Santee-Gillespie Field

Earlier on the day of the accident, the flight crew had conducted a patient transfer from a remote airport to another nearby airport. Following the patient transfer, the flight crew departed under night conditions to return to their home base. Review of air traffic control (ATC) communication, as well as cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings, showed that the flight crew initially was cleared on the RNAV (GPS) runway 17 instrument approach. The approach plate for the instrument approach stated that circling to runway 27R and 35 was not authorized at night. Following the approach clearance, the flight crew discussed their intent to cancel the approach and circle to land on runway 27R. Additionally, the flight crew discussed with each other if they could see the runway. Once the flight crew established visual contact with the runway, they requested to squawk VFR, then the controller cleared them to land on runway 17. The flight crew then requested to land on runway 27. The controller asked the pilot if they wanted to cancel their instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan, to which the pilot replied, “yes sir.” The controller acknowledged that the IFR cancellation was received and instructed the pilot to overfly the field and enter left traffic for runway 27R and cleared them to land. Shortly after, the flight crew asked the controller if the runway lights for runway 27R could be increased; however, the controller informed them that the lights were already at 100 percent. Just before the controller’s response, the copilot, who was the pilot flying, then asked the captain “where is the runway.” As the flight crew maneuvered to a downwind leg, the captain told the copilot not to go any lower; the copilot requested that the captain tell him when to turn left. The captain told him to turn left about 10 seconds later. The copilot stated, “I see that little mountain, okay” followed by both the captain and co-pilot saying, “woah woah woah, speed, speed” 3 seconds later. During the following 5 seconds, the captain and copilot both stated, “go around the mountain” followed by the captain saying, “this is dicey” and the co-pilot responding, “yeah it’s very dicey.” Shortly after, the captain told the copilot “here let me take it on this turn” followed by the co-pilot saying, “yes, you fly.” The captain asked the copilot to watch his speed, and the copilot agreed. About 1 second later, the copilot stated, “speed speed speed, more more, more more, faster, faster… .” Soon after, the CVR indicated that the airplane impacted the terrain. Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that at the time the flight crew reported the runway in sight, they were about 360 ft below the instrument approach minimum descent altitude (MDA), and upon crossing the published missed approach point they were 660 ft below the MDA. The data showed that the flight overflew the destination airport at an altitude of about 775 ft mean sea level (msl), or 407 ft above ground level (agl), and entered a left downwind for runway 27R. While on the downwind leg, the airplane descended to an altitude of 700 ft msl, then ascended to an altitude of 950 ft msl while on the base leg. The last recorded ADS-B target was at an altitude of 875 ft msl, or about 295 ft agl.

The pilot was on a cross-country flight, receiving vectors for an instrument approach while in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The approach controller instructed the pilot to descend to 2,800 ft mean sea level (msl) until established on the localizer, and subsequently cleared the flight for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 28R, then circle to land on runway 23. About 1 minute later, the controller told the pilot that it looked like the airplane was drifting right of course and asked him if he was correcting back on course. The pilot responded “correcting, 22G.” About 9 seconds later, the pilot transmitted “SoCal, is 22G, VFR runway 23” to which the controller told the pilot that the airplane was not tracking on the localizer and subsequently canceled the approach clearance and instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 3,000 ft. As the pilot acknowledged the altitude assignment, the controller issued a low altitude alert, and provided the minimum vectoring altitude in the area. The pilot acknowledged the controller’s instructions shortly after. At this time, recorded advanced dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the airplane on a northwesterly heading at an altitude of 2,400 ft msl. Over the course of the following 2 minutes, the controller issued multiple instructions for the pilot to climb to 4,000 ft, which the pilot acknowledged; however, ADS-B data showed that the airplane remained between 2,500 ft and 3,500 ft. The controller queried the pilot about his altitude and the pilot responded, “2,500 ft, 22G.” The controller subsequently issued a low altitude alert and advised the pilot to expedite the climb to 5,000 ft. No further communication was received from the pilot despite multiple queries from the controller. ADS-B data showed that the airplane had begun to climb and reached a maximum altitude of 3,500 ft before it began a descending right turn. The airplane remained in the right descending turn at a descent rate of about 5,000 ft per minute until the last recorded target at 900 ft msl, located about 1,333 ft northwest of the accident site. The airplane and two houses were destroyed. The pilot and the driver of a UPS truck were killed. Two other people on the ground were injured.

Shortly after takeoff from Santee-Gillespie Field, while climbing, the twin engine airplane flew into clouds. The pilot lost control of the airplane that entered a dive and crashed in flames. Both occupants were killed.