. He was given the clearance which was valid until 0930. The telephone conversation ended at 0914. The call was placed from the pilot's home. Meanwhile, the chief pilot had conducted a preflight inspection of N2CA, and had taken the airplane out of the hangar. The pilot left his home shortly after 0915 and arrived at the airport between 0920 and 0925. The pilot then loaded the baggage and boarded the two passengers. The chief pilot said that both engines had been started by the time he had driven the tug back to the hangar and started to close the hangar door. The airplane remained on the ramp for I5 to 30 seconds while a person handed some company material to the pilot through the cockpit window. The pilot was in the left cockpit seat, and a male passenger was in the right cockpit seat. The airplane was immediately taxied directly to runway 28, a distance of about 225 feet. The chief pilot said that the airplane was stopped on the runway for 30 to 60 seconds before the takeoff roll started. He said it was exactly 0930 by his watch when the takeoff roll started. He said that, assuming that the generators were turned on as soon as the second engine was started, about 2 minutes elapsed from the time they were turned on to the time the takeoff roll was started. The chief pilot and another pilot at the airport described the takeoff as normal, although the airplane required about three-quarters of the runway before liftoff. The airplane disappeared from sight when it was 20 feet to 50 feet above the runway. The witnesses described the weather as low ceilings, reduced visibility because of fog, but no rain. The runway was damp from 8 previous rainfall. No significant winds were noted. There were no witnesses to the accident. One person, located one-half mile northeast of the accident site, heard a "jet'' fly over his house in a southwesterly direction and shortly afterward heard an explosion. A second person, located one-fifth mile north of the accident site, heard the airplane fly over his house on a southerly heading. He heard a loud explosion and immediately thereafter saw a fire in the woods. He and his sons ran toward the explosion. One son returned to call the sheriff; the call was placed through the operator and was logged at the sheriff's office at 0934. A call was received at a nearby State Police office at 0936. The airplane crashed in a woods about 1.75 miles due north of Mountain View Airport on a heading of 120'in an attitude that was at least 30' nose down and a left bank of 90'. The airplane wreckage was spread over a 400-square-foot area. All three occupants died in the accident.