United States of America

Following an uneventful flight from Atlanta-Fulton County-Brown Field, Georgia, the crew was cleared to land on runway 23 at Morristown Municipal Airport, NJ. After touchdown, the airplane deviated to the right and veered off runway. While contacting soft ground, both wings (the entire wing structure) detached and the aircraft came to rest on its right side in a grassy area. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Norfolk-Chambers Field NAS on a local mission. En route, the airplane crashed in unknown circumstances in the Chincoteague Bay, off Wallops Island. The aircraft came to rest partially submerged in shallow waters. Two crew members were rescued while the pilot Lt Hyrum Hanlon was killed.

After its departure from Hyde County Airport, North Carolina, the single engine airplane followed an erratic track according to ATC. While cruising along the shore, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea about 30 km northeast of Beaufort-Michael J. Smith Field Airport, few km east of the Drum Inlet. The wreckage was found at a depth of about 55 feet. Two bodies and other remains were later found.

The airplane had recently undergone an annual inspection, and the pilot planned to fly the airplane back to his home base. After receiving clearance from air traffic control, the pilot proceeded to take off. The airplane accelerated and reached a peak groundspeed of 81 kts about 2,075 ft down the 4,097-ft runway. Once airborne, the airplane drifted slightly to the right and the pilot radioed an urgent need to return to the airport. The controller cleared the airplane to land and no further transmissions were received from the accident airplane. The airplane’s flight path showed that it slowed before turning back toward the left and the airplane’s speed continued to decrease throughout the remainder of the data. The final data point recorded the airplane at a groundspeed of 45 kts. The groundspeed would equate to 60 kts airspeed when considering the 15-kt headwind. The stall speed chart for the airplane listed the minimum stall speed for any configuration as 64 kts. Postaccident examinations of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. External and internal engine damage indicated that the engine was producing power at the time of impact, but the amount of power output could not be determined. Based on the available information, the pilot perceived an urgent need to return the airplane to the airport; however, due to the amount of damage from the impact and postimpact fire, the reason that the pilot was returning to the airport could not be determined. Stall speed information for the airplane, the recorded winds, and flight track data, indicated that the airplane encountered an aerodynamic stall before impacting the ground near the departure end of the runway. Since the airplane stalled and impacted the ground before reaching the perimeter of the airport, the pilot may not have had sufficient altitude to execute a forced landing to the empty field off the departure end of the runway.

Shortly after departure, the engine lost total power and the pilot was forced to ditch in open water; the occupants egressed and were subsequently rescued by a recreational vessel. Examination of the engine revealed a fracture hole near the n°2 cylinder, which was likely the result of the n°2 cylinder connecting rod fracturing in fatigue as a result of high heat and high stress associated with failure of the n°2 bearing. The fatigue fracture displayed multiple origins consistent with relatively high cyclic stress, which likely occurred as excessive clearances developed between the bearing and the crankshaft journal. The n°2 connecting rod bearing may have failed due to a material defect in the bearing itself or due to a disruption in the oil lubrication supply to the bearing/journal interface. Either situation can cause similar damage patterns to develop, including excessive heating and subsequent bearing failure.

On December 27, 2021, about 1914 Pacific standard time, a Gates Learjet Corporation 35A, N880Z, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near El Cajon, California. The 2 pilots, and 2 flight nurses were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 repositioning flight. Earlier in the day, the flight crew had flown from Lake Havasu City Airport (HII), Lake Havasu, Arizona, to John Wayne / Orange County Airport (SNA), Santa Ana, California, for a patient transfer. They departed SNA about 1856 to reposition to their home base at Gillespie Field (SEE), El Cajon, California. Review of preliminary communication recordings revealed that at 1908:23, the pilot contacted the SEE Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and reported to the controller they were on the GPS approach to runway 17. The controller issued the current wind and cleared the pilot to land on runway 17. At 1912:03, the pilot reported the airport in sight and requested to squawk VFR. The controller did not acknowledge the request to squawk VFR, however, he reissued the landing clearance for runway 17. At 1912:13, the pilot requested to land on runway 27. The controller asked the pilot if they wanted to cancel their IFR flight plan, to which the pilot replied, “yes sir.” The controller acknowledged that the IFR cancelation was received and instructed the pilot to overfly the field and enter left traffic for runway 27R and cleared them to land runway 27R. At 1912:30, the pilot requested that the runway lights for runway 27R be increased, however, the controller informed them that the lights were already at 100 percent. Preliminary Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that after departure from SNA, the flight made a left turn out over the waters of the Pacific Ocean and flew generally south – southeast along the coast and ascended to a cruise barometric altitude of about 11,000 ft sea level (MSL). After the flight passed Carlsbad, California, the airplane turned left and began to descend toward SEE. As shown in figure 1, ADS-B data showed that the airplane overflew SEE at a barometric altitude of about 775 ft MSL (407 ft above ground level) and entered a left downwind for runway 27R. While on the downwind leg, the airplane descended to a barometric altitude of 700 ft MSL, then ascended to a barometric altitude of 950 ft MSL while on the base leg. The last recorded ADS-B target was at 1914:09, at a barometric altitude of 875 ft MSL. Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane struck a set of power lines and subsequently impacted the yard of a residential home about 1.43 nautical miles east of the approach end of runway 27R. The airplane came to rest upright on a heading of about 118°, at an elevation of about 595 ft msl. The wreckage debris path was oriented on a heading of about 310° and was about 186 ft long and 90 ft wide. All major structural components of the airplane were located throughout the wreckage debris path. The wreckage was recovered to a secure location for further examination. At 1855, recorded weather data at SEE showed weather conditions were variable wind at 5 knots, visibility of 3 statute miles, mist, broken cloud layer at 2,000 ft, overcast cloud layer at 2,600 ft, temperature of 10° C, dew point temperature of 8° C, and an altimeter setting of 29.98 inches of mercury. No precipitation was indicated. At 1955, SEE reported a variable wind of 5 knots, visibility 3 statute miles, mist, broken cloud layer at 1,100 ft, overcast cloud layer at 2,600 ft, temperature of 10°C, dew point temperature of 8°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.96 inches of mercury. No precipitation was indicated.

The single engine airplane departed Houston-George Bush-Intercontinental Airport at 0910LT on a cargo service to Victoria. Twelve minutes later, while climbing to an altitude of 4,200 feet, the aircraft collided with a paraglider. Out of control, it entered a dive and crashed three minutes later in a field. The aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot, sole on board was killed, as well as the paraglider.

During an instrument approach at night in a twin-engine turboprop airplane, the pilot reported an engine failure, but did not specify which engine. About 9 seconds later, the airplane impacted terrain about ¼-mile short of the runway and a postcrash fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. During that last 9-second period of the flight, the airplane’s groundspeed slowed from 99 kts to 88 kts, as it descended about 400 ft in a slight left turn to impact (the airplane’s minimum controllable airspeed was 92 kts). The slowing left turn, in conjunction with left wing low impact signatures observed at the accident site were consistent with a loss of control just prior to impact. Postaccident teardown examination of the left engine revealed that the 1st stage turbine rotor had one blade separated at the midspan. The blade fracture surface had varying levels of oxidation and the investigation could not determine if the 1st stage turbine blade separation occurred during the accident flight or a prior flight. The 2nd stage turbine was operating at temperatures higher than the 1st stage turbine, which was consistent with engine degradation over a period of time. Additionally, the 2nd stage turbine stator assembly was missing vane material from the 6 to 12 o’clock positions, consistent with thermal damage. All of these findings would have resulted in reduced performance of the left engine, but not a total loss of left engine power. The teardown examination of the right engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of both propellers revealed that all blade angles were mid-range and exhibited evidence of little to no powered rotation. Neither propeller was in a feathered position, as instructed by the pilot operating handbook for an engine failure. If the pilot had perceived that the left engine had failed, and had he secured the engine and feathered its propeller (both being accomplished by pulling the red Engine Stop and Feather Control handle) and increased power on the right engine, the airplane’s performance should have been sufficient for the pilot to complete the landing on the runway.

The pilot was conducting a solo night cross-country flight in low visibility through mountainous terrain. The pilot was then cleared by an air traffic controller to conduct a RNAV (GPS)-E instrument approach into the destination airport. After passing the final approach fix and before the missed approach point, the pilot, for an unknown reason, executed a left turn, consistent with the missed approach procedure. During the turn toward the holding waypoint, the airplane did not climb. Shortly thereafter, the airplane impacted steep rising terrain The local weather at the time of the accident indicated a cloud ceiling of 1,200 ft above ground level and 1 statute mile visibility, which was below the weather minimums for the approach. Data retrieved from the onboard avionics revealed that although the pilot flew the published route in accordance with the instrument approach procedure, the minimum required altitudes were not adhered to. A review of the ForeFlight weather briefing data indicated that a route weather briefing had been generated by the pilot with the filing of the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. While no weather imagery was reviewed during the period, the pilot had checked METARs for the destination and another nearby airport before departure and viewed the RNAV (GPS)-E approach procedure at the destination airport. A review of the data that was presented to the pilot indicated that visual flight rules conditions prevailed at the destination with light snow in the vicinity at the time it was generated. Based on the preflight weather briefing the pilot obtained, he was likely unaware of the IFR conditions and below minimum weather conditions at the destination until he descended into the area and obtained the current local weather during the flight. It is probable that, based upon the weather and flight track information, as the pilot was on the instrument approach, he became aware of the below minimum weather conditions and elected to initiate the missed approach, as evident by the turn away from the airport similar to the missed approach procedure and the flaps and landing gear being in transition. This investigation was unable to determine why the missed approach procedure was prematurely initiated and why the airplane failed to climb. Additionally, there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies found during a postaccident examination that would have precluded normal operation.

The airplane was departing into instrument meteorological conditions using a standard instrument departure. The takeoff instructions consisted of making a climbing right turn direct to a nondirectional beacon. After departing, the pilot made a radio communication to an air traffic controller asking if he will tell him when to turn. The controller replied that he would not be calling his turn and that the pilot should fly the departure as published making a climbing right turn to overfly the approach end of the runway. The pilot acknowledged the communication, which was his last transmission. The airplane made a 360° turn and descended below the cloud layer. The airplane then climbed back into the cloud layer and made an inverted loop, descending into the ground in a near-vertical attitude. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. Recorded audio of the airplane before the accident was consistent with the engines operating. The signatures on both propellers were consistent with one another and consistent with the engines operating at a similar rpm. The pilot was qualified and recently underwent recurrent training. The reasons the pilot became spatially disoriented could not definitely determined. The pilot left the anti-collision lights on while in the clouds, which may have resulted in him having flicker vertigo.