Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 690A in Norfolk: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jul 30, 1993 at 1700 LT
Registration:
N707BP
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Mountain Home - Norfolk
MSN:
690-11326
YOM:
1976
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
17770
Captain / Total hours on type:
414.00
Circumstances:
The Rockwell 690A, N707BP, was flying a straight-in entry to a downwind leg for runway 19 at the non-controlled airport. The only radio call heard from the Rockwell was a request for an airport advisory when it was about 20 miles southeast. The Piper PA-28R, N33056, had departed from runway 19. No radio calls were heard from the Piper. Witnesses observed the Rockwell heading north and the Piper heading east moments before the collision. The witnesses stated the Piper pitched up and banked steeply moments before the collision. The collision occurred approximately 2 miles east-southeast of the airport. On-scene investigation showed that the Piper's left main landing gear tire had made an imprint on the bottom of the Rockwell's outboard left wing. Paint color from the Rockwell had transferred to the Piper's left wing skin. All six people in both aircraft were killed.
Probable cause:
The failure of the pilots of the Rockwell 690A, N707BP, and the Piper PA28R, N33056, to see and avoid each other. A factor which contributed to the accident was the failure of both pilot's to follow recommended communication procedures contained in the airman's information manual for operating at an airport without an operating control tower.
Final Report:

Crash of a Convair CV-240 in Boise

Date & Time: Jul 27, 1993 at 1317 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N156PA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Boise - Boise
MSN:
324
YOM:
1953
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2128
Captain / Total hours on type:
1400.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1
Circumstances:
Left seat pilot was receiving a flight check for ATP and CV-240 type rating; right seat pilot was FAA OPS inspector. Following a simulated single-engine approach the airplane landed wheels up. Left seat pilot had received a total of 1.4 hrs left seat training in CV-240 prior to this flight; log book not endorsed.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to extend the landing gear, and the check pilot's inadequate supervision. A factor in the accident was the pilot's inadequate upgrade training by the company.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-100ER in Byers: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 26, 1993 at 1352 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FCRJ
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Wichita - Wichita
MSN:
7001
YOM:
1991
Location:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
3836
Captain / Total hours on type:
875.00
Aircraft flight hours:
771
Aircraft flight cycles:
800
Circumstances:
The crew was performing a lateral and directional stability test. Changes from earlier tests combined new leading edge fairing, new flap setting, lower reference airspeed, and trial settings for the stall protection system (shaker and pusher). Engineers had briefed the crew data would be sufficient if the steady heading sideslip (shss) maneuver ended at a 15° sideslip, or at onset of stall warning; crew agreed to end at stall warning. During the test the capt continued past stall warning to 21° sideslip at full rudder. The airplane rolled rapidly through 360 deg° and entered a deep stall. The copilot attempted to deploy the anti-spin chute. However, all the chute system cockpit switches were not properly preset; instead of assisting recovery, the chute parted from the airplane. Full control was not regained before impact. The chute system design allowed deployment of the chute even when the hyd lock switch was in the unlocked position and the hooks clasping the chute shackle to the airframe were open. System tested ok before flight. All three crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
The captain's failure to adhere to the agreed upon flight test plan for ending the test maneuver at the onset of prestall stick shaker, and the flightcrew's failure to assure that all required switches were properly positioned for anti-spin chute deployment. A factor which contributed to the accident was the inadequate design of the anti-spin chute system which allowed deployment of the chute with the hydraulic lock switch in the unlocked position. (When in the unlocked position, the hooks clasping the chute shackle to the airframe are open).
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Fairfield

Date & Time: Jul 16, 1993 at 1405 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N75CX
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hermiston – Fairfield
MSN:
P-337
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
1062
Captain / Total hours on type:
363.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2256
Circumstances:
On Friday afternoon, July 16, 1993, at 1405 mountain daylight time, a Beech B-60, N75CX, registered to the pilot, overran the end of the runway and impacted terrain while landing at the Camas County Airport, Fairfield, Idaho. An IFR flight plan was filed for the business flight, conducted under 14 CFR 91, which departed Hermiston, Oregon at 1244, July 16, 1993. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area. The private certificated pilot and passenger Peter W. VanKomen were seriously injured. Passenger Chris A. Carrow suffered minor injuries in the accident. The aircraft was destroyed in the mishap. There was no fire. Witnesses reported the pilot landed on runway 7, near the center of the 2950 feet long gravel airstrip and was unable to stop on the runway. The aircraft skidded off the east end of the runway where it impacted a ditch and dirt embankment. The Camas County Sheriff reported he examined the aircraft tire marks on the runway, which according to his measurement, started 1400 feet from the west end of the runway (See Sheriff Report). The sheriff indicated in his report that a witness, Bill Simon, stated in an interview that the pilot landed in downwind conditions, estimated to be 15 to 20 knots. Witness David Coffin, a private pilot, reported the two wind socks on the strip were fully extended, indicating the wind was blowing from west to east at a velocity in excess of 25 MPH, and gusting 30 to 35 MPH. The surface aviation weather observation, taken at Hailey, Idaho, 24 miles northeast of the accident site at 1350 MDT, July 16, 1993, was recorded as 3000 feet scattered clouds, visibility 30 miles, temperature 65 degrees F., dew point 29 degrees F., wind 210 degrees at 10 knots and altimeter 30.05 inches Hg. The density altitude at the Camas County Airport was calculated to be 6488 feet. The airport facility directory indicates the Camas County Airport has a single 2950 by 40 feet dirt runway, oriented 070 and 250 degrees. The elevation at the airport is 5058 feet above mean sea level.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper inflt planning/decision in selecting the wrong runway for landing. A factor relating to the accident was the strong tailwind weather conditions.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 402C in Las Vegas: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 12, 1993 at 1440 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N818AN
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Las Vegas – Grand Canyon
MSN:
402C-0324
YOM:
1980
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
4120
Captain / Total hours on type:
568.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11513
Circumstances:
The pilot had a 25 minutes turnaround for the accident trip from the prior flight. No witnesses were found who observed the pilot preparing for the flight or performing a preflight inspection. Company procedures specify that the pilots are responsible for loading and unloading the baggage. The manifest for the prior flight showed 54 lbs of baggage in the nose compartment. Shortly after liftoff, the pilot told the local controller that the baggage door was open and he requested a 'go around.' The local controller told the pilot to make right traffic. Multiple witnesses saw the airplane in a nose high attitude during the initial climb after takeoff. They reported the pilot entered a right turn which continued until the airplane 'fell to the ground and hit nose first.' An airline pilot witness said that the airplane's actions were a 'classic VMC roll.' Other witnesses reported that the left nose baggage compartment door was open during the takeoff and initial climb. Evidence shows that the right eng was developing little or no power. All three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed while maneuvering in the traffic pattern. A factor which contributed to the accident was the pilot's failure to assure that the nose baggage compartment door was secured.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna T303 Crusader in Prescott: 5 killed

Date & Time: Jul 4, 1993 at 0320 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N9667C
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Prescott - Prescott
MSN:
303-00200
YOM:
1982
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
550
Captain / Total hours on type:
40.00
Aircraft flight hours:
3123
Circumstances:
On July 4, 1993, about 0320 hours mountain standard time, a Cessna T303, N9667C, collided with terrain about 2,000 feet short of the approach end of runway 21 at Ernest A. Love Field in
Prescott, Arizona. The airplane was destroyed. The commercial pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was being operated as a personal flight. The local flight departed Love Field about two minutes before the accident. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. The accident airplane arrived at Love Field about 2300 hours on July 3, 1994. An airport operations specialist employed by the City of Prescott greeted the airplane to see if the pilot needed fuel. Three males got out of the airplane, one of which was carrying a can of beer. One occupant of the airplane replied to the operations specialist fuel inquiry and stated, "Not right now, maybe later or in the morning." The operations specialist asked the three men if they had a place to stay and they indicated they were meeting friends. The night manager of the Airport Centre Motel, located off the west boundary of Love Field, noticed the three men walking from the airport 2330 hours on July 3, 1994. The motel manager stated all three men were drinking beverages from cans. The manager was unable to state the type of beverages they were drinking. At 2300 hours, July 3, 1994, the girl friend of one of the airplane's passengers received a call from her boy friend requesting a ride from Love Field to "downtown" Prescott. The girlfriend met her boy friend with two other friends. According to the girl friend, all three men were holding beer cans. The girl friend dropped the men off in the downtown area with plans to meet later. Approximately 0100 hours July 4, 1993, three females were leaving the Palace Saloon in downtown Prescott. The women were approached by three men on the sidewalk. One of the men identified himself as a pilot to the women. One of the women did not believe him and being associated with pilots in the past she asked him, "How many hours do you need [from] bottle to throttle?" The pilot responded, "Eight, but I guess I will have to break that rule tonight." The six walked on the sidewalk continuing the conversations. The woman who previously challenged the pilot walked along side him. She described him as quiet, friendly, not intoxicated, and at one point apologetic for being quiet. The pilot expounded on his quietness by stating he was very tired, and that he had been in Laughlin, Nevada, the night before, worked all day, rented the airplane, and then flew to Prescott. As the evening progressed, the group went to a restaurant, ate, and walked to the women's hotel. The men solicited a ride to the airport and the women agreed. During the ride to the airport, two of the men were talkative but the pilot remained quiet. The pilot was observed closing his eyes with his head back. The group arrived at the airport about 0245 hours. The men offered to show the women the airplane. The pilot opened the airplane and moved into the cockpit. The woman, who earlier challenged the pilot, asked one of the other men, "Why is the pilot so quiet, is he drunk?" The other man said, "No, he only had a few drinks." The woman then heard the pilot and the other man talking in the cockpit. The pilot was trying to turn on the pilot-controlled airport lighting. The woman heard the other man tell the pilot to "stop clicking the button so many times, and that it was supposed to be three clicks and then stop." The men then offered the women a 10-minute ride in the airplane. The woman who earlier challenged the pilot refused. Her two friends accepted and got into the airplane and she went back to their vehicle and waited. At 0254 hours, the pilot contacted the Prescott Flight Service Station (FSS) on frequency 122.4 Mhz and asked about the pilot- controlled lighting system. The pilot indicated that he tried to activate the lights but was unsuccessful. After consulting the Airport/Facility Directory, the air traffic control (ATC) specialist informed the pilot the lights were pilot activated on frequency 125.3 Mhz. The ATC specialist then heard seven "clicks" on 122.4 Mhz. He advised the pilot that he was still on 122.4 Mhz. The pilot replied, "Thank you, sir, we got 'em." At 0259 hours, the ATC specialist asked the pilot if he needed any further assistance. The pilot indicated that further assistance was not needed. The ATC specialist then issued the Prescott altimeter setting, 29.92 inHg, and asked the pilot if he had the flight precaution for turbulence. The pilot responded he did not. The ATC specialist issued AIRMET Tango for occasional moderate turbulence below 20,000 feet. The pilot then acknowledged he had received it. There were no further communications between the pilot and the Federal Aviation Administration ATC specialist. FAA radar data from Albuquerque Center tracked a single aircraft in the Love Field traffic pattern at 0319 hours. The radar data listed ten positions corresponding to right traffic off runway 21. The radar data indicates the tracked airplane reached an altitude of 6,500 feet mean sea level (msl), or about 1,500 feet above the ground.
Probable cause:
The pilot misjudging distance and altitude during a night approach. Factors which contributed to the accident were: the pilot's impairment due to fatigue exacerbated by alcohol consumption, the dark night, and the high density altitude and turbulent weather condition.
Final Report:

Crash of a Grumman TS-2A Tracker in Columbia: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 19, 1993
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N427DF
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
MSN:
550
YOM:
1958
Flight number:
Tanker 92
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The pilot, sole on board, was fighting a forest fire in the region of Columbia, California. The aircraft made a stable and level approach to the drop zone. After the retardant was dropped on fire, the pilot initiated a climb when the aircraft impacted trees, rolled to the left and crashed in an inverted position. The pilot was killed.

Crash of a Cessna 421B Golden Eagle II in Gadsden

Date & Time: Jun 10, 1993 at 1727 LT
Registration:
N699DT
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Gadsden - Huntsville
MSN:
421B-0540
YOM:
1973
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
15500
Captain / Total hours on type:
300.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4430
Circumstances:
The airline transport pilot reported that shortly after takeoff from runway 36, he heard a loud noise from the left engine area, and observed smoke trailing the left engine nacelle. He confirmed that the left engine was losing power, and he feathered the left propeller. He was unable to maintain altitude, and the aircraft was force landed on wooded terrain. The aircraft caught fire on the ground after colliding with trees and was destroyed. An inspection of the left engine turbocharger revealed that the rotor shaft was seized, with evidence of metal transfer to the bearing journals.
Probable cause:
The failure of the left engine turbocharger due to rotor shaft seizure, which resulted in a loss of engine power.

Crash of a Beechcraft E18S in Detroit: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jun 8, 1993 at 0502 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N51FG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Detroit - Louisville
MSN:
BA-324
YOM:
1957
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
1700
Captain / Total hours on type:
27.00
Aircraft flight hours:
11916
Circumstances:
The pilot was conducting his initial revenue and solo flight for this company, in this type of airplane. The weather for takeoff included fog and low ceilings. The airplane was equipped with a primary (left) attitude indicator which was electrically operated via an independent switch. This aircraft was the only such airplane operated by this company, with an independent switch configuration for the primary attitude indicator. The airplane collided with the terrain on the airport, just after takeoff. Subsequent examination revealed no anomalies with the engines or airframe. The primary attitude indicator was located. On examination it was found to have a malfunctioning on/off flag which gave the indication of being operative regardless of power to the unit. No rotational damage was noted within the gyro housing. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command's inadequate preflight preparation, false indication (on/off) of attitude indicator, and attitude indicator switched off. Factors were fog, low ceiling, the pilot-in-command's improper use of the attitude indicator, and his lack of total experience in the type of airplane.
Final Report: