United States of America

After dropping company executives off at Medford, the pilot was to return to Santa Rosa empty. Witnesses along the 25 nm valley which ends at the accident site reported that the aircraft buzzed their locations at agl altitudes variously described as '10 feet' and 'so low you could count the rivets.' US forest services personnel near the accident site reported that the aircraft flew over their position 'just above the trees' following the slope of the mountain upward. The accident site is on a popular hiking trail the pilot's girlfriend reportedly said she would like to visit. On site examination revealed that the aircraft first contacted the upper 5 feet of the treetops in a climb attitude. No preimpact failures of the acft were identified. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot canceled IFR 8 miles from the airport to continue on a visual approach and landing. Witnesses stated a strong thunderstorm had just passed over the airport. Wind info issued to the pilot by unicom were west at 20 knots. Witnesses observed the aircraft approach runway 31 and execute a go-around before touchdown. The aircraft circled left to a runway 06 (almost direct downwind) approach. Touchdown occurred about 2/3 down the 3,100 feet long runway. The engines were heard to spool up to high power (no thrust reversers) but the aircraft did not become airborne. It overran the runway into rough terrain and caught fire. Investigation showed the landing gear was down, flaps were at approach setting and speed brakes were fully deployed. Both pilots were killed.

The purpose of the flight for both aircraft was an aerial photo mission. N5113S was used as the camera platform. The pilots of N5113S and N4346L discussed prior to takeoff the procedures of the flight. Both aircraft departed and flew a course to position the airplanes on a southerly heading. N5113S was to the east and slightly above and ahead of N4346L. The photographer shot one roll of film and reloaded. He was ready to begin shooting when N4346L began to close in on N5113S. The pilot of N5113S felt two 'bumps' as N4346L closed, and did not see the aircraft pass under. The pilot of N5113S maneuvered his aircraft to determine controllability and saw N4346L spiralling to the ground. Examination of N4346L revealed the vertical stab and rudder had separated in-flight. There were numerous paint smears found on the right side on N5113S. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The pilot was issued runway 05, 7,500 feet, for IFR departure with favoring 4 knots quartering headwind. Pilot requested runway 14, 4,498 feet, for takeoff with a 4 knots quartering tailwind. Ground witness and control tower observed aircraft use nearly all of the runway on takeoff roll. After an abrupt rotation, the controller observed aircraft yaw to left and make a low altitude left turn. Seconds later the aircraft rapidly descended into trees and caught fire. The left propeller was found in the feathered position and the left engine was consumed by a ground fire. There was no evidence of any internal engine failure. The engine time smoh was 43 hours. Witness heard the aircraft takeoff with a series of loud backfires 25 days prior to the accident. Injector nozzles on the right engine were learned to correct the problem after 6 hours of operation one week later. The pilots log failed to show any recent training in single engine procedures. Both occupants were killed.

Witnesses reported a normal takeoff and climb was made to an altitude of approximately 400 feet agl at which time engine power ceased/decreased. The right wing then dropped, the nose and left wing rose and the aircraft entered a near vertical descent to ground impact. Post accident examination of the engines and turbochargers failed to disclose any pre-impact failures. Examination of the prop governors disclosed an rpm setting below takeoff or climb power; however, exact rpm setting could not be determined. The pilot had recently purchased this aircraft and most of his multi-engine experience was in Beech Barons. The throttle quadrant location of the throttle and prop controls on the Baron are in the reverse position of those on the Cessna 421. The pilot also had not been check out in the Cessna 421. All four occupants were killed.

N6857E was transporting executives from Holland, MI, to Muskegon. The pilot was executing an ASR approach to runway 06. The MDA is 537 feet agl. Copilot called out 1,200 feet then below 1,000 feet, pilot continued approach. Aircraft struck trees two miles from runway at 15 feet agl. The approach was conducted in heavy fog conditions. The pilot had descended below approach minimums on several occasions in the past. A pilot and two passengers were killed while three other occupants were seriously injured.

N40443 was contracted by the Wyoming Department of Agriculture to spray grasshoppers. Investigation revealed the pilot held a private certificate with asmel ratings. His medical certificate was denied because he failed to provide information concerning high blood pressure and alcoholism. Copilot held a commercial certificate with asel rating. No evidence was found to indicate that either pilot had any operating experience in the Martin 404 aircraft. Former employees of operator stated that N40443 was not well maintained. The ADI system and interior lights were inoperative. Weight of aircraft at the time of accident was calculated to be 44,492 pounds. The max gross total weight for a 'dry' takeoff from a 4,500 foot runway was approximately 37,900 pounds. The flight manual performance charts indicate that a runway length of over 5,500 feet would be needed for an aircraft at 44,492 pounds. The aircraft collided with a dirt bank during takeoff. All three occupants were killed.

On June 18, 1986, at 0855 mountain standard time, a Grand Canyon Airlines DHC-6, N76GC (Twin Otter), call sign Canyon 6, took off from runway 21 of the Grand Canyon Airport. The flight, a scheduled air tour over Grand Canyon National Park, was to be about 50 minutes in duration. Shortly thereafter, at 0913, a Helitech Bell 2068 (Jet Ranger), NGTC, call sign Tech 2, began its approximate 30-minute, on-demand air tour of the Grand Canyon. It took off from its base at a heliport adjacent to State route 64 in Tusayan, Arizona, located about 5 miles south of the main entrance to the south rim of the National Park. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The two aircraft collided at an altitude of 6,500 feet msl in the area of the Tonto Plateau. There were 18 passengers and 2 flightcrew members on the DHC-6 and 4 passengers and 1 flightcrew member on the Bell 206B. All 25 passengers and crew members on both aircraft were killed as a result of the collision. Because of the lack of cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders in both aircraft, as well as the lack of radar data, no assessment of the flight path of either aircraft could be made. As a result, the reason for the failure of the pilots of each aircraft to “see and avoid” each other cannot be determined. Consequently, the issues highlighted in this report concern primarily the oversight of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on Grand Canyon-based scenic air tours or sightseeing flights and the actions of the National Park Service to influence these operations. Because of an exemption to 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135, local scenic air tours were conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. This investigation revealed that there was no FAA oversight on the routes and altitudes of Grand Canyon-based scenic air tour operators. This was contrary to the intent of Safety Recommendation A-84-52. Further, the National Park Service, through its authority under a 1975 law, was conducting a study to determine the effects of aircraft noise on the Grand Canyon and, at the same time, influencing the selection of air tour routes. The routes of the rotary-wing operators were ‘moved as a noise conservation measure to where they converged with those of Grand Canyon Airlines at the location of the accident. Other safety issues concern the lack of regulations to limit flight and duty times of pilots conducting scenic air tour flights, and the lack of a requirement for the pilots of such flights to use intercoms or public address systems when narrating during the flights. All 20 occupants of the Twin Otter were killed, among them 11 citizen from The Netherlands and two Swiss.

The pilot stalled the airplane while making a steep turn to avoid high voltage power lines. The airplane caught fire on impact and the air taxi pilot subsequently died of extensive thermal injuries. The pilot was flying in formation with another aircraft at low altitude. When the power lines were sighted the other aircraft successfully pulled up and avoided the wires. The accident pilot turned steeply and lost control of the aircraft before crashing.

The pilot departed Olathe, KS, en route to Jackson, WY. The pilot radioed the Denver EFAS and reported his position as 56 miles northwest of Casper, WY. There was no further radio communication with N114CM. The pilot's wife stated after the accident that the pilot had a habit of taking a 'cat nap' when he flew. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.