United States of America

Aircraft was dispatched with inoperative airframe deice system, tho an operational deice system was required for flight in known icing conditions. During descent to land, aircraft encountered light icing conditions. Capt believed aircraft could 'handle it' and continued descent. As he began ILS final approach, he noted significant increase of ice accumulation and used higher than normal approach speed. As full (50°) flaps were set, aircraft began buffet and pitched nose down. Capt corrected with full back pressure on control column, but aircraft landed hard, gear collapsed and aircraft slid about 3,600 feet to a stop. No preimpact mechanical anomaly was found, except for inoperative deice system. Investigation revealed pilots had received printout of weather from company computer system with surface observation and terminal forecast, but no area forecast (FA). Pilots and ground personnel were not aware that FA was available at company weather terminal. FA forecasted light and occasional moderate rime and mixed icing in clouds and precipitation above freezing level. Weather deteriorated, but pilots did not require inflight weather info or pireps. Flight mnl noted tailplane ice may cause nose down trim change with flap extension. There was evidence of tail plane stall, lack of company training in cold weather operations, deficiencies in use of deicing systems, and lack of FAA surveillance.

The crew was completing a local training mission at Yakima-Vagabond AAF. On final approach, the crew shut down the left engine to simulate a failure when the aircraft rolled to the left, lost height and crashed about 500 yards short of runway threshold. Both pilots were injured.

While executing a VOR approach, on a dark, foggy night, depth perception and ground contact were lost when the landing lights were turned on short final. A hard landing resulted, before corrective action became effective, resulting in wing spar, engine mounting support and propeller damage. The runway, and entire airport was covered with about 3 inches of mirror smooth ice, causing considerable glare. All four occupants escaped uninjured.

The pilot reported that shortly after lifting off, the airplane began decelerating slowly. He thought the throttles had retarded; however, all of the engine instruments indicated takeoff power. Realizing that he could not return to the airport, the pilot selected a forced landing area and aimed the airplane between two trees. Investigation revealed that both props were at or near feather pitch angles at impact and being driven under power. Both engines had been changed immediately prior to the flight and both ground idle stops had been adjusted after the engine change with the left engine being slaved to the right. The system operated off of a squat switch on the right gear. Misriging of the right engine would be reflected in the left and allow oil pressure to be vented from the domes, which in turn would allow the propeller cylinder springs to drive the props toward feather as the right strut extended during takeoff. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured.

A pilot (whose instrument currency could not be determined) took off at night in IMC. Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft crashed about 1.5 mile from the departure end of the runway. There was evidence that it impacted in an 85° right bank, nose down attitude at high speed. No preimpact part failure was found during the investigation; however, during a pre-purchase inspection on 10/16/90, several discrepancies were noted. These included an inop flight director, an autopilot malfunction and a misrigged flight control system that allowed the control wheel to indicate a left turn when the aircraft was in level flight. There was no record of these being repaired. Records showed the pitot-static system was last tested on 3/24/88. The pilot was taking sine-aid and tylenol for a chronic sinus infection. Although tox checks indicated the presence of 50.7 ug/ml of pseudoephedrine and 36.4 ug/ml of acetaminophen in the pilot's urine, none was found in his blood. The sinus cond could have affected the pilot's balance and equilibrium. All six occupants were killed.

The flight departed Cold Bay for the approximately 15 minutes flight to False Pass. There are no weather reporting facilities at False Pass. Cold Bay weather was 4,500 feet overcast, light rain and fog; forecast called for frequent ceilings below 1,000 feet. Wreckage located between two mountains. False Pass weather estimated 400 feet overcast, 2-3 miles in rain and fog, winds 25-30 knots. Fishing boat captain in area estimated winds down the mountain at 60 mph or greater.

The air taxi cargo pilot crashed on a mountainside, about 7 miles from the airport, while on a VOR/DME instrument approach. Variable low ceilings and visibility had prevailed on the day of the accident. The pilot had had the flu for the preceding 2 weeks and was still taking medication. Sole on board, he was killed.

On December 3, 1990, at 1345 est, Northwest flight 1482, a DC-9 (N3313L), and Northwest flight 299, a Boeing 727 (N278US), collided near the intersection of runway 09/27 and 03C/21C in dense fog at Detriot-Metropolitan-Wayne County Airport, MI. At the time of the collision, the B-727 was on its takeoff roll, and the DC-9 had just taxied onto the active runway. The B-727 was substantially damaged, and the DC-9 was destroyed. Seven of the 40 passengers and 1 crew member aboard the DC-9 received fatal injuries. None of the 146 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard the B-727 were injured.

As the flight was approaching the destination, at night, the pilot obtained vectors for a descent over mountainous terrain. During the approach, he cancelled the IFR flight plan and the aircraft descended below radar coverage. Subsequently, the aircraft crashed in mountainous terrain, northwest of the destination airport. Impact occurred in a wooded area at an elevation of about 2,700 feet. The ELT did not activate during the accident. A search was initiated on 12/1/90, but the aircraft and surviving passenger were not found until the next day. The Canadian ATP pilot and other four passengers were fatally injured. After initial impact with trees, the main portion of the fuselage traveled about 1,000 feet before coming to rest. No preimpact mechanical problem was found.

During a cross country flight, the pilot failed to plan for the effects of known adverse weather, including strong winds aloft and mountain wave activity. The pilot overflew several possible fuel stops, continuing on toward the destination until the fuel was exhausted. The airplane collided with heavily wooded terrain after the loss of power to both engines.